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Note that a final chapter entitled “Seizing sentiments and Mixing Feelings” has been omitted 
from the thesis due to space restrictions. The chapter now appears as an appendix to the thesis. 
Focusing on the on the role of things in sentimental constructions of sympathy, the section 
includes analyses of selected passages from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759) and Laurence Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (1768) as well 
as from from late eighteenth-century it-narratives. Occasional references to these works and the 
contents of this chapter that occur in the thesis will be marked by an asterisk (*).  
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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the representation of personhood and property in eighteenth-century satiric 
literature. Theoretically the thesis pits the thing theories of Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour and 
Jacques Derrida against Marxist theory of alienation and fetishization of commodities so prevalent 
in treatments of possessive individualism that favour the subject. The main tenet of the thesis is that 
the literary constructions of proprietorship rehearse philosophical, scientific and legal tensions 
between aggregate and unitary notions of personhood. Although embedded in different discursive 
practices, what characterizes the literary satiric avatars of eighteenth-century possessive personhood 
are their aggregate nature, their tendency to fall to bits with the loss of their properties and their 
precarious position as assembled fictions or material compositions. 
 The dual status of personal effects as both illusory surfaces and material possessions is 
explored in analytical discussions of satiric literature ranging from The Memoirs of the 
Extraordinary Life, Works and Discoveries of Martinus Scriblerus (1741) though Jonathan Swift’s 
dressing room poems and satirical dressings and undressings in Mary Evelyn’s Mundus Muliebris 
and Alexander Pope’s The Rape of the Lock (1712;  1714) to it-narratives such as The Adventures of 
a Quire of Paper (1779). Revisionist readings of contemporary notions property and personhood in 
- among others - John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Edward Young’s 
Conjectures on Original Composition (1758) are used as points of departure in uncovering the 
pressures exerted on unitary constructions proprietorship satiric versions of the aggregate self.  
 The analytical bulk of the thesis falls into two parts. The first part centres on the 
impasses inherent in Locke’s concept of property in the person as these surface in the debate on 
luxuries and necessities taken up by early eighteenth-century divestmental satires and dressing room 
poems and brought to bear on the discussion of the poetical device of hypotyposis. The second part 
of the thesis considers the role played by versions of aggregate personhood in legal and literary 
debates on the nature of authorship that anticipated the legal establishment of copyright. Stressing 
the nature of books as compound works, material as well as ideational compilations, satires on 
authorial writing question the partition between disembodied originality and material concretion 
that guarantees the indivisibility of authorial possession his work. As is evident from the appendix*, 
these finding are supported by the role of personal property in satires on sensibility in the second 
half of the century. Thus, the early eighteenth-century waywardness of personal property might be 
retraced in in the degree to which things resist possession even within the strictures of ownership by 
turning to literary constructions of sympathy in the sentimental barter of personal effects. Following 
this, a reading Laurence Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy (1768) as a 
parody of the sentimental entanglement of porous selves and vital matters supports the conclusion 
that the satiric enactment of sensibility figures sympathy less as the deliberately staged substitutions 
of pictorial imagination than as the scandalous outburst of passion that arises in the unexpected 
physical encounter with things.  
The thesis ends by calling for a complication of theories of the Enlightenment that fail 
to recognize the acute awareness in eighteenth-century literary discourse of the complicity of self-
ownership and fetishism. Thus, satires of possessive individuality indicate that the ubiquitous 
consumerism identified by twentieth century philosophy as one of the primary ills passed on by 
Enlightenment to modernity are not only produced but also thematized in the eighteenth century.  
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Resumé 
 
Afhandlingen undersøger fremstillingen af forholdet mellem personlig identitet og ejerskab 
("personhood and property") i britiske satirer fra 1700-tallet. I projektets teoretiske ramme modstilles 
Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour og Jacques Derridas teorier om tingen som filosofisk begreb og den 
Marxistiske teori om fremmedgørelse og varefetishisme, der hidtil har været bærende i den litterære 
behandling af ejerskabsfunderet individualisme ("possessive individualism") til fordel for en 
filosofisk forståelse af tingslighed, der undgår en simpel dikotomi mellem subjekt og objekt. 
Afhandlingens hovedpåstand er, at litterære konstruktioner af ejerskab afspejler filosofiske, 
videnskabelige og juridiske spændinger mellem en opfattelse af individet som henholdsvist en enhed 
og en samling af forskellige egenskaber og ejendele. På trods af indlejringen i forskellige diskursive 
praksisser, finder de satiriske versioner af det ejerskabsfunderede selv en fællesnævner i 
fremstillingen af individets sammensatte natur, dets tendens til at falde fra hinanden gennem tabet af 
ejendele og dets grænsestatus som sammensat fiktion eller materiel sammenstykning. 
 Den tvetydige forståelse af personlige effekter som både illusoriske overflader og 
materielle ejendele bliver undersøgt i den analytiske behandling af satirisk litteratur fra The Memoirs 
of the Extraordinary Life, Works and Discoveries of Martinus Scriblerus (1741), Jonathan Swifts 
digte om kvinders aften- og morgentoilette, samt lignende satiriske af- og påklædningsscener i Mary 
Evelyns Mundus Muliebris (1690) og Alexander Popes The Rape of the Lock (1712;1714) til 
tingsfortællinger som The Adventures of a Quire of Paper (1779). Med udgangspunkt i 
revisionistiske læsninger af datidige forestillinger om ejendele og personlig identitet i blandt andre 
John Lockes Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) og Edward Youngs Conjectures on 
Original Composition (1758) afdækkes det pres, som enhedssøgende konstruktioner af ejerskab og 
identitet udsættes for i satiriske versioner af det sammensatte selv.    
 Afhandlingens analytiske hovedsektion er todelt. Første del koncentrerer sig om de 
blindgyder, der er indbygget i Lockes begreb om selvejerskab som disse kommer til udtryk i debatten 
om forholdet mellem luksus og fornødenheder, der i det tidlige 1700-tal tages op i satiriske 
skildringer af af- og påklædningssituationer, og som senere gør sig gældende i diskussionen om 
hypotyposis som lyrisk greb. Anden del af afhandlingen overvejer den rolle, som det sammensatte 
selv spiller i de juridiske og litterære diskussioner af forfatterskabets natur, der foregriber den 
juridiske indstiftelse af forfatterens ophavsrettigheder. Ved at understrege bogens sammensatte natur, 
som materielle såvel som idémæssige kompilationer, stiller satiriske fremstillinger af 
forfattervirksomheden spørgsmålstegn ved opdelingen mellem ulegemliggjort originalitet og materiel 
medialisering, der garanterer forfatterens udelelige ejerskab over det skrevne. Som det fremgår af 
afhandlingens appendiks*, understøttes disse resultater af den rolle personlige ejendele spiller i 
satiriske fremstillinger af følsomhedskulturen i anden halvdel af århundredet. Således kan man 
genfinde det tidlige 1700-tals betoning af lunefuld uberegnelighed i det personlige ejerskabsforhold i 
den grad ting modsætter sig besiddelse selv inden for ejerskabets begrænsninger ved at undersøge 
litterære konstruktioner af sympati i sentimentale udvekslinger af personlige ejendele i 
følsomhedskulturens satiriske litteratur. Hvis man læser Sternes A Sentimental Journey Through 
France and Italy (1768) som en parodi på den sentimentale sammenfiltring af , kan det konkluderes, 
at den satiriske fremstilling af følsomhedskulturen afbilleder sympati mere som et skandaløst udbrud 
af affekt, der opstår i et uventet møde med tingene, end som fantasiens bevidst iscenesatte billedlige 
ombytninger.  
 Afhandlingens konklusion opfordrer til en nuancering af teorier om oplysningstiden, 
der ikke af anerkender den gennemgående bevidsthed i 1700-tallets litterære diskurs om forbindelsen 
mellem selvejerskab og fetichisme. Således vidner satiriske fremstillinger af ejendomsfunderet 
individualitet om, at den allestedsnærværende forbrugerisme, som blev identificeret af det tyvende 
århundredes filosofi som det største onde videregivet af oplysningstiden til moderniteten ikke alene 
produceres men også tematiseres i 1700-tallets egen litteratur.
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I. Introduction 
 
i. A Thing or Two on Theory 
 
“…we must always move in the between, between man and thing” 
Martin Heidegger. What is a Thing? (1935-36) 
 
 
One of the most amusing pleas for the centrality of the thing in twentieth-century counter-
Enlightenment thinking appears at the beginning of Martin Heidegger’s What is a Thing? (1935-
36). Heidegger retells an anecdote from Plato’s Theaetetus:   
 
The story is that Thales, while occupied in studying the 
heavens above and looking up, fell into a well. A good-
looking and whimsical maid from Thrace laughed at him 
and told him that while he might passionately want to know 
all things in the universe, the things in front of his very 
nose and feet were unseen by him. (3) 
 
The point is not just that the philosopher has let the things that matter fade away, while in search of 
better things to think about, but that things themselves elude philosophizing exactly because of their 
proximity. Heidegger points out that things are not only the specific animate and inanimate material 
entities that first come to mind – a watch, a cup, a flower, a bird – but also anything “that is a 
something (ein Etwas) and not nothing” (7). “Thing” is the universal name for all that is, but it is 
also the preferred term for the "something" that cannot go by any other name. Conjuring up the 
imponderable, “thing” is the name we give to the discrete yet unspecifiable entity, a mark of the 
failure to categorize and classify what is nevertheless right in front of us: behold the thingamajig.  
Perhaps that is why things seem to take us by surprise, emerging in the kind of 
suddenness that always accompanies a falter. It is only when we lose our footing, in that jolt of 
apprehension (not quite Angst but perhaps Ängstlichkeit) that makes us flinch when we stumble 
over an obstacle that cannot be cleared, that we spot the thing that was already there at the periphery 
of our vision. This is the scandal of the thing, or rather the thing as skandalon. Things are most 
visible when we unexpectedly bump into them, because they are out of place, or – as Heidegger 
suggests elsewhere – in situations of instrumental breakdown when they are stripped of their 
everyday functionality (Being 103, 105). Things seem to matter most at the moments when their 
destined trajectory is interrupted, or the purpose we have imposed upon them suspended – when the 
toaster is broken: “[W]hat cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipmental Thing 
which looks so and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been 
present at hand too” (Being 103). When things no longer serve their ends, when they have become 
immobile, inert and “just lie there”, they suddenly take on a different kind of vitality, disclosing 
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themselves “as they are…‘in themselves’” (Being 122).1  Detached from our usual practices, things 
come into their own.2  
 Things mark the breakdown in the ordering schemata of “instrumental rationality” that 
have been the modern heritage of the Enlightenment. Even when we limit the term to material 
entities, excluding things like human practices and actions,3 “things” remain irreducible to objects. 
In “The Thing” (1951-52) Heidegger opposes things to objects: things move in a dimension that lies 
between what he considers a reductive opposition of subject and object.  Heidegger invokes the old 
Germanic sense of “a thing” as “a gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion” (174). 
While objects stand as the already given unalterable unities that we represent (vor-stellen), things 
are quasi-animated forms that we can only apprehend (vernehmen). Objects are made to form 
categories and separate the world into the discrete, unalterable, tabular cells that can “stand side by 
side singly” (180), while everything that is “[n]estling, malleable, pliant, compliant, nimble” (180) 
gathers in the circling (gering) of things. The “annihilation of the thing” (168) can only be reversed 
by abandoning the type of thinking that remains within the “precincts of representational thinking” 
in favour of the type of thinking that occur as a “co-responding” (179) which refrains from turning 
things into objects and people into subjects. Insofar as the thing names the dynamism of the 
material entity, its tendency to abandon its over-againstness (Gegenständlichkeit) in relation to 
those who attempt to apprehend it in favour of more volatile positions in spaces that are not quite its 
own, it comes to mark a certain slippage between the object and the subject. Where things are, in 
the permutations between the indurations of the object, the boundaries between the subject and the 
object, the interior and the exterior, the inanimate and the animate fluctuate. We can only begin to 
apprehend the things that surround us once we begin to think without insisting on the cogito, the 
thinking subject unencumbered by things, as the grounds for the presencing of the world. In other 
words, Heidegger suggests that thinging and thinking are not only parallel but interlinked processes. 
We are, insists Heidegger, “in the strict sense of the German word bedingt, we are the be-thinged, 
the conditioned ones” (178). 
 In the insistent rejection of the object-subject dichotomy and his identification of a 
type of agency - or at least movement - in nonhuman gatherings, Heidegger's things resemble the 
nonhuman “hybrids” or  - in a term borrowed from Michel Serres – “quasiobjects” that arise within 
the “actor-networks” or “collectives” more recently promoted by philosopher and sociologist of 
science, Bruno Latour.4 Although Latour accuses Heidegger of falling into the metaphysical well he 
purports to pass over, thereby overlooking the things right in front of him, while fixing his eyes at 
                                                 
1 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa have argued that Heidegger's description of an instrumental breakdown 
provides a (partial) model for "practices for making sense of entities as independent of those very practices" (Dreyfus 
and Spinosa 54). It is suggested that we should consider the sudden unconcealment of the bare “occurrentness” 
(Vorhandenheit) of things produced by equipmental malfunction as an example of a more general strategy of 
defamiliarization or decontextualisation, which enables us to “cope with things in themselves”. For a critique of 
Dreyfus and Spinosa's argument, see T. L. S. Sprigge.  
2 Latour also points to the breakdowns in his “list of situations where an object's activity is made easily visible”: “The 
third type of occasion is that offered by accidents, breakdowns, and strikes: all of a sudden, completely silent 
intermediaries become full-blown mediators; even objects, which a minute before appeared fully automatic, 
autonomous, and devoid of human agency, are now made of crowds frantically moving humans with heavy equipment.” 
Latour, however, also points to the possibility of theoritical and historical attention as well as fictinoalization as 
occasions that will make otherwise invisible things (the aggregates of technology he elsewhere calls “black boxes”) 
visible again (Reassembling 79-86). 
3 In What is a Thing? Heidegger lists one group of things which "includes also plans, decisions, reflections, loyalties, 
actions, historical things…" (6).  
4 As Edwin Sayes points out, Latour uses “actant”, “actor”, “entelechy”, “monad”, “hybrid” and “quasi-object” as terms 
without precise delimitation that serve “to signal dissatisfaction with the philosophical tradition in which an object is 
automatically place opposite a subject” (Sayes 136).  
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the distanced Thing (Being) above and beyond,5 his ontology draws on the same desire to “start 
from the vinculum itself, from passages and relations” that prove the world as one of “translation, 
substitution, delegation, passing” (We Have Never 129).6 Latour calls for a new sociology that will 
“study the production of humans and nonhumans simultaneously” (We Have Never 103) and 
recognize “nonhumans” not only as “intermediaries” that “transport meaning or force without 
transformation”, but as “mediators” that “transform, translate, distort, and modify meaning or the 
elements they are supposed to carry” (Reassembling 39).  Agency, Latour insists, “is simply not a 
property of humans but of an association of actants”: It is a mistake, or unfairness, that our 
headlines read ‘Man flies,’ ‘Woman goes into space.’ Flying is a property of entities that includes 
airports and planes, launch pads and ticket counters” (Pandora's 182). When “nonhumans” are 
recognized as transformative mediators, agency must necessarily be uncoupled from intentionality 
and subjectivity to allow for the “shades” of agency that emerge between “full causality and sheer 
inexistence” and to reveal how “things might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, 
influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on” (Reassembling 72). Rather than an inversion of 
agency from subjects to objects this is a dislocation of agency that allows us to retain a certain 
“uncertainty about action” (Reassembling 60) and opens up what might be recognized as room for 
interpretation. Latour himself points to fiction and theatricality when unfolding the metaphors 
implied by the word “actor”, a word that “like that of ‘person’, comes from the stage”:  
 
To use the word ‘actor’ means that it’s never clear who and 
what is acting since an actor on stage is never alone in 
acting. Play-acting puts us immediately into a thick 
imbroglio where the question of who is carrying out the 
action has become unfathomable. As soon as the play 
starts...nothing is certain: Is this for real? Is it fake? Does 
the audience’s reaction count? What about the lighting? 
                                                 
5 The central passage here is from Latour's work We Have Never Been Modern in which he explicitly attacks 
Heidegger's work as an (unwitting) extension of Kantianism: “But Heidegger is taken in as much as those naïve visitors, 
since he and his epigones do not expect to find Being except along the Black Forest Holzwege. Being cannot reside in 
technology – that pure Enframing (Zimmerman, 1990) of being [Ge-stell], that ineluctable fate [Geschick], that supreme 
danger [Gefahr]. They are not to be sought in science, either, since science has no other essence but that of 
technology…Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as pure 
'stock'. Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects, objects and discourse. Networks 
are full of Being. As for machines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, 
its incompleteness, its mark, its trace of Being?” (65) Latour's argument runs along the same lines as Adorno’s attack on 
Heidegger in Negative Dialectics (196). For more on this, see note 12. Although I find Latours philosophy alluring and 
his ebulliant vocabulary useful to the current project, I subscribe to the criticism of his reading of Heidegger's view on 
technology, put forth by critics such as Jeff Kochan, Søren Riis and Lynnette Khong. Latour not only misinterprets 
Heidegger’s view on technology (which does not amount to a one-sided rejection), but also uses the caricature of 
Heidegger’s view he constructs to veil obvious similarities between his own and Heidegger's position. Both Heidegger 
and Latour conceive the gathering of things/the assembling/sorting/mediation of collectives as the ground for history 
that somehow itself exists in a realm beyond history.  Thus, Latour insists that “[I]t is the sorting that makes the times, 
not the times that make the sorting” (We Have Never 74). Similarly, Heidegger construes the thinging of the thing as 
historicality as such, in the sense that, conceived as the oblivion of Being, the loss of the thing as thing in the object is 
the destining (Geschick) that, while preceding both, has moulded man. Jeff Kochan’s critique of the opacity of Latour’s 
concept of mediation points to this impasse, which is common to both philosophers: “One the one hand, Latour is 
committed to the fundamental historicity of all phenomena - everything comes into being through a historical process of 
mediation. On the other hand, he seems unwilling to allow any historicity with respect to the phenomenon of mediation 
itself - mediation is the agent of historical change but is not itself subject to historical change.”  For Heidegger’s view 
on technology, see Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954). 
6 In Reassembling the Social, Latour insists that “it is best to begin in the middle of things, in medias res” (27). 
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What is the backstage crew doing? Is the playwright’s 
message faithfully transported or hopelessly bungled? Is 
the character carried over? And if so, by what? What are 
the partners doing? Where is the prompter? (Reassembling 
46)7 
 
The actor is never a single individual endowed with subjective powers, it is always a specific 
aggregate of natural and artificial, human and nonhuman components. In the reality that the fiction 
of actors reveals, distinctions between objects as mute, inactive and “shapeless receptacles” (55) 
and subjects as “speaking and thinking” (60) manipulators fall away to reveal the magic of “the 
non-separability of quasi-objects, quasi-subjects” (139). 
 The recognition of a “Middle Kingdom” (We Have Never 79) in between the subject 
and object poles is enough to lift the “damning curse...cast unto things” that have made them 
“remain asleep like the servants of some enchanted castle” (Reassembling 79). It is a 
disenchantment that is not built on the oblivion of the "work of mediation" that otherwise 
characterizes modernity, which is instituted by silencing the work of nonhuman mediators so as to 
maintain the purity of the subject-object dichotomy. The result of this work of purification is a 
“luminous dawn” (We Have Never 35) that allows the moderns to “mobilize the world” (We Have 
Never 72), producing ever-more complex, yet unrecognized, mediators, mixing together “much 
greater masses of humans and nonhumans, without bracketing anything and without ruling out any 
combination” (We Have Never 41). However, the unchecked proliferation of hybrids comes about 
only because the moderns ignore the complexity and the composition of the gathering of things that 
make up our world: what is really an aggregate comes to appear as a “black box”, an impenetrable 
substance “counting for one, even if it is internally made of many parts” (Reassembling 39) whose 
presence8 can only be made felt again once it is recognized that “[e]verything happens in the 
middle” (We Have Never 37). There can be no true enlightenment in such black-boxing, only the 
eerie obscurity of “mute objects” (We Have Never 79) waiting to be delivered by those who have 
the audacity to invent the “specific tricks” that can “make them talk” (Assembling 79) again. 
                                                 
7 The quote is interesting not only because it exposes Latour’s view of aggregate agency, but also because it reveals his 
fascination with the kind of self-delusion (Marxist work of ideology) that he dismisses so categorically elsewhere in 
Reassembling the Social (117). Latour might argue that the passage is designed to show exactly why the distinction 
between fiction and reality does not call for analysis, as acting happens whether we believe in it or not (gods and door 
stoppers alike are actors) - in fact, he consistently labours to break the rule of representation by separating fiction and 
lying, construction and illusion: “To go from metaphysics to ontology is to raise again the question of what the real 
world is really like. As long as we remain in metaphysics, there is always the danger that deployment of the actors' 
worlds will remain too easy because they could be taken as so many representations of what the world, in the singular, 
is like.” (117). Yet his references to the “imbroglio” of deceptive appearances and the list of questions invite rather than 
preclude analysis. In a related passage, Latour uses marionette puppetry to describe the dislocation of agency: “So who 
is pulling the strings? Well, the puppets do in addition to their puppeteers. It does not mean that puppets are controlling 
their handlers - this would be simply reversing the order of causality - and of course no dialectic will do the trick either. 
It simply means that the interesting question at this point is not to decide who is acting and how but to shift from a 
certainty about action to an uncertainty about action - but to decide what is acting and how.” (60) Reminiscent of 
Heinrich von Kleist’s “On the Marionette Theater” (1811), the image works to produce rather than alleviate suspicions 
about the power of illusion.  
8 In “Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closer” (1988) Latour writes of the felt 
“presence” that is absent when mediators are allowed to “remain silent (black-boxed)” (369). In the idea of the 
disappearance and reappearance of presence, Latour approaches Heidegger's understanding of the presencing (Anwesen) 
of being.   
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 For both Heidegger and Latour, things/hybrids obtain their liberating powers against 
the background of a narrative of a history of forgetting,9 in which the Enlightenment figures as an 
inescapable eclipse in the historical residing of the thing as the dimension of intimate alterity 
between the subject and the object. At the apex of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant’s 
metaphysics stands as the assertion of a detached and self-grounding transcendental subject that 
leaves things homeless as abominations, fetishes in a disenchanted, spiritually impoverished world 
(Being 248-249; We Have Never 56-57).10 It is a narrative that has often been repeated in the 
modern critique of Enlightenment rationality. Thus while, like Latour, Theodor W. Adorno accuses 
Heidegger of falling prey to the metaphysics that is the object of his critique,11 he fundamentally 
agrees with him about his diagnosis of the ills passed on by the Enlightenment to modernity. What 
cannot survive the eighteenth-century unrelenting desire for objectivity is exactly the involvement 
of things, people and gods, that “manifold-simple gathering” making “earth and sky, divinities and 
mortals dwell together all at once” that Heidegger names the “thinging of the thing” (“The Thing” 
173, 173, 180). In what is perhaps the most influential description of the eighteenth century 
“awakening of the subject” (5), Max Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), 
the “extirpation” (2) of such human-material gatherings as superstitions is presented as the key to 
the  “disenchantment” (1)12 that is the victory of instrumental rationality: enlightenment depends on 
the eradication of the “power that springs from the dread of the fetish” (17) by the supplantation of 
the “multiplicity of mythical figures” with a “universal fungibility” (7). As people increase their 
                                                 
9 Latour insists that the “Modern Constitution” is not an illusion or a case of false consciousness: “But the relation 
between the work of purification adn that of mediation is not that of conscious and unconscious, formal and informal, 
language and practice, illusion and reality. I am not claiming that the moderns are unaware of what they do, I am simply 
saying what they do - innovate on a large scale in the production of hybrids...” (We Have Never 40). Yet, on the very 
next page Latour proceeds to point out a blind-spot at the core of modern self-perception: “The moderns think they have 
suceeded in such an expansion only because they have carefully separated Nature and Society (and bracketed God), 
whereas they have suceeded only because they have mixed together much greater masses of humans and nonhumans...” 
(41). Likewise, Latour is careful to point out that the moderns “credit only” the work of purification with their success. 
It is hard not to see these statements as involving a differentiation of levels of consciousness or knowledge; there are 
obviously some things the moderns are more aware of than others.  
10 Fashioning the history of metaphysics as the advancing domination of the object by the subject, Heidegger finds the 
Kant’s presupposition of the priority of the subject: “It seems as if Kant has given up the Cartesian approach of positing 
a subject one can come across in isolation. But only in semblance. That Kant demands any proof at all for the ‘Dasein 
of Things outside of me’ shows already that he takes the subject – the ‘in me’ as the starting-point for this problematic” 
(248). Heidegger’s relation to Kant is complex, but Kant’s inability to locate temporal finitude within the subject was 
one point on which they differed. For an account of Heidegger’s critique of Kant’s “anthropomorphism”, see 
Colebrook.  
11 In Negative Dialectics (1966) Adorno criticizes Heidegger for what he considers his "allergies to entity" (140), that is, 
his aversion to concrete, ontic analysis. Adorno’s charge is directed at what he considers Heidegger’s sacrifice of the 
“somatic moment” (193) to the “ideal of the ‘purity’ of Being” (74). Heidegger’s insistence that Being should “not bear 
the stigma of a reflecting intelligence” (81) returns it into the very “endogamy of consciousness” (191) he is so intent on 
avoiding. The suspension of the dialectic between the subject and the object, the (false) exit into that Thing that is 
“immediate and primary beyond subject and object” (106), elides “the nonidentical moments [that] show up as matter, 
or as inseparably fused with material things” (193). In his search for that third Thing capable of supplanting the 
dialectics of subject and object, Heidegger resorts to the veneration of a vacuous “primal word” (84), while his 
“philosophizing will go on as though about matters of substance” (74). Marked by unwitting abstraction, Heidegger’s 
anti-materialism “refuses to have the prima philosophia crassly compromised by the contingency of material things, by 
the transciency of the concretion originally promised” (75). What is left is “what the thinker would least like it to be: the  
monstrosity of a flatly abstract object” (110). 
12 Adorno and Horkheimer here borrow Max Weber's concept of Entzauberung as a corollary of modernity. Their 
concept of instrumental reason as a mark of modernity is likewise indebted to Weber’s concept of objectification or 
impersonalization, Versachlichung. For a short account of the uses of the concept of disenchantment in sociology, see 
Michel. 
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power by making “dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities” (2), things 
lose what is “non-exchangeable even in the exchange” (7).  
 The domination of objects by the “unity of the subject” (6) is bought at the cost of a 
new bewitchment caused by the compulsive adherence to "the objectification of mind" (21). 
Drawing on Karl Marx’s concept of alienation through the fetishization of commodities, Adorno 
and Horkheimer describe how eventually also “the economic apparatus endows commodities with 
the values which decide the behaviour of people” (21). It is against the background “that man 
attain[s] the identity of the self that cannot be lost in identification with the other but takes 
possession of itself once and for all as an impenetrable mask” (6). Crucially, the modern self comes 
into its own through an act of self-appropriation – an acquisitive objectification through which “the 
all-powerful self becomes a mere having, an abstract identity” (6). In this process Enlightenment 
turns against itself and succumbs to the fetishism it seeks to dispel, most spectacularly in the 
hypostatization of its own tools, the levelling instruments of objectification. What is not seen by the 
possessive, enlightened self is that “the split between subject and object, which it will not allow to 
be bridged, becomes the index of the untruth both of itself and of truth” (31). 
 The promise of Horkheimer and Adorno’s narrative is that of “a true praxis capable of 
overturning the status quo” (33) and thus effectuating the freedom of thought that the 
Enlightenment forfeited. The fulfilment of this promise “depends on theory’s refusal to yield to the 
oblivion in which society allows thought to ossify” (33).  At the centre of the narrative, then, is the 
location, the surveillance of a certain blindness, an oblivion13 within Enlightenment thinking itself. 
While this blindness alerts us of the darkness inscribed in the disenchantment of the world, it might 
also remind us of the power wielded in the very description that brings such darkness to light. As 
the authors themselves point out, the “proscribing of superstition has always signified not only the 
progress of domination but its exposure” (31). The risk of this knowledge is the exposition of the 
dialectic of Enlightenment itself as the result of a hypostatic hat-trick and the authors as skilful 
tricksters equipped by a magic powerful enough to conjure up the otherwise hidden movement and 
intentional malice hidden in the apotheosis of reason. In this reading of the work, the point at which 
the conceit of personification is substituted for an animistic anthropomorphism that one can believe 
in marks the fulfilment of the deception, the point at which “incantatory practices of the magician” 
(5) come to produce its own reality: “With the spread of the bourgeois commodity economy the 
dark horizon of myth is illuminated by the sun of calculating reason, beneath whose icy rays the 
seeds of the new barbarism are germinating” (25). In other words, in as much as the strength of 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s narrative relies on the privileged unveiling of a culture of objectification 
that is too myopic to spot its own destructive effects, it is essential that the Enlightenment remain 
not only credulous but also ignorant, oblivious of its own superstitions. 
 This thesis seeks to complicate this narrative of Enlightenment objectivity by pointing 
to the acute awareness in eighteenth century writing itself of the magical substitutions necessary to 
sustain the self-possessive individual whose apparent unity was the backbone of enlightened 
thinking.  It does so by examining the permeable in-between of subjects and objects, more 
specifically between personal properties and their owners, in British eighteenth-century satirical 
writing. Looking at the exchanges produced by the circulation of objects as well as the more 
complicated passages produced by its restriction at a time when transformation of Britain into a 
consumer society changed the nature of proprietorship, the thesis focuses on how the reliance on a 
personhood established as a “a mere having” blurred rather than sharpened the division between 
subject and object. 
                                                 
13 Note the closeness to a Heideggerian vocabulary of forgetfulness (Seinsvergessenheit) in this choice of words.  
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ii. Historicizing the Fetish 
 
To explore the dynamics of “the between” (Heidegger, What is 243), I draw on a series of works 
that have dealt with the role of material life and the mutability of things and people in eighteenth-
century literature. Many of these works take their point of departure in John G. A. Pocock’s 
suggestion in an essay first published in 1978 that “different modes of property may be seen as 
generating and encouraging different modes of personality” (103).14 As part of a larger survey of 
the clash between civic virtue and commerce, Pocock found that the clash in the eighteenth century 
between real and mobile property, between possession and exchange, had a bearing on the “problem 
of personality” (123). More specifically, Pocock’s identification of an emergent image of “social 
personality…founded upon commerce: upon the exchange of forms of mobile property and upon 
modes of consciousness suited to a world of moving objects” (109) has proved very influential in 
eighteenth-century literary studies of the last thirty years. When a few years later Neil McKendrick, 
John Brewer and J. H. Plumb traced the “birth of a consumer society” in the eighteenth century, the 
way was paved for a scholarly attention to the commodification of material culture of the eighteenth 
century and its literary configurations which had formerly been reserved for the more densely 
cluttered, more completely industrialized nineteenth century. Indeed, McKendrick’s description of 
an eighteenth-century world of “commodities in mass demand” (29) and “fashionable prodigality” 
(31) fired by a “ferocious pursuit of getting and spending” (2) seems remarkably similar to the 
nineteenth century world of “extravagant consumption” (811) Karl Marx describes in Capital 
(1867).  
 With the recent exception of Julie Park, whose interest in fetishism is mainly 
developed from Freudian models, scholars including Laura Brown, Colin Nicholson, Christopher 
Flint, Jonathan Lamb and Erin Mackie have used Marx’s commodity fetishism as the conceptual 
model for the transformations of things and people in the “increasingly transactional universe” of 
the eighteenth century (Pocock 48).15 Thus, armed with Pocock’s insight that the mobilization of 
property “formed the substratum of a quarrel which ended as that between the unity of personality 
and its increasing diversification” (122) and Marx’s concept of the “metamorphosis of 
commodities” (189), Nicholson takes aim at the "notion that essentialist humanist assumptions of a 
bedrock, universally shared 'human condition' constituting ‘human nature’” (xiii) had its 
unequivocal beginnings in the eighteenth century. Deriving much of its force as well as its 
motivation from a complication of the post-modern critique of “Enlightenment universals”, such 
criticism has made it possible to locate a post-modern questioning of “an autonomous, unified 
identity” (Nicholson, Writing xiii) within the very Enlightenment discourse that postmodernism is 
seen to disavow.  
                                                 
14 Nine of the ten essays in Virtue, Commerce and History had already appeared in publication between 1976 and 1982. 
“The Mobility of property and the rise of eighteenth-century sociology” had thus appeared in Theories of Property: 
Aristotle to the Present. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1978. 
15 There is a tendency in the Marxist-oriented criticism to overstress Pocock’s discovery of the importance of mobile 
properties and consumerism in the eighteenth century. Thus both Mackie and Nicholson (1994) overlook important 
aspects of Pocock's work. For instance, when Mackie cites Pocock’s Virtue, Commerce, and History (1985) to prove the 
ubiquity of a “possessive market society” (32), she ignores the fact that that much of the book is devoted to counter the 
doctrine of “possessive individualism” that had become paradigmatic with C. B. Macpherson’s 1962 work on the 
origins of liberal democracy (Mackie 39, 128-29 and 138). Instead of "a unidirectional transformation of thought in 
favour of the acceptance of ‘liberal’ or ‘market’ man”, Pocock poses “a bitter, conscious, and ambivalent dialogue” (71) 
between “a conception of property which stresses possession and civic virtue...and one which stresses exchange and the 
civilisation of the passions” (115), embodied respectively by the grounded property of the estate and the new, more 
ephemeral, mobile forms of property, such as financial credit and consumer goods.  
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 Deconstructive in nature, this strategy repeats Paul de Man’s critique in Blindness and 
Insight (1971) of Derrida’s seminal reading of Rousseau’s Confessions (1782). While Derrida 
points to what Rousseau calls “the concept of the supplement” as “a sort of blind spot in Rousseau’s 
text, the not-seen that opens and limits visibility” (163) that points to “a certain exteriority in 
relation to the totality of the age of logocentrism” (161), de Man finds that the duplicity of 
Rousseau’s text “accounts at all moments for its own rhetorical mode” (139): “Accounting for the 
‘rhetoricity’ of its own mode, the text also postulates the necessity of its own misreading. It knows 
and asserts that it will be misunderstood. It tells the story, the allegory of its misunderstanding...” 
(136) In other words, the myopia belongs not to Rousseau but to Derrida. As Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak has suggested such a reading plays an inexhaustible (and at times exhausting) game that 
“hangs on who knew how much of what he was doing” (Of Grammatology xxxviii).16 The real 
value of deconstruction, however, is to show that such a question is wedged within the discourse 
that attempts to exclude it.  Thus, deconstruction as a reading strategy has obvious advantages when 
it comes to the encircling of things as the indescribable in-between of subject and object, the 
eruption of alterity within ipseity.  As Michael Marder has shown, although occupying a seemingly 
inconspicuous place in Derrida’s deconstruction, “the split thing, the indwelling of 
différance...invalidating the logical principle of identity” (135) works as any of those other 
antinomic words upon which deconstruction fastens to reveal not so much an ambiguity as an 
impending systemic collapse. Along with other undecidables such as “différance”, “the 
pharmakon”, “the trace”, “the gift”, “the supplement” and  - perhaps most pertinent to the present 
project – “the proper”, “the thing” marks “where the other resists appropriation” (Derrida, “As If” 
96):  
 
For Derrida, the thing is what remains after the 
deconstruction of the human, the anima, and the 
metaphysical belief in the thing itself, in its oneness and 
self-identity. The thing understood as the remains stands on 
the side of what has been called ‘the undeconstructible’ 
within deconstruction itself, of what both animates and 
outlives the deconstructive goings-through, experiences, or 
sufferings. (Marder 138, italics reversed) 
 
Indeed, the location of an originary split in the construction of self-possessive individualism that is 
the aim of this thesis cannot deny its debt to the Derridean understanding of the temporal 
antinomies of the “always already”: “[T]he indefinite process of supplementarity has always already 
infiltrated presence, always already inscribed there the space of repetition and the splitting of the 
self” (Of Grammatology 93). Likewise Derrida’s concept of the supplement, his insistent 
deconstruction of “the proper” as the unity of property and propriety, the economy of what he calls 
the “originary prosthesis” as well as his recuperation of the centrality of textual margins for “the 
end of the book” are all relevant to the mutual constitution of subject and object that implodes in the 
“thinging of things” in eighteenth-century satire.  
 Nevertheless, while I cannot disagree with the aim of this type of criticism of an 
uncomplicated concept of “an autonomous, unified identity” (Nicholson, Writing xiii), I do think 
                                                 
16 The question may also be considered key in determining the structural ambiguities of satirical uses of authorial 
personae. Perhaps satire is best understood not only by pointing to the gap between the author and his personae, but by 
pitting the unwitting insights of the latter against the blindness of the former. As hinted in the section on Laurence 
Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey (1768), the question does not need to be solved to point at the textual economy of the 
satirical text. 
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that its theoretical foundation calls for a re-examination. Firstly, both Marxist and deconstructivist 
criticism derive their persuasiveness from the unravelling of a certain obtuseness in the literature 
they target. Thus relying on the revelation of the antinomic profundity behind or beneath the false 
consciousness that blindly accepts the collusion of property, propriety and self-appropriation, this 
type of analysis works to confirm what might be called a deep model of criticism according to 
which the critic provides the insightful depth to an obscurely flat and decidedly unenlightened 
literature. In recent years Christina Lupton has worked to bypass these assumptions in eighteenth-
century criticism by pointing to types of literature that work “under conditions we can recognize, of 
candid reflection rather than false consciousness” (Knowing xi). Crucially Lupton challenges the 
assumption that critical awareness of material, economic and social conditions under which literary 
production labours precludes the enjoyment of its “power and mystery” (Knowing viii). Arguing 
that the eighteenth century abounds with “knowing books” that “serve as nexuses of nonhuman 
consciousness” (Knowing x), Lupton also calls for the critical acknowledgment of eighteenth-
century literary “preparedness of people to imagine consciousness in things” (x). While Lupton 
concentrates primarily on the mid-century, I want to point to texts throughout the century that 
openly display the terms of production and reception under which they labour in ways that point to 
the entanglement of people and their properties and that mobilize questions of personal identity.  
 Secondly, the dehumanization intrinsic to Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism 
tends to make criticism focus on the reversal of subject and object implied in the mutual processes 
of commodity fetishism and human reification at the expense of more complicated involvement of 
things and people that stop short of such positional substitutions. It is in fact an involvement that is 
at least intimated if not fully accounted for in Marx’s own writing. The distinction between things 
and persons constitutes the essential condition for the capitalist system of property and commodity 
exchange, but exchanges of commodities are always attended by more essential displacements, 
producing what Marx in the first part of Capital calls “material relations between persons and social 
relations between things” (104). It is the conflicted co-existence of use-value and exchange value 
within one and the same object that produces commodities as a type of liminal or hybrid things, 
“sensuous things which are at the same time suprasensible” (165).17 The power that appears to 
inhere in the commodity is its exchange value, a function of abstracted18 human labour that is 
mistaken for the object’s true worth, its intrinsic value. What is an empty abstraction appears as 
material reality, or rather, appearance itself is taken for the real thing.19 The completion of this 
transposition is the hypostatization of exchange value itself. It is not only that exchange value seen 
as a property of the thing itself, but also that value itself becomes a thing, a commodity with its own 
metamorphic cycle: “[V]alue suddenly presents itself as an independent substance, endowed with a 
motion of its own, passing through a life-process of its own, in which money and commodities are 
mere forms which it assumes and casts off in turn” (256). The power that is seen to inhere in the 
                                                 
17 “A commodity is a use-value or object of utility, and a ‘value’. It appears as the twofold thing it is as soon as its value 
possesses its own particular form of manifestation, which is distinct from its natural form.” (Marx, Capital 152) 
18 Exchange value is the “disappearance of the different concrete forms of labour” in favour of the appearance of 
“human labour in the abstract” (Marx, Capital 128). 
19 Distinguishing himself from the “bourgeois economists” who “in their shallowness make it a principle to worship 
appearances only” (Capital 279), Marx wants to dig deeper to expose the unreality that this hides, to make appearance 
show itself as such. The first stage of demystification is therefore to make the unreality of things unfold before our eyes, 
to make us see how the fetish manifests itself, to make us see it as it really is. The fetish is therefore at one and the same 
time a “fantastic form” (165) and a representation of things “as what they are” (166). Marx writes, indeed he must write, 
as if he was describing an ontological metamorphosis as well as an exchange of semblances. For an in-depth analysis of 
this paradox, see Derrida’s The Spectres of Marx. The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and the New 
International (1993) and Jean Baudrillard’s For A Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (1972). 
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object is its “universal exchangeability” (161), its ability to transform and be transformed, to move 
as if by itself. 
 Out of the entanglement of thing and person, at the precise moment of their 
intersection, the fetish emerges, an alien, soulless thing that cannot be fully possessed although it is 
a kind of possession that animates it, an “animated monster which begins to ‘work’, as if its body 
were by love possessed” (302).20 Replacing human labour (even in its abstracted form) with the 
more insubstantial work of value itself, capital has acquired that most human of characteristics: the 
“occult ability” (255) to conjure up new valuables from within itself, new fetishes that in turn will 
“bring forth living offspring, or at least lay golden eggs” (255). This kind of monstrous21 birth takes 
on its most bizarre concretization of the commodity in the strange form of a whimsical table. Once a 
commodity, the table “not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other 
commodities it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas [Grillen], far 
more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will” (163-64). The usurpation of 
the human subject by the object is completed as the latter self-replicates, conjuring up new 
monstrosities, material phantasms that are encountered rather than projected. The inversion is 
complete and irreversible. The only “if” that appears in this description takes us not from the sane 
reality of passive and controllable things to an irrational world where a table can be imagined to 
move of its own accord, but from this familiar fiction to the more disturbing unreality of the 
prodigious idées fixes that materialize from its wooden brain. Here is no return to a simpler reality 
before things began to stir, and no reincorporation of a more material use value.  
 Yet, although Marx mimics the critique of the fetish as the unacceptable something in 
between man and thing, the real outrage of Marx’s commodity fetish is not that it exists as a 
crystallization of the material exchanges between person and thing – such "metabolic interaction 
[Stoffwechsel] between man and nature" is the very "nature-imposed condition of human existence" 
(Capital 290) realized in the process of labour. Thus, insofar as it implies a crossing between the 
human and the material spheres, the fetish resembles the product of labour.22 However, what makes 
the commodity a perversion, what makes it a fetish, is that its value "is realized only in exchange" 
(178) and therefore does not express the “direct relation between man and things” (178) but the 
indirect relation between one thing and another. This is why in Marx’s early notes on James Mill 
(1844), he writes of commodity exchange as the process by which “things lose the meaning of 
personal, human property” (261), that is, their “specific personal nature” (261):  
 
[T]he mediating movement of man engaged in exchange is 
not a social, human movement, it is no human relationship: 
it is the abstract relation of private property to private 
property…[which] is one in which private property is 
estranged from itself. (261) 
 
As the product of the “conversational relationships or relationship of rank between commodities” 
(262), exchange value is the veiled “separation of man from things” (262). Thus like Heidegger, 
Marx decries the moment things lose their involvement with men and come to stand over-and-
against them as mere objects. When this happens man is subject to a “self-estrangement, [a] 
dehumanization” that pertains to “the moral existence, the social existence, the very heart of man” 
                                                 
20 Marx quotes Goethe’s Faust and exploits the fact that the fetish, in its nature as the singular “gathering” of “an 
otherwise unconnected multiplicity” (Pietz 12) marks the point when the specificity of what is vaguely apprehended as 
"a something" gives rise to the monstrous and the grotesque.  
 
22 Throughout Capital, Marx stresses the reciprocal constitution of man and thing in the process of labour: “[Man] acts 
upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature” (283).  
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(263). In Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) Marx thus defines the “loss of and 
bondage to the object” (324) that occurs when the worker's “labour becomes an object, an external 
existence…[that]…begins to confront him as an autonomous power”, that is, when “the life which 
[the worker] has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile and alien” (324).  
 In a study of the nineteenth-century “sense of things” (2003) that has perhaps done 
more than any other work to introduce objects as subject-matter in eighteenth-century studies,23 Bill 
Brown has pointed out how as a figuration of the separation between man and thing in the 
commodity fetish, the whimsical table is strangely at odds with its more abstract, conversational 
counterparts that appear later in the same chapter of Capital. The sensuous-suprasensuous 
parthenogenesis of the table is here replaced by the merely verbal “intercourse” (177) between 
generic “commodities” (177) that converse without the least whimsicality “merely as exchange 
values” (177). As abstract equivalents, these purely vocal beings seem the perfect exemplifications 
of the “conversational relationships” that things cultivate among themselves. As if with one voice 
each commodity says the same as the other, “each embodies the existence of the other, each exists 
as his own surrogate and as the surrogate of the other” (268). The table, on the other hand, has a 
very “specific personal nature”, a corporeal existence of its own that appeal to the imagination as 
well as to that “felt need for a thing”, which is “the most obvious, irrefutable proof that that thing is 
part of my essence, that its being is for me and that its property is the property, the particular quality 
peculiar to my essence” (“Excerpts” 267). Thus, as Brown notes, the table does not embody 
“material relations among people” or “social relations among things” but rather “something like a 
social relation between human subject and inanimate object” (29). Although Marx insists that the 
fetishism of commodities is tied to the mystifications of exchange that remain unaffected by 
“[e]vents which take place outside the sphere of circulation, in the interval between buying and 
selling” (256), what he describes is the another kind of mystery, the mystery of a “felt need” which 
is attributable neither to use (immediate usefulness) nor to exchange. This conflict of values 
presents the outline of what Brown calls “a kind of possession that is irreducible to ownership” 
(13).  
 If a recovery of this type of possession in the eighteenth century depends on the 
recuperation of what Marx identifies in private property prior to the mystification of exchange as 
“the exclusive, distinguishing personality of its owner” (“Excerpts” 268), it also necessitates an 
examination of the specific historical and cultural conditions that enable things to turn into 
valuables. Thus, secondly, and more importantly, the equation of the eighteenth century 
representation of the relation between acquisitive selves and their properties and Marxian 
commodity fetishism circumvents the very historical process by which the commodification of 
things came about. As anthropologist William Pietz shows, Marx draws on an Enlightenment 
discourse in which fetishism came to mark the pre-enlightened categorial confusion between inner 
and outer worlds through the false attribution of purposiveness to inanimate, natural objects.24 As 
                                                 
23 In the survey of scholarship dealing with material culture within eighteenth-century studies given by Mark Blackwell 
in the introductory chapter of The Secret Life of Things (2007) both Bill Brown's book A Sense of Things: The Object 
Matter of American Literature (2003) and his article on "Thing Theory" (2011) are mentioned as points of departure. 
Thus several of the authors represented in The Secret Life of Things (2007) reference Bill Brown’s work, as does 
Cynthia Wall when using his Heideggerian concept of thingness in her description of the development of description in 
the eighteenth century (Wall 200).  
24 Pietz mentions Charles de Brosses’ Du culte des dieux fetishes (1760) and Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement 
(1798) as examples of how the discourse on fetishism became part of a philosophical debate that sought to distinguish 
things from people. Taking its cue from Aristotle’s distinction between self-moving natural being (phusis) and the 
fabrictaed artefact (prosthesis) that requires an external cause of movement (causa efficiens), the eighteenth century 
debate fastened on movement (animation) as a marker of humanity. Building on this insight, we can see that the outrage 
that the “absurd form” of Marx’s commodity is meant to elicit is at least initially related to the outrage of matter in 
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such, the discourse of fetishism attested to the difficulties within Enlightenment thought of coming 
“to cognitive terms with the scandalous fact of the organism, the purposeful natural being” (Pietz 
139). Sorting out what does from what does not belong to a person, then, is a part of a greater 
philosophical debate that sought to distinguish what Pietz has termed the “mechanistic-material 
realm of physical nature” from the “end-oriented human realm of purposes and desires” (138). 
Taking as their point of departure Isaac Newton’s theories of motion and the attraction of objects 
and the materialist potential in Locke’s theories of personhood, scientific thinkers and clergy came 
to think of the essence of things in terms of inherent activity, if only as a latent magnetic or 
“sympathetic” force of attraction. As John Yolton has demonstrated in his book on how the 
eighteenth century was marked by “thinking matter” (1984), materialist hypotheses of the self-
animation of matter were haunted by the risk of personal disintegration. Newton’s suggestion that 
“the small particles of bodies [might have] certain powers, virtues or forces, by which they act at a 
distance…upon one another” (Opticks Query 31 350) was to pose moral and philosophical 
dilemmas throughout the century. The materialist conjecture of matter in motion is not only 
problematic to traditional religious theories of the soul, it is also inconsistent with the idea of 
personal identity. In a 1704 tract that refined Ralph Cudworth’s objections to materialism in The 
True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678)25, John Toland suggested that if “action is essential 
to matter”, even “the most heavy and hard Body” (qtd. in Yolton 101), i.e. even the most dull thing 
becomes capable of the kind of self-willed motion that was formerly the prerogative of man.  
 Therefore being sensitive to the movement of things is not only a question of tracing 
objects through their circuits of exchange, but also of examining what renders things exchangeable 
or commodifiable, that is, how they gain their autonomy as independent objects worth representing 
in the first place. In other words, the alignment of eighteenth-century consumerism and Marxist 
commodity fetishism seems to shortcut the very historical process Marx sets out to retrieve. 
Building on the recognition that the fetish “is above all a ‘historical’ object” (Pietz 12), this type of 
contextualisation reveals the discourse of fetishism as the result of a clash between “different 
regimes of value” (Pietz 5) rather than as the logical error of hypostatization and allows the 
discovery of the historically embedded mechanisms and practices that enable the prizing of our 
most intimate possessions to differentiate itself from the pricing of commodities. In order to come 
to the understanding that things have not always been what they are, that the categories to which a 
thing belong is a historical configuration, we must commit to what anthropologist Arjun Appadurai 
has called “a minimum level of…methodological fetishism” (5). Tracking the object’s “social life” 
through the specific historical and cultural field in which it is passed around, Appadurai is 
concerned with things in motion, whether the movements they produce be “slow or fast, reversible 
or terminal, normative or deviant” (13). The dynamic aspect of things, Appadurai suggests, can only 
be made an object of examination if we “follow the things themselves, for their meanings are 
inscribed in their forms, their uses, their trajectories…” (5) Thus although from a theoretical point 
of view it is “human transactions and calculations that enliven things”, from a methodological point 
of view it is “the things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social context” (5).  
 Assiduously following the trajectories of auctioned snuff-boxes, heirloom bodkins, 
stolen locks, misplaced snuff boxes, lost manuscripts and sold-off starlings, eighteenth-century 
                                                 
motion, of non-human vitality, of an object that has gathered to itself the purposive mobility of a subject. The scandal of 
such a gathering also forms part of Marx’s case against capital, which by “constantly changing from one form into the 
other…becomes transformed into an automatic subject” (Capital 255) that is engaged in its own valorization process. 
For an overview of the philosophical fate of the Aristotelian distinction between phusis and prosthesis as well as an 
account of Derrida's concept of “originary technicity”, see Bradley. 
25 Ralph Cudworth had objected that if a person is seen to consist of a congregation of “small particles” in motion, 
“every Atom of Matter must needs be a Distinct Percipient, Animal, and Intelligent Person by itself” (I.ii 72). 
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satiric literature seems particularly willing to commit itself to the fetishism required to display the 
life in things that makes them move, inspire and animate the more obviously animated persons with 
whom they are involved. It is my contention that alongside the philosophical, legal and scientific 
discussions, eighteenth-century literary constructions of personal property as a type of movable 
matter provided one framework within which the vitality – the viability as well as the vivacity - of 
matters in motion could be assessed. If this assessment leads to the disturbing independence of the 
value generated by the perpetual movement of commodities in the exchange circuit, it also 
highlights the importance of the kind of worth that can make a particular thing belong when even 
the most personal things become movables. In other words, in the eighteenth century the integrity of 
personhood is measured against what in Marx describes as the ceaseless conversions and re-
conversions between use-value and exchange-value that constitutes the “metamorphosis of 
commodities” (198) as well as the transmutations that happen in between these exchanges, “once a 
commodity has found a resting-place…out of the sphere of exchange” (151). As an estimation of 
the permeability of the boundaries between a person and the properties he owns, judgments of 
fetishism are made on the basis of the extent to which an object attains a certain autonomy and 
independence from the subject that apprehends it, or the degree to which an object resists 
possession even within the strictures of legal ownership. 
 In Eighteenth-Century Fiction and the Law of Property (2002), Wolfram Schmidgen 
has given one version of such a “history of objectification” (3). There are important insights to be 
gained from his understanding of the eighteenth century as a “transitional culture” the emerging 
modernity of which depends on “the interruption of a circulatory logic that makes movement across 
space central to transformation” (142), that is, on a conceptualisation of things and persons which 
frees personal identity and value from the determination of place to make them mysteriously inhere 
in the subject or objects itself. Indeed, Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass argue for a similar 
trajectory of clothes in the Renaissance, a period in which “clothes were still material mnemonics in 
metropolitan centers even as they were becoming the commodities upon which international 
capitalism was founded” (11). With the rise of the “transcendental subject of modernity” the notion 
of clothes as “detachable and discardable goods” obliterated their ability to be true “fashionings, the 
materializations of memory, objects that worked upon and transformed the body of the wearer” 
(13). According to Jones and Stallybrass, by the mid-eighteenth century, clothes had all but lost 
their material powers of self-constitution. Jones and Stallybrass as well as Schmidgen locate the 
near-completion of this erosion of the materially embedded subject in the sentimental literature in 
the last quarter of the century. Apart from a historical qualification of the discourse of fetishism, 
this type of recuperative approach offers a refreshing corrective to Pocock’s stark opposition 
between civic humanist virtue and liberal commerce. Thus Schmidgen’s suggestion that the critical 
focus on the difference between movable and immovable property, “one corrupting and fleeting, the 
other virtuous and stable”, should give way to “a more flexible perspective which recognizes the 
essential connection between all forms of property” (15) comes close to my own hypothesis that the 
boundaries between alienability and inalienability are constantly redrawn throughout the century as 
new notions of personal property are tested against the realities of commercial circulation.   
 Yet, my thesis is an attempt to complicate the lapsarian aspect of Schmidgen's 
narrative. Firstly, if the exploration of the eighteenth-century configuration of property and 
personhood cannot do without the acknowledgment of the conceptual existence of things “in the 
between, between man and thing” (Heidegger, What is 243) or the existence of hybrid forms of 
property that cross the boundaries of mobility and immobility, it is also a question of recognising 
the point at which such overlaps come to constitute “a crisis in which the identity of the self is 
called into question” (Pietz 12). Whereas Schmidgen posits the early eighteenth century as an 
Edenic world of “plenitude and interconnectedness” (185), I want to suggest that the existence of a 
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“unified human-material sphere” (86) constituted a moral and philosophical problem throughout the 
century. The crisis was there from the beginning. We have, as Latour would have it, “never been 
modern”. Conversely, when Schmidgen sees the “pictorial isolation” (144) of the sentimental 
novels of the late eighteenth century as a rupture of a “tangible continuity between human and 
material spheres” (140-41), he ignores the persistence of paradigms of touch and proximity in the 
constitution of sentimental property. Necessarily stressing continuities rather than disruptions, this 
approach forgoes the brilliance of an Enlightenment “subject unhampered by fixation upon objects” 
(Jones and Stallybrass 11) in favour of the strange illumination provided by the recurrence of what I 
will call an “aggregate self”26 that comes to shine only by the light of its possessions.  
  
                                                 
26 The term draws on, but is not completely identical Latour’s understanding of aggregate individuality: “This is exactly 
what the words ‘actor’ and ‘person’ mean: no one knows how people are simultaneously at work in any given 
individual, no one knows how much individuality there can be in a cloud of statistical data points. Figuration endows 
them with a shape but not necessarily in the manner of a smooth portrait by a figurative painter” (Reassembling 54). 
The term is thus meant to be sufficiently heuristic to encompass discussions of layered personalities and objective 
interiorities that lie outside the scope of Latour’s philosophy.  
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iii. The Matters to Come 
 
Focusing on the satiric mode, the purpose of this thesis is not to offer yet another argument on the 
emerging realism of the novel. Neither does the thesis promote a Bakhtinian argument on the 
inherently subversive nature of Menippea as a privileged space of submerged alterity. Yet by 
pointing out the presence of aggregate selfhood as a satirical antithesis to the autonomous, deep and 
self-possessive selfhood that has been posited as the most significant by-product of the eighteenth 
century not only by twentieth-century philosophers but also by theorists of the rise of the novel, the 
thesis does seek to provide a more facetted image of eighteenth-century fictions of the self.  Still the 
most powerful account of such fictions, Ian Watt’s inescapable The Rise of the Novel (1957) has 
been the target for most subsequent criticism.  Thoroughly post-romantic in its focus on a 
subjectivity marked by interiority and individual autonomy,27 Watt’s book finds the value of the 
eighteenth-century novel writing in the bourgeois formation of a possessive self: the rise of the 
novel is also the rise of economic individualism and self-possessive subjectivity. Thus, in Watt’s 
view, only when “the exploration of personality and personal relationships” comes to exclude the 
“treatment of movable objects in the physical world” (26) can Samuel Richardson’s cultivation of 
painful privacy undergo the desired development as a precursor of modern anxiety and stream of 
consciousness techniques. The novel is not only the medium but the product of modern, self-
expressive subjectivity; it is the “exact transcription of psychological processes” (194). Such 
formulations present the novel as a pure insubstantial interior, a text unencumbered by the weight of 
physical form and unfettered by the economic constraints and the technological complexities of its 
production. Novels are no longer print copies but duplicates of particular personalities. By the end 
of Watt’s book, the varieties of novelistic writing treasured in “small duodecimo volumes” (42) 
have been transformed into “the novel”, a stable entity, existing not as an artefact, a manufactured 
thing, but as a generic, immaterial “form” (39).  Like the subject, the novel withdraws to an interior 
untainted by the other goods among which it nevertheless circulates.28 
 Primarily interested in novelistic techniques of self-representation, Watt’s study 
obscures other less mimetic forms of writing that the psychological accuracy of the novel is seen to 
have displaced.  As Brian A. Connery and Kirk Combe suggest, Watt’s negligence of the satiric 
                                                 
27 Already in Lectures of English Comic Writers (1819) William Hazlitt offered a narrative of the novel in which its 
primary objective is the self-expression of a personal identity. Hazlitt coupled the democratization of material wealth 
and the abundance of novelists capable of describing people “as they are in themselves”, making us see “more of them 
than their costume” (112). Like Watt, Hazlitt points to the Lockean trinity of life, liberty and property as the foundation 
of novel writing; it is the “security of person and property” that enables the novelistic portrayal of “human nature” 
(122): 
 
The whole surface of society appeared cut out into square enclosures 
and sharp angles, which extended to the dresses of the time, their 
gravel-walks, and clipped hedges. Each individual had a certain 
ground-plot of his own to cultivate his particular humours in… (122).  
 
Living in a society of “sharp angles”, Hazlitt’s novelist is the result of what appears to be very clear-cut boundaries 
between what is and what is not “his own”, between the inside and the outside of that “square enclosure” that ensures 
subjective interiority.  
 
28 Watt sees a direct line between the kind of reading experiences afforded by Richardson’s and those afforded by 
Henry James, who more fully than Richardson allows the reader to become “absorbed into the subjective consciousness 
of one or more of the characters” (296). The psychological model of deep subjectivity guides Watt’s construction of 
genre as well as his model for reading. 
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mode29 of writing is in accordance with New Critical distaste of a type of literature whose greatness 
lies not in ethereal self-containment but in the humorous distortion of historically embedded 
discourses, institutions and types (4-6). In opposition to this, I consider satire central to the study of 
eighteenth-century resistance to constructions of possessive selves not only on account of its 
figurative stress on disunity, but also due to what Edward Rosenheim has called its rooting in 
“discernible historical particulars” (31). Specialized in “demolition projects” (Connery and Combe 
1), satire seems particularly well suited to vent the anxieties of the incomplete subject. Although 
this thesis does not seek to make an argument about the relationship between satire and the novel, 
its focus on satiric criticism of self-disclosure does work to reinforce arguments that highlight the 
proliferation and endurance of the satiric mode throughout the eighteenth century rather than its 
eclipse by the novel.30 Similarly, although the thesis does not offer a theory on the “nature of 
satire”, it does propose that the modes of figuration favoured by satire proved to be the means by 
which the fears that attended notions of self-possession specific to the eighteenth century could be 
expressed. Often overtly displaying itself as fiction, satire tends to undercut fictions that aim to be 
taken for reports of reality (Connery and Combe). Yet, as Fredric V. Bogel has shown, even as 
satire thrives on images of deceptive surfaces and true depths, it would lose its critical impact 
without at least an initial confusion of these (41-42). Instead, Bogel claims, satire is involved in a 
more complicated kind of categorical critique which is characterized by an “investment in 
defamiliarization; in modes of didacticism that strive to shake readers out of the easy stabilities of 
the ego or the naturalized assumptions of social and cultural traditions” (246). Ultimately, satire 
“dramatizes both the need for… categorical distinctions and their unavailability” (46). I want to 
suggest that in eighteenth-century satirical literature, this impasse shows itself as a conflict between 
superimposition and aggregation in the modelling of proprietorship upon which the eighteenth 
century concepts of personhood and identity rested. Reflecting on the conditions of its own 
production, including its material incorporation, satire articulates the difficulties of conceptualizing 
literary objects as inalienable yet transferable properties without resorting to the mystifications of 
abstraction. In other words, what is made strange through eighteenth-century satirical 
defamiliarization is not so much the proximity of people and their possessions, as it is their more 
fundamental confusion in the failed attempts to separate them.  
 Thus, satire's predilection for the hyperbolic and the grotesque readily allows the 
exposition of the narrow limits within which propriety and personhood can unfold and their 
vulnerability to superimposition or detraction. According to Connery and Combe, satirical 
imagination is characterized by “its militant disunity” (6) in its emphasis on incongruity: “[T]he 
yoking together of disparate matter in satire serves to reveal not wit but imminent incoherence” (6). 
Stretching the limits of imagery, satire becomes a central expression of the threat to the integrity of 
a self that relies on the imaginative powers of consciousness to hold its properties together. 
Literalization, satiric listing, zeugma and the tautological collapsing of metaphors are used as means 
to point to the impossibility of abstracting the self from its material properties. Likewise 
prosopopoeia emerges as a figuration of the hybrids that emerge along the subject-object 
continuum. Latour speaks of the categorical mistake of sociologists to “confuse the dichotomy 
human/inhuman with another one: figurative/non-figurative...The label ‘inhuman’ applied to 
techniques simply overlooks translation mechanisms and the many choices that exist for figuring or 
defiguring, personifying or abstracting, embodying or disembodying actors” (“Mixing” 303). 
Nevertheless, in the eighteenth century, satiric literalization readily confuses figuration and 
                                                 
29 I adopt Alastair Fowler’s definition of satire as a “mode” rather than a “genre”. Pointing to the limitations and 
divisions inherent in any generic, social or conceptual framework, satire adapts itself to both prose and verse and 
infuses itself into any kind of social discourse or literary form to mock, subvert, warn and moralize.  
30 For a recent survey of satiric literature outside the canon, see Ashley Marshall.  
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transubstantiation, using personification as what Latour calls “a weaver of morphisms” (We Have 
Never 137) to disassemble the “playacting” of personhood itself. Thus the simultaneous activation 
of the referential and the figurative that is the specialty of eighteenth century satirists serves to 
demonstrate how the difference between real and invented selves hinge on the ability to 
successfully navigate between an imaginary realm of fantasy and the material realm of commodity 
culture. As such the generic tendency of satire to refuse to locate its descriptive details within a 
single mode of signification, whether referential or symbolic, is suggestive of the difficulty with 
which the anxieties that attend the conflict between an aggregate and deep versions of personality 
can be allayed.  
 There is therefore a certain affinity between this thesis and the work of scholars such 
as Terry Castle, William B. Warner, Lynn Festa, Deidre Lynch, Jonathan Lamb and more recently 
Julie Park and Christina Lupton who have all sought to take issue with Ian Watt's teleological 
account of “the rise of the novel” and whose delineations of novelistic subjectivity have challenged 
the prominence of the autonomous, identical and self-possessive individual. What has received less 
attention, however, is the ways in which eighteenth-century philosophy itself carries the seed of this 
criticism. Watt finds the basis of this new subjectivity in the new “secularization of thought” 
exemplified by John Locke’s promotion of a self-proprietary liberal individual inhabiting an 
“essentially man-centred world” (177) that severs the human subject from the world of inanimate 
objects. In the first chapter of the thesis, I argue that the anchoring of this separation in the notion of 
self-possession appears less sturdy in Locke's own theories of self-identity and personhood than in 
the twentieth-century criticism that takes them as its foundation.31 Reading Locke’s chapter on 
“Identity and Diversity” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689; 1694) against the 
grain (as most eighteenth-century satirists habitually did), the second chapter of the thesis reveals 
that even as Locke labours to determine the precise location of the line that divides a persons from 
his properties or the possessed and the possessing self, the model of personhood and self-identity 
that Locke offers does not entirely escape the antinomies of older concepts of aggregate selfhood. 
Indeed to Locke, the relation between property and personhood was conjunctive rather than 
divisive. Relying on what historian Michael Zuckert has called “a law of transitivity” (254), 
Locke’s model of property as what has by labour “something annexed to it” (II.v.27 288) mixes up 
what is one's own with what is not. Truly personal only when through the annexation of human 
labour the thing itself comes to bear the imprint of its possessor, Locke’s property is a distinctly 
mutable thing. Once the mutability of things has been recognized, the task becomes to determine 
the kinds of transformations that are allowed before you can consider something changed and the 
degree of proximity one thing can have to another before a convergence takes place. It is a question 
of how much things can move – not only how far a thing can move from its proper place before it 
no longer belongs, but also how much motion there can be within a thing before it no longer 
coincides with itself. In other words, once it has been recognized that properties and their owners 
are somehow contiguous, the problem becomes to determine how far a property can stray from its 
owner before it no longer belongs to him, or to which degree a particular object can approach its 
proprietor before it is not only appended to but coextensive with the subject over-and-against which 
it is defined.  
 Yet if ownership is only a form of annexation and property merely a lateral 
appendage, then how is one to ensure that what has first been acquired remains one's own? Locke 
posits a solution that David Hume famously dismisses as “fiction”: identity relying merely on the 
imaginative power of consciousness to create coherence in an otherwise unconnected, successively 
acquired flow of impressions and experiences absorbed by a body whose parts are “not shifted all at 
                                                 
31 I side with Michael P . Zuckert against John Pocock in placing Locke’s philosophy at the centre of discussions of 
property and personhood.  
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once” (Essay II.xxvii.8 335). The following chapters of the thesis suggest ways in which the 
philosophical debates on the entanglement of thing and person are paralleled by cultural practices as 
these appear in the literature of the period from early dressing room poems to mid- and late-century 
satires on writing in it-narratives. At this junction between posited fiction and perceived reality, the 
polysemy of the expression “personal effects” proves useful. Thus, Lynch’s disambiguation of the 
term as encompassing both “the style of absolute proprietorship that is modelled in Locke’s 
example” (“Personal” 11) and “the representation of private subjectivity” (“Personal” 4) is 
suggestive of the overlap that places the figurative powers of literature at the centre of discussions 
of personal identity. The properties of personhood come to seem as elusive as their material 
counterparts; fiction seems to be constitutive of both. When material effects can be seen to embody 
or typify one's person, personality itself becomes an illusory effect – a fiction produced by a skilful 
prestidigitation of the available props, but also a mere object that can to be circulated and 
reacquired by new proprietors. One way that the first kind of effects could be kept apart from the 
two latter was by distinguishing between properties that were indispensable “necessities” and those 
that were merely ornamental “luxuries”. In this way the determination of which properties truly 
deserved personal investment became inextricably intertwined with the moral framework of 
propriety the limits of which were largely conceived in terms of superfluity and deficiency. In other 
words, the delimitation of luxuries from necessities was brought to bear on the confluence of 
personhood, property and propriety.  
 In the literary imagination of the period, the transgression of this framework came to 
be marked in particular by the misappropriation of the descriptive detail. My discussion of 
eighteenth century propriety and personhood owes much to Lynch’s insight that rather than “binary 
terms such as round and flat or external and internal” (1998 10), what distinguished eighteenth 
century discussions of characterization was a “discursive economy” the extremes of which were 
rather excessive particularization and lack of detail. According to Lynch, critics encouraged readers 
to “think about how many strokes of traits of character it would take for a character’s defining 
difference to be clear, and to take warning from the instances in which a superfluity of strokes 
pushed representation beyond the bunds of nature and into the domain of the grotesque” (Economy 
10).  Yet, unlike Lynch, I am less interested in the reading practices that allowed people to develop 
the “coping mechanism” (Economy 5) necessary to “personalize the interior spaces of their homes 
and their selves” (Economy 3) than in the literary constructions that work to disrupt these. Focusing 
on this kind of categorical porosity, the thesis explores the eighteenth-century satirical exploration 
of descriptive detailing as a transfigurative space that continually negotiates the boundaries between 
the inside and the outside, between the symbolic and the real and between persons and things. 
Suspended between lack and excess, sometimes personalization does not take place at all.  
 Accordingly, eighteenth-century satirical metaphorics of disguise and disclosure 
tapped into the debate on the corrupting potential of wealth, particularly the duplicities inherent in 
fashionable articles of dress and other portable accessories. Thus, chapter three explores these 
issues by looking at the debates on luxury and fashion. Taking as my point of departure the satiric 
discussion of the category of “having” in The Memoirs of the Extraordinary Life, Works and 
Discoveries of Martinus Scriblerus (1741), Jonathan Swift’s dressing room poems and other 
writings on foppery and coquetry, such as Mary Evelyn’s Mundus Muliebris (1690) and Alexander 
Pope's The Rape of the Lock (1712; 1714)32, I examine the power of things to make and unmake 
people through a supplementary logic that dismantles the construction of interiority underwriting 
uncomplicated self-possession. It is not just that clothes both shield and conceal the wearer’s true 
identity but that they come to question the very existence of such an identity beneath their surface. 
                                                 
32 I work from the 1714 five canto version (the Twickenham edition), but comment on the publication history of the 
poem as part of my interpretation in the second chapter of the thesis. 
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A composite of cosmetics and accessories, Swift’s nymph “Must ev’ry Morn her Limbs unite” (67), 
while in “Progress of Beauty” (1719-20) we witness Celia’s attempts to mend “the materials of her 
face” until “nothing's left to work upon” (112). Similarly, Martinus cannot without “great 
difficulty…abstract a Lord mayer from his Fur, Gown” (120) without the loss of both. Yet the 
violence of such denudings make a mockery of the contrived coercion of gestures that seek to 
unveil hidden depths where only surfaces reside or to gloss over dismembered confusion in abstract 
totalities. Thus in these scenes of dressing and undressing, questions of personal and descriptive 
integrity are intertwined to the point where the creative power in representation itself is put to the 
test. 
 The fourth chapter deals with the vulnerability of fictional representation and its 
susceptibility to partition by investigating the resistance to abstract, deep subjectivity in a group of 
novelistic fictions, now known variously as “it-narratives”, “object tales” or “narratives of 
circulation” on account of the characteristic use of a transmigrating object narrator or protagonist, 
usually a circulating commodity. The chapter identifies it-narratives as satires on authorship in the 
tradition of Swift’s A Tale of a Tub (1704) – a book that uses a compound model of writing 
authorship to satirise the pretensions of authorial control and highlight the fragility of material texts 
at a time when the proliferation of print made every hack an author. It-narratives use the usurpation 
of the human voice by things in motion to present what Pietz calls “inconceivable mystery…of any 
direct sensuous perception of animateness in material beings” (139). The it-narrative has been seen 
as a reflection of a transactional society the subjects of which can only be bound together by the 
continued circulation of goods.33 Indeed, in their consistent thematisation of the part even “property 
in the person” comes to take in economic transactions, these fictions do seem to produce something 
like the personification of things and the objectification of persons that Marx describes. 
 Nevertheless, the ability of the narrating object to penetrate and give voice to what 
hides within its possessors is suggestive of more dynamic relationship between person and thing 
determined by continuous metamorphoses and exchanges rather than mere positional inversions. 
Thus, the involvement of things and persons represented in the it-narrative may perhaps more 
accurately be seen as rehearsing anxieties of property and personhood specific to the eighteenth-
century consideration of vital matter as well as the establishment of authorial copyright. The use of 
prosopopoeia enables the authors of it-narratives to expose the composite complexity of what 
threatens to become a Latourian black-box, a gathering of things congealed into a single monolith 
now passively offering itself up to authorial control. Thus while the successive incorporation of the 
narrating atom in Tobias Smollett’s The History and Adventures of an Atom (1768) implies the 
literary survival of the philosophically unacceptable thesis of metempsychosis, the corporeal 
dispersion of narrative consciousness in The Adventures of a Quire of Paper (1779) articulates the 
suspicion that corpuscular divisibility might include consciousness as well as matter. Furthermore, 
the disjunction between authoring, writing and voicing introduced by the automatized writing of it-
narratives such as Thomas Bridges’ The Adventures of a Banknote (1770-71) and Charles 
Johnstone’s Chrysal, or the Adventures of a Guinea (1760) disturb the quality of uniqueness that 
makes a work properly one's own while playing on fears of the automatical man.  
 The ephemeral materiality of the printed work constitutes an interruptive force 
throughout the century, disturbing that quality of uniqueness that makes a work properly one’s own. 
In one of the pivotal cases that sought to solve the problem of authorial copyright, the problem 
authors had in distinguishing the property they had in their writing from its material embodiment 
without losing the solidity this afforded turned on the question of whether or not “sentiments 
[could] be seized” (Millar v. Taylor, qtd. in Burrow 2385). In sentimental literature this problem 
                                                 
33 For this type of reading, please see Bellamy (“It-Narrators”), Douglas and Festa (“Moral Ends”).  
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came to constitute an impasse in the distinction of sentimental from commercial exchanges. In other 
words, like authors, sentimental proprietors want to have it both ways, to cling to their sentiments 
and have others consume them. The appendix* explores these issues, primarily by looking at the 
failed constructions of sentimental value as the personal symbiosis between an individual-in-the-
making and a singularized object in Laurence Sterne’s pseudo-sentimental travelogue, A 
Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (1768). I argue that Sterne’s satire finds its 
motivation in the sudden joys found in the unexpected encounters between things and people that 
one can find in a world ruled by the “law of transitivity” rather than the nostalgic longing for forms 
of property that are less easily separated from their owners. In order to appreciate these fortuitous 
sympathetic exchanges, it is necessary to depart from the primarily pictorial models of sentimental 
sympathy and activate not only contemporary physiological models of sympathy but also older 
versions of sympathetic correspondences that rely more on the unreflective emotional response 
produced by things entirely beyond the control of the people they happen upon. 
 The thesis, then, will seek to demonstrate how personal properties become vital 
matters – both important and surprisingly lively – in eighteenth-century satiric dismantlings of self-
possession. Focusing on things that have the potential for becoming properties as well as less 
alienable properties held in “a kind of possession that is irreducible to ownership” (B. Brown 13), 
the analytical chapters seek to expose inanimate objects and animate subjects as poles of a 
continuum along which an array of other things search for a sense of belonging in their own right. 
Recognising this plasticity is not just a question of attending to the fissures of a necessarily divisive 
subject, but of addressing the complex involvement of things and persons. In an essay that borrows 
many of its insights from the anthropological examination of the personalization of property,34 
Margaret Radin suggests that the vexed relation between property and personhood must be 
recognized as “the problem of fetishism” (968) in so far as the alienability of properties can be 
measured against the degree to which “a particular object is bound up with its holder” (959). We 
invest something of ourselves in the objects we appropriate; when the investment is too great, the 
object can no longer be alienated without causing “a pain that cannot be relieved by the object’s 
replacement” (959). Only what is separate from us can be exchanged, yet only what is somehow 
attached to us can be our property, is properly ours to relinquish. Thus, if the inalienability of an 
object is determined by its relative implication in the personhood of its owner, this relation depends 
on the extent to which the object itself has acquired the characteristics of personhood, that is, the 
extent to which our personalty come to generate a personality of its own. As Radin suggests, while 
only a certain degree of self-investment in things can produce a well-developed person, its excess is 
“inconsistent with personhood or healthy self-constitution” (696) – classed as insane, the fetishist is 
hardly a person at all: “Judgements of insanity and fetishism are both made on the basis of the 
minimum indicia it takes to recognize an individual as one of us” (969). In the eighteenth century 
                                                 
34 In addition to Appadurai and Pietz, Marcel Mauss and Igor Kopytoff are worth mentioning. In a celebrated study on 
the gift, Mauss analyses practices of exchange and appropriation “in which persons and things merge” (61). The Roman 
res, for instance, was not “the crude, merely tangible thing, the simple, passive object of transaction that it has become” 
(Mauss 64). Rather, the thing passed on remained bound, if only "in part and for a time" (Mauss 64), to its original 
owner. Buying and selling were themselves complex acts of spiritual transferral, which involved “several symmetrically 
corresponding acts of taking possession, of things and persons” (67). Anthropologists such as Annette B. Weiner and 
James G. Carrier have elaborated and complicated Mauss' theories on property and gift-giving. Kopytoff attacks the 
Marxian separation of commodities and people by focusing on the "innate exuberance" (87) in an object that comes to 
light once it is “singularized”, that is, set apart and taken out of circulation for a while. Setting out to write a "cultural 
biography of things" (64) through which it becomes possible to chronicle their post-acquisitive lives, Kopytoff suggests 
that alongside the commercial process of commodification, there is an “autonomous cognitive and cultural process of 
singularization” (83), which allows the object to forge its own identity out of the material instantiations around which 
otherwise unconnected events, places, things, and people gather.  
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the establishment of such indicia came to rely on attempts to efforts to determine the kinds of things 
that could be thought to be personal properties (properties of personhood as well as personal 
possessions) and what was required to hold on to them.  
  It should be clear from the above that although I wish to explore how eighteenth-
century writings reflect and feed into certain historical forms of subjectivity, I do not assume the 
existence of a monolithic “modern subject” extricated from its setting and dislodged from the 
surrounding objects, as writers were progressively equipped with the proper technical tools.35 
Neither do I believe in the possibility of an archaeological excavation of an undifferentiated, 
unmoulded slab, that is, of a perfect retrieval of a primordial amorphousness out of which the 
subject and the object are formed. In this respect, Latour’s insistence on the nonmodernity of the 
“Modern Constitution” is useful. Rather than a fundamental break, a “Great Divide”, between the 
premodern involvement with things and a modern manipulation of them, the Enlightenment 
continues the production of hybrids that it condemns as premodern fetishism (Latour, We Have 
Never 13-49). For Latour, of course, the moderns are blind to such basic continuities, as they remain 
“unable to conceptualize themselves in continuity with the premoderns” (We Have Never 39). My 
contention is that at least in the satiric imagination of the period there was no such blind-spot. On 
the contrary, satiric constructions of the possessive individual carve out a space of hybrid 
assemblages in which things and persons congregate, if only for a little while. Eighteenth-century 
satire, then, shows a remarkable sensitivity to “the countless small divides” that “divide up beings, 
in the properties they attribute to them, in the mobilization they consider acceptable” (Latour, We 
Have Never 107) at the expense of the assertion of the “Great Divide” between nonhumans and 
humans, culture and nature, objects and subjects. Satire allows the playful etching not only of the 
interiorized individual is chiselled alongside other more shallow, less stable shapes, which do not 
necessarily prefigure the finished subject. When considered in this light, the history of subjectivity 
becomes a heteromorphic process that cannot be integrated into any unidirectional evolution with 
an already set final form towards which it inevitably advances. As such, the history of the mutual 
constitution of the human subject and the inanimate object necessarily questions the abstract 
separation by which they are established as analytical entities. The self-possession that unfolds in 
“the between” is delimited but not exhausted by the vertigo of an endless fall into the ethereal 
projections of a mind that has no outside as well as the nausea of a sudden collision with a matters 
that resist interiorization. To explore the vital matters that take place between these two poles, we 
must, at least for a while, give in to the truth of “the conceit that [things], like persons, have lives” 
(Appadurai ll3), that there is life in things.  
                                                 
35 Ian Watt notoriously speaks of Daniel Defoe’s “gaucherie” (120), which stands in the way of the proper development 
of psychological characterization that later techniques of psychological realism made available. 
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II. Thinking Things and Collecting Persons 
 
i. "That conscious thinking thing": Vital Matter and the Problem of Personal 
Identity 
 
[B]y the intervention of some very small addition or subtraction of matter…  
almost of any thing, may at length be made any thing…  
Robert Boyle. "An Excursion about the Relative Nature of Physical Qualities" (1666)  
 
In the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1694) Locke added a chapter 
on “Identity and Diversity” in response to William Molyneux who had requested a more elaborate 
discussion of the principium individuationis in the work. Locke argues that without innate ideas, 
men are furnished with ideas “according as the Objects, they converse with, afford greater or less 
variety” (II.i.7 107). What makes “man himself to himself” (II.xxvii.10 336) is memory as the 
“Repository” or “Store-house of our Ideas” (I.x.3 150). Locke’s self is the product of the continuous 
accumulation and re-circulation of perceptions – it is in fact nothing but “a conscious thinking 
thing” (II.xxvii.17 341). What distinguishes the self as a thinking thing from other things is 
consciousness, and “in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being” 
(II.xxvii.9 335). In paragraph seventeen Locke specifies that consciousness constitutes personal 
identity by way of appropriation in one of the most quoted passages of the new chapter on identity 
and diversity:  
 
That with which the consciousness of this present thinking 
thing can join it self, makes the same Person, and is one 
self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it 
self, and owns all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as 
far as that consciousness reaches. (II.xxvii.17 341) 
 
What makes it possible for the thinking thing to become a self, 36 for it to become a person, is the 
constitution of a possessive relationship. Locke's use of the verb “attribute” unlocks an ambiguity 
that entwines his definition of personal identity with his theory of property. Among the meanings 
the Oxford English Dictionary lists for the verb is “to ascribe as a quality or ‘attribute’ belonging, 
proper, or inherent” and “to assign, bestow, give, concede, yield to any one, as his right”. It is in this 
space of signification between belonging as “possessing” and as “being a part of” that Locke moves 
when he uses the verb: being a person is having a person. Consciousness is conjoined to 
proprietorship, and both are necessary to preserve individual moral accountability, that is “the Right 
and Justice of Reward and Punishment” (II, xxvii, 18, 341) in this world and the next. Only what is 
owned can be owned up to: I can only be “concern’d, and justly accountable for any 
Action…appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness” (Ii, xxvii, 16, 341). Yet, although what 
is being described here is clearly an act of appropriation, it is less clear what or whom it is that does 
the appropriating. Whereas the property is specified respectively as “consciousness”, “actions”, 
“self” and “person” (which are all attributed or owned), the proprietor remains a less substantial 
entity the place of which has been taken up by a nominal relative. “That which” owns and attributes 
to it self, the subject to which consciousness can join itself is nothing but a grammatical 
                                                 
36 I side with Fernando Vidal’s suggestion that “self…is for Locke that which the word person names” (950) against 
Raymond Martin's claim that “persons are thinkers…whereas…selves are sensors” (48). Although this may be the case 
in II.xxvii.17 and II.xxvii.9, there is no consistent use of this distinction in the rest of the chapter. Indeed Locke 
explicitly writes that “Person, as I take it, is the name for this self” (II.xxvii.26).  
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construction the antecedent of which is, as will be shown below, also rather obscure.37 Before 
returning to this tricky passage, it is necessary to recognize the originality of Locke’s concept of 
personhood and identity in the light of the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century debate on 
personal identity.  
 In stressing that identity of consciousness determines the identity of persons, Locke 
distances himself from the scholastic variants of Aristotelian hylomorphism as well as from René 
Descartes’ suggestion that the self relied on the sameness of one indivisible spirit or soul which 
remained the same throughout a person’s existence. But, as Fernando Vidal has demonstrated, 
Locke’s eagerness to make identity independent of sameness of substance or form is not only an 
attempt to redefine the terms of the scholastic search for the principium individuationis but also an 
attempt to bypass some of the problems connected with the philosophy of mechanist materialism 
that had established itself in the last part of the seventeenth century and to which Locke at least 
partly subscribed (Vidal 952).38 Mechanist philosophy opposed scholastic hylomorphism according 
to which matter was an undifferentiated substratum subject to change only through its potential 
union with different forms. To the scholastics, then, what allowed each individual thing to stand 
apart was its single continuing substantial form. Edwin McCann explains: “[E]ach natural object 
has a substantial form which, as the principle of its unity and operations, unites the matter of which 
it is composed into a single individual thing (unum per se), constitutes it a member of its species, 
and thus provides the conditions of its continuing identity” (63).  Matter itself remained the same, 
inert and immutable. According to the new mechanist theories, however, matter changed as a result 
of variations in the number, motion and position of particles (indivisible atoms or divisible 
corpuscules) that were the same for all bodies (Schofield 3-5). With no underlying substratum that 
remained the same, nothing seemed to preclude the alchemistic transmutation of one thing into 
another. In “An Excursion about the Relative Nature of Physical Qualities” (1666), Robert Boyle 
finds evidence for the principle that any thing may be transformed into anything else in an 
experiment concerning the transformation of water into wood: 
 
Since bodies, having but one common matter, can be 
differenced but by accidents, which seem all of them to be 
the effects and consequents of local motion, I see not why it 
should be absurd to think, that (at least among inanimate 
bodies) by the intervention of some very small addition or 
subtraction of matter…and of an orderly series of 
alterations, disposing by degrees the matter to be 
                                                 
37 There is a similar vagueness in the quoted passage of paragraph 16 in which actions are “appropriated to me” by 
consciousness. As Raymond Martin and John Barresi have noted, it is impossible to determine “what in such a…claim 
is the referent of the word me” (22). If the self is consciousness, then what is the “me” that is there before consciousness 
begins to appropriate?  
38 The degree to which Locke embraced mechanism has been subject of much debate. Michael Ayers is of the opinion 
that Locke can – with some reservations – be classed as a “pure mechanist” (135). For the argument that Locke was 
“never seriously committed to mechanism” (352), see Matthew Stuart. In addition to this there is some terminological 
disagreement about the philosophical tenets covered by the term. Schofield uses the term “materialism” to designate the 
Aristotelian notion of matter's inertness and opposes it to “dynamic corpuscularity” or “mechanism”, according to 
which matter is “’endued’ with central powers” (8), most notably motion. To Yolton, on the other hand, “materialism” 
distinguishes a notion of matter that is not only endowed with superadded powers of activity, but inherently full of life 
(92). Although, as will become clear below, Yolton’s distinction between inherent and superadded powers is important, 
I use “materialism” throughout as an umbrella concept that includes all dynamic concepts of matter, reserving 
“mechanism” for the theories that leave things themselves passive and powerless, considering the activity of matter a 
result of physical impulse, contact and number only. 
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transmuted, almost of any thing, may at length be made any 
thing… (474) 
 
While only a few contemporary chemists shared Boyle’s conviction (Kuhn 22-23), the universal 
transmutability of all things (not necessarily excluding animate bodies) was a logical, if theoretical, 
consequence of the dynamic and corpuscular concept of matter.  
In view of this consequence, the question of the principium individuationis became 
less about locating the essential forms within a thing that could ensure individuality than about 
determining how a thing that was not the same from one moment to the next could still remain 
itself. Locke found his answer in consciousness, a concept that involves self-reference over time 
rather than selfsameness in essence. As Paul Ricoeur has remarked, Locke’s turn to consciousness 
marks “a conceptual reversal in which selfhood was silently substituted for sameness” (126) as a 
criterion for identity. The difference between the Lockean and the Aristotelian identity “is nothing 
more than the difference between a substantial or formal identity and a narrative identity” relying 
on the “cohesion of one life time” (Ricoeur 246). In fact, just as what ensures the continuance of the 
same person is “the same continued consciousness” (II.xxvii.25 346), so does what constitutes the 
same organism rely on its “participation of the same continued Life” (II.xxvii.5 331). A mass of 
matter cannot afford to lose or gain any of its constituent particles, for “if one of [the] Atoms be 
taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same Mass” (II.xxvii.3 330). The identity of a 
living organism, however, does not rely on this kind of mereological essentialism. As long as a 
mass of matter is organized “in one coherent Body, partaking of one Common Life, it continues to 
be the same” (II.xxvii.4 331). Yet, if an organism is constituted wholly by a “Collection of Matter” 
(II.xxvii.4 331), and such a collection cannot lose or gain any of its parts and still remain the same, 
why is it that the organism can do so? In other words, if a man is at any one time a specific mass of 
particles the identity of which depends on a specific mereological relation, how can he remain the 
same from one moment to the next, that is, how can he survive the replacement of the “successively 
fleeting Particles of matter” (II.xxvii.7 332) by which he is constituted in the time that has lapsed? 
In paragraph eight Locke provides a solution that incorporates both temporal continuity and 
constant turnover of matter, suggesting that “the same successive Body not shifted all at once, 
must…go to the making of the same Man” (II.xxvii.8 335). Something must remain the same, if the 
man is to be himself from one moment to the next, but Locke does not specify what this means. Is a 
single limb enough? Is it enough that one atom remain the same? William Alston and Jonathan 
Bennett have pointed out “the awkward, ingenious phrase ‘the same successive body not shifted all 
at once’ shows Locke straining with the difficulty” (29) of maintaining the identity of a corpuscular 
organism without resorting to the Aristotelian notion of substantial forms. 
Although the notion of personal identity is construed as an analogy of organismal 
identity (consciousness is to the identity of person as life is to the identity of man), the two are 
conceptually distinct. In fact, Locke’s emphasis on consciousness as a repository that ensures the 
continued ownership of past and present experiences enables him to establish a notion of personal 
identity that is independent of sameness of immaterial as well as material substances. Although 
persons are “vitally united” (II.xxvii.11 337) to the material “Particles” (II.xxvii.11 337) that 
constitute their bodies, the loss or gain of material parts does not affect the continuance of 
personhood: 
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Thus we see the Substance, whereof personal self consisted 
at one time, may be varied at another, without the change 
of personal Identity: There being no Question about the 
same Person, though the Limbs, which but now were a part 
of it, be cut off. (II, xxvii, 11, 337) 
 
Likewise a person may be associated with a number of different, successively existing immaterial 
substances (souls) without ceasing to exist as the same person. The question is, Locke insists, “what 
makes the same Person, and not whether it be the same Identical Substance, which always thinks in 
the same Person, which in this case matter not at all” (II.xxvii.10 336). Thus, it is possible (though 
perhaps not likely)39 that personal identity “can be continued in a succession of several substances” 
(II.xxvii.10 336).  
A person, then, has neither material nor immaterial constancy: “[T]he union or 
separation of…a Spiritual Substance would make no variation of personal identity, any more than 
that of any Particle of Matter does” (II.xxvii.25 346).  Therefore “person” is merely a “Forensick 
Term appropriating Actions and their Merit” (II.xxvii.26 346). In short personhood relies on the 
ability of an individual “personality” (II.xxvii.26 346) to retain ownership of whatever material or 
immaterial parts have been acquired as his own. That this is a precarious endeavour is suggested by 
the puzzles that Locke outlines at the end of the chapter. Distinguishing between “man”, a purely 
biological concept covering the human organism, and “person”, a concept comprising agency and 
self-consciousness that relates only to “the sameness of a rational Being” (II.xxvii.9 335), Locke 
suggests that there is no necessary coincidence between the two. It is possible, therefore, for two 
men to share one personality as well as for two persons to be associated with the same man (see for 
instance, II.xxvii.23) – what determines sameness of person is solely consciousness. Here we return 
to the question of the elusive appropriator. The paragraph begins with perhaps the oddest example 
of the separation between organismal and personal identity, known as the case of the severed finger. 
The example parallels the above quoted section of paragraph eleven in which Locke makes it clear 
that the loss of a body part would not hinder the continuance of a person, so long as the lost part 
remains “separate…from that consciousness” (II.xxvii.11 337). In this case, however, it is the lost 
limb and not the remaining body that comes to constitute the person:  
 
Upon separation of this little Finger, should this 
consciousness go along with the little Finger, and leave the 
rest of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger would be the 
Person, the same Person; and self then would have nothing 
to do with the rest of the Body. (II.xxvii.17 341)   
 
It is from this example of the conscious finger that Locke reasons that “it is the consciousness that 
goes along with the Substance, when one part is separated from another, which makes the same 
Person” (II.xxvii.17 341). It is, as we have already seen Locke add, “[t]hat with which the 
consciousness of this present thinking thing can join it self” that “makes the same Person” 
(II.xxvii.17 341). Yet the referent of “that which” makes a person necessarily refers back to the 
“Substance” of the severed limb with which the consciousness goes along in the previous sentence. 
What appropriates consciousness, then, is not an organism entire, but a limb, an appendage, a piece 
of mere matter, a thing.     
                                                 
39 “I agree the more probable Opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the Affection of one individual 
immaterial Substance” (Locke II.xxvii.25 345). 
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 Locke means to prove the integrity and indestructibility of personal identity anchored 
in consciousness by suggesting that a person can suffer the loss of nearly his entire body without 
losing himself. Once selfhood has been severed from the material organism, persons are no longer 
threatened by the corpuscularian transmutability of matter as defined by Boyle and other 
mechanists. Yet, as will be made clear below, the image of the thinking, severed finger “vitally 
united” to the personalising consciousness seems to invite the same ambiguities as Locke’s theory 
of property in the person expounded in Two Treatises of Government (1689). Is the severed finger 
an object that has emulated the human ability to think, or is it a person who, having lost just a little 
too many of his vital parts, has come to relinquish its humanity to what used to be a mere bodily 
appendage? One could object that these questions that are premised on the very confusion of man 
and person against which Locke writes. Indeed to Locke the human form was no guarantee for 
personhood. In paragraph eight, Locke insists that a parrot capable of rational discourse could not 
be classed as a man, but nowhere does he suggest that such a creature could not be classed as a 
person.  
 Nevertheless, to many of his contemporaries and to philosophers and writers of the 
following century, the association of personal identity with the extension of consciousness was not 
as much a guarantee as a destruction of individuation. One central discussion stood between Bishop 
Edward Stillingfleet and Locke. Corresponding with Locke in the aftermath of the publication of 
the second edition of the Essay, Stillingfleet objects that Locke's identification of the word 
“consciousness” with the word “person” does not comply with “the common use of Language,” 
which holds a person to be a “compleat intelligent Substance” (“An Answer” 578, 611). To 
Stillingfleet Locke’s notion of an ever-changing consciousness persisting as a mere store-house of 
fleeting sensory perceptions depends on “such a Substance as cannot be preserved without an 
Organiz’d Body” (“An Answer” 572). This in turn ties personal identity too tightly to “a Material 
Substance which wholly [loses] its Personal Identity by Death. So that here can be no Personal 
Identity at all…” (“An Answer” 572)  In his own work on the subject, A Vindication of the Doctrine 
of the Trinity (1997), Stillingfleet maintains that the foundation of identity “in Man is that vital 
Principle which results from the Union of Soul and Body” (453), thereby ensuring the doctrine of 
resurrection.40 In the early eighteenth century, the debate between Locke and Stillingfleet was 
continued by Locke’s disciple Anthony Collins and the philosopher Samuel Clarke. Whereas 
Collins echoes Locke in stating that “No Man has the same numerical Consciousness to day that he 
had Yesterday” (1711 43), Clarke believes this notion threatens the “Principle of Personal 
Individuality, upon which the Justice of all Reward or Punishment is entirely grounded” (88). 
Collins, on the other hand, defends “the Question…whether Thinking can be an Affection of 
Solidity” (1711 67): “Consciousness is not a mere abstract Name, but is the Power of the Brain 
answering to the Powers in Matter that produce Sensations in us” (1711 43).41 
 Almost twenty years after Locke's Essay Shaftesbury still considers the question of 
“Sameness or Identity of Being” (The Moralists III.i 351) pertinent. There is, he thinks, “a strange 
Simplicity in this You and Me, that in reality they should be still one and the same, when neither 
one Atom of Body, one Passion, nor one Thought remains the same” (The Moralists III.i 351).42 
Shaftesbury himself resorts to a sameness of purpose, a “Sympathy of Parts” (The Moralists III.i 
                                                 
40 For more on this discussion, please see Welch, Yolton (39,42) and Fox (“Locke”). 
41 Collins is very clear about this: “I certainly think the Eye to be the Organ of Seeing, as I do the Nose of Smelling, or 
the Lungs of Breathing, and I may add the Brain of Thinking...” (1711 11). In 2011 the Clarke-Collins correspondence 
was collected and published in a single volume.  
42 In “Miscellany IV” Shaftesbury argues that as Locke himself admits that consciousness “may be as well false as real 
in respect of what is past”, the suggestion that personal identity resides in consciousness leaves question of “the same 
successional We or I” undecided (III.i.2 193-94, 194).  
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350) as an explanation for identity – a construction that is not unlike the notion of “life” that Locke 
had used to establish the identity of man. (Like many others, Shaftesbury did not recognize Locke’s 
distinction between man and person). If there is no such sympathy, that is, if there is “Nothing, at 
last, which thinks, acts, or understands for All,” then everything will be reduced to “Matter 
modify’d; a Lump in motion, with here and there a Thought, or scatter’d Portion of dissoluble 
Intelligence” (The Moralists III.i 357). Later in the century, Joseph Butler also took his point of 
departure in Locke’s theory in The Analogy of Religion (1736). Like Locke, he considered 
appropriation the defining action of that “living Agent each Man calls himself” (17), but unlike 
Locke, Butler is very clear about the duality of proprietor and property. Whereas the appropriated 
“Quantities of Matter” may be lost or alienated “and actually are in a daily Course of Succession”, 
the proprietor "remains one and the same permanent living Being” (18). The property is 
“compounded and so discerptible”, the proprietor is a “single and indivisible Power” (16). 
Although, deferring to Locke, Butler concedes that it is impossible to prove empirically whether 
this single and indivisible self is a material or immaterial, he considers it a reasonable conclusion 
that “our gross organized Bodies…are no Part of ourselves” (17). What is appropriated is therefore 
not, as in Locke, part of oneself, but rather merely an owned thing the dispossession of which does 
not place the self in jeopardy.43 Thus, there is no principal difference between the matter of our 
body parts and the “foreign Matter” of things like glasses, artificial limbs or microscopes which are 
also “Instruments, which the living Persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with” (22).  
In an appendix to the Analogy of Religion specifically devoted to the “strange 
Perplexities…raised about the Meaning of…Identity or Sameness of Person” (301), Butler 
summarizes the main points of Locke’s “hasty observations” as follows: 
 
That Personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: 
That it lives and dies, begins and ends continually: That no 
one can any more remain one and the same Person two 
Moments together, than two successive Moments can be 
one and the same Moment: That our Substance is indeed 
continually changing, but whether this be so or not, is, it 
seems, nothing to the Purpose, since it is not Substance, but 
Consciousness alone, which constitutes Personality; which 
Consciousness, being successive, cannot be the same in any 
two Moments, nor consequently the Personality constituted 
by it. (305)  
 
Butler believes that Locke cannot base identity on consciousness and consistently maintain “that the 
Person is really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious Sense” (306). But if personal identity 
is merely fictitious, there can be no accountability and thus no final punishment on the Day of 
Judgement. Butler therefore asserts the traditional view that the permanence of personality is 
ensured by a substance (300-308). Only three years later, Hume maintains that identity was indeed 
the imagined link between our successive perceptions; as such it is nothing but “a fiction” (I.iv.6 
166). We cannot, Hume argues, find sameness in what is really the variable perceptions of 
consciousness without the operation of the imagination: “Thus we feign the continu’d existence of 
                                                 
43 Butler, then, does not recognize Locke’s caution that not all particles of matter could be shifted at once, if the man 
should remain the same. In attempt to safeguard the Biblical theory of bodily resurrection, Butler argues: “We have 
passed undestroyed through so many and great Revolutions of Matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves; why 
should we imagine Death twill be so fatal to us?...That the Alienation has been gradual in one Case, and in the other 
will be more at once, does not prove any thing to the contrary” (19). 
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the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption; and  run into the notion of a soul, and self, 
and substance, to disguise the variation” (I.iv.6 166). Even later in the century, the transience of 
personal identity is bemoaned by Thomas Reid in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785). 
Although maintaining that memory afforded some permanency, Reid thinks that “identity cannot, in 
its proper sense, be applied to our pains, our pleasures, our thoughts, or any operation of our 
minds…They are all successive in their nature like time itself, no two moments of which can be the 
same moment” (317). Thus “if personal identity consisted in consciousness, it would certainly 
follow, that no man is the same person any two moments of his life” (336). As Raymond Martin 
and John Berresi have shown, such worries continued to be expressed in the early nineteenth 
century. Thus in 1805 Hazlitt considered it a “plain” fact that “this conscious being may be 
decompounded, entirely destroyed, renewed again, or multiplied in a great number of beings” (qtd. 
in Martin and Barresi 148). 
Furthermore, not all of Locke’s contemporaries subscribed to his distinction between 
man and person. Vidal points to the dismissal of Locke's distinction by the theologian Humphrey 
Hody who instead insists on the body as the carrier of personal identity. Thus, according to Hody, 
“we cannot be the same Men unless we have the same Bodies” so that if “Euphorbus, and Homer, 
and Ennius, had one and the same Soul, yet they would not have been one and the same, but Three 
distinct Men” (qtd. in Vidal 957). But with this realisation comes the fear that the weakening of the 
old Aristotelian paradigm of substantial forms might carry the dissolution of personal identity. If the 
principle of individuation is not to be found in a unifying essential form, that is, if bodies are merely 
matter variously figured and positioned, is there anything at all that holds the parts together in the 
aggregate that is man? How many parts may be lost, before the man himself is lost? Such 
misgivings find nourishment in the knowledge that, as Alston and Bennet put it, “no composite 
being is totally self-sufficient” (39):  “For if a thing has parts it is, in a sense, dependent on them; 
since it could lose the ones it now has, it is, so to say, at their mercy so far as retaining its integrity 
is concerned” (39). Hody solves the problem of bodily disintegration by nominating what he 
thought were “the integrant and necessary parts” of the body as “those which remain after the 
utmost degree of Maceration, without which the Body would not be Integral, but Imperfect” (qtd. 
in Vidal 957). According to Hody the integral parts include the bones, skin, tendons, ligaments and 
nerves; as long as these parts were intact, the man himself would be.44 
Yet, as we have seen, Locke remains agnostic about the composition of persons (Conn 
121). Although he admits that it is probable that persons are compound beings consisting of “the 
same immaterial Spirit united to the same Animal” (II.xxvii.21 343), he leaves the possibility open 
that persons are merely material organisms “without any regard to an immaterial soul” (II.xxvii.21 
343). In a later chapter on the subject of “the Extent of Humane Knowledge” (IV.iii), he maintains 
that it is 
 
                                                 
44 Others found it more difficult to determine which were the essential and which were the spare parts. 
As Vidal shows, the issue was central to the discussions of anthropophagy and bodily resurrection that took place 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The question was whether the consumption of one man by another 
would affect the Christian promise of the resurrection of the dead, according to which the resurrected will be not only 
spiritually but corporeally identical to their former living selves. If one person eats and thereby incorporates another, 
how is it possible for either of the two original bodies to rise again? In addition to Hody, the philosopher Samuel Clarke 
and the Dutch mathematician and naturalist Bernard Nieuwentijt continued the discussion begun by Augustine and 
other early Christians of whether or not there were parts of the human body that were indigestible, and whether or not 
the digested matter could somehow be retrieved and reformed for resurrection. The matter also took up space in the 
correspondence between Stillingfleet and Locke, though Locke insisted that he had solved the problem with the 
separation of person and man, whereby resurrection of the same persons could take place “in what Bodies soever they 
appear” (II.xxvii.26 347).   
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impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas, 
without revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has 
not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a 
power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to 
Matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial Substance: It 
being, in respect of our Notions, not much more remote 
from our Comprehension to conceive, that GOD can, if he 
pleases, superadd to it another Substance, with a Faculty of 
Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking consists, 
nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been 
pleased to give that Power… (IV.iii.6 540-541)  
 
Locke is careful to insist that he does not mean in “any way [to] lessen the belief of the soul’s 
immateriality” (IV.iii.6 541), explaining in the following paragraphs that matter cannot 
spontaneously produce thought nor motion outwith God’s power to superadd these. Yet, as Yolton 
points out, the very hint that there might be vitality (whether inherent or superadded) in matter  
posed a threat not only to the “orthodoxy of religion” (4) but also to the notion of matter as 
“senseless, sluggish, and inactive” (4) that seemed integral to the safeguarding of human integrity. 
Stillingfleet objected that Locke’s suggestion could be construed as an ungodly confusion of matter 
and thought. In his reply to Stillingfleet, Locke defends the logical tenability of his argument and 
goes “one step further” to suggest the possibility that “God may give to matter thought, reason and 
volition, as well as sense and spontaneous motion” (qtd. in Yolton 18).  
The notion of vital matter45 was supported by new advances in physics. Already in his 
1687 work, The Mathematical Principles of Natural philosophy (1668), Isaac Newton had had 
identified the “mutual attraction” of bodies across space, by which they would be caused to be 
“moved among themselves” (XI 218). Newton is careful to emphasize that the forces of attraction 
that he describes bear no relation to actual “physical disquisitions”, as he is treating only 
“mathematical subjects” (XI 218). The attraction and repulsion of material bodies are thus not a 
property of matter itself, but rather a manifestation of an external “active principle” (Newton, 1718, 
376) of divine origin. Nevertheless, in the English second edition of his Opticks (1713), Newton 
boldly indicates that “small Particles of Bodies” have “certain Powers, Virtues or Forces, by which 
they act at a distance, not only upon the Rays of Light for reflecting, refracting and inflecting them, 
but also upon one another for producing a great part of the Phænomena of Nature” (“Query 31” 
350).  Thus, there is “a certain most subtle Spirit which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies”, 
and it is by the force and action of this etherial medium that the particles of bodies mutually attract 
one another (Mathematical Principles 93). Newton clearly states that it has a material existence. In 
the Opticks it is described as a kind of “Aether” that “(like our Air) may contain Particles which 
endeavour to recede from one another..and that…are exceedingly smaller than those of Air, or even 
than those of Light” (326). It is exactly because this ether is “exceedingly more rare and elastick 
than Air” that it has the capability both to be almost non-resistant to the motion of bodies and to 
cause the effect of attraction “by endeavouring to expand it self” (Opticks 327). This porous ether is 
the force that makes bodies move by pressing itself on them.   
Newton still maintains a distinction between forces and matter – the elasticity of ether 
is a result of the interparticular forces, not of particles themselves; matter existed independently of 
the surrounding forces. Yet, as P. M. Heimann and J. E. McGuire make clear, Newton’s reference 
to this “force-aether” makes it possible for a number of later eighteenth-century writers not only to 
                                                 
45 The notion of vital matter was a break with Cartesian substance dualism. According to Descartes the same substance 
cannot have both physical and non-physical properties (Conn 117). 
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entertain the possibility of motion as immanent in material entities themselves but also to doubt 
solidity as the essence of matter.46 Already in 1704 John Toland proclaimed that “action is essential 
to Matter”, existing in “the most heavy and hard Body” (qtd. in Yolton 101), and in 1712 Robert 
Greene suggested that activity was immanent in matter. To Greene extension and solidity are 
merely abstract ideas and not real properties of matter; rather “Action or Force in general is the 
Essence or Substratum of Matter” (qtd. in Heimann 276). In the second half of the century the 
notion of active matter are developed by thinkers like Joseph Priestley. Abolishing the dichotomy 
between force and matter, Priestley defines matter as “a substance possessed of the property of 
extension, and of powers of attraction or repulsion” (xxxviii). Priestley does not merely add force 
to matter, for he considers the theory that “two substances that have no common property, and yet 
are capable of intimate connection and mutual action…both absurd and modern” (xxxviii). What he 
promotes is rather a new kind of matter that broaches the distinction between materiality and 
immateriality; Priestley’s matter is force and extension. 
 
The principles of the Newtonian philosophy were no sooner 
known, that it was seen how few, in comparison, of the 
phenomena of nature, were owning to solid matter, and 
how much to powers, which were only supposed to 
accompany and surround the solid parts of matter…Now 
when solidity had apparently so little to do in the system, it 
is really a wonder that it did not occur to philosophers 
sooner, that perhaps there might be nothing for it to do at 
all… (12) 
 
Without the forces or powers that makes it cohere, matter itself is nothing; no “figured thing can 
exist, unless the parts of which it consists have a mutual attraction, so as either to keep contiguous, 
or to preserve a certain distance from each other” (5). With solidity itself disappearing, things 
become less impenetrable, more liquid. Experimenting with two pieces of money, those most liquid 
of things which after all require the pressure of a “very considerable” (13) weight before they can 
be seen to constitute “the same continued piece of metal” (13), Priestley cannot but conclude that 
things resist convergence not because of “solid resisting particles” (15) but because of their “powers 
of resistance” (15). Thus, as Yolton notes, when neither solidity nor extension is part of the essence 
of matter, matter becomes etherial: “The ‘materiality’ of matter recedes as matter becomes active” 
(92). As the concept of matter changed from solid corpuscules to more insubstantial powers, things 
become a little more fleeting than Locke would have wanted. At the same time, when all things 
material can propel themselves into motion, it becomes difficult to reject the possibility that thought 
too resides in matter itself. Indeed, this is the conclusion Priestley wants his reader to draw when he 
claims that thought “is a property of the nervous system, or rather of the brain” (27).47 But if 
thought is an activity of matter itself, how can one distinguish between one "thinking thing" and 
another? Certainly, when matter itself thinks, the difference between active, self-determining, 
automotive spiritual beings and inert, impenetrable material bodies becomes more elusive. The 
distance between people and things diminishes. When matter becomes endued with motion and the 
capacity to think, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the thinking thing that is man and 
                                                 
46 For more on this development, see Heimann. 
47 Priestley restates this, setting out “to prove the uniform composition of man, or that what we call mind, or the 
principle of perception and thought, is not a substance distinct from the body, but the result of corporeal 
organization,…for whatever matter may be, I think I have sufficiently proved that the human mind is nothing more than 
a modification of it” (qtd. in Heimann and McGuire 270).  
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other kinds of things which are merely systems of matter. Indeed, Yolton finds in Locke and 
Newton the “seeds for later writers to say this is precisely what man is – a system of matter with 
sense, spontaneous motion, thought and reason” (18).  
What difference, then, is there between a clock and a man? Analogies between the 
workings of bodies and those of mechanical contraptions like clocks were common already in the 
mid-seventeenth century. In the Treatise on Man (1664) Descartes had used the metaphor of a clock 
to illustrate the workings of certain bodily functions, and Hobbes had begun the Leviathan (1651) 
by asking why, when “seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some 
principal part within”, we could not say “that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by 
springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life” (11). At least until the 1740s analogies 
like these were common among writers influenced by the new mechanist philosophy.48 The 
physiologist Herman Boerhaave, for instance, used the hydraulic machine as a model for the human 
body, finding that at least “some portions of the human body correspond in their structure with 
mechanical instruments" and therefore "must be governed by the same laws” (qtd. in Schofield 
193). Locke also took up the metaphor and compared a mechanical watch and the living organism: 
 
For example what is a Watch? ’Tis plain ’tis nothing but a 
fit Organization, or Construction of Parts, to a certain end, 
which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to 
attain. If we would suppose this Machine one continued 
Body, all whose organized Parts were repair’d, increas’d or 
diminish’d, by a constant Addition or Separation of 
insensible Parts, with one Common Life, we should have 
something very much like the Body of an Animal… 
(II.xxvii.5 331) 
 
Here Locke is limiting the mechanical analogy to the body of an animal, but in the subsequent 
paragraph he goes on to claim that the identity of man, “like that of other Animals” is placed “in 
one fitly organized body”  (II.xxvii.6 332). Only if there is something “in the Nature of Matter” (II, 
xxvii.6 332) that secures the identity of man, is it possible to exclude the “very strange” (II.xxvii.6 
332) theories of the transmigration of souls.  
Thus, in the eighteenth century, automata were constructed not only for entertainment, 
but to explore the practical truth of the new materialist philosophy (Chapuis and Droz). In 1738 
Jacques Vaucanson put on display three automata in a Paris hotel. Alongside two mechanical 
musicians (a flute and a pipe-and-tabor player), the prime attraction was an artificial duck, the most 
notable characteristic of which was its ability to digest and after a suitable pause excrete its food. As 
opposed to the seventeenth-century waterpowered automata, which imitated living beings only in 
appearance, the mechanical duck also imitated the internal functioning of the animal. According to 
a later description in Dictionnaire des Sciences (1777) the duck was capable of imitating “the 
digestive process in three things, firstly, the swallowing of the food, secondly the maceration, 
cooking or dissolving of it, and thirdly the action causing it to leave the body in a markedly changed 
form” (qtd. in Chapuis and Droz 241). Similarly, it was the anatomical likeness of the flute player 
that was highlighted in the advertisement of the display, which stressed the “infinity of wires and 
steel chains…[forming] the movement of the fingers, in the same way as in a living man, by the 
dilation and contraction of the muscles” (qtd. in Riskin, “Defecating” 601). What was most 
remarkable about the android flute player, however, was its respiratory system, which allowed it to 
                                                 
48 In addition to the quoted sources, the Gaby Wood and Kang also provide an overview of eighteenth-century automata 
and their metaphorical uses. 
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produce music by blowing air from three sets of bellows connected to a set of windpipes. In other 
words, the flute player’s music did not arise from a music box hidden within the figure but from the 
flute itself, which was operated as any other flute.  
 Not only representing but also simulating the matter of life, Vaucanson’s automata 
initiated an era of mechanical construction focused on the production of simulated life in matter, 
which Jessica Riskin has called “the period of simulation” (“Eighteenth-Century” 101).49 While 
seventeenth-century and nineteenth century automata also illustrated analogies between man and 
the machine, life and mechanics, the eighteenth century distinguishes itself by “the very literal way 
in which it construction the similarity between animal and artificial machinery” (Riskin 
“Eighteenth-Century” 101). Already in 1753 the German Friedrich von Knaus had begun to 
construct automata that would solve the problem of mechanical writing, succeeding in 1760 in 
making what he called a “selbstschreibende Maschine” capable of writing 68 words in French 
(Chapuis and Droz 290-91). Knaus’ feat was topped by Pierre Jacquet-Droz when in 1774 he 
exhibited a mechanical boy, producing finished letters in a careful writing style (Chapuis and Droz 
293). Speaking, however, was considered too complicated, too human a process to be imitated. One 
review of Vaucanson’s automata thus considered it impossible to simulate “what goes on in the 
larynx and glottis…[and] the action of the tongue, its folds, its movements, its varied and 
imperceptible rubbings, all the modifications of the jaw and the lips” (qtd. in Riskin, “Defecating” 
617). La Mettrie also found that it would require a great degree of skill to produce a speaking 
machine, although he adds that even that “may not be altogether impossible” (73). Marking the 
point when the theoretical possibility of thinking and automotive matter brings the mechanical 
metaphor to take on a life of its own, simulative automata simultaneously draw and relocate the 
boundaries between human and thing, between intelligence and rote repetition.  
The “fear of automatical man” (45) that Yolton finds in the opposition to the 
materialist-mechanist hypothesis cannot only be attributed to the mechanical reproduction of the 
properties to which man was thought solely to be entitled. What was perhaps just as disturbing was 
the nagging suspicion – also found in Locke’s theory of personal identity – that the location of 
motion, self-propelled movement, in mere objects somehow threatened personal self-sameness. In 
L'Homme Machine (1748), Julian Offray de la Mettrie used Vaucanson’s automata to illustrate his 
theory of the “man-machine”, including the hypothesis of vital parts.50 Although La Mettrie stresses 
that the power of movement was to be found in the organization of matter in “the whole body”, he 
endows the individual material parts of the body with an extensive power of self-determination. 
Thus he finds “undeniable” evidence “that every fibre, that the minutest parts of organized bodies, 
                                                 
49 For an overview of earlier automata and waterworks, see Silvio Bedini. 
50 Although there were no outspoken proponents of La Mettrie's man-machine hypothesis, Yolton mentions the 
pamphleteer Henry Layton as a radical precursor to La Mettrie. A closer look at Layton proves that he was eager to 
promote the new mechanist way of thinking. Like Locke, Layton saw no reason why God could not have made “use of 
Matter and Motion to produce Effects, that must always be wonderful in our Eyes” (“Observations upon Dr. Nicholl’s 
Book” 3): 
 
I find it more easy for me to conceive, That God can make his fine 
Piece of Clock-work, Man, to exercise the Powers and Faculties of 
Life, Motion, Vegetation, Sensation, Intellect, and Thought, by the 
Acting of a Material Spirit, in the exquisitely Fram’d Parts and Organs 
ordain’d by him in the Human Person to such purposes. (6) 
 
Man is “an Intelligent Piece of Clockwork” (4), Layton argues. There is, then, “in Man…nothing Intelligent by it self”; 
it is “the Man only, and his whole Person that is Intelligent” (4). It is the clockwork itself that creates consciousness. In 
another tract Layton referred to the legendary robots, a wooden eagle and an iron fly, made by the German 
mathematician and “Artificer” (66).  
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are put into motion by a principle inherent in themselves” (58) in an experiment that had recently 
been performed by the young Genevan scientist Abraham Trembley on a certain polyp. Trembley’s 
polyp was remarkable both because of its ambiguous biological status between plant and animal and 
because of its ability to regenerate by division (Vartanian 259-60). The polyps not only move, as La 
Mettrie writes, but “spring up again into life” after they have been cut into pieces, “and in the space 
of eight days, there arises a production of as many animals as the pieces into which they were 
divided” (57). Applied to man, such a suggestion does not seem to leave any anchor to secure man’s 
identity over time. Indeed, in Britain many immaterialist critics argued that the location of motion 
and thought in matter would lead to the complete atomisation of man. As Yolton notes, the doctrine 
that “[i]f any bit of matter thinks, every bit must” was “repeated many times throughout the 
eighteenth century” (21). A typical version of this argument can be found in Ralph Cudworth’s The 
True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), republished as late as 1757.51 To Cudworth the 
suggestion that motion and intelligence was inherent in matter was not only atheist but also 
illogical: 
 
 …if matter as such had life and understanding in it, then 
every atom of matter must needs be a distinct percipient, 
animal, and intelligent person by itself; and it would be 
impossible for any such men and animals as now are to be 
compounded out of them, because every man would be 
variorum animalculorum acervus, a heap of innumerable 
animals and percipients. (I, ii, 72)  
 
We have returned to Locke’s severed person-finger. When the parts from which the whole person is 
pieced together have the same properties as the person himself, the distinction between part and 
whole cannot be sustained. Not only does the part take on the autonomy that was previously that of 
a person, persons themselves become nothing but “thinking things” in quite a different way than 
Locke imagined.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 The 1770 title-page of a reissuing of Cudworth’s A Discourse Concerning the Evidences of our Knowing Christ 
(1642) advertises Cudworth as “the author of The True Intellectual System of the Universe”, suggesting that the work 
was known through the major part of the century.  
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ii. The Mixing of One's Own: John Locke on Proprietorship and Personhood 
 
“Whatsoever…he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.” 
John Locke. Two Treatises of Government (1689-90) 
 
The exchange of properties between persons and things is also found in Locke’s Two Treatises of 
Government (1689-90) in which, as the primary force in the creation of political society property, it 
is placed firmly at the centre of the argument. Only when the multiplication of people and property 
“with the Use of Money” (II.v.45 299) has rendered possessive relations ungovernable by the law of 
nature is there a need for a social compact that could “regulate the right of property” (II.v.50 302). 
To Locke, the question of how the communism of the state of nature could be replaced by the 
contractual government of the state of society is also the question of “how Men might come to have 
a property in several parts of that which God gave to Mankind in common” (II.v.25 286). Property, 
therefore, is antecedent to the institution of government; even in the state of nature “there must of 
necessity be a means to appropriate [the fruits and beasts of nature] some way or other before they 
can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man” (II.v.26 286-87).  
C. B. Macpherson has argued that Locke’s theory of property is an example of a 
philosophy of “possessive individualism” (263) forming the ideological basis of an emerging 
“possessive market society” (270). According to Macpherson, Locke assumes “that man is free and 
human by virtue of his sole proprietorship of his own person, and that human society is essentially a 
series of market relations” (270). Locke is seen as a proto-capitalist, advocating a society 
subordinated to the “laws of the market” (272) and ruled by an individualist subject “created in the 
image of market man” (269). I agree with the criticisms made by John Dunn and more recently 
James Tully against Macpherson’s reading and subscribe to their efforts to restore Locke's argument 
to its historical context. Macpherson probably exaggerates Locke’s prophetic powers, and he 
certainly conflates “property in the bourgeois sense” (215) with Locke’s far more complicated 
concept, which has its roots in seventeenth-century philosophy of natural law. However, I cannot 
agree with Tully when he argues that Locke’s is really an argument of “community ownership” 
(165). As G. A. Cohen suggests, Locke is less concerned with redistribution than with the 
establishment of a society in which owners can “secure the possessions they already precariously 
enjoyed” (193) in the state of nature. Indeed, my primary objection to Macpherson is not that he 
overlooks Locke’s supposed communism but rather that he fails to recognize the painful awareness 
of the volatility of ownership ensconced in Locke’s argument. Although his theory of property 
partially relies on claims of self-identity, it bespeaks the instability of the object possessed as well 
as of the possessive subject.  
Locke’s central argument is made in paragraphs twenty-six to twenty-seven in chapter 
five of The Second Treatise, in which it is explained how the natural goods that “God gave to 
Mankind in common” (199) are transformed into personal property through labour. Focusing on the 
tension between the logical coherence and the rhetorical suggestiveness of the argument, the 
following sketch of the two short paragraphs seeks to recuperate the peculiar hybridity of Locke’s 
concept of property that is lost in Macpherson’s account.    
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The first example of appropriation is given at the end of paragraph twenty-six: 
 
 The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, 
who knows no Inclosure, and is still a Tenant in common, 
must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can 
no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any 
good for the support of his Life. (II.v.26 287) 
 
The paragraph turns on the central definition of the possessive adjective “his”: the Indian makes the 
fruit or venison “his” by making them “part of him”. It is a curious formulation. What does it mean 
that the fruit or venison become “part of” the Indian? Locke’s use of victuals as this his first 
example of property complicates the question. All of Locke’s initial examples of property are cases 
of foods: venison, fruits (II.v 26), acorns, apples (II.v 28), deer and fish (II.v 30). As Matthew 
Kramer points out, the fact that Locke can be seen to be “submitting a thesis about digested food” 
(114) renders the passage invalid as an argument for the establishment of regulatory property rights. 
The complete absorption of the appropriated foods makes a contestation of proprietorship unlikely; 
once the edible items have “evolved through digestion into being the components of human 
bodies…a prohibition on seizing [them is] superfluous” (Kramer 117).52  A theory of property 
rights requires a concept of property that implies some form of separability – only if properties have 
the ability to be alienated, exchanged, sold and stolen is their preservation through a social compact 
necessary. Using consumption as his primary model for appropriation, Locke makes property 
inseparable from its proprietor. As a kind of absolute appropriation, digestion prevents theft only by 
effectively cancelling out the very concept of property as it is no longer alienable. What is lacking 
here is the marking of a boundary between exterior and interior. 
Thus, Karl Olivecrona claims that the proprietary control the Indian achieves when he 
makes the fruit or venison “part of him” does not apply to his body but to his entire sphere of 
personality comprising both body and mind – what earlier philosophers of natural law such as Hugo 
Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf had termed his suum. Defined only as a catalogue of goods, the suum 
can be enlarged by collecting objects necessary to survival: “The underlying idea was that the 
personality of the collector had been extended so as to encompass the fruits. Therefore it was an 
injury to rob him of them” (Olivecrona 223). To Grotius the term “Damnum, Damage, probably 
derived from demo to take away” (II.xiii 370) can therefore be applied “when a Man has less than 
his Right; whether that Right be merely from Nature, or some super-added human Act, such as the 
Establishment of Property, Contract or Law” (II.xiii 370). Olivecrona insists that Grotius 
presupposes a “'spiritual ego” (223) to which the goods belong, which is to some extent supported 
by Grotius’ description of the institution of property as a “super-added human Act” (II.xiii 370).53 
However, when it comes to the injury caused by the removal of properties from the suum, there is 
no distinction between the primary catalogue of body, limbs, reputation, honour and actions and 
“what belongs to every one in Consequence of establishment of Property” (II.xiii 370). Embedded 
in the accumulative logic of the suum is the simultaneous disappearance of owner and owned. Like 
Locke’s initial assimilation of consumption and appropriation, the equation of physical injury and 
material dispossession in Grotius’ understanding of “damage” produces a conceptual collapse that 
                                                 
52 I will here ignore Kramer’s charge that Locke confuses privileges of use (sometimes essential to survival) with 
property rights. As I am interested in the reception and dissimination of Locke’s ideas in the eighteenth century, it is 
irrelevant for my thesis to consider Locke’s theory in terms of twentieth century Hohfeldian distinctions between rights 
and privileges (Locke repeatedly conflates possession with proprietorship throughout the Two Treatises). 
53 Unlike Locke, Grotius believed that property was not to be found in the state of nature but is the result of a later 
communal agreement. 
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obliterates the idea of alienable property. Conversely, Grotius’ indication that the suum consists of 
removable possessions makes it difficult to determine what exactly is doing the owning. In fact it 
suggests a very material self, a coreless bundle of properties that can be taken away, piece by piece, 
until the full damage is done and nothing at all remains. 
The difficulties of the suum resurface in Locke’s description of self-possession, which 
is at the root of his definition of property. Paragraph twenty-seven of chapter five begins: 
 
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to 
all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person: 
This no Body has any right to but himself. The Labour of 
his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are 
properly his. (II.v.27 287-88)  
 
The analogy between “his own Person” and the work and labour that are also “his” is an implicit 
but fundamental part of the argument. Man owns his own person in the same way he owns the 
labour of his body and the work of his hands. But what exactly does Locke mean by the words 
“man” as proprietor and “person” as his property? The first part of the argument is repeated in a 
later paragraph:  
 
…[T]hough the things of Nature are given in common, yet 
Man (by being Master of himself, and Proprietor of his 
own Person, and the Actions or Labour of it) had still in 
himself the great Foundation of Property… (II.v.44 298) 
 
Although the parallel construction “Master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person” does not 
necessarily indicate an identity between its two parts, it does imply a close connection between self-
mastery and proprietorship in the person. Thus the possessive relation that Locke describes might 
be purely reflexive, involving only one entity mysteriously carrying two different names. If so, 
Locke would be subscribing to a Levellist tradition of self-ownership. As early as 1646 Richard 
Overton had founded his theory of equal natural rights on the premise that “every one as he is 
himselfe, so he hath a selfe propriety, else he could not be himselfe” (qtd. in MacPherson 140).  As 
Cohen has pointed out, there is no “deeply inner thing” (211) involved in this idea of self-
ownership; rather “what owns and what is owned are one and the same namely, the whole person” 
(69). But for reasons already examined, the complete amalgamation of the two parts of the 
possessive relation leads to the conceptual implosion of property. If the property and its proprietor 
are not only isomorphous but also singular, the use of property in the person as the foundation for 
alienable property is untenable.54 Like the analogy between digestion and appropriation, the analogy 
between property in the person and personal property conflates possession and ownership. The 
possession is clasped so firmly, embraced so completely that the thing that is owned no longer can 
be discerned. If self-identical individual is the model of both proprietor and the property, the 
difference between what is “me” and what is “mine” is effaced. 
 Yet, the idea that man is “absolute Lord of his own Person and Possessions” (II.ix 
350) seems intuitively appealing, and the concept of ownership in the person easily becomes 
synonymous with individual sovereignty. In other words, Locke evokes the image of an 
autonomous, inalienable self to justify the inviolability of property. However, since J.P Day’s 
article “Locke on Property” (1966) scholars have pointed out that Locke’s analogy between 
                                                 
54 It is of course possible to use property in the person as an argument for personal responsibility, i.e. as a foundation for 
an ethics, but this is almost certainly not the work the concept is intended to do here. 
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“person” and “work” or “labour” hinges on the inherent imprecision of the possessive adjective 
“his”. Suggesting that Locke deliberately “confuses [the]…non-possessive sense of his with the 
possessive use of it” (214), Day remarks that the differences between expressions such as “his 
teeth”, “his golf” and “his TV set” are obliterated in Locke’s analogy. Following Day, Alan Hyde 
finds that Locke writes as a punster, exploiting the fact that the “possessive adjective may represent 
fragmentation and alienation as easily as it represents some kind of inalienable essence” (55). My 
point here is that Locke must necessarily leave the term person undefined in order for it to do the 
desired double work. Only by leaving room for a reflexive understanding of the relation he 
describes can “person” become the cipher for both the absolutely owned and the absolutely 
separable property. The ambiguity of the term is a logical impracticality but a rhetorical necessity.  
Let us now turn to the second part of the argument:  
 
Whatsoever [Man] removes out of the State that Nature 
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, 
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the 
common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of 
other Men. (II.v.27 288)  
 
It is uncertain whether this section constitutes a logical proposition, let alone a stringent argument 
(Kramer 117). Whereas “labour” in the previous sentence could be taken to mean the concrete 
product of work, here it designates the activity or the energy necessary for appropriation.55 
Although Locke elsewhere recognizes that “labour makes the far greatest part of the value of 
things” (II.43 297), it is not through increase of value that labour establishes property rights. It is 
rather the labourer's annexation of “something that is his own” to the object worked upon that 
allows natural goods to be converted into properties. As Zuckert points out, it is the fact that Locke 
locates exclusive property rights in such a “labour's transformative power” (264) that distinguishes 
him from Pufendorf and Grotius. Whereas Pufendorf had accounted for exclusive rather than 
common property rights by the institution of a tacit consent, Locke finds that labour alone will 
secure the proprietor's right to exclude others from accessing what is properly his. To Locke the title 
that labour bestows “does not depend on the express consent of the commoners” (II.25 28), nor, as 
Zuckert adds, “on the tacit consent of any of them” (254). It is in the establishment of what Zuckert 
calls “a law of transitivity” (254) that Locke’s real innovation is to be found. 
The implication of Locke's argument is that the labourer has a right to the object he 
has worked upon because the object has come to incorporate his labour. Jeremy Waldron correctly 
insists that “Locke wants the labour, not the labourer, to be mixed with the object he produces” 
(182). Yet, it is very difficult not to acknowledge that something is passed on from the labourer to 
the object through “the work of his hands” and “the labour of his body”. Whatever later 
qualifications Locke makes, the initial transformation of thing into property seems to require a 
certain contingence, a metonymic extension of a possessive self.  At the centre of this passage, then, 
there is a magical moment of transubstantiation dependent on what Jonathan Lamb has called “a 
transfusion of identity from human to thing” (“Modern Metamorphoses” 147) by touch. As 
Schmidgen notes, it is indeed only because Locke bases “the appropriative process on a physical 
                                                 
55Waldron objects that the proposition is logically incoherent insofar as Locke uses “labour” to designate both the action 
of mixing and one part of what is mixed Comparing Locke’s statement with a simple proposition such as “the cook 
mixes the egg with the batter” (40), Waldron finds that “in the case of labouring of an object, there are not two things to 
be brought into relation with one another but only one thing and an action that is performed on it” (42). 
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traffic between person and thing” (55) that he can make property exists as a substantive entity prior 
to any social conventions. The “mixing” of labour and goods creates a new polymorph, mixed thing 
– the property – both extrinsic to and part of its owner. In terms of Locke's previous metaphor, the 
physical equivalent of proprietorship is not digestion but indigestion; only a thing which is 
separable from, yet somehow joined to the suum can become a property. Absolute ownership is 
always already compromised; there is no pure sphere of subjectivity where property moves.  In this 
way property comes to require both mastery and the relinquishment of control.  
The labour theory works as an elaboration of the idea of the amorphous suum, 
extendable to comprehend appropriated objects through the transferred energy of labour. Why then 
is there a need to bring in the supplementary theory of property in the person? Pinpointing the 
failure of Locke’s labour theory of property, Robert Nozick asks: “Why isn’t mixing what I own 
with what I don't own a way of losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don’t?” (174-
75). Nozick’s question dislodges an unarticulated logical problem: how is it possible to tell whether 
my properties belong to me or I belong to them? My suggestion is that the concept of property in 
the person is introduced to counter this syllogistic collapse. The tension between the two theories is 
the tension between the notion of an aggregate, diffluent subject existing only as the proprietor of 
removable parts and the more formalized concept of a singular, self-contained subject which is the 
“absolute Lord of his own Person and Possessions” (II.ix 350). The suum represents a kind of pure 
horizontality that does not give priority to the part that does the owning. But if contiguity is 
constitutive of ownership, what enables the proprietor to keep hold of his properties? Property in the 
person, then, is to guarantee the precedence of the subject and the subordination the objects it 
appropriates. Appropriation is no longer conceived as paratactic accumulation, but as hypotactic 
subordination that leaves the person intact. The person functions as the supreme property, the one 
property that cannot be exteriorized but must remain “properly his” (Two Treatises II.v.26 288) by 
what Robert Epstein calls “a kind of natural necessity” (1227). But as we have seen, this kind of 
property does not exist as property at all precisely because it is not detachable.  
It is this slippage between the subject and the object position that Macpherson 
unwittingly repeats when he describes a Lockean individual who “is essentially the proprietor of his 
own person and capacities” (263), as if the person doing the possessing could be divorced from the 
person possessed. It is difficult to describe what happens here. The impossibility of keeping 
separate the owner and what is owned necessitates the institution of absolute ownership, and yet 
only absolute ownership allows this impossibility to be recognized. The possibility that the 
transformation of person into thing is a concomitant to the conversion of thing into property can 
only be countered by resorting to another hybrid: property in the person. In place of the 
congealment of the self-owning individual we find the secretion of a thinglike subject or the 
absorption of an anthropoid object. Thus the logical short circuit of Locke’s argument leaves him 
with a double hybridization. Either the person is a commodity that can be circulated, parcelled out 
and marketed as any other material property, or the material property partakes in personhood as 
something potentially inalienable and infused with identity. The Lockean person moves in an 
anamorphic space where internal depths consistently reveal themselves as external manipulable 
surfaces, where what is one’s own is continually mixed with what is not. Before it is a saleable 
good, Locke’s labour is first and foremost the transformative energy necessary to form and then 
bridge the gap between world of things and the world of persons. As the work of mixing, property 
spans both worlds. Locke seeks to secure the possessions that have been so precariously 
appropriated by creating a sphere of properness removed from improper commercial intercourse – a 
prudence that results only in the propagation of possessions, expanding the transactional space. At 
the very instant “the individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities” 
(Macpherson 163), the distance between the appropriated thing and the inalienable person shrinks, 
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and both become movables. Nothing is too personal to be put into circulation; nothing is too 
intimate to be manipulated.  
In another perspective, Locke’s theory can be seen as a compromise between 
incompatible types of property. In his monumental attempt to theorize English common law, 
William Blackstone makes a clear distinction between persons and things, dedicating a book to each 
of them. “The objects of dominion or property are things, as contradistinguished from persons,” he 
insists (II.ii 481). Like the materialists, Blackstone points to self-propelled motion as the essential 
indication of personhood. A person’s liberty, his free will “consists in the power of loco-motion, of 
changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct” 
(I.i 130). However, when it comes to things the things that are to be our properties, this kind of 
vitality is troublesome. Similarly, bereft of “loco-motion”, persons come to resemble things that 
“are esteemed to have no free will of their own” (I.ii 166) and therefore belong “under the 
immediate dominion of others” (I.ii 166).56 Suggesting that the difference between free and unfree 
men in the eighteenth century is “distinguished by degree than by absolute difference” (257), 
Valenze identifies “a large category of people….[that] existed within a relatively indeterminate 
realm” (257). Unlike the commercial law, much of eighteenth-century common law relies on the 
existence of such an intermediate realm, allowing for the existence of propertyless individuals such 
as apprentices, indentured servants and convicts between fully commodified things and fully 
autonomous persons. Thus, Teresa Michals has noted that common law, unlike commercial 
legislation, recognizes a “mixed category” between “the class of persons, who by definition have 
certain rights” and “the class of things, which by definition do not”, namely that of “a right-bearing 
subject who is also the property of another” (201).  
 There is, then, a group of persons who are also things in so far as they are “objects of 
dominion or property” (Blackstone II, ii, 481): wives, servants, and children are all somewhat short 
of being complete persons. Such persons are properties, but they are not, however, commodities. 
Instead they are so closely bound to their proprietor that they cannot stray from him. The 
proprietary relationship that is instituted by marriage, for instance, is a union the bonds of which are 
more than metaphorical:  
 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: 
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated 
and consolidated into that of the husband… (Blackstone I, 
xv, 430)  
 
Like the property in his own person, the property a man has in his wife is inalienable, and wives are 
not therefore chattel that can be disposed of freely. While this immobility and their proximity to 
their owner ensure their existence outside the commercialized sphere of commodity exchange and 
so make them more like other persons, these qualities are also what makes them fall short of proper 
personhood to become more like inanimate chattel. The distinction that is implicitly used here is 
that between properties that can circulate freely and thus enter into a market exchange and those 
that are somehow vitally attached to their owners as the source of their liberty. Real property can 
only be had in land, while anything that moves is less susceptible to subordination:  
 
                                                 
56 Blackstone discusses the restrictions of voting rights here. The specific persons talked about here are the non-
propertied classes, whose lack of a self-direction not only leaves them justifiable disenfranchised, but also without 
access to “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world” 
(II.i 471).  
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[Wa]ter is a movable, wandering thing…so that I can only 
have a temporary, transient, usufructuary, property 
therein…But the land, which that water covers, is 
permanent, fixed and immovable: and therefore in this I 
may have a certain substantial property. (II.ii 17-18) 
 
A “movable, wandering thing” will naturally uproot the independence gained through possession, 
while liberty is “rooted in…our very soil” (I.i 123). Unlike movable things that can only transiently 
be held onto, land forms a kind of property that cannot be taken away without causing some kind of 
damage to its owner. Only after the death of its the proprietor is it passed on, bequeathed as 
heirloom rather than sold as commodity. 
Contrasting the inalienable property of land that confers political liberty and 
independence on its own with the alienable property of movable, wandering things that are only 
transiently attached to their proprietors, Blackstone articulates what Pocock has identified as the 
“tensions between virtue and commerce” (366). According to Pocock the eighteenth century was 
marked by a conflict between the ideals of classical republicanism and the transactional realities of 
emergent commercial capitalism, each with its own view of the relationship between man and his 
properties. Whereas the civic man of republicanism considers property a prerequisite for man’s 
political liberty and independence that did not affect his relationships with other men, the homo 
economicus of political economy is primarily a proprietor interacting with other men through an 
increasingly refined economic system regulating the exchange of properties.57 The old model of 
civic man that founded personality solidly in real property came under pressure from new forms of 
property producing “new forms of consciousness suited to a world of moving objects” (109). In 
other words what Pocock describes is the “enduring conflict” (109) between a conception of 
property as the inalienable basis of a hierarchical differentiation between men of varying rank and 
one that considered it a perpetually circulating means of commercial exchange among formally 
equal individuals. 
Historians such as Jan de Vries, Lorna Weatherhill and Neil McKendrick et. al have 
all documented an upsurge in spending in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as the 
indication of a “consumer revolution”. The variety and quantity of manufactured goods increased, 
and commodities that were previously the prerogative of the wealthy could now be purchased by 
more modest consumers. Investigating a series of studies of consumer demand, Jan de Vries finds 
that despite analytical uncertainty, “the basic finding of long-term growth in the volume and 
diversity of consumer possessions is so common to all the available studies that it hardly seems 
possible that it can be placed in jeopardy” (106). In her survey of 17 key items of domestic goods in 
probate inventories, Weatherhill finds an overall increase of goods during the first quarter of the 
eighteenth century. In London the listing for items such as books and clocks more than doubled 
from 1695 to 1725, and items such as pictures, looking-glasses and curtains saw considerable 
increases. What is spurred by this kind of consumption is the same as the fear that Locke attempted 
to abate through the concept of property in the person: the fear of losing what is “one's own”, that is 
it is the fear of a kind of property that no longer stays put, but circulates freely in the market place. 
Blackstone considered the great end of the law to promote “the grand ends of civil society” by 
“steadily pursuing that wise and orderly maxim, of assigning everything capable of ownership a 
legal and determinate owner” (II.i 15). Determinate ownership is, however, not so easily assigned to 
the new insubstantial and mobile forms of property. Indeed, when it comes to the wrongful taking 
of “personal chattel”, one can only hope for a “pecuniary equivalent” and not the return of the thing 
                                                 
57 See also Alfred Lutz. 
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itself: “For things personal are looked upon by the common law as of a nature so transitory and 
perishable, that it is for the most part impossible either to ascertain their identity, or to restore them 
in the same condition as when they came to the hands of the wrongful possessor” (III.ix 146). More 
importantly, if a person wants to avoid the same kind of transitoriness, that is, if a person wants to 
keep what is “properly his” (Two Treatises II.v.26 288) and not slide into servile objecthood, he 
must retain sufficient loco-motion to mark his self-direction in a society that requires constant 
circulation without losing the security that is gained by being firmly “rooted in…our very soil” (I.i 
123). It is an impossible balancing act between too much and too little movement. 
This logic can also be found in the ruling economic theory of mercantilism as part of 
what in his study of mercantilism Eli F. Heckscher refers to as a “logical inconsistency” (317), 
namely “the attempts to increase trade in general and foreign trade in particular with the ceaseless 
striving to obstruct imports” (317). The idea was to ensure and export surplus and thus a “decrease 
in the circulation of goods and an increase in the circulation of money” (179). In this connection 
“native consumption was...valueless in the eyes of the mercantilists” (115). This call for restraint 
had roots in Aristotelian ideas of self-sufficiency and (130-32) and puritan ideas of frugality (Mason 
3). Yet, as Liz Bellamy has shown, “the most striking feature of economic writing from the mid-
seventeenth century is the increasing stress on consumption” (Commerce 20). Alongside the 
prominent anti-commercial discourse identified by Pocock, Bellamy finds examples of a “marginal 
but essentially bourgeois discourse” (Commerce 20) of economic analysis, extolling the benefits of 
trade. In fact, as Schmidgen points out, to the mercantilists of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, the value of things was created in circulation. Heckscher refers to the 
mercantilist “fear of goods” (57), that is, the awareness of the danger that lies “in not being able to 
dispose of the goods, and in having them remain on one’s hands” (57). This, then, is the other part 
of the mercantilist “logical inconsistency” – the inclination “to increase trade in general” (317). One 
part of mercantilist theory was therefore directed against what the English mercantilist, Nicholas 
Barbon, called the “deadstock called Plenty” (qtd. in Heckscher, 115). Rather than retaining his 
goods, the mercantilist trader wants to “rid [himself] of them as fast as possible” (Heckscher 57). 
One strain of late mercantilist thought locates the original of wealth not in production, but in 
circulation – wealth was generated in the process of exchange (Schmidgen, 108-10; Heckscher).58 
The more hands an object passes through, the greater the wealth it will generate.  
It is within this dynamic between circulation and its restriction, between properties 
that have a “determinate ownership” and those that do not that Locke’s concept of personhood must 
be situated. Indeed, sometimes it seems as if its very purpose is to avoid taking sides in this clash 
between two different orders of things. In other words, while the consumptive model on which it is 
based somehow exposes the impossibility of securing a “determinate ownership” without losing a 
sense of propriety (both ownership and selfhood), it also exposes the inadequacy of a merely 
aggregate self whose properties can be taken away without causing vital damage to its owner. A 
person’s properties – those material possessions and attributes that belong to him – are somehow 
too mobile, too independent to be truly personal. On the other hand, it is this very mobility that 
gives each piece of property the capacity to retain its constitutive power even after its separation 
from its original owner. In the intimate acts of mixing that allows us to merge just for a little while 
with what belongs to us, we belong to our properties as much as they belong to us. Taking Locke’s 
empiricism to its logical extreme, Hume stresses man’s need for constant external stimuli. Without 
the continual impressions afforded by outside objects and people, man would be undone, unfastened 
by things that no longer grip him. According to Hume it is only in the encounter with “foreign 
objects” capable of producing the necessary vitality that the mind “awakens, as it were, from a 
                                                 
58 See for instance Gianni Vaggi and  Peter Groenewegen.  
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dream” and “the whole man acquires a vigour, which he cannot command in his solitary and calm 
moments” (II.ii 226):  
 
Those who take a pleasure in declaiming against human 
nature, have observed, that man is altogether insufficient to 
support himself; and that when you loosen all the holds, 
which he has of external objects, he immediately drops 
down into the deepest melancholy and despair. (Hume II.ii 
226) 
 
Characterizing man’s separation from objects as a fall, a “drop” into a “languid state” of 
immobility, Hume paints a picture of a man as a precariously poised figure threatening to collapse 
into “a languid state” of immobility in the absence of the props that support him. “Rather than an 
“impenetrable mask”, Locke’s person struggles to even keep the mask on. Paradoxically it is only 
the vitality of things that keeps man from slipping into the reification of torpidity. In this view, the 
risks of Locke’s model are better figured as constipation, as the property in the person fails to 
restrict the voracity of an aggregate self stuffed with (re-)collected things that will not pass. In the 
next chapter we will explore a similar space: Locke’s aggregate self and the contingencies of 
identity resurface in the debate on luxury goods as this plays itself out in a early eighteenth-century 
divestmental satires and dressing room poems. As persons as well as other things collect 
themselves, adding one piece to another, only those that have “not shifted all at once” or kept hold 
of too many superfluous parts, succeed in staying together. 
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III. Dressed Selves and the Luxuries of Personhood 
 
i. Martinus and “the Category of Having”: Curing Consumption in the Memoirs 
of Martinus Scriblerus 
  
“There are Numbers of Beings in about this Metropolis who have no other identical Existence than what the 
Taylor, Milliner, and Perriwig-Maker bestow upon them.” 
Richard Campbell. The London Tradesman (1747) 
 
In book four of the Essay, Locke takes up the problem of identity again, objecting to the “ordinary 
way of Reasoning” (IV.iv.16 572) according to which people “take the measure of Man only by his 
out-side” (IV.iv.16 572). “People do lay the whole stress on the Figure, and resolve the Essence of 
the Species of Man...into the outward shape,” Locke complains (IV.iv.16 572). To demonstrate the 
absurdity of such reasoning Locke uses the example of a “Changeling”, a term that both designates 
an idiot or simpleton and a person or a thing surreptitiously put in place of another: 
 
The well-shaped Changeling is a Man, has a rational Soul, 
though it appear not, this is past doubt, say you. Make the 
Ears a little longer, and you begin to boggle: Make the Face 
yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a 
stand: Add still more and more of the likeness of a Brute to 
it, and let the Head be perfectly that of some other Animal, 
then presently ‘tis a Monster; and ‘tis demonstration with 
you, that it hath no rational Soul, and must be destroy’d. 
(IV.iv.16 572) 
 
Locke uses the monster and the changeling to suggest “something neither Man nor Beast, but 
partaking somewhat of either” (IV.iv.16 573). But words such as “changeling” or “monster” do not 
quite encompass the liminal states between man and animal suggested by this boggling shape-
changing. Thus, there is also something else lurking in the passage, some thing that is not quite “a 
Monster” yet, but which is no longer “a Man”. “[P]resently ’tis a Monster,” Locke writes, but for 
now, as the face becomes narrower, flatter and longer, the “well-shaped Changeling” that “is a 
Man” escapes categorisation and becomes an “it”, a nameless, shapeless thing in transition.59  It is 
possible, Locke suggests a bit further along, that there may be “several degrees of mixture of the 
likeness of a man, or a Brute” (IV.iv.16 572) the “precise Lineaments” (IV.iv.16 572) of which 
cannot be ascertained. Replacing the opposition of man an animal as “distinct Species so set out by 
real Essences, that there can come no other Species between them” (Iv.iv.13 569) with a continuum 
that encompasses named and nameless species in between the human and the non-human realm, 
Locke turns the problem of identity into a question of degree. How much can a person be altered 
before he is no longer a person but some thing else? Or, as Lynch phrases it: “When do differences 
and peculiarities count as part of the thing’s intrinsic meaning, and when do they count as mere 
accessories to its significance?” (124). It is the question that also haunted theologians such as Hody: 
which parts are indispensible and which are necessary to make up a whole man? When is the whole 
no longer recognisable as such? Although the point here is to prove the inconstancy and 
deceitfulness of figure, the superficiality of the mere outside of man, the metamorphosis of the 
                                                 
59 In the phrase “Add still more and more of the likeness of a Brute to it”, “it” may refer to the narrowing “Face”, 
whereas in “’tis a Monster”, “it” is likely to refer to the entire being in transformation.  
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changeling comes to demonstrate the power of face value.60 Locke wants to teach us to look 
beneath the surface, to make us see that there is more to a book than its cover, but, as Locke 
suggests elsewhere books that are “unbound, and without Titles” are “only shewing the loose 
Sheets” (II.x.27 505). Is there, then, anything but the “outward shape” that holds a person together?  
 At least since Kenneth Maclean declared that only the Bible could rival the literary 
influence of Locke’s Essay (v)61, it has been recognized that the literary take on the problem of 
man’s identity was largely conducted in Lockean terms in the early eighteenth century.62 In the 
Memoirs of the Extraordinary Life, Works and Discoveries of Martinus Scriblerus (1741),63 the 
question of identity in parts is satirically examined as the “great noise about this Individuality” (xii, 
140). A collaborative work by the literary “Scriblerus Club”, the Memoirs is a medley work, a 
spoof-biography whose hero works as an appropriately fickle vehicle for its satire on Locke’s 
theory of the discontinuities of identity. The work then belongs to a sub-genre of Menippea as a 
satire of “learned wit”. Tracing its origins to Lucian’s Menippus, or the Descent into Hades (ca. 165 
AD),64 the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin sees the distinguishing trait of the Menippean 
satire as a “lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract...to the material level” (19, 69). 
Adopting the carnivalesque “logic of the ‘inside out’“, works in tradition of learned wit share with 
all Menippean satire the desire to rethink “all that is sacred and exalted is...on the level of the 
material bodily stratum” (Bakhtin 370). Peculiar to the works of learned wit, however, is that this 
effect is achieved by the playful display of false learning and pseudoscience in the idiosyncratic 
style of a scribbling academic. Accounting for the education of an eccentric pedant by his father, a 
would-be philosopher with a severe veneration for the Ancients, the Memoirs is written in the vein 
of Lucian, Rabelais and Burton, prefiguring Sterne’s Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, 
Gentleman (1759-67) as a late example of a work whose theme is the “comic clash between the 
world of learning and that of human affairs” (Jefferson 247).  
 In chapter seven Martinus overhears an argument between his assistant, Conradus 
Crambe,65 and his father and tutor, Cornelius, on the subject of individuality. Crambe sides with 
Locke in the controversy, maintaining that “few men have that most valuable endowment, 
                                                 
60 Lynch reminds us that to the eighteenth-century speaker, “Person” meant both the “physical appearance” of someone 
and “an Individual, or a particular man or woman” (The Econonmy 119). The quotes are from Johnson’s Dictionary 
(1755-56), but the Latin sense of “persona” as mask can also be found in the modern sense of the word. As the recent 
edition of the Oxford English Dictionary has it, “person” is both “the body regarded together with its clothes and 
adornments” and the “self, being, or individual personality of a man or woman”. See “person, n.” OED Online. June 
2013. Oxford University Press. 12 August 2013. 
http://dictionary.oed.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/cgi/entry/50176218?query_type=word&queryword=person&first=1&m
ax_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=w87F-SqQDwE-2448&hilite=50176218. Lynch also 
deals with Locke’s motif of the changeling (The Economy 51-53).  
61 The quote is from Maclean’s monograph on John Locke and English Literature of the Eigtheenth Century (1936): 
“The book that had most influence in the Eighteenth Century – the Bible excepted – was Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding” (v).  
62 See for instance Fox (Locke), Erickson and Lamb for support of this view. 
63 Although according to Charles Kerby-Miller the Memoirs were written as a collaborative work during the initial days 
of the Scriblerus Club, primarily in 1714, it did not appear in publication until it was included in volume two of the 
1741 edition of The Works of Mr. Alexander Pope, in Prose. Parts of the work were written in 1716-18 and the final 
chapters as late as 1726-27 (57-68). 
64 The approximate date of writing is estimated by H. W. Fowler and H. G. Fowler in their edition of Lucian’s works. 
Lucian of Samosata. The Works of Lucian of Samosata. Complete with eexceptions specified in the preface. 4 vols. 
Fowler, H. W. and H. G. Fowler, eds. and trans. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905: xvi.  
65 In Nathan Baily’s Universal Etymological English Dictionary (1721) “crambe” is defined as “a Repetition of Words, 
or saying the same Thing over again”. Kerby associates the word with “the popular game of crambo, a play in rhyming 
in which a person repeating a word used before is forced to pay a forfeit” (247). Johnson writes of “crambo” as a “play 
at which one gives a word, to which another finds a rhyme” (vol. 1).  
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Individuality”, as it is “commonly said that a man is not the same he was, that madmen are beside 
themselves, and drunken men come to themselves” (VII 119).66 Cornelius, however, counters this 
argument with an analogy: 
 
Cornelius told Martin that a shoulder of mutton was an 
individual, which Crambe denied, for he had seen it cut into 
commons: That’s true (quoth the Tutor) but you never saw 
it cut into shoulders of mutton: If it could (quoth Crambe) it 
would be the most lovely individual of the University. (VII 
119) 
 
The satire here is two-pronged, the butt being both social and philosophical. Both chopped up food 
for university students and the social equivalent of this, the common cut of society, the word 
“commons” reveals the pretensions of a discourse that dismisses the material divisibility of identity 
in favour of the abstract universalism of subjective individualism. The fact that materialism is 
equated with the lowly orders of society does not amount to the endorsement of a sadly degraded 
metaphysics (the loss of the soul as Aristotelian spiritual substance), but rather to a satiric 
exposition of the social subjugation inherent in what Adorno and Horkheimer see as the 
Enlightenment drive towards abstraction, also implied by Locke’s attempt to rescue personal 
identity through the purely “Forensic Term” of property in the person (Essay II.xxvii.26 346). The 
elevation of abstract individualism renders all matter common: the satire speaks from where it 
temporarily rises again. The humour that fuels this sort of endeavour is akin to the decrownings 
Bakhtin considers typical of “the upside-down world” (426) of Menippea. Thus, as Robert A. 
Erickson suggests, much of the humour of the above passage stems from literalization, that is, from 
the “comic technique of transforming an immaterial something (whether it be a word, an ideal, or a 
system of thought) into a material something, preferably a ludicrous bodily figure” (389-90). The 
most obvious butt of Crambe’s deprecating literalization is the veiled materializing consequences of 
Locke’s insistence on the empiricist basis of knowledge. Indeed, like Locke’s man who must piece 
together complex abstractions from “simple ideas taken in by Sensation” (Essay II.xviii.1 223), 
Martin can only “form single apprehensions” (VII 118) out of which argument and judgment do not 
easily arise. Such concretization is well suited to Martin’s understanding which is “so totally 
immers’d in sensible objects” (VII 119) that he demands “examples from Material things of the 
abstracted Ideas of Logick” (VII 119).  “[F]orc’d to give Martin sensible images” (119), Cornelius 
caters for a reified mind. But Crambe’s analogy threatens to turn the relationship between the 
analogues from one of similarity to one of identity. 67 As individuality turns itself into a shoulder of 
                                                 
66 The source of this parody is Locke’s buttressing of that his assertion that “the same Man would at different times 
make different Persons” in “our way of speaking in English, when we say such an one is not himself, or is besides 
himself” (Essay II, xxvii, 20, 343).  
67 Another satiric aim here is Locke’s use of analogy. More specifically, the object of satire here is the Lockean style of 
argument by analogy. In Book four of the Essay Locke defends the use of analogy to describe “Things...that falling not 
under the reach of our Senses...are not capable of Testimony” (IV.xvi.12 665). Thus, the “violent agitation of the 
imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter” (IV.xvi.12 666) that produces heat is rendered perceivable in “the 
bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon another” (IV.xvi.12 665).  In other words, things that are too small or too 
ethereal to be perceivable as such can nevertheless be rendered so through analogy to the commonplace world of 
phenomena. Analogy, then is a way of reasoning that allows human understanding to observe the things that are 
otherwise” not within the scrutiny of humane Senses” (IV.xvi.12 665). It is worth noting, however, that Locke is less 
enthusiastic about analogical argumentation than the satire suggests. Thus Locke is very careful to stress that as 
opposed to the infinitely more reliable sources of knowledge such as observation and “rational Experiments” (IV.xvi. 
12 666), analogy only works as a kind of “conjecture” to establish the “grounds of Probability” (IV.xvi.12 665). Shai 
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mutton, abstract ideas are reduced to things of the sensible world – there is no place for metaphysics 
in a world peopled with mutton meat. 
 Making the question of individuality hinge not on consciousness but on bodily 
substance, Cornelius aligns himself with the more traditional Aristotelian view that men are 
“Substantia” (VII 120), that there is a substantial form that guarantees the identity of man. If man is 
a shoulder of mutton, that is, nothing but material substance, he is also susceptible to a division of 
personal identity. Matter sustains individuality as little as consciousness – divided into parts with a 
life of their own on the college table, the shoulder of mutton is no longer one with itself. Here the 
reader is served a ration of Cudworth’s multiple man as variorum animalculorum acervus, each 
atom of which constitutes an “intelligent person by itself” (I.ii 72). As Charles Kerby-Miller notes, 
the humour of Crambe’s last remark depends on a pun on the words “university” and “individual”: 
if the mutton chop could be divided and yet still remain the same, it would not only be “the loveliest 
indivisible thing in the whole, or universe” but also “the loveliest person among the colleges” 
(Arbuthnot et al. 250). Here the analogy to Locke becomes evident. Cornelius, however, insists on 
upholding a distinction between part and whole – unlike Locke’s severed finger (and, later, 
Trembley’s polyp), the “commons” are lowly cuts of Crambe’s shoulder of mutton that do not have 
the same status as the whole from which they have been taken. As Frank Palmeri has argued the 
satire of the Memoirs remains ambiguous in that the materialist consequences of the Lockean way 
of thinking things are too convincing to be dismissed by strategies of ridicule. Between Locke’s 
episodic, narrative identity and the aggregate identity of the materialists, there seems to be no 
recourse to the stable, enduring and unified identity of Aristotelian scholasticism. As Palmeri notes, 
“the satiric equation of the soul with the corporeal...principle of individuation meets no rational or 
substantial refutation” thus revealing “a strong resistance by what is parodied to the satiric parody 
directed against it” (334).  
 In chapter twelve of the Memoirs the discussion of identity continues as Martin 
endeavours to find “the Seat of the Soul” (XII 137). A literalist, however, Martin converts this 
metaphysical endeavour into a study of anatomy, finally concentrating on the location that 
Descartes had considered the principal seat of the soul, the pineal gland.68  Keen to “find out the 
different Figure of this Gland”, Martin wants to secure a physical cause of the “different Tempers in 
mankind” (XII 137). But with embodiment comes a levelling rather than differentiation of humanity 
to the point of dehumanization, as “Calves and Philosophers, Tygers and Statesmen, Foxes and 
Sharpers, Peacocks and Fops, Cock-Sparrows and Coquets, Monkeys and Players, Courtiers and 
Spaniels, Moles and Misers...exactly resemble one another in the conformation of the Pineal 
Gland” (XII 137). Nevertheless Martin has his theory confirmed in a letter from the Secretary of 
“The Society of Free-Thinkers”, a term that had recently been popularized by Anthony Collins’ A 
Discourse of Free-Thinking, Occasion’d by The Rise and Growth of a Sect call’d Free-Thinkers 
(1713).  Free-thinking was a label used about the materialism that had grown out of Locke’s 
speculation on the divine superaddition of thought to matter. An anti-clerical work, A Discourse of 
Free-Thinking could not avoid being tied to Collins’ earlier debate with Clarke on the possibility of 
thinking matter. Thus, the members of the Society of Free-Thinkers think it possible “to explain, by 
the structure of the Brain, the several Modes of thinking” (XII 141). Indeed, they dabble in the 
construction of human automata, having employed “a great Virtuouso at Nuremberg”69 to construct 
                                                 
Frogel has argued that the always looming collapse of the abstract theme and the concrete phoros causes the analogy to 
lose its status as an indicator of probability to become a (faulty) criterion of argumentative validity.  
68 For more on Descartes’ theory of the pineal gland as the seat of the soul, see Porter and Schama (24). 
69 This could be a reference not only to Regiomontanus but also to another sixteenth century mechanic, Hans Bullmann 
of Nuremberg (?-1535). According to Bedini, “the first android of record” was constructed by Bullmann in the shape of 
a human musician (31). 
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an “artificial Man” who “will not only walk, and speak...but (being wound up once a week) will 
perhaps reason as well as most of your Country Parsons” (XII 141).70  
 Like Locke, the free-thinkers also attempt to navigate between the allure of the 
transformative powers of matter and the necessity of a stable identity. Thus, keen to impart to him 
their ideas of what makes a man “the same Individual he was twenty years ago; notwithstanding the 
flux state of Particles of matter that compose his body” (XII 140), they proceed by way of “a 
familiar example” (XII 140): 
 
Sir John Cutler had a pair of black worsted stockings, 
which his maid dairn’d so often with silk, that they became 
at last a pair of silk stockings. Now supposing those 
stockings of Sir John’s endued with some degree of 
Consciousness at every particular darning, they would have 
been sensible, that they were the same individual pair of 
stockings both before and after the darning; and this 
sensation would have continued in them through all the 
succession of darnings; and yet after the last of all, there 
was not perhaps one thread left of the first pair of 
stockings, but they were grown to be silk stockings, as was 
said before. (XII 140) 
 
Christopher Fox interprets the passage as a “brilliant burlesque of the historical Collins’ use of 
Locke’s theory” (“Locke” 18). Appearing to argue for Locke’s theory of identity, the passage really 
rehearses the pressures of Locke’s consciousness-bound conception of identity provided by the 
transience of matter.  Despite the narrative singularity of consciousness, the stockings do not remain 
the same “both before and after the darning” (XII140; Fox “Locke” 18). It seems that the “flux state 
of particles” does after all have the power to change one thing into another. As Crambe points out to 
Martin, it is far from certain that the members will “bear him harmless from anything that might 
happen after this present life” (XII 142).71 In such a fluid world, the Secretary’s concluding phrase 
in which he “beg[s] leave to assure you that we are, &c.” seems to offer little certainty of his 
singularity.  
 The free-thinkers are, however, careful to counter the charge of infinite divisibility of 
individuality (the threat of Cudworth’s variorum animalculorum acervus), suggesting that in the 
“Animal system” as well as in the House of Commons “all things are determin’d by a Majority”, as 
it is “the reason of the whole assembly” that assures self-determination. An assembly, it is 
suggested, can have properties that differ from those that pertain to the individual members. This 
issue was a central one in the debate on identity. Collins had suggested that there might be “Powers 
in Systems of Matter that inhere not in the parts of those Systems singly consider’d” (12). 
“Thinking or human Consciousness” is according to Collins such a “numerical” power, the result of 
a “conjunction of several Particles, not each endu’d with that Species of Motion call’d Thinking” 
(18, 12, 27). The freethinkers take a similar stand, arguing that in man as in the House of Commons 
“many unthinking Members, compose one thinking System” (XII 140). Thus, like the “flux body” 
(xii 140) of the House of Commons, man is “a Corporation” (xii 140).  Here, again, the learned wit 
turns into social satire, as the members of the political organ are equated with the dense particles of 
                                                 
69 Although there were no outspoken proponents of La Mettrie’s man-machine hypothesis 
70 Here again the satire is dual, as the image of the automatical man that so haunted materialist philosophy is equated 
with the mechanical sermonizing of a country parson.  
71 See note 39 on the discussion of materialism and the problem of bodily resurrection. 
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the organ of thinking. Reduced to matter, the body politic loses its authority. The apparently 
superficial substitution or reallocation of material parts has the power to re-class simple worsted as 
fine silk or “the most lovely” shoulder of mutton as ordinary commons – in fact, when it comes to 
crossing class barriers, corporeal surfaces are more effective than the depths of consciousness.  
 It is a truth that is tested with particular force in the eighteenth-century discussion of 
clothes and the “category of having” as these collided in the concept of “habitus”. Miriam Kosh 
Starkman finds the source of the satire on the undressed self in the Memoirs in the work done in the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century to distinguish between Aristotelian “accidents” and 
“substances” and the ambiguous classification of clothes as belonging to both these categories. The 
relics of the discussion lived in the 1701 translation of Francis Burgersdijck’s Monitio Logica72 and 
in surveys such as Henry Curson’s The Theory of Sciences Illustrated (1702). In the Memoirs, the 
discussion of the possible identity criteria of the mutton chop thus prefigures a dispute over the role 
of accidents and substances in the establishment of the general characteristics of man in the abstract. 
Cornelius “runs through the prædicaments” (VII 120), listing the ten universal categories mentioned 
in Aristotle’s Organon. The three academics have “the greatest difficulties” (vii 121) with the 
“Tenth prædicament” (VII120) – that of possession, habitus, or habit. Crambe declares “that his 
Habitus was more a substance than he was; for his cloaths could better subsist without him, than he 
without his cloaths” (120). Whereas an accident is an “Adjunct” (Curson 85) and therefore “no 
Entity” (Curson 4) by itself, a “Substance...is a thing that subsists by it self, which Thing, Entity or 
Substance (for they are Synonyms) hath an Essence, and Existence distinct from all other things, and 
containeth Accidents which happen thereunto” (Curson 52). The 1701 translation of Francis 
Burgersdijck’s Monitio Logica (1626) refers to the fourth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in which 
“habit is used “for Cloathing...whence also the last Category is call’d the Category of Having” (VI 
4). Burgersdijck therefore attributes the difficulty of the tenth predicament to the duality of the term 
“habit”, which covers both “the act of him which has, and that which is had” (30). Thus, “habit” 
signifies 
 
the Conjunction of Clothes, Armour, and such like things 
with the Body; as Clothes, Armed, Gowned, Shielded, 
Speared, Bearded, Strewed, or Covered with Arras, 
Tapestry, &c. These and the like Words signifie not 
Clothes or Arms, but the Conjunction of Clothes or Arms 
with the Body. (ix 30)73 
 
 “Habit” in the eighteenth century meant both dress and accustomed action,74 that is both “a 
Manner, after which Clothes or any thing like Clothes, are put about the Body, appended or any 
other way adjoined to it” (Burgersdijck 30) and “the perfect having of any thing, as he that often 
speaketh French shall by continuance obtain perfection” (Curson 53). In both cases, the type of 
possession is not concomitant with mere proprietorship. Habitus in other words comprises the 
problem of the ambiguous status of property as a detachable appendage, both part of and separate 
                                                 
72 Translated as An Introduction to the Art of Logick (1701). 
73 Like Burgersdijck, Pierre Nicole and Antione Artauld’s Logique Port-Royal (1662), translated as Logic, or the Art of 
Thinking in 1697, negotiates the dual status of clothing by categorising it as a “substantial Mode” (46), that is by 
placing it within the middle category of “real Substances applied to other Substances” (46). Clothes is a substance that 
modifies another substance by conjoining with it. James Harris still follows this solution to the problem of the tenth 
predicament in his Philosophical Arrangements (1775), describing “THE GENUS OF HABIT, or rather OF BEING 
HABITED” (347) as “a Relation, existing between Substances” (348). 
74 Johnson’s Dictionary distinguishes three senses of the word, which can be seen as a graduation of possession: “state 
of anything”, “dress”, “any thing acquired by frequent doing” and “custom, inveterate use” (vol. 1). 
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from its owner. It reveals a split in the “the Category of Having” (Burgersdijck VI 14) between the 
“perfect having” (Curson 53) that makes what is had inseparable from the person by whom it is had 
and the mere conjoining of a property that is still somehow a separable entity in itself. Conceived as 
habit, then, the appendage of clothing finds its place “between him which has on the Garment, and 
the Garment it self” (Burgersdijck VI 30). A clothed person thus exists neither as a thing, nor as a 
mode, but “as a Thing modify’d” (46), that is as a “Substance [which] is considered as determined 
by a certain Manner or Mode” (46): 
 
...when we consider two substances together, we may 
regard one as a mode of the other. Thus a man dressed may 
be considered as a whole made up of the man and his dress; 
but to be dressed is, in relation to the man, only a mode or 
phase of existence under which we regard him, although 
the parts of the dress may be themselves substances... (55)  
 
As Starkman has noted, the underlying equation of “clothes” and “man” (both are substances) in 
such passages makes ample room for ironic reversals and self-fashioning: “If, then, by a satirical 
reversal we turn this particular example of the accident man clothed around, the result is clothes 
manned, or clothes modified by man” (59). 
 Later in the century, in James Harris’ Philosophical Arrangements (1775), clothes still 
figures uneasily between the two senses of habit, being assimilable neither to the category of 
“inherent Attributes” (349), nor to properties of a more disposable kind: 
 
THE being Habited therefore is in it’s [sic] strictest Sense 
something less than the first Relation, that between a 
Substance, and it’s [sic] Attributes; something more, than 
the Second Relation, that (I mean) between a Possessor, 
and his Possessions. (Harris 350) 
 
It worth noting that Harris believes the relation between a person and his possessions differs from 
that between a person and his clothes, “for, tho’ these are both of them Substances, and tho’ a 
Possessor may be said to have an Estate, he cannot be said to have it upon him. He does not wear it” 
(349). A footnote adds that the possessions of “Slaves, or Friends, or Fathers, or Children” do not 
belong to the category of habitus, “for...none of them are said to exist in their being THROWN 
ROUND US, or SUPERINDUCED, altho’ they are all...our Possessions” (349).75 These are 
important comments. Firstly, Harris uses the inalienable property of the estate as a parameter of 
proprietorship. The relationship between a person and his estate or his children is obviously more 
permanent and less volatile than that between a person and things that “exist in their being 
THROWN ROUND”. This, one could assume, is what makes the possession of clothes a less than 
“perfect having”. Yet, in the main text Harris insists that “something more” than the mere 
possessive relation is to be found in the wearing of clothes – your clothes are after all closer to you 
than your children. Secondly, it is suggested that putting on clothes (or armour or other worn 
things) is an act of superinduction that bespeaks a prior depth. Whereas the earlier tracts write of 
clothes as appendages or adjuncts, lumps of matter that join or fuse with the body of the wearer, 
Harris’ clothes are integumentary layers that are superimposed or put “upon” the body. Yet despite 
Harris' hint of an autonomous self to be found beneath the layers of clothing that hide it, his 
                                                 
75 The note is a gloss on Aristotle by Simplicius in his Commentaries on the Prædicaments from the early sixth century. 
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insistence on the dual position of clothes as habit points to the persistence even late in the century of 
aggregative models of personality reliant on the mixing of the self and its possessions. In other 
words, if as Harris opens up for self-fashioning through the superinduction of disposable layers, he 
locates the power of this investiture not in the self but in the clothes.  
 As both addition and replacement, an exterior excess76 converted into interior 
necessity, Harris’s concept of clothes as habit constitutes a Derridean supplement. As such it points 
to a rift in the concept of the self-possessed individual, which “ought to be self-sufficient”, but 
somehow craves the supplement provided by an “exterior addition” (Of Grammatology 93). Indeed, 
as Derrida points out, man only “allows himself to be announced to himself after the fact of 
supplementarity” (Of Grammatology 244) The paralogic of the supplement that can be identified in 
the category of habitus holds “that what adds itself to something takes the place of a default in the 
thing… [which] as the outside of the inside should be already within the inside” (Of Grammatology 
215). In his work on the slow demise and transfiguration of European sumptuary law, Alan Hunt 
points to a similar logic in what he calls “regimes of recognisability”77 (390). Once “the inherent 
instability and transgressability of clothing as a social device for ordering appearance” (72) has 
been recognized, it becomes necessary to supplement it with other, more stable attributes that only 
slowly can be taken in or properly ingested rather than merely procured. Hence, Hunt suggests, 
recognizability comes to rely less on conspicuous consumption and more on covert forms of 
conspicuous leisure: “‘Appropriateness’ developed as a concern for securing a linkage between 
behaviour and ‘demeanour’, an idea that readily lends itself to a linkage between ‘appropriate 
appearance’, ‘neatness’ and ‘respectability’“ (117). The transformation of sumptuary law into 
modern codifications of habits and appearance testifies to a shift from “hierarchic consumption to 
fashion as a cultural capital” (376), which requires new ways of appropriation to repair the 
inadequacies of consumptive properties that can be acquired too easily.78 
 Writing on the social life of gloves in the Renaissance, Peter Stallybrass and Ann 
Rosalind Jones note that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries “[c]lothing, as habit, implies a 
way of life” (117). They quote from an article by Daniel Defert79 according to whom it is “an 
anachronistic illusion” to “confuse the meaning of habit....with that of fashion”: “Habit has the 
original connotation of habitus, which implies work on the body...[T]he habit-habitus…defines the 
                                                 
76 Derrida quotes Robert’s French Dictionary when pointing out that the supplement is an “exterior addition”, somehow 
always located “outside of the positivity to which it is super-added, alien to that which, in order to be replaced by it, 
must be other than it” (Of Grammatology 145). 
77 Hunt draws on the ambiguity of the term “recognition” as denoting the identification of both distinguishing individual 
marks and the acknowledgment of social standing: “In this focus on ‘recognition’ I draw attention to its capacity to 
carry a double sense. On the one hand to ‘recognize’ is to be able to ‘identify’ (as in ‘I recognized Harold standing at 
the bus-stop’) and on the other to ‘recognize’ is be ‘accorded recognition’ (as in ‘Jane was awarded a prize in 
recognition of her contribution’)” (108). As Hunt indicates, the term thus has much in common with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of “distinction” that plays on difference between “to distinguish” and “to be distinguished” (68). 
78 Opposing the view that sumptuary laws simply failed because of some innate weakness in the face of the rise of 
social and economic individualism, Hunt writes of the transformation of sumptuary legislation rather than its 
disappearance. Thus in addition to still existent sumptuary regulation such as the prohibition on the wearing of uniforms 
by civilians, he finds a number of areas in modern legislation in which “sumptuary logic” as the “regulation of the 
visible” (181) still prevails. The regulation of prostitution on the grounds of  “its very visibility, its recognizability” 
(380), the distinction between prohibited “loitering” and  encouraged “lingering”  in shopping centres and the ubiquity 
of work uniforms (whether proscribed or voluntary) are notable examples: “The critical point about cultural capital is 
that its mechanisms, whilst explicit, are not capable of codification; ‘dressing like a lady’, ‘speaking like a gentleman’ 
can be judged by the eye and ear are suffused with cultural capital, but cannot be legislated for. Thus considerations of 
style, fashion, taste and distinction come to the fore and they have no need for the prohibitory barriers of sumptuary law 
“ (376). 
79 Defert, Daniel. “Un Genre éthnographique profane au XVIe: les livres d’habit.” Histoire de l’Anthropologie (XVIe-
XIXe Siècles). Ed. Britta Rupp-Eisenreich. Paris: Klincksieck, 1984: 27.  
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mode of being of established groups and not the free choice of individuals” (qtd. in Jones and 
Stallybrass 117). Arguing that the relation between the “inward habit of virtue” (116) and “the 
outward habit of robes and gloves” (116) was thought to be essential rather than contingent in this 
period of time, Jones and Stallybrass identify ways in which clothing in the Renaissance was 
“imagined as antithetical to fashion – that is, to the rapid shifting of shapes and styles” (116):  
 
[The opposition] of clothes and person was always in 
tension with the social practices through which the body 
politic was composed: the varied acts of investiture. For it 
was investiture, the putting on of clothes, that quite literally 
constituted a person as a monarch or a freeman of a guild or 
a household servant. Investiture was, in other words, the 
means by which a person was given a form, a shape, a 
social function, a ‘depth’. (Stallybrass and Jones 2)  
 
Also in the eighteenth century clothes came to bear out the conflict between stable social identity 
and stylized self-fashioning.  Habit is also in the eighteenth century, as Harris writes, the state of 
“being habited”, being worn by one’s clothes. There is a sense here that clothes are as much 
determined by their wearer as he is by them. Harris’ emphasis on superinduction, however, implies 
a different attitude – what is put on can also be taken off; it has no necessary connection to what is 
underneath. Here habit, custom, becomes costume, self-presentation as well as self-concealment. 
Indeed, as I will attempt to prove, in the eighteenth century clothes come to bear out the conflict 
between stable social identity and stylized individuality. As Jones and Stallybrass suggest, the 
materialization of virtue in habit is always “threatened by the contingency of things” (119) – a habit 
that you merely put on is easily lost, worn out or stained. The depth exposed by the habit is itself at 
risk of becoming a surface; the layers of habit may after all conceal nothing but their own 
superinduction, the symbolical work they are meant to do. 
 Jones and Stallybrass’ use of the modifier “quite literally” suggests the modern 
difficulty in accepting an act of self-fashioning that is not just symbolical but also material. It 
perhaps in the discovery of their symbolical potential that things lose their constitutive powers. 
Thus, Hunt attributes the waning of sumptuary laws during the seventeenth century to the “ever-
present possibility for deceit and dissimulation provided by clothes” (390). No “regime of 
recognizability” (390) can attain permanence once the “inescapable unreliability of appearential 
ordering”(390) has been recognized. What sumptuary laws attempt to regulate is “the separable 
connection between the body, the self and its appearance” (Hunt 66) that inheres in the 
transformation of clothes from habit into fashion. What the Memoirs illustrates is the conceptual 
absurdity that this process brings about in the shaping of a coherent personality.  Thus, satire on the 
difficulty of the tenth predicament is not just the satirical debunking of an obsolete philosophical 
question, but also the literary channelling of the fear that the “contingency of things” delimit the 
powers of self-fashioning that are constitutive to personhood. The “contingency of things” certainly 
seems to thwart the efforts of the Scriblerus clan to delimit the things necessary to make up a 
recognizable person that will support social stability. When Cornelius asks Martin if “he could not 
frame the Idea of an Universal Lord Mayer?” (VII 120), Martin concedes that having seen only one 
Lord Mayer, he has “great difficulty to abstract a Lord mayer from his Fur, Gown, and Gold Chain; 
nay, that the horse he saw the Lord Mayer ride upon not a little disturb’d his imagination” (120). 
However, eager “to shew himself of a more penetrating genius” (VII 120) Crambe swears that he 
can “frame a conception of a Lord Mayer not only without his Horse, Gown, and Gold Chain, but 
even without Stature, Feature, Colour, Hands, Head, Feet, or any Body; which he suppos’d was the 
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abstract of a Lord Mayor” (vii 120). The philosophical butt of the joke is again Locke who insists 
that abstraction consists “in the leaving out of something, that is particular to each Individual”  
(Essay III.iii.9 412) in order for “the particular Ideas, received from particular Objects...[to] become 
general” (Essay II.xi.9 159). As Lockean man “totally immers’d in sensible objects” (VII 119), 
Martinus is incapable of leaving out any of the particulars without losing the concept itself. The 
simple materiality of Locke’s abstraction stands revealed – in Locke’s world, it is suggested, one 
can never rise above the particulars of mundane life. Crambe on the other hand divests the 
individual from all the bits and pieces of which he is made up to the point at which nothing is left. 
Here the other consequence of Locke’s theory is revealed: Without a body, the abstraction is 
nothing but air, a formal name without real substance.  What both Crambe and Martinus lack is a 
sense of the spiritual, an awareness of a moral or spiritual value outside that of material exchange. 
Brean S. Hammond has made this point, suggesting that the “serious side of the Scriblerian project 
was to replace in the world the spirituality that mechanistic natural philosophy...had taken away” 
(113). Yet, the ultimate butt of the satire is not just their absolute literal-mindedness, their failure to 
see anything else in a person than his material parts, but also the vacuity of a world emptied of 
things that have lost their powers of investiture. As such it is not so much an attack on what is 
perceived as the materialist inclination in Locke’s thinking as it is a satire on the material emptiness 
that is a result of attempts to create a purely “Forensick” person (Essay II.xxvii.26 346) from the 
material accidentals that constitute the man.  
 As was the case with the “unthinking Members” of the House of Commons, the image 
of the aggregate, material nature of identity also serves as a tool of social satire. Emptied of its 
paraphernalia the office of the Lord Mayor seems nothing but an abstract formality; stripped of his 
fur, gown and gold chain,80 less and less remains of the formerly so consequential Lord Mayor. In 
this way, the things whose very existence consists in being “thrown round” somebody show their 
powers of gathering - without them there is nothing around which anything can be thrown. 
Alongside the Scriblerian wish to debase and render commonplace what is thought of as untainted 
by material transformations, Crambe’s wish to show himself the “more penetrating Genius” in 
undressing of the Lord Mayor is also suggestive of the desire to bare the true self underneath its 
cover. The Lord Mayor can only appear in his pure, ideal form without any of his habits; relieved of 
his material accessories, his true self can stand undressed. Punning on the polysemy of the word 
“abstract” as both summary or abridgement and ideal form, Crambe’s comment pinpoints the 
paradox of habit as a category of possession as zeugma allows possessions, attributes and body 
parts to mix in the imagined reality of the person. Yet as it turns out the removal of the things that 
has been put “upon” him considerably detracts from his presence. The Lord Mayor undressed is 
immaterial – both removed from material embodiment and unmistakably unimportant. In other 
words, the abstract essence of the Lord Mayor is in fact nothing but the bits and pieces he has put 
“upon” himself. As habit is positioned between the superficial outside and essential inside, between 
self-presentation and self-concealment, its potential for theatricalization is exposed. Here, then, 
begins the disconnection of the old habit-habitus conjunction – clothes no longer represent only “a 
way of life” defining the “mode of being of established groups” but also a self-stylization defined 
by “the free choice of individuals” (Jones and Stallybrass 117). In such a space what Terry Castle 
has called the “displays of exquisite destabilization” (159) can unfold, thus allowing clothes to 
serve “both as a voluptuous release from ordinary cultural prescriptions and as a stylized comment 
upon them” (167). The Lord Mayor is, as Harris would have it, truly “being habited”. Conceived 
simultaneously as removable layers and as material extensions of the person by whom they are 
worn, clothes both establish and obliterate the difference between a real and an invented self. The 
                                                 
80 Cf. King Lear: “Through tatter’d clothes small vices do appear; / Robes and furr’d gowns hide all...” (IV.vi.157-158 
951). 
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inner self that Crambe’s comment seems to promise is never reached. What is revealed instead is 
not an autonomous individual taking “possession of itself once and for all as an impenetrable mask” 
(6), but rather a thoroughly fashioned person struggling to keep real in a world where the 
mobilisation of the symbolic powers of clothes renders investiture an empty gesture.  
 The Lord Mayor is not the only one to undergo the ambiguous self-divisions of 
undressing. In “The Case of a young Nobleman at Court” described in chapter XI, the removal of 
clothes is put forth as a cure to the “distemper” (madness) of self-love – a “disease” that is itself a 
condition of self-division. Having an “amorous inclination” (XI 135) to himself, the young 
nobleman “converses almost…with none but himself” (XI 134), and refusing to hide his 
“Familiarities” with his body from the world, “he is downright scandalous in his behavior with 
himself” (XI 36). The story thus revolves around the nobleman’s continual “ogling…[of h]imself in 
his looking-glass” (135). The division from which the nobleman suffers, then, is between a “false” 
(XI, 136) and a true version of himself. It is an “extremely dangerous” (XI 135) condition that, if 
untreated, will cause the sufferer to be “condemn’d eternally to himself” to the point at which “he 
may run to the next pond to get rid of himself” (XI, 136) As Fox has shown, the text draws on “a 
cluster of associations linking masturbation to the distemper of self-love and to the greatest self-
lover of them all”, Narcissus – an allusion that in the eighteenth century referred to the Ovidian 
myth rather than to the modern psychological complex of narcissism (“The Myth”  21-22).81 But 
although the initial diagnosis of the case may be attributed to Ovid, the affliction from which the 
nobleman suffers belongs specifically to the eighteenth century. His “ogling” is after all not 
returned in a pond but in a looking-glass, the proliferation of which according to Weatherhill is one 
of the indicators of the early eighteenth-century consumer boom. An item of display and self-
display, the looking glass is associated with a culture in which the consumption of goods becomes 
indicative of a split in the topography of self between the “front” projected to the outside world and 
the “back” with its “essentially private” (Weatherhill 9) character.82  
 The Memoirs describes narcissistic self-duplication in terms of luxury consumption; 
the nobleman is in danger of getting rid of himself not only because he longs for a “fleeting image” 
but also because he covets an object of consumption. Like most other commodities described in this 
chapter, the looking-glass figures between an imaginary realm of fantasy and the material realm of 
commodity culture. In other words the nobleman’s disease is caused by an exteriorization of an 
internal image as much as it is caused by the interiorization and dematerialization of a range of 
material objects that have been adopted by his personality. Indeed the nobleman sees himself 
duplicated not only by looking-glasses but by “polish’d Toys and even clean Plates” (XI 136), the 
removal of which is the only way to ensure that “the admired object” does not return. Not only has 
he “presented himself with any Love-toys; such as gold Snuff-boxes, repeating Watches, or 
Tweezer-cases” (XI 135), he has also bought “a very fine brilliant ring” (XI 135), which must be an 
                                                 
81 Fox (“The Myth”) shows that many of the characteristics that were attributed in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries to the mythical figure of Narcissus can be recognized in the case of the young nobleman: his dislike of 
women, his self-absorption and vanity, his addiction to the flattery of those who support his delusion. Like Narcissus, 
the nobleman loses himself in his own idealized image and mistakes the shadows of his reflected form with the 
substance of reality – the reflection seen is nothing but a disembodied dream. “He thinks that a body, that is only a 
shadow,” the narrator of Ovid’s version of the myth mockingly states (III, 417, 152). “[C]orpus putat esse, quod umbra 
est” (Ovid, III, 417). Miller’s translation goes: “He loves an unsubstantial hope and thinks that substance which is only 
shadow”  (153). Here Ovid seems to parallel the critique of Locke’s separation between the purely “Forensick” and 
largely disembodied concept of person and the organismal concept of man. The story of the young nobleman, however, 
makes no obvious allusions to Locke. 
82 Suggestive both “of a certain self-awareness and a desire to set the atmosphere of rooms” (Weatherhill 189), the 
looking glass belongs at the “front stage” of the eighteenth century household, that is, it belongs to “the settings of 
activities in which people present themselves to others…[which] can be likened to a theatrical stage” (Weatherhill 9). 
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equally ostentatious means of self-presentation. Recognising in the objects his own reflected 
persona, he outshines their own autonomous lustre; occupied by his gaze, they are infused by his 
personality. An imaginative investment, this kind of visual appropriation is accompanied by a 
narcissistic cultivation of delusional phantasms.  
 Erin Mackie has explored the links between consumption and “the pleasures of 
imagination” described by Joseph Addison’s Mr Spectator in a series of essays in The Spectator 
(1711-12, 1714).83 Arising from “visible Objects” (no. 411 84), these kind of pleasures are 
dependent on the “most perfect and delightful of all our Senses” (no. 411 84), the sense of sight. 
Although to Addison sight ultimately serves to apprehend “agreeable Visions of Things that are 
either Absent or Fictitious” (no. 411 86), it is also connected to a more material kind of possession. 
Thus, “a more delicate and diffusive kind of Touch” (no. 411 83), sight “spreads it self over an 
infinite Multitude of Bodies, comprehends the largest Figures, and brings into our reach some of the 
most remote Parts of the Universe” (no. 411 83-84). In other words, the pleasure of seeing is a more 
superior pleasure of possessing: “A Man of a Polite Imagination…often feels a greater Satisfaction 
in the Prospect of Fields and Meadows, than another does in the Possession. It gives him, indeed, a 
kind of Property in every thing…” (no. 411 87). The distinction Addison makes is between a 
concrete, material proprietorship encumbered by economic contingencies of loss, resale and other 
forms of dispossession and a purely imaginative acquisition that can retain a firm grasp of the 
accumulated goods.84  
 However, Addison’s style of spectatorship not only sublimates possession as an object 
of visionary imagination, it is also a form of fantasy or illusion. Referring to Locke’s distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities (no. 413 98), Addison outlines “that great Modern 
Discovery…that Light and Colours, as apprehended by the Imagination, are only Ideas in the Mind, 
and not Qualities that have any Existence in Matter” (no. 413 97). Thus, according to Addison, 
“Things would make but a poor Appearance to the Eye, if we saw them only in their proper Figures 
and Motions” (no. 413 96). In other words, beauty has its origin in the superadditions of the 
imagination, that is in “those Ideas which are different from any thing that exists in the Objects 
themselves” (no. 413 96). Thus, if through the visual manipulation that allows what Addison calls 
“a kind of Property in every thing he sees” (no. 411 86), the nobleman’s gaze works to annex 
everything it takes in, to make it truly his, it does so only by adding “imaginary Glories” (no. 413 
96) and “Supernumary Ornaments” (no. 413 96) to the objects he contemplates. Like Addison’s 
spectator the distempered nobleman is “delightfully lost and bewildered in a pleasing Delusion” 
(no. 413 97).  
                                                 
83 I have consulted the first collected edition of the periodical in Eighteenth-Century Collections Online. For a good 
collection of issues of The Spectator and The Tatler that deal with the impact of commerce and commodification on 
social and individual identity, see Addison, Joseph and Richard Steele. The Commerce of Everyday Life: Selections 
from THE TATLER and THE SPECTATOR. Ed. Erin Mackie. Bedford/St. Martin’s: Washington University: 387-397. 
84 Michael McKeon has also made this point: “The capacity for disinterestedness is signalled by the metaphorical nature 
of absolute ‘property’, a kind of ‘possession’ that improves upon the merely sensible grossness associated with the rude, 
uncultivated literality and interestedness of actually owning ‘real’ estate. To put this another way, the polite exercise of 
the imagination marks the separation out of the ‘propriety’ of appropriate behaviour from the ‘propriety’ entailed in 
appropriating things, which henceforth will have its own denomination, ‘property’” (364). In distinguishing between 
imaginative and material spectatorship, Addison draws on Shaftesbury who had already allocated a superiority to 
possession by sight. Thus, in The Moralists (1709) the Doge of Venice is “taken with the Beauty of the Ocean” to the 
extent that he performs a “Nuptial Ceremony…to wed the Gulf” and call it “properly [his] own”. Shaftesbury’s moral, 
however, goes against the Doge’s attempted appropriation of the Ocean by wedlock to show that he has “less 
Possession” of it “than the poor Shepherd, who from a hanging rock, or point of some high Promontory, stretch’d at his 
ease, forgets his feeding Flocks, while he admires her Beauty” (III.iii.2 396). In a subsequent passage Shaftesbury lets 
his spokesperson, Theocles, argue that “the Enjoyment of the Prospect” of an orchard or a vale is not dependent on the 
consumption of its fruits, nor therefore on the “Property or Possession” of it (III.iii.2 397).  
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 Yet, as Mackie notes, “[w]hile these fantastic embellishments are celebrated as a kind 
of surplus value created by the aesthetic imagination, they, or something very like them, become 
suspect in relation to fashionable objects” (47).  Thus, it is exactly the manipulative potential of his 
gaze that puts the nobleman’s fashionable objects beyond his control and beyond his grasp. The 
delusional investment of Addison’s aesthetic gaze is after all of a different kind than that of the 
nobleman. In short, while Addison’s gaze ultimately remains an ennobling sublimation of 
possession, the nobleman’s stare is a baser attempt at acquisition – a crass kind of consumption that 
cannot eschew the contingencies of market bound proprietorship. Whereas the aesthetic spectator 
gets in touch with things by investing them with something of his own, the nobleman seems to lose 
not only his grasp on things but also his grip on himself by doing the same. Hopelessly attached to 
detachable objects of fashion, the nobleman must constantly take care that he does not “get rid of 
himself” (XI 136).85 Once one recognizes oneself in the (ex-)changeable object of fashion, identity 
becomes as disposable as snuff-boxes, watches and tweezer-cases. Exploiting the conjunction 
between the “inward habit of virtue” and “the outward habit of robes and gloves” (Jones and 
Stallybrass 116), this is at least what Martinus’ cure to the nobleman's distemper suggests:  
 
First, let him ***Hiatus.*** Secondly, let him wear a Bob-
wig…Let him return the Snuff-boxes, Tweezer-cases (and 
particularly the Diamond Ring) which he has receiv’d from 
himself…Let all Looking-glasses, polish’d Toys, and even 
clean Plates be removed from him, for fear of bringing 
back the admired object. Let him be taught to put off all 
those tender airs, affected smiles, languishing looks, 
wanton tosses of the head, and coy motions of the body, 
that mincing gait, soft tone of voice and all that enchanting 
woman-like behavior, that has made him the charm of his 
own eyes, and the object of his own adoration. Let 
him…survey himself naked, divested of artificial charms, 
and he will find himself a forked straddling Animal, with 
bandy legs, a short neck, a dun hide, and a pot-belly. (XI 
136) 
 
 While the hyperbolic and incongruous enumeration of objectionable possessions86 
renders the passage humorous rather than tragic, the equation of divestiture and sub-human 
deformity closely parallels that of its most obvious intertextual reference in Shakespeare’s tragedy 
of dispossession: Lear’s frenzied encounter on the heath with “the thing itself, unaccommodated 
man” as “a poor, bare, forked animal” (III.iv.94-95 932) in the scene that serves to expose what Dan 
Brayton has called “the deceitful nexus of ownership and dissimulation” (412) haunting the play.87 
Indeed, both King Lear and the story of the nobleman are fuelled by the unfolding nightmare of 
                                                 
85 Mackie makes a similar point: “Defining his or her sexual, social, and ethical identity through the selection of goods, 
the modern consumer risks a kind of psychic colonization by the commodity, a process often represented as the loss of 
identity” (47). 
86 Shakespeare also makes use of enumeration, but with a very different effect. Compare Shakespeare’s carefully 
balanced isocola of “the worm no silk, the beast no hide, the sheep no wool, the cat no perfume” with the deliberately 
banal specificity, incongruity and humorous use of adjectives of “polish’d Toys”, “clean Plates” and “wanton tosses of 
the head”.  
87 The scene is traditionally identified as a key anagnoretic moment in the play. In addition to Brayton, Dye, Greenfield 
and Holly among others deal with Lear’s removal of his clothes and his identification of Edgar/Poor Tom as 
“unaccommodated man”.  
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what expropriation might do to a person whose identity is coextensive with his possessions. 
Suggesting that King Lear might best be thought of as a “play about a man’s attempt to outlast his 
property” (25), Margreta de Grazia finds that it reveals the antinomies resulting from the dual 
understanding of possessions as “superfluous things...because unnecessary for subsistence”, yet 
“absolutely necessary for upholding social and personal identity” (24): “Lear unhinges when his 
retainers are denied him, as if his retainers held him rather than he them” (24). Thus is Lear’s 
divestiture is not only the self-destruction of a madman, but also a division of the unity of being and 
having that promises to turn the necessary predicates of personhood into “lendings” (III.iv.95 932) 
that can be discarded to allow the emergence of what James Kearney has called “the human animal 
stripped of all prosthetic and pretension” (458). It is a promise of disenchantment that the play does 
not fulfil, insisting not only on the return of “fresh garments” (IV.vii.23 954) and sanity to Lear, but 
also on the inadequacy of unpropertied man: as Laurie Shannon argues, “unaccommodated man” is 
underprovisioned rather than self-sufficient, “a creature without properties, a natural-historical 
embarrassment”, deficient when compared to other animals that have coats and walk sturdily on 
four legs. Indeed, as de Grazia argues, Lear is a play that works to block “the mobility identified 
since the nineteenth century with the Modern - through its locking of persons into things, proper 
selves into property, subjectivity effects into personal effects - in an attempt to withstand flux or 
fluidity, superflux or superfluity” (21). In other words, “without having the historical vantage to 
know exactly what it is” (de Grazia 33), the play dramatizes an unsound personhood diseased and 
absorbed by superfluous luxury items.  
 The question that arises from Lear’s divestiture as well as from the remedial 
undressing that Martinus prescribes for the nobleman is not whether the artificial “lendings” can be 
forsaken, but rather what degree of artifice is necessary to constitute a healthy person.88 The 
censored first part of the cure may be giving a typographical license to a healing interruption of the 
nobleman’s “Familiarities” with himself. The second part of the cure, however, is wholly taken up 
by a meticulous denuding of the nobleman. Like the undressing of the Lord Mayor and Lear, the 
removal of the nobleman’s clothes and other portable accessories carries a promise of unveiling or 
disclosure of a truer person inside, a deeper self beneath. Dispossessed of his “artificial charms” – 
both the knickknacks he carries and the mannerisms “that have made him a charm in his own eyes” 
–  the nobleman reverts to his natural self. Beneath the material superficialities of fashion lies the 
deeper, more real matters of his “bandy legs, a short neck, a dun hide, and a pot-belly”. Like his 
clothes, the nobleman’s “tender airs” can be “put off”, revealing an unrefined brutishness beneath. 
Even politeness is counterfeitable.89  
 The nobleman’s inspection of his own naked body is presented as the cure to that 
other, more ambiguous kind of observation in the looking-glass. Deprived of reflection, “the 
                                                 
88 Dean Frye also regards this question as integral to King Lear, when he argues that the play “points...to the need for at 
least some artifice. Man alone cannot exist just as he is born, but must create. What matters to the moralist is the degree 
of artificiality that is necessary and so may be regarded as natural” (29). The question of excess or superfluity is posed 
at least three times in the play: Lear’s initial description of Goneril’s “gorgeous” clothes as what “nature needs not” 
(III.iv 260-262 924), Tom Poor’s description of his fictitious former self as a foppish “serving-man...that curled my 
hair; wore gloves in my cap” (III.iv.78-79 931) and “had three suits to his back, six shirts to his body” (III.iv.118 932) 
and - perhaps most prominently - Lear’s claim that “[t]hrough rough tattered clothes small vices do appear”, while 
“[r]obes and furred gowns hide all” (IV.vi.157-158 951). While these examples equate overdressing and moral 
depravity, Lear’s axiom that “[o]ur basest beggars / Are in the poorest thing superfluous” (II.iv.256-257) complicates 
the relationship between necessity and luxury in a way that anticipates the eighteenth-century debate. As de Grazia 
points out, the “axiom keeps the poor and the rich by relativizing both need and excess: a man has more or less of both 
depending on his social position...It would seem that the only excess beggars could know would come from the 
handouts of the rich, though in their hands gratuitous waste would instantly convert to necessary subsistence” (32).  
89 Cf. the fool’s admonition in Lear that “wise men are grown foppish / And know now how their wits to wear, / Their 
manners are so apish” (I.iv.139-141 905). 
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admired object” cannot return. Notably the referent of this phrase remains ambiguous, 
simultaneously signifying the nobleman himself, his “false” (XI 136) image and the object of 
consumption. Such a fusion between man and commodity cannot take place once the nobleman is 
made to “survey himself naked” (XI 136). In other words, the removal of the exterior objects to 
which the nobleman is attached also precludes the objectification that is at the root of his self-
division. The passage thus turns on the distinction between two kinds of looking. Unlike the 
nobleman’s gaze in the looking glass, the healing “contemplation” (XI 136) advocated by Martinus 
generates a material singularity rather than an ethereal duplicity. Whereas the former kind of 
looking produces only the irreducible physicality of limbs and skin, the latter has a multiplying, 
divisive effect that allows the nobleman to “find himself” not only in his own but in other bodies of 
matter. Yet, the disavowal of the duplicitous transposition of looks between the nobleman and the 
eye-catching things that surround him is itself a kind of objectification. The stripping away of the 
exterior layers of habit leaves the nobleman a dehumanized being, an animated object. A person 
deprived of everything but his physicality, the nobleman has truly become a thing, an unnamable 
Lockean monster of the in-between. The attempted plunge below the surfaces of wearable things is 
in fact just another descent into thinghood.  
 The problem that is ultimately posed in the case of the nobleman is thus not how to 
extract oneself from the world of consumer goods but how to ensure that their consumption does 
not result in duplicitous imposture and enamoured overattachment. The opposition is not between 
absolute possession and pure non-acquisitiveness but between two categories of having, that is, 
between the kind of proprietorship that causes distempers, “languishing looks” and “woman-like 
behavior” and another kind that we must infer to remain unaffected by the “artificial charms” 
possessed (XI 136). What makes the nobleman’s proprietorship unhealthy is precisely what makes 
him so similar to Addison’s polite spectator: his ability to see more in the objects that he has taken 
in than “their proper Figures and Motions” (no. 413 96). It is his perception of properties “different 
from any thing that exists in the Objects themselves” (no. 413 96) that renders the commodities 
powerful enough to contain the nobleman within their own reflection. Similarly, endowed with the 
ability to “soften the most obdurate heart” (XI 135), even the most trivial knickknacks will make 
their owners capitulate to their intangible powers of seduction. Thus, as the objects by which the 
nobleman has been absorbed seem to take on a life of their own, the nobleman himself becomes 
something like an alienable object whose properties can “be removed from him” one by one until 
nothing remains. The “charm of his own eyes, and the object of his own adoration” (XI 136), the 
nobleman has taken his own person as property in an act of self-objectification that returns as the 
personalization of property. Possessing a little too perfectly the habits of “woman-like behavior”, 
his own(ed) person has come to take the place of the “artificial charms” with which he surrounds 
himself (XI 136). 
 It is a chiasmic structure whose inversion of inanimate and animate is not dissimilar to 
the “personification of things and the reification [Versachlichung] of persons” (Capital 1054) 
described by Marx. Thus, in the sensuous-suprasensuous objects created by and invested in the 
nobleman’s self-love it is tempting to recognize Marx’s commodity fetish, that “animated monster 
which begins to ‘work’, as if its body were by love possessed” (Capital 302). Indeed, Mackie does 
not hesitate to establish a “correspondence” between early eighteenth-century depictions of the 
consumption of fashionable commodities and “the notion of fetishization... as it develops in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially in...Marxian thought” (50). Nevertheless, while the 
case of the nobleman is illustrative of a general fetishistic confusion between inner and outer 
worlds, the cathexis it unfolds is essentially different from the mystifications of the commodified 
object outlined by Marx. As Schmidgen notes, “[u]nlike the modern commodity fetish”, early 
eighteenth-century consumer objects “remain recognizable as human extension, as being directly 
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involved in the process of human reproduction” (122).  In other words, whereas Marx’s commodity 
fetishes derive their powers from their absolute separation from the human sphere, the objects that 
exercise their control over the nobleman do so exactly because of their involvement in the 
(re)production of his humanity. The polished toys that surround the nobleman sustain their powers 
of investiture exactly because of the “metabolic interaction” (Capital 290), the Stoffwechsel that 
takes place between them and him not in the process of labour but in the mere act of possession. 
What the Scriblerian satire criticises is not a protocapitalistic form of consumption through which 
“things lose the meaning of personal, human property” (“Excerpts” 261), but rather a kind of having 
that overemphasizes this kind of meaning, somehow making property too personal. Rather than the 
absolutely alienable commodity that Marx’s nineteenth-century consumer faces as “private 
property...estranged from itself” (“Excerpts” 261), the early eighteenth century is confronted by a 
hybrid creation, a personal property that is nevertheless commodifiable. It is not “the separation of 
Man from things” (“Excerpts” 263) in the moment of consumption, but their entanglement in the 
“the Category of Having” (Burgersdijck vi 14) that is presented as the inescapable condition of 
personhood in the case of the nobleman.90  
 The successful negotiation of the portable personal property depends on the ability to 
wear one’s habit without being worn by it, that is, on the ability to remove the exterior layers of 
portables without vacating the interior they outline. Locke’s attempt to abstract the purely interior 
person from its material embodiment in the man is one way of doing this. Martinus’ cure works in a 
similar way, seeking to resolve the diseased involvement of persons and things in “personal 
properties” by dissolving the concept itself, that is, by instituting the separation between persons 
(uniquely individual beings of depth) and things (transferable and replaceable entities that are 
nothing but deceptive surfaces). It is this separation between men and things in the moment of 
consumption that Marx decries, as it, paradoxically, leads to the dehumanization of man. In the 
Memoirs, however, it is the act of dispossession that dehumanizes. This is so because the mixing of 
things and the consumption as appropriation of goods still carried constitutive rather than mere 
symbolical powers of personification. Healthy consumption – only implied by the lack of viable 
alternatives in the Memoirs – implies the ability to see something else than empty abstraction or 
gross concretion in your personal belongings. Or rather, if consumption leaves the nobleman 
completely self-absorbed, the removal of the possibility to consume and properly take in the things 
one makes one's own renders personification and propriety impossible in the first place. Thus, the 
image of the nobleman stripped naked is ambiguous.91 Is it the habit or is it the act of dishabiting 
that is the cause of the monstrous transformation? Does Martinus’ cure heal by pointing to the 
consumer’s unrefined brutishness, the dehumanized thingness that festers underneath the fineries of 
consumption? Or is the cure no less afflicted than the disease itself, removing humanity layer by 
layer as the nobleman is denuded?  In either case, however, once man has been stripped of all his 
things, he is somehow less of a person, and more of a thing. 
 Nevertheless, even if the clothes or habit in The Memoirs may be read as a 
prefiguration of Marx’s commodity fetish, the human reification that ensues is nothing like that of 
Marx’s self-estrangement. Whether, as with the Lord Mayor, in the abstraction of a brute fact, or, as 
in the case of the nobleman, in the concretion of a factual brute, the dehabited man of The Memoirs 
resembles Locke’s changeling rather than Marx’s self-estranged consumer.  Thus, in the case of the 
nobleman the dehumanization that results from the separation of man and his things does not 
                                                 
90 When, as in Marx, having is thought of in terms of consumption, the power relation between he who has and that 
which is had is unequivocous and unidirectional than when, as in Burgersdijck or Harris, it is though of in terms of 
clothing, or superinduction. In the former case the thing had is internalized, eaten and thus contained, whereas in the 
latter case it and thus susceptible to potentially infinite additions and thus uncontainable overspill.   
91 The ambiguity is a generic one: satire always risks producing what it purports to criticize. 
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merely pertain to “the moral existence, the social existence, the very heart of man” (“Excerpts” 
263) but also to the make-up of his very personhood. At the end of his cure from the lures of luxury 
consumer goods the nobleman is quite literally a charmless, ill-bred creature, all limbs and no 
persona. As Maurice J. Quinlan and Jefferson have noted, this kind of literalization is a typically 
Scriblerian conceit: a morally reprehensible man is made physically reprehensible. Nevertheless, in 
the final transformation of the nobleman into some thing akin to Locke’s changeling we may read 
more than mere comical effect. Whereas, the discussion on the predicaments satirizes a largely 
obsolete ratiocinative techniques of scholasticism, the nobleman's transformation is suggestive of 
very real, contemporary concerns about the possibility of thought being merely “Matter modify’d” 
and man being nothing but “a Lump in motion” (Shaftesbury, Moralists 357).92 As D. W. Jefferson 
has argued in another context, the comic use of the materialist ideas that are exposed to the wit of 
the Scriblerians is not only “a symptom of satirical reaction against them. That they should have 
been matter for comedy is a sign that they were not dead. To be matter for comedy they had to be 
matter for the imagination” (227). 
 The fear that the satire allows to take hold in the imagination is the fear of the loss of a 
necessary involvement of things and persons in personal properties. It is the fear that the property 
by which we are habited can nevertheless separate itself from us to be had by somebody else, or that 
we may be separated from ourselves bit by bit to be habited by different properties. As in post-
Newtonian materialist thinking, the movement of material parts seems to be attended by their 
dematerialization. It is their capacity for circulation, their ability to be “put off” that makes them 
dangerous, transforming them from essential parts to mere “Supernumerary Ornaments” (Addison 
no. 413, 96).  Just as Locke lets the matter of man evaporate into the ever-changing consciousness 
of personhood, so the Scriblerians let the nobleman’s material objects depend on the fickle 
additions of the imagination, allowing them to become “imaginary Glories” (Addison no. 413, 96). 
The fear that the same properties might possess different imaginary values merely through their 
capacity for circulation finds its counterpart in the apprehensions spurred by Locke’s conundrum 
that the same man might be different persons merely through the transport of his consciousness. In 
other words, when properties move, so do identities. Just as the same item may carry “imaginary 
Glories” according to the proprietor to which it belongs, so one man might carry different 
personalities according to the items he holds. The potential for  “displays of exquisite 
destabilization” creates a new aesthetics of description only by exploiting the fears inherent in the 
supplementary logic that attends the dual position of personal properties as both essential and 
ornamental, both fixed carriers of a general social identity and the movable bearers of personal 
choices of acquisition and consumption. 
 
 
                                                 
92 Shaftesbury’s The Moralists (1709) had been published only four years earlier than “The Case of a Young 
Nobleman”, which initially appeared in Guardian 11 (24 March, 1712/13).   
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ii. “Objects of mutability”:  
Self-Fashioning and the Problem of Luxury in Early Periodicals 
 
“No Man is ignorant that a Taylor is the Person that makes our Cloaths; to some he not only makes their 
Dress, but, in some measure, may be said to make themselves.”  
Richard Campbell. The London Tradesman (1747). 
 
In an explanatory note on Derrida’s expression “metaphysics of the proper”, Spivak points out the 
semantic plurality of Derrida’s use of the word “proper”: “le propre - self-possession, propriety, 
property, cleanliness” (Of Grammatology 26). What turns this semantic chain into metaphysics is 
exactly its insistent unity and indivisibility. Challenging the line between real wants and imaginary 
desires, luxury becomes central to this mutual establishment of propriety and selfhood, what one 
might call the propriation of the self-possession. Elisabeth Kowaleski-Wallace has pointed out the 
dual status of commodities as goods for sale. According to Kowaleski-Wallace, the eighteenth-
century “commodity” was not only a thing, a tradable object, but also the quality of suitability in 
relation to a need; commodities were commodious, “fit” and “proper” because “fitted to a certain 
purpose” (Consuming 73).93 As ornamental, superfluous trade objects, luxuries broke the 
connection between the two senses of commodity; catering not to wants but to fancy such products 
were unfit and improper. Traditionally, therefore, luxury belonged to the range of private vices the 
indulgence of which posed a threat to the progress of public good. In Charles Davenant’s 
Discourses on the Public Revenue, and on the Trade of England (1698) this distinction between the 
vanity of the private indulgence of luxury and the virtuous promotion of thrift for the common good 
is received wisdom:  
 
It is without doubt the honestest and wisest thing in the 
world, quite to cure luxury; but if it is grown too big for the 
laws made, or to be made...the next wisdom consists in 
contriving to get such a foundation of wealth, as that the 
vain and expensive temper of a people may not be 
destructive to the public. (I.v.1 391-92) 
 
Similarly in An Essay upon publick Spirit (1711) John Dennis considers “Pride, Luxury and 
Avarice, the legitimate Offspring of Self-Love which is private Spirit” (I 12) and thus “the greatest 
Corrupter of Publick Manners” (preface vi).  
 Yet, the opposition between luxuries, the incommodious products of fancy and the 
wealth that supports the common good was under pressure from the very beginning of the century. 
In 1705 Mandeville's “Six-penny Pamphlet” called The Grumbling Hive; or Knaves turn’d Honest 
put into verse the paradox that private vices often amounted to public virtues. The Fable of the 
Bees; Or Private Vices Public Benefits”, the 1714 reissue of the poem, contained a prose exposition 
of the paradox, seeking “to demonstrate That Human Frailties, during the degeneracy of 
MANKIND, may be turn’d to the Advantage of the CIVIL SOCIETY, and made to supply the Place 
of Moral Virtues” (title page). Thus Mandeville contends that vice (vanity, greed, luxury, pride and 
envy) produces prosperity:  
                                                 
93 There is a similar conjunction of moral worth and tradable wealth in the word “goods”. In The Commonwealth of 
Oceanea (1656) James Harrington expressed the faith in the commodious effects of commoditities when he argued 
there was a close association between two kinds of goods: “Internal, or the goods of the Mind; and External, or the 
goods of Fortune” (39).  
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Frugality is like Honesty, a mean starving Virtue, that is 
only fit for small Societies of good peaceable Men, who are 
contented to be poor... ’Tis an idle dreaming Virtue that 
employs no Hands, and therefore very useless in a trading 
Country...Avarice again knows innumerable Tricks to rake 
it together, which Frugality would scorn to make use of (K 
76-77).  
 
Following Pocock, Bellamy considers the Mandevillian paradox symptomatic of “the disjunction 
between on the one hand an economic system based on complex exchange, in which growth, profit 
and trade were identified as inherently good and beneficial, and on the other a system of personal 
morality which stressed frugality and economy” (Commerce 21-22). Although Mandeville was not 
the first to make this point, 94 what is notable about Mandeville’s phrasing of the paradox is that it 
expresses “economic theory in terms of moral discourse” (Bellamy, Commerce 22), thus pointing to 
the inadequacy of the old republican ideas of civic virtue faced with the crass realities of 
commerce.95 According to Bellamy the “storm of protest that greeted Mandeville's work” 
(Commerce 21) is expressive of a discursive divide: whereas the paradox was legitimate “within 
primitive and marginalized writings on commerce”, its introduction into the “dominant discursive 
forms” constituted by economic “works that engaged with the terms of the moral tradition” was 
controversial (Commerce 22). 
 However, as indicated briefly in the first chapter of this thesis, the paradox had its 
equivalent within economic theory itself in what Heckscher calls “the logical inconsistency” of 
mercantilism, which was at one and the same time encouraging trade and the constant circulation of 
goods while tempering consumption and the “deadstock of plenty” (Heckscher 115, 317). Hence, 
even economic thinkers writing from within the “relative autonomy of...economic theory” 
(Bellamy, Commerce 20) proved painfully aware of the offensiveness inherent in the conjunction of 
personal avarice and public wealth. In a Discourse of Coyned Money (1691), the English economist 
Sir Dudley North identifies luxurious consumption as the source of prosperity in a language that 
leaves no doubt about its problematic moral status: “The main spur to Trade, or rather to Industry 
and Ingenuity, is the exorbitant Appetites of Men, which they will take pains to gratifie, and so be 
disposed to work, when nothing else will incline them to it; for did Men content themselves with 
bare Necessaries, we should have a poor World” (qtd. in Bellamy 2005, 17). As Kowaleski-Wallace 
suggests, the question was whether one should “consider wide-scale consumerism as enhancing the 
                                                 
94 Already in 1623, Edward Misselden had in commenting upon “the circle of commerce” questioned the distinction 
between private and public wealth: “Is it not lawfull for Merchants to seeke their Privatum Commodum in the exercise 
of their calling? Is not gaine the end of trade? Is not the publique involved in the private, and the private in the 
publique? (qtd. in Bellamy, Commerce 18). In 1690 Nicholas Barbon wrote in A Discourse of Trade that it “is not 
Necessity that causeth the Consumption...but it is the wants of the Mind, Fashion, and desire of Novelties, and Things 
scarce, that causeth Trade” (qtd. in Cruise 79). George Mackenzie Essays upon several moral subjects (1713) complains 
of the common defence for luxury, which holds “that it is not fit to decry Luxury too much in this Age, because it 
entertains and feeds so many poor Artisans, and others who would starve without its Assistance, having no other Trade, 
but the making Perfumes, Laces, Embroideries, and such things which Frugality condemns as Baubles, or abhors as 
Poisons” (339). Also writing at the end of the previous century, Sir Dudley North similarly suggested that the “main 
spur to Trade, or rather to Industry and Inguity, is the exorbitant Appetites of Men, which they will take pains to 
gratifie”, concluding that if “Men content themselves with bare Necessaries, we should have a poor World” (qtd. in 
Bellamy, Commerce 17). For more on the pro-consumption discourse and its disruption of the traditional bond between 
civic virtue of thrift, see Bellamy (Commerce) and Cruise. 
95 The book is as a sustained attack on Shaftesbury’s ideals of innate disinterested benevolence in Characteristics of 
Men, Manners, Opnions and Times (1711). 
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national coffers, allowing for lucrative trade on a global level, or...recognize that same spending as 
draining the nation of its capital, rendering it dependent and ‘weakened’ by its inability to live off 
indigenous resources” (Consuming 7). Curing excessive consumption is as difficult to eighteenth-
century economic writers as it is to Martinus Scriblerus; consumption is always both material 
acquisition and physical disease, or in Brewer and Porter’s words, “both enrichment and 
impoverishment” (4). 
 To Mandeville, the distinction between necessity and superfluity initially seems 
simple; value beyond use is mere “Ornament”: “Cloaths were originally made for two Ends, to hide 
our Nakedness, and to fence our Bodies against the Weather, and other outward Injuries: To these 
our boundless Pride has added a third, which is Ornament...” (M 102). But if Mandeville recognizes 
the chimerical status of value beyond use, he also acknowledges the reality of a felt need: “The 
Goldsmith, Mercer, or any other of the most creditable Shopkeepers, that has Three or Four 
Thousand Pounds to set up with, must have two Dishes of Meat every Day, and something 
extraordinary for Sundays. His Wife must have a Damask Bed against her lying in, and two or three 
Rooms very well furnish’d...” (V 227). Thus, ultimately Mandevillle finds nothing but 
“obscurity...in the words Decency and Conveniency” (L 80), as “what is call’d superfluous to some 
degree of People will be thought requisite to those of higher Quality” (Remark L 81). Luxury, 
therefore, is also a relative concept, existing in the space between perceived lack and imagined 
excess, between the real and the unreal:  “[I]n one sense every thing may be call’d [luxury], and in 
another there is no such thing” (L 97).96  
 Clothes became central in the efforts to distinguish diseased consumption from 
commodious acquisition. In Mandeville’s description of clothes as a bodily fence against injuries, 
there are still vestiges of the old paradigm of habit: the sense that clothing is the natural extension of 
the body, “the body’s body” from which “one may infer the state of a man’s character” (Erasmus 
qtd. in Roche 6). This is of course the traditional phrasing of the correspondence between the 
“inward habit of virtue” and “the outward habit of robes and gloves” (Jones and Stallybrass 116). 
Like Jones and Stallybrass, Daniel Roche argues that the eighteenth century saw the disintegration 
of the habitus-habit conjunction that had provided a convenient legitimation of “a stationary 
economy, in which everyone had their place and ought to consume according to their rank, where 
clothes revealed status” (5-6). The emergence of an economy of exchange and the absence of 
complicated sumptuary laws97 proscribing certain types of cloth to all but the elites gradually put 
the traditional coincidence of clothes and character under pressure: “In the eighteenth century, we 
can trace the transition between two worlds, one where the social being must correspond to the 
representation he gives of himself and which is given of him by others, and one where the changing 
social configuration allowed a little confusion of being and seeming” (Roche 510). In an expanding 
economy where an increasing section of the population were able “to present an appearance” 
(Roche 504), the luxury of ornament disturbs the equilibrium between a man’s interior and his 
                                                 
96 It is a description of the concept of luxury that reverberates throughout the century. Towards the end of the century, 
William Paley remarks Moral and Political Philosophy (1785) that “it is not enough that men’s natural wants be 
supplied; that a provision adequate to the real exigencies of human life be attainable: habitual superfluities become 
actual wants; opinion and fashion convert articles of ornament and luxury into necessaries of life” (qtd. in Cruise 47).  
97 For more on this process, see Berg (32) and Lemire. In England sumptuary laws came to an end in 1604 in a process 
that reflected the consitutional dispute over the legislative powers of crown and parliament rather than the irrelevance of 
such legislation. Thus, despite the 1604 repeal of the sumptuary acts of 1533 and 1553, the necessity for sumptuary 
regulation continued far into the eighteenth century. The frequent appeals to sumptuary intervention throughtout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries testify to the pressure exerted by the repeal on the ability of clothes to function as 
part of a regime of social recognizability. For more on the repeal process and the subsequent debates on the need for a 
resumption of sumptuary legislation, see Hunt (295-325).  
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exterior, marking the point when the clothes and their wearer no longer correspond. Or rather, when 
ornamental, decorative, disproportionate and excessive, clothes comes to signify the disjunction 
rather than the coincidence of appearances and reality. In Shaftesbury’s account of “some noble 
Youth of a...sumptuous gay Fancy” (“Miscellany III” 173), the disjunction has turned into an 
opposition, allowing clothes to disguise rather than to reveal: “The Elegance of his Fancy in 
outward things, may have made him overlook the Worth of inward Character and Proportion: And 
the Love of Grandure and Magnificence, wrong turn’d; may have possess’d his Imagination 
overstrongly with such things as Frontispieces, Parterres, Equipages, trim Varlets in party-colour’d 
Cloathes; and others in Gentlemens Apparel” (“Miscellany III 73). In his History of Man (1704) 
Nathaniel Wanley is likewise worried about the disjunction between clothes are their wearers. 
Wanley seeks to recover the broken links, trusting the good sense of people to distinguish 
cleanliness and simplicity properly “proportion’d” to estate and status from the gaudy coverings of 
ostentatious luxury: 
 
Gaudy Cloaths are the most Insignificant things in the 
World, to recommend the Wearers to People of good 
Sense; who can see a Coward tho cover’d with an 
Embroider’d Coat, and an empty Scull under a Monstrous 
large and full Peruke: A plain clean and decent Habit, 
proportion’d to one's Quality and Business, is all a wise 
Man aims at in his Dress, and is an Argument that he has 
bestow’d more Cost and Time in furnishing his Inside, than 
his Outside: Whilst others for want of Capacities, like 
Popish Relics are wrapt up in Silver. (IX, 41 ) 
    
The care with which descriptions such as these take to distinguish the proportioned from the 
monstrous, the simple from the oversized and the vestures of decorum from those of disguise 
testifies to the fact that not sense but sight is had the powers of social determination. Mandeville 
notes that “People where they are not known, are generally honour’d according to their Cloaths and 
other Accoutrements they have about them” (M 123). Portable properties, clothes and “other 
accoutrements” that can be had about have the power to present people “not as what they are but 
what they appear to be” (M 123).  
 The problem that Mandeville hints at is that “[e]veryone should appear what he was, 
but might also appear what he aspired to be” (Roche 55); if clothes were the mark of social 
hierarchies, they might also subvert them. Where habits change, fashion enters. It is this possibility 
of “Emulation” that is obtained by the acquisition of those “most Insignificant things” (Wanley IX 
41) that powers the “many Shiftings and Changings of Mode” (Mandeville M 106).98  
 
The Druggist, Mercer, Draper and other creditable 
Shopkeepers can find no difference between themselves 
and Merchants, and therefore dress and live like them. The 
Merchant’s Lady, who cannot bear the Assurance of those 
Mechanicks, flies for refuge to the other End of the Town, 
and Scorns to follow any Fashion but what she takes from  
                                                 
98 Roche points to the article on luxury in the Encyclopédie, which clearly establishes the subversive potential of 
fashion, stating the “first cause of luxury” to be “discontent with one’s estate; the desire to better oneself” (460). 
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thence. This haughtiness alarms the Court, the Women of 
Quality are frighten’d to see Merchants Wives and 
Daughters dress’d like themselves...Mantua-makers are 
sent for, and the contrivance of Fashions becomes all their 
Study, that they may have always new Modes ready to take 
up... (M 106) 
 
Fashion was not an eighteenth century invention. Nevertheless, as John Styles suggests, a 
“significant and possibly growing proportion of [products] (though by no means all) were fashion 
products, in the sense that their successful sale depended on repeated changes in their visual 
appearance in accordance with changing metropolitan notions of what was fashionable” (528).  This 
increase in fashion products extended much further than clothes, incorporating ceramics, china, 
glass, silver, furnishings, jewellery and “decorative accessories from button and buckles to cameos 
and medallions”  (McKendrick 66-81; Berg 247-79). Maxine Berg argues that the practice of 
emulation “was more complex than the process of ‘aping one's betters’“ (251): “It was a choice of 
an individualist over a hierarchical lifestyle: changes and trends would allow private individuals at 
least a minimal margin of freedom, choice, and autonomy in matters of taste” (250-51). What 
Mandeville describes, therefore, is the acceleration in the eighteenth century of the individualization 
of habit and the separation of clothes from class and hierarchy divisions that had its conception in 
the previous century.  When objects that have formerly been exhausted by fixed social contents 
become susceptible to “packaging” and “careful connection” (Berg 252), not only clothes and other 
“accoutrements” but also persons become what Mandeville in his poem calls “Objects of 
Mutability” (9).99 Thus, as James Cruise notes, what Mandeville objects to is not that his 
contemporaries have made “Apparel...a main Point” (Mandeville 103) but that their use of clothes 
for the purposes of “Emulation” makes them “resist classification” (Cruise 81). When “handsome 
Apparel...[is] a main Point”, that is, when people consistently present themselves not “as what they 
are but what they appear to be” (Mandeville 123), exchanges in any form – whether commercial or 
communicative – become predicated on the workings of disfiguration, emulation and mutable 
anonymity.100 Alongside firmly established socio-economic or occupational groups, new group 
allegiances based on stylistic choices or consumptive patterns form. Group designations such as 
“fops”, “fribles”, “coquettes” and (later) “macaronis” not only designated a certain kind of 
excessive, luxurious and diseased consumption but also a specific style capable of traversing socio-
economic boundaries (West 173-175). Robert B. Heilman has described how the term “fop” in the 
late seventeenth century came to be applied to the specific follies of the “affected and overdressed 
man” (365) rather than the stupidity of the general fool. He dates the 1690s as the turning point, at 
                                                 
99 Mandeville refers to “Laws and Cloaths” (9) under the rule of envy, vanity, pride and avarice, but it is clear that 
people themselves are transformed by luxury. 
100 Much more is at stake than the counterfeitability of personal identity in the shift to a culture of appearances. In The 
Character of the true publick Nation (1702), Andrew Brown locates in luxury “a Spirit of blackest and Rankest 
Atheism” (58). When “all things are as men take them...there is no Realities at all, but all only entia Rationes, Figments 
and Chimera’s” (64). Erin Makie uses Daniel Defoe’s The Compleat English Tradesman (1727) as an example of the 
feared ramifications of the dissimulative potential in fashion. Defoe also sees in the tradesman’s appeal to “the popular 
Vice of over gay Dress, and Excesses in habit” (159) a “Crime...agasint Truth, and the Author of Truth; in pushing on 
Business at the expence of our Morals, and with a Chain of accumulated Falsehood and Prevarication.” (159).  The 
tradesman operates in the intangible realm of fantasy rather than the mundane world of commodites, as he replaces the 
material commodity with its invented counterpart. As the simplest cloth is dressed up as silk, reality evaporates as 
“Imagination [is] gratified” [158). The tradesman himself is not dissimilar to fashionable and promiscuous fops, 
“dress’d up with all possible sincerity and modesty” (158) while lying expertly to flog his commodity. See also Mackie 
on Defoe’s attempt to extract trade itself from the life of fashion: “Trade is not a ball, where people appear in masque, 
and act a part of make sport; where they strive to seem what they really are not” (Defoe qtd. in Mackie 76). 
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which “a fop” came to refer to “a hyperfashionable man about town, attitudinizing, and more often 
mannered than well-mannered” (365).  Characters such as John Crowne’s “Sir Courtly Nice”, 
George Etherege’s “Sir Fopling Flutter”, and Colley Cibber’s “Sir Novelty Fashion” attest to “the 
emergence, alongside the traditional and still continuing use of fop in the general sense of fool, of a 
special meaning: the man of mode whose properties are cane, cravat, periwig, powder, snuffbox, 
and mirror” (Heilman, 388). 
 The dangers of such stylistic freewheeling remained the potential for self-
dispossession. In The London Tradesman (1747), Richard Campbell claims that tailors to the 
fashion hungry metropolitan consumers have developed into “Shape Merchants” (194) with the 
power to “metamorphose Mankind” (191): 
 
There are Numbers of Beings in about this Metropolis who have no 
other identical Existence than what the Taylor, Milliner, and 
Perriwig-Maker bestow upon them; strip them of these Distinctions, 
and they are quite a different Species of Beings; have no more 
Relation to their dressed selves, than they have to the great Mogul, 
and are as insignificant in Society as Punch, deprived of his moving 
Wires, and hung up upon a Peg. (191) 
 
To some, Campbell persists, Protean “Mr. Fashioner” (191), “not only makes their Dress, but, in 
some measure, may be said to make themselves” (191). Here, as in the denudations in the Memoirs, 
dispossession is an ambiguous act whose power lies less in the dehumanization of the subject than a 
questioning of the very status of subjectivity. The consumer of fashion only seemingly loses his 
autonomy once “deprived of his moving Wires”; like Punch, his independence is forged and his 
humanity artificial. The separation the clothes from the man, the proprietor from his properties, only 
proves their metonymic dependence – the “dressed self “ is nothing but an outward form, a merely 
material “accoutrement” that is not quite self-sustaining. The Humean figuration of man as a puppet 
propped up by the stimuli of external objects resurfaces in such descriptions of mutable beings. 
 Viewed in this light, the “Case of the Young Nobleman” in the Memoirs forms part of 
a commonly satirized Mundus Foppensis, a world of foppery, or excessive male consumption 
rivalled only by the equally consumptive, female world of coquetry, or Mundus Muliebris.101 As 
Kerby notes, the satire on the nobleman’s narcissism takes its cue from a longer tradition of critique 
of masculine overdressing, more specifically from previous contributions in The Tatler and The 
Spectator (277-80). Thus the snuffbox and the tweezer-case both appear in Isaac Bickerstaff’s list 
of foppish “Effects” in Richard Steele’s The Tatler (no. 113).102 The items listed belong to a young 
court witness who in a previous number of the periodical has been “carried off dead upon the taking 
away of his snuff-box” (no. 113 268). Like Martinus’ patient, the young man is excessively attached 
to his belongings, indiscreetly “beat[ing] his Snuff-box with a very sawcy Air” (no. 110 260):  
 
He was going on with this insipid Common-place Mirth, 
sometimes opening his Box, sometimes shutting it, then 
viewing the Picture on the Lid, and the Workmanship of 
the Hinge, when, in the midst of his Eloquence, I ordered 
his Box to be taken from him; upon which he was 
                                                 
101 The two worlds are depicted in Mary Evelyn’s poem Mundus Muliebris (1690) and the anonymus retaliative poem 
Mundus Foppensis (1691). Both are reproduced in Erin Mackie’s selection from the The Tatler and The Spectator 
(1998): 584-612. See note 84. 
102 Bickerstaff is Richard Steele’s persona. 
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immediately struck speechless, and carried off stone-dead. 
(No. 110 260) 
 
The young man is accused of having an amorous relationship with the coquettish “Mrs. Rebecca 
Pindust”, who by the use of “a Looking-glass, and by the further use of certain Attire, made either 
of Cambric, Muslin, or other Linnen Wares...had put to Death several young Men” (no. 110 260). 
The young man had declared himself prepared to die for “the lady”, but it is not by the hands of 
Mrs. Pindust but by the hinges of his snuffbox that he expires. His handling of the snuffbox and his 
“saucy air” more than suggests that he is more enamoured with the box than with the lady. Luxury 
consumption and masturbatory lasciviousness connects in the intimacy between the young man and 
the snuffbox, elsewhere described as exquisitely gilt item “with an invisible Hinge, and a Looking-
glass in the lid” (no. 113 268). Here the moral problem of luxury has less to do with the 
Mandevillian unreality of a felt need than with its more traditional association “with the sinful 
indulgence of the body” (Kowaleski-Wallace, Consuming 76).103 Yet, what is on trial is not just the 
inappropriately intimate connection between Rebecca Pindust and her beau, but that between the 
beau and “his Box” (no. 110 260).  Consumption itself is on trial here: signifying both promiscuity 
and death by attachment, the item of consumption is culpable on two counts. 104 In other words, the 
problem is the young man’s proximity to an object of circulation, a commodity publicly offering 
itself to anybody willing to pay.  
 The wanton attachment to things practised by the foppish court witness was widely 
satirized at the beginning of the century; the erotic preference for things over people was a 
characteristic mark of excessive consumption. The Tatler’s Mr. Bickerstaff often finds occasion to 
warn against the seductive powers of fashion, as when in The Tatler (no. 151), he notes the sway of 
“every Thing that makes Show, however trifling and superficial” (350):  
 
Many a Lady has fetched a Sigh at the Toss of a Wig, and 
been ruined by the tapping of a Snuff-box. It is impossible 
to describe all the Execution that was done by the 
Shoulder-know while that Fashion prevailed, or to reckon 
up all the Virgins that have fallen a Sacrifice to a Pair of 
fringed Gloves. (350) 
 
In the same issue Mr. Bickerstaff recounts how his family has successfully kept his wealthy great 
aunt from marrying simply by the transference of her amorous passions “to a Tippet...with a white 
Sarcenet Hood” (351). Writing in The Guardian (no. 149), John Gay also finds “the greatest Motive 
to Love” (353) in dress, the effect of which “may bear a Parallel to Poetry with respect to moving 
the Passions” (353). Like Mr. Bickerstaff’s aunt, Gay’s ladies of fashion seem more inclined to 
affiance themselves to fashionable objects than to their human counterparts. A staple item in the 
world of foppery at least since George Etherege’s The Man of Mode, or, Sir Fopling Flutter (1676), 
fringed gloves were considered a particularly attractive match.  “I have known a Lady at sight fly to 
a Red Feather, and readily give her Hand to a fringed pair of Gloves,” Gay recounts (353). It is a 
concern that is shared by Addison, who in The Spectator (no.15) notes how a girl disposed to 
consider men “not as what they are but what they appear to be” (Mandeville M 123), is “in danger 
of every embroidered Coat”, while “a Pair of fringed Gloves may be her Ruin” (86). The “Fringe-
                                                 
103 According to Kowaleski-Wallace, the concept of luxury as lascivious would give way to a more morally acceptable 
concept of luxury as “something which is desirable but not indispensible” (Consuming 76), but as we have seen above, 
the placement of luxury between wants and needs entails its own paradoxes.  
104 See Mackie (122-125) for more on eighteenth century “fashion on trial”. 
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Glove Club” mentioned in The Spectator no. 30 connects the fringed gloves to their “impertinent” 
owners, “a Set of People who met and dressed like Lovers” (165, my emphasis). Suggesting both 
identity and similarity, the word “like” indicates not only veiled homosexuality, but also a potential 
for dissimulation in general. Trading on the still common confusion of “as” and “like”, the phrase 
suggests that in the dressing up for love is also the dressing up of love. The members of the Fringe-
Glove Club who “express their Passion in nothing but Dress” (165) are faking their own identity; 
they both are and are not the lovers they pretend to be. It is an awkward position between 
dissimulation and simulation, between feigning not to have what one has (a mere material 
substitute) and feigning to have what one doesn’t (the beloved itself, the reality of love).   
 There is more to note in these comments than the simple synecdochic reduction of the 
flirtatious fop to his fashionable accessories. Firstly, they speak of a world where love is not only 
communicated but incorporated by the changing fashions of commodities.  The replacement of the 
“Fringe-Glove Club”, the members of which are all “Persons of...moderate Intellects” (165) by 
another society of lovers with a stronger focus on “Learning and Understanding” (165) does nothing 
to change the objectification of love: “Instead of Snuff-boxes and Canes, which are usual Helps to 
Discourse with other young Fellows, these have each some Piece of Ribbon, a broken Fan, or an old 
Girdle, which they play with while they talk of the fair Person remembered by each respective 
Token” (164). Secondly, they entail a gendering of consumption, aligning women and Mandevillian 
emulation to describe the involuntary entrance of men into the arena of fashionable identity 
manipulation.105 The fop, of course, occupies a shifty middle ground, knowledgeable of the 
possibilities of manipulation inherent in fashion, and yet an object of manipulation himself. As 
opposed to the coquette, however, the fop is not only obliged to mould himself according to his 
tailor’s latest fabrications, but also forced to adopt the whims of those other, more powerful “Shape 
Merchants” – the ladies of fashion that he pursues.  
 In an issue of the Guardian (no. 97), Gay’s “Mr. Simon Softly” shares his frustrations 
at his loss of direction in the indecipherable “Discourse” of fashion that is skilfully manoeuvred by 
a newly widowed lady he is pursuing: “I was betrayed after the same manner into a Brocade 
Wastecoat, a Sword Knot, a pair of Silver fringed Gloves, and a Diamond Ring. But whether out of 
Ficklness, or a Design upon me, I can’t tell; but I found by her Discourse, that what she liked one 
Day she disliked another: So that in six Months Space I was forced to equip my self above a dozen 
times” (58). The exhaustion of Mr. Softly’s fortune seems an appropriate punishment in a reversal 
of betrayal that gives the widow the advantage as the experienced consumer of luxury in a pursuit 
that initially casts Mr. Softly in the role as predator aspiring “to get a rich Widow” (no. 97, 58). 
Mr. Softly is not the only man who fails to direct women’s desires from the accessories to the man. 
In “To a Lady on her Passion for old China” (1725)106 Gay recounts a similar case of fetishistic 
adoration in which the poetic persona is in direct competition with “brittle” porcelain:  
 
 
                                                 
105 As Laura Brown and Laura Mandell have noted the association of “female adornment and dress” with “mercantile 
capitalism” (Brown 429) worked as a convenient “scapegoating” (Mandell, Misogynous 108) in the moral dilemma of 
consumption: “The activities and motives of the male adventurers and profiteers, and the systematic dimensions of 
imperialist expansion disappear behind the figure of the woman; in effect, because women wear the products of 
accumulation, they are by metonymy made to bear responsibility for the system by which they are adorned” (Brown 
429). Mackie has also written extensively of the conjunctions between women, fashion and credit: “All suffer from an 
overactive fancy and disordered imagination. The natures of woman and fashion are marked by the whimsical caprice, 
arbitrary change, and addictive involvement that characterize credit” (113). 
106 Deborah Laycock has written on the analogy between women and china at the beginning of the eighteenth century.  
Laycock mentions Ambrose Philips’ “The TEA-POT; or, The Lady’s Transformation” (1730) and Elizabeth Thomas’ 
“The Ladies Exercise at Tea...Or the Metamorphosis of a Set of Ladies into a Set of China Tea-Cups” (1729).  
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WHAT Ecstasies her bosom fire! 
How her Eyes languish with desire! 
... 
China's the Passion of her Soul; 
A cup, a plate, a dish, a bowl 
Can kindle wishes in her breast, 
Inflame with joy, or break her rest.  (1-6) 
 
A little later in the poem, commodity and consumer approach the point of metaphorical 
coalescence: 
 
When I some Jar behold, 
Or white, or blue, or speck’d with gold, 
Vessels so pure, and so refin’d 
Appear the types of woman-kind 
... 
I grant they’re frail, yet they’re so rare, 
The treasure cannot cost too dear! 
... 
But Man is made of courser stuff, 
And serves convenience well enough (29-44) 
 
The implication is that only morally “brittle” women are seduced by the insubstantiality of fashion, 
while men as modest “earthen”-ware (45) have they feet more firmly planted on the ground and – 
one could assume – in the virtuous soil of landed property. “Convenience” is reserved for men, 
while only women desire useless luxury that is “[t]oo fair, too fine for household duty” (34). The 
metaphorical merging serves not only to feminize luxury consumption but also to transform 
commodification into prostitution. A “woman’s not like China sold” (69), Gay’s persona insists at 
the end of the poem, and yet, as she “cannot cost too dear”, we sense that she is rather overpriced 
than priceless or beyond commercial valuation. It is no coincidence that “commodity” is used as a 
slang term for the female genitalia in the eighteenth century (Carter 63). The construction of 
prostitution as the paradigm of the relation between consumer and commodity legitimates the moral 
indignation of luxurious self-display. But, the conflation of sexual license and commodification 
does more than distill the general anxiety of eighteenth-century culture about “its debasement into 
trade or business” (Brewer 358). It also creates in the parallel image of the prostitute and the 
commodity a precise model of the dichotomies of consumption in an economy increasingly based 
on movable goods.  
 In The Tatler (no. 143) “The Censor” places an advertisement to announce the legal 
proceeding against a shoe maker of Pall Mall whose “fine wrought Ladies Shoes and Slippers put 
out to View...create irregular Thoughts and Desires in the Youth of this Nation” (335). The 
shopkeeper “is required to take in those eyesores, or show Cause the next Court Day why he 
continues to expose the same” (335). As with the case of Mrs. Pindust, the commodity is put on 
trial: “[H]e [the shopkeeper] is required to be prepared particularly to answer to the slippers with 
green lace and blue heels.” But if there is something in the objects themselves that generates 
attraction, it is the fact that they are “put out to view” that makes them a case for the court. The 
alignment of prostitute and commodity is also a subtext here. In her description of the category of 
the prostitute as a complex and contradictory manifestation of cultural anxiety, Sophie Carter also 
depicts the conflicted acquisition of luxuries in the emergent consumer culture: 
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The status of the prostitute’s body as a purchasable 
commodity, contravening the norms of chastity and virtue, 
meant that it was the epitome of availability, obtainable and 
material. Yet this body was equally autonomous and 
always in circulation, and, and moreover, consisted of 
nothing but a succession of facades, to the extent that its 
definitive characteristic would seem to be its elusiveness, 
its indeterminacy – ultimately its immateriality. (76)   
 
What is really objectionable about both prostitutes and blue heeled slippers “put out for view” is not 
their desirability but their promiscuous self-display. On the other hand, implicating the writer 
heavily in the consumptive desire he seeks to censor, the Censor’s last comment on the slippers is 
less suggestive of the moral indignation than of frustrated acquisitiveness. It seems even the Censor 
is not immune to the “irregular Thoughts” induced by desirable commodities. Viewed as a product 
of prostitution, the commodity comes to signify not only the immoderate appropriability, but also 
the fickleness of consumption and thus by extension the immaterially inobtainable in objects of 
exchange that are somehow too commercial to be securely possessed. A private property publicly 
for sale, the commodity is not only before acquisition and after consumption, but also somehow 
also while in possession, another man’s goods. 
 In the case of Mrs. Rebecca Pindust in The Tatler, personal properties are quite 
literally “exposed to Sale” (113 268), as a later issue of The Tatler has the court witness’s “effects” 
reauctioned after his death “to defray the Charge of his Funeral” (113 268). The auction catalogue 
comprises 41 different items, all them able to be “put on”, worn or carried. The catalogue includes 
among other things, typically foppish items, such as four additional snuffboxes, “[t]wo more of 
ivory, with the portraitures on their lids of the two ladies of the town; the originals to be seen every 
night in the side-boxes of the playhouse”, “two embroidered suits...a dozen pair of red-heeled shoes, 
thee pair of red silk stockings, and an amber-headed cane” (113 268). Each item typifies the kind of 
fashionable stylishness that signals foppish luxury. In a larger sense they embody impropriety of the 
kind of possession that is both too intimate and too frivolous: propriety cannot survive the transition 
of personal effects to fashionable commodities.  In the case of the foppish court witness, personal 
properties are eventually completely supplanted by material ones. Whereas during his court 
appearance the young man’s foppish personality can be gauged metonymically by the use of his 
most personal possession, the gilt, mirrored snuffbox, in the auction inventory the objects have 
completely replaced the person. Or rather with no other description of the foppish court witness but 
that contained in the catalogue of objects, he exists in the text only as “the Whole” (113 268) of his 
collected effects. It is a kind of disintegration that comes with the overinvolvement with what 
elsewhere in The Tatler is described as the regrettable placement of one’s “Affections on improper 
Objects”, the giving up of “all the Pleasures of Life for Gugaws and Trifles” (151 350).  It is this 
complicity of propriety and property - which Derrida simply terms “the proper”107 - that is the 
subject of much eighteenth-century satire on clothes and that troublesome category of having.  
 
 
                                                 
107 In his chapter on “The Violence of the Letter” in Of Grammatology Derrida speaks of “the originary violence” of 
language (naming, categorizing, conceptualizing) that “has severed the proper from its property and its self-sameness” 
(112). As the baring of the logic of supplementarity, undressing comes to have a similar function in eighteenth-century 
dressing-room satires. 
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iii. Dressing Room Anatomies: Swift’s Dissections of Fashioned Selves  
 
“…he that can with Epicurus content his ideas with the films and images that fly off upon his senses form the 
superficies of things; such a man, truly wise, creams off Nature…” 
Jonathan Swift. A Table of a Tub (1704) 
 
Death by consumption also became a common poetic subject. Martinus’ curative denuding of the 
narcissistic nobleman is a stock situation, more typically taking place in a lady’s dressing room. 
Anxieties about the “dressed selves” found their fullest literary expression in a satiric genre that has 
come to be known as “the dressing room poem” (Chico, Designing Women). The late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries abound in dressing room poems, both what Harry M. Solomon calls 
“toilette pastorals” (435) that present a “temperate, even admiring, view of the ‘toilette’“ (434-435) 
and more satiric versions “which emphasize disease and physical decay” (440). To the former 
belong for instance Edmund Waller’s “Of Her Chamber” (1645, reprinted 1729), Thomas 
D’Urfey’s “Paid for Peeping” (1690), Allen Ramsay's The Morning Interview (1731) and to some 
extent Joseph Thurston’s The Toilette (1730), whereas Richard Ames’ “The Folly of Love” (1691), 
Gay’s “The Toilette” (1716) and all of Swift’s dressing room poems belong to the latter (Solomon 
433-436). Pope’s toilette scene in the first canto of the Rape of the Lock can be placed in either 
category (L. Brown, Ends 109-111). Translated fully into English in 1646 by Sir Robert Stapylton 
in Juvenal’s Sixteen Satyrs and later by Dryden in The Satires of Juvenal and Persius (1693), 108 
Juvenal’s sixth satire on women is the inspiration common to all dressing room poems. The satire 
offers a panorama of disreputable, corrupted women to dissuade the addressee, Postumius, from 
marriage. Both Stapylton and Dryden modernize Juvenal’s stereotypes, turning them into 
aristocratic coquettes and luxury craving ladies of fashion in accordance with contemporary 
seventeenth-century affectations. Central to the imitation of the dressing room poems that were to 
follow is the scene that reveals a wife’s hectic preparations to meet her lover, “[a]s if that fame and 
life were both at stake” (Stapylton 526). Hair dressing takes up a notable position in the beautifying 
process: “Her haire she doth in that rare method tie, / And builds her head so many stories high” 
(Stapylton 528-29). Yet, the self-inflation is nothing but superficial artifice that changes shape 
entirely when viewed from the rear: “You see, Andromache before, behind / She’s lesse, you there 
another woman find. / ’Tis so. For you by her short wast may see / A Virgin Pigmy needs must 
taller be” (Stapylton 530-34). Elsewhere makeup and skin lotions have the same powers of 
metamorphosis. Dryden’s version reads: 
 
She duly, once a Month, renews her Face; 
Mean time, it lies in Dawb, and his in Grease 
... 
The Crust remov’d, her Cheeks as smooth as Silk; 
Are polish’d with a wash of Ashes Milk; 
... 
But, hadst thou seen her Plasitred up before, 
’Twas so unlike a Face, it seem’d a Sore. (593-599) 
 
In Stapylton’s version the last two lines are phrased as a question, thus evincing less certainty about 
what is the face and what is sore, or rather whether the crust reveals of conceals the face it renews: 
                                                 
108 Felicity Nussbaum lists the following seventeenth and eighteenth century versions of Juvenal’s Sixth Satire: Sir 
Robert Stapylton. Juvenal’s Sixteen Satyrs (1647), Barten Holyday. Juvenal and Persius Translated and Illustrated 
(1673), Dryden. Translations from Juvenal (1693). E. B. Greene. The Satires of Juvenal, Paraphrastically Imitated 
(1746) and Thomas Neville. Imitations of Juvenal and Persius (1769). 
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“But what’s thus poultic’d, and thus plaister’d o’re, / Is it a face? or may’t be call’d a Sore?” 
(Stapylton VI.96 495-96). This kind of defacement and disfiguring and the attending confusion of 
surface and depth becomes a standard element in the dressing room poem.  
 Another classical source of the dressing room poem is Ovid’s Remedia Amoris, a 
piece that, as Nahum Tate’s widely circulating translation has it, aspires to “curb the desp’rate 
Force of Love” (74-75).109 Intended as an “Antidote” (77), the advice of the poem is only directed 
against the diseased kind of lovesickness that can prove “fatal” (21) or “poys’nous” (48). Addressed 
to those “injur’d Youths” (44) who “hopeless languish for some cruel Fair” (45), the intended 
addressee of the poem is not unlike the foppish gentleman that Martinus Scriblerus110 attempts to 
cure in that he too is both unsoundly lovesick and suicidal: “But let poor Youths, who Female Scorn 
endure, / And hopeless burn, repair to me for Cure: / For why should any worthy Youth destroy / 
Himself, because some worthless Nymph is coy?” (15-18). To my knowledge, nobody has yet 
remarked on the parallel between Ovid’s Remedia Amores and the case of the young nobleman in 
the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus. One obvious difference between the two texts is the absence of 
a connection between object fetishism and masturbatory narcissism in the Remedia – excluded from 
the mistress bedroom, possibly even by her “cautious Husband” (270, 34), Ovid’s addressee is more 
of a jilted suitor than an effeminate coxcomb. Nevertheless, the image of the “injur’d Youth” (271, 
44), who instead of his mistress “the Gate caress[es]” (270, 35) and “on th’ill-natur’d Timber 
vent[s] his Spight” (270. 37), might suggest a classical precursor for the association between 
deadening impotence and a love encumbered by too many things. Ovid’s “Antidote” also 
anticipates Martinus’ cure, proscribing not only industry, pecuniary preoccupations and country 
walks, but also satiric undressing as a remedy for the sickness of love: 
 
Her Beauty’s Art; Gems, Gold, and rich Attire 
Make up the Pageant you so much admire: 
In all that specious Figure which you see, 
The least, least Part of her own self is she. 
In vain for her you love, amidst such Cost, 
You search; the Mistress in the Dress is lost. 
Take her disrob’d, her real self surprise 
I’ll trust you then, for Cure, to your own Eyes. 
(Yet have I known this very Rule to fail, 
And Beauty most, when stript of Art, prevail.) 
Steal to her Closet, her close Tiring Place, 
While she makes up her artificial Face. 
All Colours of the Rainbow you’ll discern, 
Washes and Paints, and what your sick to learn.  
(368-381) 
 
                                                 
109 Ovid’s Remedia Amores was first translated in 1600 by “F. L.” as Ovid his remedie of love, translated and intituled 
to the youth of England. However, the translations that were most frequently reprinted were Thomas Heywood’s Publii 
Ovidii Nasonis de arte amandi: or the art of love (1625, 1650, 1662, 1672, 1677, 1682, 1684, 1701, 1705), which after 
1662 included a translation of the Remedia, John Carpenter’s Ovids Remedy of love, directing lovers how they may by 
reason suppresse the passion of love and Nahum Tate’s translation that appeared in Ovid’s Art of love … Together with 
his Remedy of love … by several eminent hands [J. Dryden, W. Congreve, N. Tate etc.] (1692, 1709, 1712, 1716, 1719, 
1725). See Nussbaum on the connection between Swift’s “A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed” (1731) and Ovid’s 
Remedia Amoris.  
 
 78 
The image is that of duplicity waiting to be disclosed pictured as the disjunction between the 
“specious Figure” made by “rich Attire” and the lesser “real self”. Whether the disrobing reveals 
beauty or “what your sick to learn”, the “real self” always presenting another specious “artificial 
Face”. In Designing Women (2005) Chico notes that “the process of hiding” suggested by this view 
of dress calls “into question the very project of exposing a private space to public scrutiny” (40): 
 
In other words, things may still be hidden, – even a 
dressing room with its doors thrown wide open – may still 
contain its own purloined letters, evidence of the unseen, 
sitting in plain view...[T]hat privacy is in some way 
authentic is itself illusory, with every exposure 
precipitating yet another obfuscation. The promise of 
disclosure – indeed, even the fact of disclosure – only 
introduces yet another opportunity for enclosure. (40) 
 
This kind of analysis certainly bears out here – the fact that Ovid’s Remedia is shaped as a 
corrective to the youth who is already sick with love for the “specious Figure” of the dressed self 
makes the cure of undressing exactly a “promise of disclosure”. The cure will be the youth’s “own 
Eyes”: “[Y]ou’ll discern”, you will distinguish between the “Figure which you see” and the unseen 
“real self”, the “she” within, Tate’s poet assures us. But even in the presented future scenario of 
disclosure, all that is discerned is the “Colours of the Rainbow”, the “Washes and Paints” that make 
up “her artificial Face”; the “real self” within remains not only out of view but also a new incentive 
for inoculation, a new promise of a further healing view inside. Yet, the notion of a depth on which 
Chico’s analysis is premised is itself called into question in the text. With the knowledge that each 
disclosure presents a new secret comes the attending intimation that there is nothing at all to 
disclose; if bottomless depth is a source of anxiety here, so is boundless surface. Despite the 
unarticulated horrors of the “real self” that hides underneath her “rich Attire”, the fear that the poem 
openly voices is that of disappearance. This complicates Chico’s paradox of privacy in the dressing 
room. In fact the privacy of the mistress' “own” self is doubly paradoxical, that is, it is not only 
somehow both natural (artless and honest as opposed to the “artificial” or “made up” face) and 
corrupt (susceptible to “surprise” and disintegration by revealing discernment and so deceitfully 
duplicitous) but also both “real” and illusory (“lost” in dress and so not actually there).  In other 
words, the mistress is lost in her dress not through concealment but through coincidence; the dress 
does not conceal an inner self; it absorbs it. 
 The threat that “the Mistress is in her Dress lost” turns the old habitus-habit nexus 
inside out, presenting the happy coincidence between “inward Character” and “outward Things” as 
collapsed depth. In Tate’s Remedia the fact that what you see is what you get is no longer 
reassuring but discomforting. The problem is yet again one of proportion and propriety, indicated 
not only by the modifier “all that” (370) but by the semantic span of the adjective “rich” (368), 
connoting both sumptuousness and copiousness. In other words, the mistress disappears not as a 
result of a seamless fusing of clothes and person; she is simply swallowed up in a kind of 
vestmental appropriation. As the surface annexes the depth it is intended to protect, the question of 
luxury and ornament once more becomes central: how much is too much? In a sentence that is 
grammatically no less complex than Locke’s constitution of personal identity by way of 
appropriation,111 Tate assembles the Mistress as a three part puzzle: “In all that specious Figure 
                                                 
111 See the previous chapter: “That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join it self, makes 
the same Person...and so attributes to it self, and owns all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that 
consciousness reaches” (Essay II.xxvii.17 341). 
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which you see, / The least, least Part of her own self is she” (370-71). The spatial relation between 
“she”, “her own self” and “all that specious Figure” is hazy; it is impossible to find out which term 
is the subordinate one, and so which part is pre-posited. Syntactically, the prepositional phrase “In 
all that precious Figure” subordinates “she” and “her own self”, of which “she” is the “least, least 
Part”. Semantically, however, the expression “her own self” suggests authenticity through 
ownership: as the owner of both the “Beauty’s Art” that makes up “that precious Figure” and the 
“self” within, “she” is the comprehensive term. Pitting syntax against semantics, the awkward 
construction conveys a taxonomic failure; is it the mistress or the attire that is contained in 
possession? The next couplet, of course, sides on the syntactic impropriety and finishes off the 
proprietor completely. 
 Swift excelled in this kind of antinomical undressings. Often satiric literalizations of 
Locke’s idea of man as a “Store-House” or a “Repository” (Essay I.x.3 150) are employed to 
expose the dangers of potential self-divestitures inherent in the excesses of consumption, as in 
Swift’s epigram from 1720112: 
 
Dorinda dreams of dress abed, 
’Tis all her thought and art, 
Her lace has got within her head, 
Her stays stick to her heart. (1-4)113 
 
This anatomy of Dorinda’s heart and head is a condensed version of the more thorough stripping 
presented in “The Progress of Beauty” (1719-20), “A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed” 
(1731) and “The Lady's Dressing Room” (1732). In Dorinda’s case, of course, the inside has no 
depth, or rather, the outside “has got within”, as lace and stays take up the interior of both mind and 
body. This frustration of the look inside in transposition of inside and outside is typical of Swift’s 
dissective denudings.114 What Swift’s dressed selves and Locke’s changeling share is the 
fascination and fear of the corporeal reality of luxurious self-fashioning.  
In an article on Burton’s Anatomy, R. Grant Williams traces the intimate relationship 
between “modern empirical dissection” and a “rhetorical cut” that exists in “a dialectical 
relationship with a unified textual body” (596). Williams refers to Matthaeus Curtius’ notes on 
Andreas Vesalius’ first public anatomy at Bologna in 1540, which make it clear that “dissection 
means more than physically cutting up a body” (595): 
 
I reply [writes Curtius] that dissection can be performed in 
two different ways: in one way really or actually, in another 
way through description…For also this is to dissect a 
body…For anatomy embraces the art of dissection, both 
performed actually and by description. (Qtd. in Williams 
595) 
 
                                                 
112 In her edition of Swift’s The Complete Poems Pat Rogers sources the poem to a 1720 letter in which Swift uses the 
epigram as an epigraph to “Lines from Cadenus to Vanessa” (701).  
113 In a poetic witticism called “On the Collar of Mrs. Dingley’s Lap-Dog” (ca. 1726), Swif plays with the 
transmigration of souls produced by the love of things: “Pray steal me not, I’m Mrs Dingley’s, / Whose heart in this 
four-footed thing lies” (The Complete Poems 312).  
114 The drive to decipher and control female deception through anatomical dissection finds a parallel in King Lear: 
“Then let them anatomize Regan: see what breeds about her heart. Is there any cause in Nature that makes these hard-
hearts?” (III.vi.70-71 936) 
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Similarly, Barbara Maria Stafford has shown how anatomy “and its inseparable practice of 
dissection” were still in the eighteenth century “paradigms for any forced, artful, contrived, and 
violent study of depths” (47). Thus, to the “tactile cuts inflicted by actual instruments” 
corresponded a kind of “violent and adversarial jabbing”, an “intellectual method that uncovered the 
duplicity of the world” (Stafford 47): “Each suggested the stripping away of excess by 
decomposition and fragmentation for the purpose of control” (47). But dissection (textual or actual) 
holds out the promise not only of a look inside but of a complete view. Or rather,”[d]issecting the 
body should not result in dismembered confusion” but rather operate according to “synecdochic 
logic” in which each part possesses a “membership in a greater totality” (Williams 595). Anatomy, 
therefore, was tied in with a Lockean process of baring abstraction, through which “the lowly 
particular was mentally separated from the elevated generality…[t]he trivial predicate was severed 
from the significant subject, the unimportant individual was subtracted from the important 
universal.” (Stafford 47). Thus “numerous Vesalian and post-Vesalian anatomical drawings are 
simulacra of antique statuary” that project “a classical unity onto the corpse” while containing 
“anxieties over the gory excesses of the viscera” (Williams 595).  
 Anybody familiar with Juvenal’s satire would know that dress too can provide such 
excesses. In his 1714 piece in The Guardian (no. 149), Gay connects the anatomical projection of 
corporeal unity with the fashioning of the self. Gay is concerned with the relation between the 
“Sciences of Poetry and Dress” (349), claiming that “the Rules of the one, with very little 
Variation, may serve for the other” (349): 
 
As in a Poem all the several Parts of it must have a 
Harmony with the Whole; so, to keep to the Propriety of 
Dress, the Coat, Wastcoat and Breeches must be of the 
same Piece. (349-350)  
 
Like physics and writers, the “Shape-Merchants” that trade in clothes are also engaged in the 
incorporation of anatomical parts into a harmonious whole. It is, however, a procedure that requires 
not a little tweaking to keep “all the several Parts…of the same Piece” (349-350): 
 
THE Mantoe-maker must be an expert Anatomist…[S]he 
must know how to hide all the defects in the Proportions of 
the Body, and must be able to Mold the Shape by the Stays, 
so as to preserve the Intestines, that while she corrects the 
Body she may not interfere with the Pleasures of the Palate. 
    (355) 
 
The risks of anatomical shape molding that are implied here are those of privation and excess. If a 
less than expert anatomist fails “to preserve the Intestines”, the risk is not only that the inners spill 
out in a disproportionate display that will result in bad taste, but also that they may be lost 
altogether. The anatomist of Swift’s Dorinda will not be unfamiliar with such risks.  
 In fact, Swift was writing at a time when anatomical interiors had begun to spill over 
in exactly the kind of “dismembered confusion” that the Vesalian anatomical cut had laboured to 
avoid. As Judith Folkenberg argues, the eighteenth century had barely given up the Vesalian 
tradition of depicting dissected corpses as idealized figures in landscapes. With Govaert Bidloo’s 
Anatomia Humani Corporis (1685), translated by William Cowper in 1698, a new departure was 
made in Gérard de Lairesse’s attending drawings of “specimens as they looked on the table, pinned 
and tied to reveal anatomical form and structure” (Rifkin et al. 131). It is a shift that not only lets 
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the reader “enter the dissecting room” (Rifkin et al. 131) and so reveals the procedures of dissection 
themselves, but also gives up the “formal perfection” (Williams 595) of human anatomy. Whereas 
the Vesalian corpses readily showed themselves in their entirety, Lairesse’s corpses are 
dismembered specimens, body parts mercilessly pinned down in “delirious disfiguration” (Williams 
595). Like Lairesse’s anatomical drawings, Swift’s textual anatomies are acutely aware of their own 
malformations, as they abandon the subordination of dissected parts to a whole. In other words, in 
Swift's poems as much, as in Bidloo’s anatomy, it is the discipline of anatomy itself that is sliced 
open and the belief that the look inside will yield a comprehensive and comprehensible whole that 
is effectively cut to pieces. 
 Anatomy provides both method and motivation in Swift’s stripping of the fashionable 
consumer. Empirical anatomizing and undressing as it appears in the incisive voyeurism by the 
satirist are both premised on the urge to peer into and dissemble an interior to reveal a deeper truth. 
Portrayed in vivo as living actors in dynamic poses, the subjects of anatomical drawings of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries often delicately retract their skin, as if removing a layer of 
clothing, to expose their interior. Swift’s “The Progress of Beauty” (1719-20) and “A Beautiful 
Young Nymph Going to Bed” (1731) are both scenes of anatomical disassembly in the form of the 
surveyed prophylactic dressing and undressing of a syphilitic prostitute or actress. What is at stake 
in the poems is the satiric subsumption of the logic of supplementarity in the form of what Derrida 
calls the “originary supplement” (Of Grammatology 313): prosthetic extensions that transform into 
artificial substitutions of what they were meant to repair, exposing not only the complicity of phusis 
and prosthesis but their mutual undoing. Showing the divisibility of what was meant to supply 
completion, the poems hint at an originary lack, an aporetic impasse in the constitution of “the 
proper” that points to the impossibility of retrieving an originary possessor to ground any act of 
appropriation or dispossession. As such they provide not only haunting allegories of the 
impossibility of ownership, but also a site of mourning for the loss of the proper (that wholly fitting 
property) that has yet to appear. 
 “The Progress of Beauty” chronicles Celia’s growing difficulties in preserving “the 
materials of her face” (109).  The central part of the poem records her efforts to cosmetically 
recompose her diseased face which suffers the incremental deformation and loss of body parts 
(teeth, nose, lips, hair and eyes are all lost) afforded by her disease and the contemporary cure of 
mercurial ointments: 
 
But, art no longer can prevail 
When the materials are gone  
The best mechanic hand must fail, 
When nothing’s left to work upon 
 
Matter as wise logicians say, 
Cannot without a form subsist; 
And form, say I, as well as they, 
Must fail, if matter brings no grist. (77-84) 
 
 “Each night a bit drops off her face,” the narrator declares, but Celia is melting away before the 
onset of the syphilitic liquidity. Like Juvenal’s lady of fashion, Celia sports an “artificial face” (6) 
that takes a great deal of “workmanship” (52) and “paint” (37) to maintain; her beauties are the 
“marvelous effects” (56) of cosmetic colouring that when smudged at night results in a 
disintegrative muddling. Her “complexions” (30) rely on the colours remaining “in their proper 
place” (22).  Thus, she goes “entire to bed” (29), but wakes up a “mingled mass of dirt and sweat” 
 82 
(20). This “mingled” version of Celia’s “early self” (49) is the closest we get to her real self, or 
rather, there is no earlier version of Celia that has not been made up. Whereas the physical 
disintegration is narrated in terms of fragmentation as the piecemeal loss of “bits” (the teeth, the 
nose, the cheeks, the lips), the cosmetic decay takes place as a liquefaction that lets her facial 
makeup exceed its “place and use” (47) and flow “in trickling streams betwixt her joints” (44). The 
effect of this sudoriferous meltage is an amalgamation of cosmetics and skin, as the “black, which 
would not be confined…mingles in her muddy cheeks” (36). Similarly, 
 
The Paint by perspiration cracks, 
And falls in rivulets of sweat, 
On either side you see the tracks, 
While at her chin the confluents met. (37-40) 
 
The chin is not only where the colours diluted by sweat merge and turn into “the brown” that Celia 
“[w]ith spittle while she spins, anoints” (42), but also where Celia, or rather Celia liquefied by 
paint, joins her own cosmetic solvent. The precise point of merger is of course particularly difficult 
to determine when the parts are confluent – “matter brings no grist” to fluid shape. This kind of 
self-secretion leaves the “materials of her face” oddly unreal, “the marvelous effects” of a 
superficial paint job. In other words, when everything is made up, then there really is “nothing left 
to work upon”.  
 In “A Beautiful Young Nymph” a similar personal dispersal takes place, as Corinna, 
the “pride of Drury Lane” (1), climbs the “four storeys…to her bower” (8) and proceeds to remove 
not only her clothes and make-up, but a variety of artificial prostheses. The “three-legged chair” (9) 
on which she seats herself anticipates the dismemberment that is to take place, as she pulls off  
“artificial hair” (10), “a crystal eye” (11), “eyebrows from a mouse’s hide” (13), plumpers, a 
complete “set of teeth” (20),”rags…to prop [h]er flabby dugs” (20-21), a “steel-ribbed bodice” (24), 
and “bolsters that supply her hips” (28). Like Celia, Corinna is an aggregate being, neither subject, 
nor object but a composite of a skin and things. It is a kind of mixing that parallels the social mixing 
enabled by the replacement of habit by fashion, a self-fashioning that has the power turn a Drury 
Lane whore into a “lovely goddess” (23). Corinna is her own “shape-merchant”; the skilful 
“operator” (25) of “her steel-ribbed bodice” (24), she is both puppet and puppeteer. But mixing also 
comes with its own risks – however carefully the parts “that supply her” (28) are stored, they will 
always be subject to surreptitious appropriation. When Corinna wakes in the morning, she has quite 
literally been robbed of her personal effects: the glass eye is gone, a rat has dragged her plaster 
away, the cat has urinated on her plumpers and the lap-dog has infected her wig with fleas. A 
caesura (57) marks Corinna’s shock at the discovery of the loss of her limbs and her consequential 
paralysis. Like Campbell’s fashion puppet, she is immobilized “deprived of [her] moving Wires, 
and hung up upon a Peg” (191). We are, as Gilmore suggests, “reminded of Bergson’s theory of 
automatism” (36)115 in a passage that draws its comedy from the sudden revelation of the thinghood 
of a person, as matter succeeds in the petrification of movement.  
                                                 
115 In his essay on the meaning of the comic, Henri Bergson considers mechanical rigidity quintessentially comical: 
“Where matter thus succeeds in dulling the outward life of the soul, in petrifying its movements and thwarting its 
gracefulness, it achieves, at the expense of the body, an effect that is comic” (13-14). Thus the kind of laughter that 
Bergson finds disclosed in the comical realization of mechanical life is not unlike the surprise that Heidegger identifies 
as our reaction to broken tools. What they have in common is a certain helpless paralysis that Heidegger terms 
“helplessness” produced by the disappearance of the ready-to-hand in favour of a conspicuous unreadiness-to-hand that 
arises when a tool is broken, out of place or when it becomes an obstacle rather than a piece of equiment: “When its 
usability is discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment in 
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 Yet, Corinna’s attachment to her things is not just a matter of mechanical 
manipulation but also of gentle touch (29). In other words, she treats her personal effects not only 
“with art” but also “with care”, taking her time to wipe the crystal eye clean and smooth the mouse-
hide eyebrows before placing them in her play-book. It is a personal engagement in things that leads 
to what David Womersley calls a “dilemma of reading” (111) arising from a “coexistence of 
compassion and contempt” (112). The pity felt for Corinna originates in the recognition in her 
gesture of care of a sense of mourning, a wish - on her as well as on the satiric observer’s part - to 
tend, care for and so mourn (sorgen)116 what has been lost. However, Corinna’s blatant love of 
things elicits pity or disdain, depending on whether or not it shows her “bestowing a ridiculous, 
because inappropriate, degree of care upon something merely disgusting” (Womersley 111). The 
ambiguity is maintained in the last stanza, which, even as it effectively “cuts off the drift towards 
sympathy with the nymph” (Womersley 111), does not manage to extract the stuff of personality 
from the “scattered parts” of which it has been divested: 
 
The nymph, though in this mangled plight, 
Must every morn her limbs unite. 
But how shall I describe her arts 
To recollect the scattered parts? 
Or show the anguish, toil, and pain, 
Of gathering herself again? 
The bashful muse will never bear 
In such a scene to interfere. 
Corinna in the morning dizened, 
Who sees, will spew; who smells, be poisoned. (66-74) 
 
As Barbara M. Benedict points out, the satirist’s question can be read both a refusal on moral 
grounds and as the resigned avowal of a conceptual impossibility: “‘Recollecting’ involves the twin 
acts of physically reconstituting and psychologically remembering. Such a task cannot be described 
in poetic language, not only because the erotic and obscene topic falls beneath the conventional bar 
for public verse, but also because…literalistic language cannot describe the process of making an 
inner self when there is no material to make it” (“Self” 100). Swift’s pun is suggestive of how 
vulnerable to loss is a person whose properties are in need of recollection. Locke suggests that it is 
possible to “wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of retrieving 
them” (Essay II.xxvii.20 342) and when this happens, I am no longer quite myself, but another 
person (II.xxvii.20 342). This trickling away of memories finds a material counterpart in the 
“constantly fleeting particles of matter” which found the corporeal identity of man (Essay II.xxvii.6 
332). In other words, recollection escapes description not only because the identity that such 
recollection brings about is premised on something as insubstantial as consciousness as far as “can 
be extended” (Essay II.xxvii.9 25), but also because the piecing together of the property one has in 
the person is impossible, when the stuff of personality itself is so easily lost, whether consumed by 
others (mice or men) or simply forgotten. 
                                                 
a certain un-readiness-to-hand...The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, and as 
such it uncovers the Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of something ready-to-hand” (Being 101-102). 
116 In “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” (1951-52), Heidegger points to the polysemy of the German word for “sorrow” 
(Sorge). Heidegger describes the relationship between man and thing as one of concern or care (Sorge). He insists that 
although things will always concern us, the best way to respond to things is “to cherish and protect, to preserve and care 
for” them (147). Derrida has written on the mourning of the always-already lost in The Work of Mourning (2001). 
According to Derrida there is always “the mourning that is prepared and that we expect from the very beginning” (146).  
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 Like Bidloo, Swift practices a kind of “violent and adversarial jabbing” (Stafford 47) 
that makes use of the anatomical method of dissection while refusing to subordinate the dissected 
parts to an anatomical whole. Stopping short of recollection, the satirist absconds himself from the 
excess of dress. Laura Mandell notes that although the poem “has painfully detailed every 
disgusting, disease-ridden part of Corinna’s body…the poem’s last couplet tells us that it is the 
‘dizened’ or dressed Corinna who will make us nauseous” (1). The fact that it is impossible to tell 
whether the satirist leaves Corinna unassembled by choice or by necessity allows him to present her 
recollected self as an illusion, both deceptive and unreal, and thereby Corinna herself as both 
deluded and deluding, a skilful manipulator of fetishistic power of things and the victim of a 
misguided fetishism. In striking this balance, the satirist must leave open a window for us to indulge 
in that “minimal level of methodological fetishism” (Appadurai 5) that will allow us to entertain her 
existence in “scattered parts” as reality. He dispels the unity that dress awards as illusory only by 
resorting to a reality of dismemberment that leaves no room for a collected identity at all. As the 
anatomist in the dissection theatre, the satirist remains unaffected by the mutilation that takes place, 
comfortable in what Chico calls the kind of “disembodied authority” (Designing Women 98) that is 
attached to the scientific subject, who is only an I/eye to the empirical description of the object in 
view. Thus, it would appear that the abysmal disassembling of self-possession is contained and 
restricted by the unity of the implicit satiric persona that gathers it in its gaze, a persona that 
remains properly veiled (that is appropriately clothed) in its appearance only as a diffusive, 
surveying gaze through a nominal, unadorned “I”. Corinna, on the other hand, is left to her own 
chimeric self, an artificially created wholeness, a “dizened” monster gathered from excesses that are 
not her own.  
Yet, while “disembodied authority” might be what the text dreams of being able to 
“show”, it is ultimately an illusion that is partly shattered by the moral implications of the questions 
asked – there is, after all, something that leaves the detached observer (en)grossed. It is precisely in 
this involvement that one might perceive the economy of acquisition that is the satirical aim; what 
implodes in the observer’s abject fascination is the distinction between an Addisonian aesthetic 
gaze, diffusive and disinterested, and a merely possessive ogling. There is a sense in which the 
satiric persona exhausts itself in the aggregate self it seeks to encompass, losing itself in the 
impropriety of the excessive desire to possess. Thus we might also read the satiric persona’s 
question literally, against its rhetoricity, as a proper avowal and mourning of properties always-
already lost: a literal declaration of the proper that arises in the lost and longed-for proficiencies of 
recollecting, representing and gathering that elide the possessive powers of the I/eye.117 In other 
words, in the question the persona owns to the loss that is truly his own: the dispossession of 
recollective powers that are always already slipping away, always already beyond his sight. The 
question the poem asks is thus not dissimilar to Derrida’s questioning of the proper: “But what is 
this proper, if this proper consists in expropriating itself, if the proper of the proper is precisely, 
justly [justement], to have nothing of its own [en propre]?” (Derrida, Sauf le nom 69) 
 Before the dissective divestitures in “The Progress of Beauty” and “A Beautiful 
Young Nymph going to Bed” Swift had turned to anatomical chopping in A Tale of a Tub (1704). 
But whereas the later poems bid us peer beneath the surface to inspect the mangled reality of things, 
                                                 
117 In “Semiology and Rhetorics” (1973), de Man pits grammar against rhetorics by pointing to the duplicity of the 
rhetorical question that always allows such questions to be read “literally rather than figuratively” (30). De Man 
suggests that “it is not necessarily the literal reading which is simpler than the figurative one” (30), which is certainly 
the case here. In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1929) Bakhtin uses the expression “loophole word” to describe a 
similar figure, that is, a phrase which anticipates its own refutation by refracting its intention and turning its 
proclaimed intention against itself: “A loop-hole is the retention for oneself of the possibility for altering the 
ultimate, final meaning of one’s own words.” (233). 
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the Tale scorns even this imperative. Traditionally the clothes parable that drives the satire of the 
Tale on religion and learning has been the main subject of commentary.118 In what follows, 
however, I temporarily leave the story of the three brothers, Peter, Martin and Jack and their cloaks 
of Christian “Doctrine and Faith” (II 34 note) to concentrate on the vestmental metaphors that 
surround this allegory. The question to be decided in the Tale is whether the “wisdom that 
converses about the surface” is preferable to the “philosophy which enters into the depth of things” 
(IX 83). At stake is not just the validity of two analytical strategies, but alternative conceptions of 
personal identity: is a person best known by his surface, that is, by the externalized signs of social 
status and identity that his appearance conveys? Or does personality reside in unseen depths that 
can only be unveiled by methodical excavation and painstaking anatomization? Refusing to pick 
sides in this argument, the Tale proves each as deceitful as the other. As the writer of the Tale 
suggests, “a strong delusion always operat[es] from without as vigorously as from within” (IX 82).  
 As in the Memoirs, the fictive author – whom critics have variously called “the critic”, 
“the madman”, “the Grub-Street author”, “the fool” and “the ingénue” – is the main butt of the 
satire.119 For my purposes it will do to accept Michael Suarez’ labelling of him as a “literary hack” 
(116), a Grub Street writer cum anatomist whose “rhetorical cut” produces a heap of disjecta 
membra rather than a “unified textual body” (Williams 596). The hack sets out with Vesalian 
ambitions of ideal perfection and the aim of writing “a complete anatomy” of human nature valid of 
“everlasting remembrance”: “To this end, I have some time since, with a world of pains and art, 
dissected the carcass of human nature and read many useful lectures upon the several parts, both 
containing and contained, till at last it smelt so strong I could preserve it no longer” (59). Here, as in 
“The Progress of Beauty”, there is “nothing left to work upon”, as the anatomist obliviously fails to 
preserve the subject he seeks to understand. The irony arises from ambiguous reference – “it” refers 
both to the entire process of anatomization and to the disintegrated body it leaves behind. The “new 
and strange discovery” that he believes the dissection has brought turns out to be the stale 
commonplace “that the public good of mankind is performed by two ways, instruction and 
diversion.” (59). The point here is that the anatomist’s “pains and arts” to cut to the bone fail to 
yield a meaningful body of knowledge. Like Martinus, the hack cannot abstract the particulars 
without losing the concept itself.  Or rather, in the efforts to subtract “the unimportant 
individual…from the important universal” both are lost. Elsewhere, the hack professes a surprising 
sensitivity to the personal damages risked by the anatomical mobilization of parts on the dissection 
table. He notes how easy it is “to injure…Authors by transplanting”, adding that “nothing is so very 
tender as a Modern piece of Wit…which is apt to suffer…much in the Carriage” and “which by the 
smallest Transposal or Misapplication, is utterly annihilated” (xlvi). As Suarez notes, the comedy 
arises because the hack is himself engaged in the production of a piecemeal composition patched 
together by various “parodic ‘transplantings’, ‘carriages’ and ‘transposals’ which recontextualize 
their source-texts in order to expose them to ridicule” (Suarez 116). 
 Anatomizing might bring truth, if only in the shape of empty commonplaces, but it 
doesn’t bring happiness. In Section IX, which famously concerns “the Original, the Use, and 
Improvement of Madness” (IX 77), the hack takes issue with “him who [holds] anatomy to be the 
ultimate end of physic” (IX 84). For the restoration of human happiness, the hack does not 
recommend surgery but cosmetics, “an art to solder and patch up the flaws and imperfections of 
                                                 
118 For scholars who deal with the allegory along these lines, see for instance Webster, Paulson, Beaumont, Starkman 
(569-602), Freiburg and Montag. 
119 The focus on determining whether or not Swift uses literary personae and so frustrates the standards against which 
the satire can be measured has been replaced by discussions of the work as a satire on the elusiveness of print culture 
itself. For the discussion of Swift’s use of personae, see Ehrenpreis. For a reading of the Tale as a satire on the lack 
proprietorship in the new world of print, see Nigel Wood. 
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nature” (IX 84). Prone to back the logic of an argument with empirical observation, the writer 
readily supports his convictions with “late experiments” (IX 84): “Last week I saw a woman flayed, 
and you will hardly believed how much it altered her for the worse” (IX 84). The comedy of the 
passage stems partly from the mimicked detachment of scientific observation paired with the fact 
that we are not told whether or not the woman was alive prior to the flaying: the hack seems not 
only indifferent but completely oblivious to the fact that it is the act of human vivisection that 
accounts for the deterioration of the woman’s looks. As in the hack’s dissection of “human nature” 
– the anatomical specimen does not survive the procedure that is meant to account for its decay: 
anatomical introspection yields nothing but dismemberment. Furthermore, the hack suggests that 
this is an off-putting truth which we would be happier not knowing. In fact, happiness is to 
perpetuate the “possession of being well deceived” (IX 83), that is, to live as Epicurus content “with 
the filmes and images that fly off upon his senses from the superficies of things” (IX 84).  
 The hack himself is not satisfied with a superficial look. “[O]ffering to demonstrate 
that [things] are not of the same consistence quite through” (IX 83), he readily supplements the 
surface senses of sight and touch with “officious reason” and its “tools for cutting, and opening, and 
mangling, and piercing” (275 83). He therefore orders “the carcass of a beau to be stripped” (IX 
83):  
 
[W]e were all amazed to find so many unsuspected faults 
under one suit of clothes. Then I laid open his brain, his 
heart, and his spleen; but I plainly perceived at every 
operation that the farther we proceeded, we found the 
defects increase upon us in number and bulk. (IX 83) 
 
Implying both undressing and skinning, the act of stripping casts the anatomical procedure as a 
purging of the excesses of consumerism. It is the same migration of the exterior into the interior of 
which Dorinda dreams. Although both the dissected beau and Dorinda wear their defects on the 
inside, they are punished for being excessively superficial.120 Or rather, as Kowaleski-Wallace has 
suggested, addicted to self-display, the beau (along with his avatars, the fop and the coquette) is the 
victim of the search for depth, an outmoded creature of surface who “pays the price for the shift 
from a world of external to internal evaluation” (“Reading” 484). Swift’s hack stands on the verge 
of such a shift, preaching the felicities of resting content with shining superficies, while at the same 
time failing to resist the urge to flay and strip and prod his way into the rotting insides. 
 There is no place for the transparent self-display of the beau in a world that insists on 
layers. The world of the Tale is thoroughly layered, a sartorial cosmos of superimposed clothing 
that has its finest expression in the satire on a sect “whose tenets [has] obtained and spread very far, 
especially in the grand monde and among everybody of good fashion” (II 35). This fashionable sect 
is also the sect of fashion, its god “the inventor of the yard and the needle” (II 36) and its religion a 
myth of serial investitures:  
 
                                                 
120 Had we been allowed to see “the defects” that Swift simply lets us imagine, they would probably not differ much 
from that “Heap of strange Materials” (134) found in Addison’s dissection of a beau’s brain a couple of years later 
(1712, no. 275). Addison’s beau, who prior to dissection “had passed for a Man”, is in reality nothing but a storehouse 
of foppish “Commodities”, commodious qualities as well as objects of exchange (135). “Fictions, Flatteries and 
Falsehoods, Vows, Promises and Protestations”, “Sonnets” and general “Nonsense” crowd his brain as well as more 
material spoils such as “Ribbons, Lace and Embroidery”, “invisible Billet-doux, Love-Letters, pricked Dances” and 
Spanish snuff (135-137). When people are stuffed with things, the inside becomes little more than a shop window and 
character description can be measured merely by the exactness with which its “Inventory” is recorded (no. 275 530).  
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They [the worshippers of fashion] held the universe to be a 
large suite of clothes, which invests everything: that the 
earth is invested by the air; the air is invested by the starts; 
and the starts are invested by the primum mobiles….To 
conclude from all, what is man himself but a micro-coat, or 
rather a complete suit of clothes with all its trimmings?..To 
instance no more: is not religion a cloak, honesty a pair of 
shoes worn out in the dirt, self-love a surtout, vanity a shirt, 
and conscience a pair of breeches which, though a cover 
for lewdness as well as nastiness, is easily slipped down for 
the service of both? (II 36) 
 
As Christopher Fox suggests, the target is, among other things,121 “materialism in the more ordinary 
sense of the term”, that is, “a society where citizens are more preoccupied with surface appearances 
than with the matters of the spirit or mind” (Locke 212). Indeed, clothed in the “very plain” but 
“very good cloth”, the three brothers that are representatives of traditional religion are “strangely at 
a loss” (II 38) when faced with the transitory shape-shiftings of the fashion world. When shoulder 
knots become fashionable, the brothers are quick to discover “their want” (II 38) and despair to find 
that there is no authorization for shoulder-knots in the will. The solution is a textual dissection 
“totidem literis” (II 39), the chopping up of sentences, words and letters until a meaning is patched 
together to suit what the fictional editor in an added note calls a "the introducing…of unnecessary 
ornaments" (II 38 note). But where “credulity” (IX 83) in surface truths takes the place of deep 
faith, dissection rarely succeeds. The brothers’ chop-work comes to reveal how fashion both defines 
and empties its own reality, how textiles spin out new meanings that have no investment in the 
reality they come to define.  
 To explore this paradox let us return briefly to the allegory of the coats on which the 
satire turns. The vested interests of three brothers, Peter, Martin and Jack (Catholicism, Lutheran 
Protestantism and Calvinist Nonconformity), collide as they attempt to preserve and maintain the 
coats their father has bequeathed to them. In her book on Swift’s clothing metaphors, Deborah 
Wyrick describes the father’s endowment of the clothes to his sons as “a ceremony of investiture” 
(34) that testifies to the belief122 “in the process or ordered transmission of authority” (34) provided 
by livery. As such, it constitutes what Jones and Stallybrass consider investiture as a “form of 
incorporation” that “materializes different forms of social relations” (275): “[T]he vestments, as 
outward signs of inward power, are badges of distinction of privileged authority and proper 
placement within a preexisting order” (Wyrick 32). “[L]engthening and widening of themselves so 
as to be always fit” (II 34), the coats work perfectly as the symbiosis of “outward signs” and 
“inward power”. If clothes were classed as accidentals, “being supplementary rather than 
‘necessary’ attributes of man”, the parable shows them as “necessary accidentals”, “bonded…into 
the very texture of man’s existence” (Wyrick 33). Thus, the father’s emphasis on the proper 
“wearing and management” of the coats implies that in fact “[p]roper dressing can be ‘read’ as 
accurate commentary upon the dressed person” (Wyrick 134, my emphasis). This is also the case, 
Wyrick believes, with the subsequent use of the “root metaphor” of the book as the fiction that 
“cosmic dressing determines the shape and order of the world” (31). Thus, Wyrick argues that the 
description of the clothed universe is only “vaguely parodic” (31), behaving like a “lyrical tableau 
                                                 
121 Other satiric objects that have been mentioned are medieval cosmography, philosophical materialism and Christian 
allegoresis. See note 95. 
122 Wyrick ascribes this belief to Swift – see Ehrenpreis on the critical discussion of Swift’s use of satiric personae. 
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of investiture [which] lacks satiric bite” (34) exactly because the status of the serial investitures of 
which it consists is never seriously questioned.  
 Nevertheless, as Starkman notes the “simple substitution of clothes for man” (58) that 
is the eventual outcome of an idolization of well-fitted tailoring does serve as part of a satiric 
strategy. More specifically, it mocks the scholastic debate about habit and the Port Royal 
designation of “a man dressed” as the modification of one substance by another: “…the 
modification of man becomes so complete that clothes eventually usurp the functions of man” (61). 
When clothes become the essence of identity, personality appears as little more than impersonation; 
investiture itself becomes an empty ritual when identity disappears into its material expression. In 
this world a Bedlam madman can easily work at Westminster Hall if he “be furnished…with a 
green bag and papers” (IX 85), “a gold chain, and a red gown, and a white rod, and a great horse” 
(II 37) will produce a lord mayor and the “apt conjunction of lawn and black satin” a bishop (II 37).  
In some cases an outfit might even lead to a more profound reclassification:  
 
[T]he dull, unwieldy, ill-shaped ox, would needs put on the 
furniture of a horse, not considering he was born to labour, 
to plough the ground for the sake of superior beings, and 
that he has neither the shape, mettle nor speed of that 
nobler animal he would affect to personate. (“An Apology” 
8).  
 
The subversive potential of such transgressive impersonations in a society where birth still decided 
whether one was “to plough the ground for the sake of superior beings” is only partly mitigated by 
the little too insistent reference to those more innate qualities of “shape, mettle” and “speed”. 
Despite the care they take to make their dress set them apart, even the brothers themselves are 
consistently mistaken for each other. Only once Jack and Martin begin to “display themselves to 
each other and to the light” (VI 65), can their differences be perceived – in the dark, they look alike. 
Having “rent the main body of his coat from top to bottom” (VI 67) in a moment of religious zeal, 
Jack not only resembles “a drunken beau”, a “fresh tenant of Newgate”, a shoplifter and “a bawd in 
her old velvet petticoat” (VI 68), but also, bizarrely, Peter with his “infinite quantity of lace and 
ribbons, and fringe, and embroidery, and points” (VI 65). It is, the narrator notes, “in the nature of 
rags to bear a kind of mock resemblance to finery, there being a sort of fluttering appearance in both 
which is not to be distinguished at a distance, in the dark or by short-sighted eyes” (XI 98). To 
avoid being deceived, one only needs to look closer and pay more detailed attention to appearances. 
Clothes make the man. Thus, in the postlapsarian world of the Tale there are no examples of 
“proper dressing” or even any suggested distinction between proper or improper dressing – dress 
either tells something wrong about the interior, or completely absorbs it. Appearances are 
everything (man is coextensive with what he wears) and always deceiving (hiding the man they 
clothe).  
 Warren Montag suggests that the emptiness of investiture in this sense complicates 
“the apparent simplicity, directness and innocence of the allegory of the coats” (93). Or rather, the 
nature of the metaphoric vehicle dissolves the distinction between proper and improper dressing it is 
designed to maintain: “Is not religion a cloak…?” (II 36). Turning the focus from the propriety to 
the fact of dress, the question turns the attack on Catholicism and dissenting Protestantism against 
Christianity as such: is not religion, no matter how it is worn, a loose cover as fickle as “perpetually 
altering” fashions (II 42)? As Montag points out, in the description of the universe of investiture the 
“term ‘invests’ oscillates between a spiritual sense (the primum mobile invested in nature) and a 
material sense (that the different parts of the cosmos are enclosed, covered, a group of strata 
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irreducible to one another” (97-98). When the first sense of investment collapses into the second, 
the natural conclusion becomes that “those beings which the world calls improperly suits of clothes 
are in reality the most refined species of animals; or to proceed higher, that they are rational 
creatures, or men” (II 36-37). According to this warped logic, the “outward dress must needs be the 
soul” (II 37). It is difficult to find a more pointed caricature of what Jones and Stallybrass call “the 
making of the human subject through…worn things” (14). This satire surely does not lack bite. The 
sect of clothes worship is what a culture of investiture looks like when habits have become 
detachable and the making of identity can suddenly be glimpsed. The allegory of the coats is 
unravelled in the idolatry of clothes; Swift kills the metaphor of habit (both clothes and custom) by 
literalizing it: what is revealed when the “soul” becomes “outward dress” is not “the power of 
clothing magically to absorb its wearer” (Jones and Stallybrass 202), but the constitution of that 
power as magic.123 The very fact that such a caricature can be made, that the allegory of clothing 
can be recognized as such at all, is suggestive of what Blanford Parker calls “the collapsing by 
satire of analogical structures into a physical monism” (65). As the satire makes clothing move from 
referential sign to functional metaphor, the “spiritual analogs of [vestmental] cosmology become 
extensions of personal habits (cosmetic clothing) and temperament” (Parker 34). In other words, the 
satire makes visible the figuration that the clothes worshippers take for reality; conversely, reality 
itself can no longer appear as figural. “[U]nencumbered by figural excesses” (70), description 
moves in a kind of vacuum “in which the observing power seems to override any moral purpose” 
(Parker 149). Stripped of unnecessary conceits, the fetish becomes a mundane object of use: clothes 
can again be recognized as a “cover”, a disguise that man makes for himself to hide his worst 
defects. 
 However, as Pietz suggests, the charge of fetishism always marks a crisis produced by 
the clash of “different regimes of value” (5). Thus the coexistence of the two mutually exclusive 
myths (the one that holds that appearances are everything and the one that holds that they are 
always deceptive) is not a sign of bad needlework, but rather the paradoxical double seeming that 
develops as apparel is unstitched from social status. Here Wyrick’s concept of clothes as “necessary 
accidentals” (surely an avatar of the Derridean supplement) is useful, suggesting exactly the kind of 
simultaneous formation and dissolution of identity that inheres in wearable objects that can be put 
on and taken off. The hack writes from inside the crisis that invests the securities of proper dressing 
with the possibilities of contingency and fraudulence that comes from the realisation of 
detachability. The solution to the crisis is the knowing forgetfulness that the hack advocates in the 
“perpetual possession of being well deceived” (IX 83). Crucially, the present participle renders the 
sentence ambiguous here: what is kept in possession is not only deception itself (its contents), but 
the “being deceived”, that is, the fact of deception. The “serene peaceful state, of being a fool 
among knaves” (84) is not achieved by simple obliviousness of the depths that are hidden by the 
surface, but by the willing suspension of such deep knowledge. Such suppression of deep truth is 
justified by the surfacing of another truth, the truth that lies in the “fiction” (IX, 83) of surfaces. 
Thus the hack wonders whether “things that have place in the imagination may not as properly be 
said to exist as those that are seated in the memory” (IX 83). If the sentence makes a stab at Locke’s 
recollective self, it also reminds us of the powerful position between sense and thought occupied by 
the imagination in the eighteenth century. As Dennis Todd notes, the twin functions of the 
imaginary in the eighteenth century were sublimation and corporealization: 
 
                                                 
123 In this effort to unstitch the fabric that fuses subject and object, Swift’s Tale resembles Shakespeare’s King Lear, 
when, as in the Tale, clothing works as a structural motif. Thelma Nelson Greenfield notes that Shakespeare uses the 
motif “largely to consider our acceptance of the motif into our modes of thinking and of living” (286).  
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Rather than sublimating sense experience into the stuff of 
the intellect, it might give to the specious, airy fabrications 
of the mind the weight and feel of reality, the vividness, 
immediacy and substantiality that we experience in our 
perception of the things of the world, and thus impute to 
fancies the title and authority of reality that belongs by 
right only to God's created world. (Todd 185)  
 
Such connotations of the imaginary turns the satire against itself: whether as corporealized fancy or 
intellectual stuff, the Lockean self has imputed to itself the “title and authority of reality” – a claim 
that is no less real for being theologically absurd. In other words, the happiness that the hack 
promotes embraces both the knowledge that surfaces are false and the knowledge that this falseness 
provides us with an image of the world as it really is. Or, in Wyrick’s terms, personality may be a 
construct of flimsy accidentals, but accidentals themselves are substantially “bonded…into the very 
texture of man’s existence” (Wyrick 33). This questioning of the ontological status of fiction has 
much in common with the unreal reality that the commodity fetish produces in the Capital: “[T]he 
relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of another appear, not as direct social 
relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between 
persons and social relations between things” (166). Marx describes the transformation that the 
commodity wields as an ontological metamorphosis as well as an exchange of semblances; the 
fetish is therefore at one and the same time a “fantastic form” (165) and a representation of things 
“as what they really are” (166). Likewise, the truth that lies on the hack’s surfaces is not a 
miscognition, but somehow how we really experience things. The recognition of this paradox, then, 
betrays the innocence of an enlightenment that merely exchanges one kind of fetishism with 
another.   
 Pointing to the possibility of possessing a delusion without being delusional, Swift’s 
satire seeks to inhabit what Pietz calls “the impossible home...of a man without fetishes” (“The 
Problem” 14). But as all possessions, delusions are hard to keep; they constantly threaten to slip 
away and leave their possessors to their former delusional selves. Hence, the more complex surface 
truths quickly transform into a more familiar Swiftian fiction: the purely material world without 
transcendence, a world of solid bodies without interiors. Towards the end of his digression on 
madness, the hack takes a deeper look into its mystery by inspecting the “merits and qualifications 
of every student and professor” (IX 85) committed to “the academy of modern Bedlam” (IX, 80). In 
a passage that exploits the full satiric potential of the transformations that self-possession can effect, 
one depraved lunatic after another appears as a “useful…member” (XI 86) of modern society, 
culminating in the description of “a surly, gloomy, nasty, slovenly mortal, raking in his own dung 
and dabbling in his urine” (IX 86): “The best part of his diet is the reversion of his own ordure 
which, expiring into steams, whirls perpetually about and at last reinfunds” (IX 86). In this image of 
self-consumption,124 modern self-sufficiency appears as a kind of continual eversion, a warped 
investiture that lets the interior pass to the exterior in a movement that is less a circle than a 
downward spiral. It is an image that turns Locke’s predication of self-possession on digestion 
(Essay II.v.26) into a perversion: here habits are possessed so deeply that "having" itself is 
cannibalized. Investiture becomes a conceptual impossibility where the transparently layered depths 
resolve into the opacity of solid surfaces: nothing is hidden, everything is engorged.  
                                                 
124 The self-consumption of the bedlam madman forms a scatological parallel to the spider’s autogenesis in the Battle of 
the Books (1704): “I am a domestic animal, furnished with a native stock within myself. This large castle (to shew my 
improvements in the mathematics) is all built with my own hands, and the materials extracted altogether out of my own 
person” (111-112). 
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 Judging by the mad man’s appearances (and what else is there to judge by?), the hack 
believes that the madman will be “the greatest ornament to that illustrious body” (IX 86) of modern 
physicians – a statement that ties the deformative excretion to his own anatomical practices (an 
association confirmed by the scriptive connotation of “dabbling”). Eugene Bud Korkowski has 
aptly called the Tale “a botched anatomy” (395), a hack work that leaves us in continual 
disorientation, as essence always “absconds to an opposite place” (399). Nevertheless, as 
Korkowski also suggests, the intention to look deeper is itself indicative of a longing for what has 
been lost: “Though he never succeeds, the hack’s probing aims at an essential center” (396). 
Similarly Montag finds that the reaction elicited by the reader makes him recoil from the scenario 
he produces. The disgust produced by the image of rot and excrement is “symptomatic of a fantasy 
held in abeyance but not abandoned, that bodies contain souls, that the created world expresses the 
essence of its immaterial creation whose intention it fulfils” (Montag 109). From this perspective 
the hack has more in common with the clothes worshippers than his satire admits to – he too reads 
referentially what is in fact a metaphor. Expecting exact correspondences between the exteriors and 
interiors when all he finds is the stench of decomposition, he too is continually surprised to see 
Aristotelian hylomorphism dissolve into a heap of Lockean accidentals: “[T]here is something 
individual in human minds that easily kindles at the accidental approach and collision of certain 
circumstances…” (IX 78). 
 The hack, then, prefers random excesses to voids, as is evident from the Apology that 
prefaces the fifth edition of the Tale in which he regrets the “many chasms” that “appear in the 
book”, which were not there in “the author’s original copy” (8). The “chasms” are ascribed to a 
“friend of the author” (10), who has readily expunged “certain passages [that] now…appear under 
the name of desiderata” (10).  When “chasms” appear under the name of identifying characteristics, 
identity itself is hollowed out. This emptying of identity is evident in the hack’s investigation of the 
“sole point of individuation between Alexander the Great, Jack of Leyden, and Monsieur Des 
Cartes” (IX 82). He obliges “the reader to attend with the utmost perpensity” (IX 82) while he 
proceeds to “unravel this knotty point” (IX 82). The explanatory passage begins “There is in 
mankind a certain” and ends “And this I take to be a clear solution of the matter” (IX 82), but the 
central part of the argument is made up of lines of asterisks and the annotator’s dry observation in 
Latin: “Hic multa desiderantur” (IX 82). The Tale swells with such declarations of absence, 
“defects” made present rather than exposed.125 Giving graphical substance to nothing, the annotator 
makes these chasms “the real ‘insides’ of the Tale’s structure” (Korkowski 406). “Hic multa 
desiderantur”, “here there is much to be desired”, but also “what is desired is here”: here in the 
printed rows of character is “that sole point of individuation” that the hack longs for. Confining 
himself to corrective surgery, the annotator can make a decisive stab at the hack’s anatomical 
method: “[T]he matter which thus strained his faculties [is] not worth a solution,” the annotator 
notes (IX 82). There is no reason to dig in the first place: the type has already been cast. The 
reaction that this kind of substantial emptiness elicits has less to do with the shock and disgust of 
divestiture than with the resignation attending the awareness that “in the inside [things] are good for 
nothing” (IX 83). What we get a glimpse of in the margins of Swift’s texts is “the emptiness of a 
new concept of a person” (Jones and Stallybrass 277), a nascent awareness of the inherently 
deceptive nature of investiture and the equally hopeless illusions that “ground the fantasy of an 
individual who is not fashioned by ‘mere’ things” (277). For now, however, there is only the 
comfort of “being well deceived” (IX 83). 
 
 
                                                 
125Eleven in all, my favourite being “desunt non-nulla”, “here is given not nothing”, which appears in section XI.  
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iv.  “And keep good humour whatever we lose”: 
Hypotyposis and Details that Matter in Mundus Muliebris and The Rape of the Lock 
 
Most Criticks, fond of some subservient Art,  
Still make the Whole depend upon a Part 
… 
 Pleas’d with a Work where nothing's just or fit;  
One glaring Chaos and wild Heap of Wit.  
Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism (1711) 
 
The disorientation that follows when depths turn into surfaces is exemplified in an early dressing 
room poem by Mary Evelyn entitled Mundus Muliebris: or, The Ladies Dressing-Room unlock’d, 
and her Toilette spread in Burlesque (1690). Completed by a “fop-dictionary, compiled for the use 
of the fair sex” (1690), the core of the text consists in the poem “A Voyage to MaryLand; or, the 
Ladies Dressing-Room”. The text turns on the traditional likening of a woman with a ship, being 
presented in the preface as “comment for a young Master” as to “what Cargo he must provide”, 
“whether the design be for Miss or Marriage” (preface, italics inversed). As he sets out to “Marry-
land” (2),126 the catalogue is to help the courting fop with the “Enumeration of Particulars and 
computation of Charges” so that he can gain advantage “by way of Barter, if [he] think[s] to 
Traffick here, and to carry the Fair One, especially if she be at her own disposal” (preface). 
Consumption and prostitution are evidently linked here, with the woman as commercial scapegoat 
“at her own disposal” comprising both product, vendor and consumer all in one. But the poem 
deserves analytical consideration not only because it places the later eighteenth-century dressing 
room poems in a tradition of seventeenth-century misogynist commonplaces, but also because it 
precisely voices the anxieties about the dressing and undressing of the self as a problem of poetic 
description.   
Describing the dressed self metonymically by its commodified possessions, the poem 
anticipates the oscillation between encyclopaedic exhaustion and indefinite accumulation typical of 
the hypotypotic strategy of later dressing room poems, particularly Pope’s The Rape of the Lock 
(1712; 1714)127. The tropological manifestations of the dynamics of the dressed self push the 
boundaries of poetic description. The portrayal of the woman fashioned in the poem seems to veer 
from “she is all this”, all these terrific embellishments too numerous to count, to “this is all she is”, 
a mere heap of things that can be measured, enumerated, exchanged and priced. Likewise, the 
woman is both the unobtainable “Fair One”, an exotic destination that never quite materializes 
(“Marry-land”) and a simple collection of things, mere “Barter” subject to “Enumeration, 
“Computation” and “Traffick” (preface). That she comes cheap despite her expensive “Trinkets” 
(226) can be seen by the author's comment that the fop has chosen to barter “not as Merchants do 
for America, Glass-Beads, and Baubles, in exchange for Gold and Pearl; but Gold and Pearl, and 
all that’s precious, for that which is of less value than Knives and Children’s Rattles” (preface).  
Nevertheless, the wealth displayed by the lady’s articles of vanity is boundless, “[f]or should the 
Bank be so importune, / To rob her of her glittering Store, / The amorous Fop will furnish more” 
(70-72). “Nor are they [i.e. women] ever sufficiently adorned,'“ the poetic narrator warns the 
courting Fop, “Or satisfy’d you have done enough to set them forth” (5-6) The inventory of the 
                                                 
126 Apart from facilitating a humorous pun that conflates woman, marital institution and geographical region, the choice 
of Maryland as destination is significant in so far as the Chesapeake region was generally thought to be populated with 
the dregs of English society and therefore characterized by rampant individualism and widespread promiscuity.  
127 Pope’s poem was first published anonymously in two cantos in Bernard Lintott’s Miscellany. In 1714 Pope issued an 
expanded version of the poem in five cantoes in an octavo format. It is the latter version as edited by Geoffrey Tillotson 
that will be referred to here.   
 93 
ladies’ world signifies potential inexhaustibility as well as reductive itemization; the lady of fashion 
is never “tir’d with Numbers” (242), always capable of adding yet another layer of adornment to her 
already fully furnished self. The risk of impropriety that David Wills locates in the status of 
descriptive ornamentation in the mid-sixteenth-century reorganization of rhetorics resurfaces in 
eighteenth-century discussions of the vivacity of the descriptive detail: “On the one hand it clothes 
language in more pleasant and even regal attire...But on the other hand rhetoric risks making 
language look as though it is wearing borrowed garb or done up like a hustler loitering at the 
crossroads” (Wills 229).128 Pointing out the semantic links between prostitution and prosthetics, 
Wills shows how rhetorical ornamentation proves “rhetoric as the prostitution of language and 
rhetoric as its prosthetization, the putting forth or setting out by means of which the plain or lifeless 
inanimate becomes lively” (228). In the eighteenth century such discussions centre on the use of 
hypotyposis.   
 Looking at the dressing room poem in terms of hypotyposis is useful, not least to 
avoid what Chico calls “privileging the social message over the poetry’s aesthetic goals” 
(Designing Women 110). Hypotyposis formed part of the classical rhetorical category of enargia, 
which comprises the visual and affective effects of a text. Etymologically, hypotyposis signifies the 
spatial form of outline, literally, what is beneath, below or under (hypo) the molded figure (typosis) 
(Gasché 206). As Rodolphe Gasché has pointed out, this definition of shape in the form of outline 
gives way to a rhetorical sense of the term as “an illustration in which the vividly represented is 
endowed with such details that it seems to be present, and to present itself in person and completely 
by itself” (207). Quintilian provides the classic definition, according to which hypotyposis is the 
creation of “images of absent things ... so vividly depicted for the mind that we seem to see them 
with our eyes and have them present” (qtd. in Ker 345). In its classical sense, the visualisation 
created by hypotyposis had more to do with the emotional impact on the reader than with 
verisimilitude.  As Walther Bernhart points out, hypotyposis employs the poetic description of 
things and persons rhetorically rather than for the sake of mimetic veracity (130), subordinating the 
descriptive visualisation to “the effect of movere, i.e., in order to achieve explexis, (i.e., 
astonishment, amazement)” (232). 129 Aiming to elicit an emotional response from the reader 
through “vivid description”, hypotyposis turns its text into a moving picture. Central to the 
effectiveness of hypotypotic representation was “the perceptual evidence (evidentia) of a 
description that is made palpable by concrete details (circumstantiae)” (Bernhart 131)130. In other 
words, hypotyposis is predicated not only on the capacity to visualize in words but on a necessary 
“wealth of...details” (Bernhart 132). This aspect of visualisation through detail, points to 
hypotyposis as what Gasché calls “the gathering and grouping of a manifold into a unique 
ensemble” (209).  “[T]ied to subjects that have all the characteristics of a whole” (Gasché 208), 
hypotyposis “presents in entirety” (Gasché 209). It is exactly this impression of entirety that brings 
the quality of enargia to the image; what is whole and present in its entirety also has energy, 
vividness, life: “[W]hat is presented in hypotyposis is endowed with reality, it is alive and self-
conscious” (Gasché 209). This capability of hypotyposis to give life, to turn words into reality 
merely through the accumulation of details, merely by putting one thing next to another, is 
overlooked in theories that consider hypotyposis merely in representational terms. In other words, 
                                                 
128 Wills refers to and quotes from Thomas Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetorique set forth in Englishe (1551).   
129 For an account that stresses the distinction between reality effect and reality, see Richard A. Lanham who underlines 
that hypotyposis is unconcerned with the referential status of the objects presented, including many different forms of 
“vivid description” (79) such as prosopographia, or “the description of the appearance of a person, imaginary or real, 
quick or dead”, characterismus, or “the description of the body or mind” (79) and prosopopoeia or personification.  
130 Bernhart quotes from Heinrich F. Plett’s Rhetorick der Affekte. Englische Wirkungsästhetik im Zeitalter der 
Renaissance. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1975. 
 94 
describing with hypotyposis in mind is not only a question of representation, but also of 
incorporation. Murray Krieger considers this materializing moment the principle feature of 
hypotyposis since hypotypotic poetry “must convert the transparency of its verbal medium into the 
physical solidity of the medium of the spatial arts” (Krieger 266). Particularity and descriptive 
detail are central to this transubstantiation: things gather and new life bodies forth.  
 Krieger refers to ekphrasis rather than hypotyposis, but the effects that he describes 
apply to hypotyposis too. In classical rhetoric, ekphrasis had a meaning quite similar to that of 
hypotyposis, that is, the achievement of a visual representation through a verbal representation. It 
seems that even by the eighteenth century, the term had not yet come to mean, in James A. W. 
Heffernan’s words, “a verbal representation of a visual representation” (my emphasis, 3). The 
Oxford English Dictionary has 1715 as the entrance date of “ekphrasis” into the English language, 
but with quite a different meaning from that of pictures in words, namely “a plain declaration or 
interpretation of a thing”. The next example occurs a century later. Thus, none of the early 
eighteenth-century treatises of rhetorics and poetics that I have examined lists the term. Gottholt 
Ephraim Lessing’s often mentioned work Laokoon; oder über die Grenzen Malerei und Poesie 
(1766), only translated into English in 1836131 does not use the term, although specifically 
discussing “the locus classicus of ekphrasis” (Chico 122), Homer’s description of Achilles’ shield 
in the Iliad. Neither was the distinction between verbal depictions of natural objects or artefacts and 
those of works of art made in works such as Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), Hume’s “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757) or The Art of 
Poetry on a New Plan (1761). When Chico uses the concept of ekphrasis to unlock the secrets of 
Pope’s “aesthetic rivalry with Belinda” in the dressing room of the Rape of the Lock, she does so 
using a critical key that was not available to him. While such a deliberately anachronistic take can 
be fruitful, viewing the dressing room poem under the aegis of hypotyposis is not only more in 
keeping with the poetics of the early eighteenth century but also indicative of the material effects of 
such aesthetic rivalry. Or rather, the presences and absences that hypotyposis so precisely produces 
matter to the eighteenth-century writer in a way that is rather different from any “radical critique of 
representation” (Heffernan 304) conceived in the twentieth or twenty-first centuries. What the 
hypotyposis of the eighteenth-century dressing room poem teaches is not just that the life bestowed 
upon personality by lifeless things is only apparent (as the precise outline of a central emptiness), or 
that there can ever only be a representation of parts. It is rather that in this very act of “counterfeit 
representation” the parts themselves spring to life, moving uncannily around in the periphery of our 
vision.  
 Figuring prominently in surveys of rhetoric and composition as a category, early 
eighteenth-century definitions of hypotyposis combine the classic Quintilian definition of vivid 
depiction with an emphasis on the visually evocative “wealth of details”. In Suada Anglicana: or, a 
Short Review of Rhetoric (1704), Richard Spencer of Cobham defines it as “a Delineation, or 
Representation of the Object of our Passions, which being always present to our Minds, it’s 
Description is lively and exact.” (II 27). Michael Mattaire’s definition in English Grammar (1712) 
has the vividness of detail completely obscuring the rhetorical aim: “Hypotyposis or figuring the 
subject under lively circumstances [circumstantiae]” (224). In The Mystery of Rhetorick Unveiled 
(1656; 1721), John Smith, on the other hand, stresses the visual element when he defines it as a 
representation of a thing that “seem[s] rather to be felt or enjoy’d, than spoken of and expressed” 
(83). Smith adds that this sensorial presence, comes about,   
 
                                                 
131 This is the earliest translation found in the British Library catalogue. 
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when a whole matter is expressed so particularly, and in 
order, that it seems to be represented unto ocular 
Inspection: Or, when the whole Image and Proportion of 
things is as it were painted out in Words. (83) 
 
The expression “ocular Inspection” suggests that the techniques of hypotyposis could also be useful 
to scientific observation, providing a means for the particulars of minute observation to amount to 
an accurate outline as well as an experiential visualisation of “the whole matter”. Description is 
hypotypotic, however, only to the extent that it presents its object just “so particularly” that the 
“whole matter” can be present to the eyes. There is then a sense that particularity can be overdone, 
that the “wealth of detail” may become the deprivation of “the whole”. The art of hypotyposis is 
therefore also the art of the “Proportion of things”: too little detail and the outline will be 
incomplete, too much and the figure will be obfuscated. In both cases the result is disintegration: the 
dis-appearance of “the whole” or the dis-figuring of the outline. Hypotyposis must exercise an 
Addisonian imaginative appropriation diffusive enough to keep a visual claim on what has been 
gathered to entirety without dwelling on the material particulars. 
 In her study of The Prose of Things (2006) in the eighteenth century, Cynthia 
Sundberg Wall132 notes that eighteenth-century poetics built on an earlier tendency to use “language 
of object imagery for description”: “Renaissance and seventeenth-century rhetorical advisers 
frequently speak of description or its parts in terms of ornament, garnishing, or, in other words, 
objects” (26). Wall traces how “eighteenth-century rhetorical criticism [becomes] increasingly 
anxious about a revolt” (1) of description that would transform its details from “ornament and 
garnishing” or “useful accessories” (26) into interfering obstacles that “tend to get in the way when 
they’re not wanted, as well as when they are” (26). Like luxury, hypotyposis poses the question of 
necessity and superfluity: how much is too much? Thomas Rymer believed it was a distinction that 
had become increasingly difficult to make, noting towards the end of the seventeenth century that 
“there is a particular Rhetorick for Poetry, which the modern poet scarce understand at all; this Art 
consists in discerning very precisely...where Ornament is requir’d, and where not” (qtd. in Wall 
29).133 As the propriety of decorum came to denote simplicity rather than gentility or loftiness, 
detail is increasingly portrayed as another expression of the mercantilistic “deadstock of plenty”, an 
impoverishing luxury. Comparing poetry to painting in a preface to his translation of Charles du 
Fresnoy’s The Art of Painting (1695), Dryden feels that each genre in visualising their subjects 
must take care to be “superfluous in nothing” (xliii). To Dryden unnecessary descriptive details are 
like “Wens, and other Excrescences, which belong not to the Body, but deform it” (xliii): “A 
Painter, must reject all trifling Ornaments; so must a Poet refuse all tedious and unnecessary 
Descriptions. A Robe which is too heavy, is less an Ornament than a Burden.” (xliii). Dryden’s 
vestmental metaphor places both dress and descriptive detail between ethereal ornament and 
physical deadweight. When too many things gather, they become superfluous obstacles rather than 
useful accessories. There is such a thing as a critical mass in description; the moment when 
insubstantial “ornament” turns into a cumbersome “burden” is the point when the sheer 
accumulation of descriptive detail produces its own reality. In the mid-eighteenth century the author 
of The Art of Poetry on a New Plan (1762)134 constructs the possibilities of emulation inherent in 
the ornaments of “imagery and description”  (II 8) along the lines of fashion. While it is possible 
with “great invention, as well as judgement to assemble low thoughts and images, and dress them in 
                                                 
132 My account of the fear of descriptive excess draws on Wall’s work, which in detail relates the changing attitudes to 
decorum and description in the eighteenth century.   
133 Wall quotes from Rymer, Thomas. Monsieur Rapin’s Reflections on Aristotle’s Treatise of Poesie (1694). 
134 The author of this work is attributed to Samuel Johnson and listed under his name in the bibliography. 
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such a manner, that they may mix with propriety among those which are sublime” (II 243), it can 
only be done using “such rich ornaments, as no modern poet can use with any propriety” (II 349).  
Poets of elaborately descriptive poetry are as morally suspicious as the “Shape Merchants” of the 
fashion industry. Both are guilty of the delusions that come with the overindulgence of the “most 
Insignificant things” (Wanley IX 41), both exploit the fact that things are judged “not as what they 
are but as what they appear to be” (Mandeville M 123) to turn imaginary ornaments into reality.   
 W. J. T. Mitchell has described the fear that attends such a moment of  descriptive 
deception: “This is the moment of resistance or counter-desire that occurs when we sense that the 
difference between the verbal and  visual representation might collapse and the figurative, 
imaginary desire of ekphrasis might be realized literally and actually” (154). Paradoxically then, in 
making the verbal visual, hypotyposis must leave something unseen, or succumb to the literalization 
of metaphor, the materialisation of the imaginary. As Mitchell argues, hypotypotic descriptions 
must remain “acts of verbal ‘conjuring’” that live “as a potent absence or a fictive, figural 
presence”: “The ekphrastic image acts, in other words, like a sort of unapproachable and 
unrepresentable ‘black hole’ in the verbal structure, entirely absent from it, but shaping and 
affecting it in fundamental ways” (158). Presenting what is not just visible but brought to life, “not 
just seen but imaginatively inhabited” (Wall 74), hypotyposis caters treacherously to the “pleasures 
of the imagination”. As Sandra Logan has noted, in the poetics of the Renaissance and Restoration, 
hypotyposis is often framed “in terms of deception” (14), occupying a position of “falseness” (15) 
as “a form of representation veiled and disguised as presentation” (15). In The Arte of English 
Poesie (1589) George Puttenham labels hypotyposis “counterfeit representation”, stressing the 
“cunning” that is involved in setting “forth things in such sort as it should appear they were truly 
before our eyes though they were not present” (qtd. in Logan 15). Although the category of fiction 
which Puttenham is just coming to grips with here was to be more firmly established in the 
eighteenth century,135 Addison’s preoccupation with the precarious position of “imaginary Glories” 
(no. 413 96) and “Supernumerary Ornaments” (no. 413 96) between material and imaginary 
spectatorship is still invested with the possibility of deception that Puttenham located in pictorial 
description. We might here recognize the logic of the supplement, wedged between “perception and 
imagination” (Of Grammatology 155) and emerging only in the alteration between absence and 
presence. 
 Roland Barthes seems to do little but reiterate Puttenham’s critique when he refers to 
hypotyposis as the institutionalization of the fantasmatic (145), as a figure “whose function was ‘to 
put things before the hearer’s eyes,’ not in a neutral, contrastive manner but by imparting to 
representation all the luster of desire ...with prismatic outlines” (145-146). Because the effect of 
hypotyposis is predicated on the ability to “present in entirety”, the fear that the illusion may be real 
is attended by the fear that the lustre of detail pries away the explexis of the whole. As Barthes 
notes, without “an aesthetic or rhetorical choice, any ‘view’ would be inexhaustible by discourse: 
there would always be a corner, a detail, an inflection of space or color to report” (145). Description 
then is always at risk of annexing the text that hosts it, reducing it to an inexhaustible report, an 
endless enumeration, a mere list. In other words, there is always a risk that the illusion of 
comprehensive particularity sought by hypotyposis gives way to the desire for an actual 
                                                 
135 Catherine Gallagher has argued that until the mid-eighteenth century “fictions could be distinguished from lies if 
they were manifestly improbable. Honest fictions, that is, were expected to distinguish themselves by their incredibility” 
(338). Hypotypotic description the aim of which was to induce in the reader a “passive acceptance” of what it made to 
appear “the real and present, the effective and affective” (Logan 15) would obviously fall short of such redemptive self-
revelation. As a “likely fiction”, hypotypotic description would be considered a lie, a deceitful illusion.  
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encyclopaedic totality that leaves nothing unmentioned.136 To Barthes the “reality effect” of 
nineteenth-century realism represents the emancipation of description, instituting a way to describe 
that could give meaning to detail outwith the “constraints of the rhetorical code”. Instead of being 
made illustrious parts of the “prismatic outlines” of hypotyposis, the insignificant details of 
description shed their incongruity as “reality effects” when safely checked by the “traffic control 
centre” of realistic narration.  
 Nevertheless pitting the liberating effects of reality over and against the fetters of 
hypotyposis, Barthes overlooks the emancipatory relief offered by the very incongruity and 
superabundance of detail itself at a time when the transition from one descriptive code to another 
was not complete. Lists can also form a liberation of the descriptive detail. Precisely because the list 
and the catalogue represent the point when the substance of detail gets in the way of the “whole 
matter”, they come to mark the erosion of the rhetorical conventions. Wall shows how “in the 
seventeenth century, the list comes to occupy more – perhaps all –genres”, and how “in some 
instances...the list takes over the form” (88). The list flourishes with encyclopaedic dreams of 
perfect compendia and complete inventories of things in the world. It is a tendency that was 
intensified by the increasing interest in collections of antiquities and curiosities as well as by the 
rise of natural history: “[B]oth natural and artificial artifacts were collected, and investigated, and 
analyzed, and classified” (Wall 88).137 In this sense, the break-down of hypotyposis under the 
weight of overabundant detailing comes to represent the pressures exerted on an aggregate self 
overcome by objectivity. 
 Wall exemplifies the desire to list with “[o]ne of the most popular teaching texts in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (90), 138  Charles Hoole’s translation of Johann Amos 
Comenius’ Orbis Sensualium Pictus, or The Visible World (1659). Comenius does not quite trust 
the visualising powers of language, choosing instead to present “all visible things...of the whole 
world” (preface) in a series of densely furnished woodcuts the illustrated objects of which are 
defined in dual-columned lists, one in Latin, one in English. The world thus comprehensively 
compartmentalized in 150 subdivided parts, the texts moves effortlessly from “The Air” and “The 
Deluge” to “Looking Glasses” and “Paper”. Bringing “the great and the small...onto the same 
comprehensible plane of the list”, the book “carves the world into a visualised text” (Wall, 91). 
Comenius uses the list to give the indefinitely expandable an air of order by itemization, exploiting 
the reader’s natural propensity to fill in the gaps: “Lists...gather things together to create a visual 
heap, a heap capable, moreover of structural meaning...[by] mak[ing] grammatical and conceptual 
connections between objects, connections that we generally find between their commas” (Wall 88). 
To Comenius the list offers a convenient tool for the handling of a boundaryless surface (the visible 
world), awarding all the parts their own identity “expressed by their own proper terms” and 
ensuring that his system of presentation “always sheweth which things belong to one another” 
(preface).  
 Defining the “Head and the Hand” (50), Comenius conscientiously lists the illustrated 
details in the woodcut, allowing only things that “belong to one another” to occupy the same 
numbered space: “In the Head are the Hair, I. (...with a Comb, 2.)...In the Face...the Nose, 8. (with 
                                                 
136 John Bender describes this difference as the difference between holistic and particularized ways of seeing, i.e. as the 
difference between a totality of “intensity and vividness” and the mere listing “of things that we might see” (qtd. in 
Wall 12, 21). See Bender, John. Spenser and Literary Pictorialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.  
137 Wall notes that the Royal Society had “its own passion for lists” (88), exhibited not only in the publication of 
scientific essays, but also by the comprehensive alphabetized indexes of The Philosophical Transactions. 
138 The book is republished at least three times in the eighteenth century (1705, 1729 and 1777).Wall refers to the 1777 
publication as the “twelfth edition” (90). It was, however, a common marketing ploy to exaggerate the number of 
editions, and I have not been able to confirm this number in the various searches of Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online.  
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two Nostrils)” (50). Relying exclusively on contiguity to convey identity, Comenius here builds a 
suum the properties of which accumulates in a heap that does not seem to have any “conceptual 
connection between [its] objects” (Wall 88). Just as Locke exploits the imprecision of a possessive 
adjective in the comparison that he means to ground the distinction between what is “properly his” 
and what is not (Two Treatises II.v.27 287-88), so Comenius’ definition exploits the ambiguity of a 
preposition that connotes both contiguity and possession. As J. Paul Hunter has shown, although 
“the primary allegiance is to structure, a process of comparison implied in the thing itself”, one 
“simply cannot tell from a list per se just what kind of comparison is going on” (151). Does the 
comb belong “with” the hair in same way as nostrils belong “with” the nose? Lists may “may assert 
equivalences”, but they “may also imply inappropriate comparisons that blur distinctions” (Hunter 
151). The satiric exploitation of the ambiguity inherent in the list is a literary art in which the 
eighteenth-century poets of the dressed selves excel. In the dressing room, the ambiguity of the 
comma is exploited to suggest levelling inappropriateness as well as acquisitive compulsion. If in 
Comenius’ universal compendium an inappropriately placed artefact easily disappears in the 
comprehensive illustration of “all visible things in the whole world”, in the dressing room of poems 
of Evelyn and Pope it is exactly the incongruity of detail that prevents us from “getting the whole 
picture”. 
 One critic of Evelyn’s work, responding in the parallel piece Mundus Foppensis: or, 
the Fop Display’d (1691),139 finds that it “looks much more like an Inventory than a Poem” (1) in 
its exposition of a lady’s personal possessions from her “Cosmeticks” to the inventory of her 
dressing room. Indeed, the narrator of Evelyn’s poem spends ten pages listing “not half that does 
belong / to this fantastic female Throng” (84) before admitting that “Arithmetick can add no more” 
(241) and so, “tir’d with Numbers,” giving up (242). The length of the list here is intended as a 
criticism of the consumption of luxuries, including elaborately trimmed petticoats with “Fringe to 
sweep the Mall” (15), a whole range of undress, perfumed gloves and ribbons and a series of 
“Washes, Unguents, and Cosmeticks” (170) that includes “Plumpers” (104) to fill out hollow 
cheeks, “Spanish Paper” to redden the cheeks (97) and a “monstrous” headdress that towers “like 
Steeple Bow, or Grantham Spire” (134). The structuring power of the comma arranges the 
incomprehensible splendour of the lady's effects in a comprehensive list of individual items. An 
effort to present “in entirety” an image of the lady of fashion, the poem uses place as an ordering 
principle, moving from the meticulous rigging out (12) of the fashionable vessel herself to the 
furnishing of her apartment, setting a “new Scene” (164) with a list of dressing room “Implements” 
(165). Each puzzling and ostentatious item of clothing has its proper place: a “Saphire Bodkin for 
her Hair” (45), “Diamond Pendants for her Ears” (49), “Bracelets for her Wrists” (55), Engageants 
“[a]bout her Sleeves” (86) and a “Manteau ’bout her Neck” (62). As in Comenius’ encyclopaedia, 
the belonging is marked by a preposition the conjunctive powers of which are grammatical rather 
than substantial. Thus the body never fully succeeds in becoming a fixed point of orientation, 
amounting rather to a random succession of dismembered parts than an organized whole.140  
 The obsessive pairing of commodity with body part reveals the prosthetic quality of 
dress; dressing is a self-extension that is also a self-effacement, as chicken skin is substituted for 
skin, plumpers for hollow cheeks, and the redness of Spanish paper for the natural colour of lips and 
                                                 
139 Unlike Evelyn’s narrator, who associates the belongings with foreign luxury and deceitful artifice, the anonymous 
critic of Evelyn’s work argues that “there is nothing to be found in all his Index, nor his Dictionary neither, but what 
becomes a Person of Quality to give, and a Person of Quality to receive” (preface). Luxuries can easily be reclassified 
as decencies.  
140 Likewise, the commonality of place does little to veil the disparity of objects in the dressing room: “The Table 
Miroir, one Glue Pot, / One for Pomatum, and what not? Of Washes, Unguents, and Cosmeticks, / A pair of Silver 
Candlesticks...”   
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cheeks. The logic of the originary supplement is exposed again as the loss of integrity becomes 
constitutive. As Wills notes, “prosthesis” was first introduced in the English language as a rhetorical 
term as “the addition of a syllable to the beginning of the a word”, and only in 1704141 did it surface 
in its medical sense as the “replacement of a missing part of the body with an artificial one” (218). 
The rhetorical and the orthopedic senses of the word collude in the impropriety of additive excess – 
the monstrosity of an amplification that turns the seamless fit of a proper placement into the misfits 
of displacement, misplacement or replacement, of a type of amplification that extends to dismember 
or amputate: “It is the supplementary movement towards ornamentation that divides the space of 
language between the proper and the foreign, passing from what is at hand to what is far-fetched 
and translated” (Wills 228). In some passages the natural body seems almost entirely obscured by 
the prosthetic one, artifice is added to artifice in a disorientating amplificatio of outlandish 
accessories:  
 
The Settée, Cupée, place aright, 
Frelange, Fontange, Favorite; 
Monté la haut, and Palisade, 
Sorti, Flandan, (great helps to Trade) 
Burgoine, Jardiné, Cornett, 
Frilal next upper Pinner set, 
Round which…[is] 
spread the Hood call’d Rayonnés…(105-112) 
 
In fact, displacement and disproportion is the order of the day, as when, resembling a “Septizonium” 
(135),  the “Artificial Tour” (117) that is her towering headdress has the power to rearrange the 
natural order of the organism: “The Face that E’rst near head was plac’d / Imagine now about the 
Wast” (131-132).142 The inspiration is Juvenalian, but the butt of criticism here is the late 
seventeenth-century banishment of ringlets from the world of fashion and their replacement by the 
commode, a style of hairdressing that required the front hair to be “turned almost straight from the 
forehead and combed over a cushion, above the which the back hair was arranged in a wreath of 
curls” (Williams 53). As Neville Williams notes in his history of the Englishwoman’s toilette, 
“once the head was dressed to look larger than life, it was a short step to artificial head-dresses” 
(53) the proliferation of which accelerated in the last decade of the seventeenth century.  Ringlets 
were no less artificial than the commode, often consisting in “luxuriant tresses...of artificial 
hair...arranged on wires to stand out from the sides of the head” (Williams 52). Nevertheless pitting 
the “Artificial Tour” (117) against what we sense is more naturally “well-plac’d Curls” (141), the 
poem constructs and image of the commode as unnatural and disproportionate.143 
 The impropriety of the appearance of Evelyn’s lady is not only impaired by 
disproportion but by its reliance on material possession. Already in the seventeenth century 
cosmetic beauty had been advertised for sale, as in Thomas Jeamson’s Artificiall Embellishments; 
or Arts Best Directions how to Preserve Beauty of Procure it (1665). Evelyn’s lady of fashion is 
                                                 
141 Wills quotes from “Kersey’s revision of Phillip’s Dictionary” (218). 
142 The fop-dictionary explicitly reveals Evelyn’s Juvenalian inspiration, defining “Septizonium” as a “very high Tower 
in Rome, built by the Emporour Severus, of Seven Ranks of Pillars, set one upon the other, and diminishing to the Top, 
like the Ladies new Dress for their Heads, which was the mode among the Roman Dames, and is exactly described by 
Juvenal in his 6th Satyr” (20).  
143 The charge of unnatural disproportion is one that continues to be repeated against the artificial headdress in the 
following decades. Looking back at the latest head-dress craze, Mr. Spectator professes that “he is not for adding to the 
beautiful edifice of nature, nor for raising any whimsical superstructure upon her plans” (no. 98 92), as “with such a Pile 
of supernumerary Ornaments, we destroy the Symmetry of the humane Figure” (no. 98 95). 
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pieced together by such “artificiall embellishments”, her beauty being of the kind that can be more 
or less easily be “procured”. But her appearance is also vexing because it disturbs the differentiation 
between nature and artifice; supplementing nature, procured beauty both adds and completes. Like 
luxury, it easily turns necessity into excess. As Jeamson notes, when “Art unlocks its Magazeen of 
Medicines” it may do so “to repair...an itchy or scabby Skin” (Index) or to unite “all parts of the 
Body in charming Concords of alluring features, and give each Member such a pleasing splendour, 
that Native Beauties seem but dull and dying shadows, to set forth their more rich and lively 
Colours” (3). The finished result, however, does not reveal which of the two processes that has 
effected it; and so Stapylton’s problem persists – is the produced artifice of the dressing room 
enhanced beauty or patched up deformity? As the emblem of the dressed self, the painted face 
remains “evidence of the unseen, sitting in plain view” (Chico, Designing 40). 
 It is an issue that remains problematic even in the defences of “artificial beauty” such 
as John Gauden’s Several Letters between two Ladies wherein the Lawfulness and Unlawfulness of 
artificial Beauty in Point of Conscience are nicely debated  (1701).144 Williams calls Gauden’s 
book “a milestone in the history of the Englishwoman’s toilet” (51) because it “demolished once 
and for all” (52) the arguments against make-up that were advanced on Biblical grounds. The 
refutation of the argument against makeup relates to motive – as the defending lady argues, the 
question is not which kinds of artificial embellishments are vicious, but rather whether or not the 
“Customable Adornings” are “intended to any sinful end” (47). Nevertheless, the question remains: 
How much is too much? The defending lady admits as much when she measures her own success 
by how “natural” it looks: “If I should deny what your Ladyship suspects, it would be very hard to 
prove it; since what you fansie as additional, is not beyond the ordinary proportion of what is 
natural to my Age and Complexion” (3). What make-up provides is replenishment rather than 
addition. Nature dictates the limits after all. 
 In a similar vein, the narrator of Evelyn’s poem complains with reference to the lady’s 
enormous headdress that whatever “Grace Nature denies; An Artificial Tour supplies” (7). Yet, the 
succeeding description of the towering accessory reveals a more complicated relationship between 
natural beauty and that which can be procured:  
 
Beauty by Tyrant Mode controll’d. 
The graceful Oval, and the Round, 
This Horse Tire does quite confound; 
And Ears like Satyr, Large and Raw, 
And bony Face, and hollow Jaw; 
This monstrous Dress does now reveal 
Which well plac’d Curls did once conceal... (138-144) 
 
Here the specific attack on the replacement of “natural” ringlets by the artificial “commode” is used 
to suggest that beauty can be the first to suffer when fashion becomes despotic; the art of dress and 
cosmetics, at least when in the reign of “Tyrant Mode”, is not necessarily a beautifying undertaking. 
The point is Ovid’s quoted above; there is a possibility that “[b]eauty [will] most, when stript of 
Art, prevail” (281, 378). As opposed to the case of the young nobleman in the Memoirs, it is the 
dressing rather than the undressing that turns (wo)man into a thing of the in-between (“like Satyr”); 
as the human face is confounded by a brutish approximation of its graceful oval (a ridiculously 
warped “Horse Tire”), a geometrical and physiognomical disfiguring takes place. Art’s “Magazeen 
of Medicines”, then, may well produce rather than cure deformity. Yet, here too there is an 
                                                 
144 An earlier edition of this book was entitled A Discourse on Auxiliary Beauty and published in 1662 and 1692. 
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unveiling of an original monstrosity, for the satyric ears, the bony face and the hollow jaw are all 
there before the application of headdress, only then successfully concealed by “well-plac’d Curls” 
(141). In other words, neither to be found in art or in nature, beauty is eternally “confounded” and 
falsifiable, always part of some deceit. The reason Evelyn’s poem fails in making the body a fix 
point is that it is nowhere to be found. The naturalness with which bracelets belong to wrists and 
bodkins to the hair obscures the existence of a proportionate bodily whole as a natural given. The 
disintegration that follows both pertains to the subject and the hypotypotic form of the poem: as 
details lose their constitutive powers to lend life to a whole, they gain an uncanny independence. In 
Evelyn’s world of cosmetic accessorizing, the power of hypotyposis is destroyed by an 
encyclopaedic listing that lets belonging die in instrumental ownership.  
 Charles Davies first constituted Mundus Muliebris as a precursor of the dressing room 
scene in Pope’s Rape of the Lock, although only few scholars have since made more than passing 
comments about the parallel.145 Like Evelyn’s lady of Fashion, Pope’s Belinda is a “painted vessel” 
(II 47) that seems to carry all the “various Off’rings of the World” (I 120), imported luxuries from 
all parts of the commercial Empire. The similarities stretch further than the use of the dressing room 
as a setting for the embarkation of  “feminine fashions and foibles” (Davies 324). Davies sees the 
differences between the two poems when it comes to the effects of their descriptive detailing: “In 
Evelyn these details are more numerous and more exactly particularised; they are grains of yellow 
sand not pin-points of starry light aswim in the little heaven of poetry where Pope's feathery wit has 
carried them” (324). But if Pope’s description shines brighter, its radiance is no less compromised 
than Evelyn’s. The poem is resplendent with “trivial Things” (I 2), commodities that always come 
in the plural form of duplication from “glowing Gems” (I 133) to “Files of Pins” (I 137)”, “Combs” 
(I 136) and the often cited “Puffs, Powders, Patches, Bibles, Billet-doux” (I, 138).  In fact, as Laura 
Brown has shown in her study of Alexander Pope (1985), the entire effect of the poem is to make 
objects “shine and glow everywhere with an indiscriminate profusion” (12) that threatens to obscure 
the very beauty they are meant to display. As in Evelyn’s poem, beauty itself never materialises: 
“Belinda’s beauty can only be seen through the commodities that she wears; the question of 
whether there is a real beauty, or a real Belinda, behind those spoils remains unanswered” (Brown 
14).  
 Elsewhere Pope professes himself as much a believer in representational perfection as 
Comenius. Added to Pope’s translation of the Iliad, upon which he was working while completing 
the second edition of The Rape, is a plate of Achilles’ shield providing “ocular Demonstration” (b 
135) of its power as “an universal Picture” (136). In the “Observations on the Shield of Achilles” 
(1720)146 that follows the plate, Pope defends Homer’s intention “to draw the Picture of the whole 
World in the Compass of [the] Shield” (129). Justifying Homer’s use of particulars, Pope answers 
the “modern Critick” (131) who argues that the description should “have been more correct and less 
charg’d with Objects” (131). Against the “main Objection...that the Shield is crowded with such a 
Multiplicity of Figures, as could not possibly be represented in the Compass of it” (136), Pope 
insists that representation can be picture perfect as long as the objects described are “disposed in the 
                                                 
145 Felicity Nussbaum mentions the poem briefly. Tita Chico devotes three pages to the poem in Designing Women 
without noting the parallel to Pope (10-105). Finally, Bonamy Dobrée and Rebecca Ferguson both mention the poem as 
a thematic inspiration for Pope. 
146 As James A. W. Heffernan notes, Homer’s description of Achilles’ shield “is not just the earliest example of 
ekphrasis we know in Western literature; it is paradigmatic, establishing conventions, contentions and strategies that 
would inform ekphrastic poetry for centuries to come” (9). Thus, the discussion of the shield carries principal weight. 
Nevertheless, as Fern Farrnham has shown, although Pope presents himself as a lone defender of descriptive 
particularity against “the Vanity of the Moderns” (136), he draws heavily on two contemporary French defences of 
Homer, i.e. Jean Boivin’s Apologie d’Homère et Bouclier d’Achille (1715) and Anne Le Fèvre Dacier’s Des causes de 
la corruption du gout (1714) written a vindication of her translation of the Iliad (1699). 
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proper Place and Order” (136). The division of the shield into “twelve regular Compartiments” 
(136) serves “to prove, that the Figures will neither be crowded nor confused” (136). Yet that which 
can be neatly compartmentalised is susceptible to fragmentation and loss. Thus, while Homer 
visualizes “the whole World in the Compass of” an object, the question is whether the objects in 
Pope’s mock-heroic dressing room are too densely lustrous to create visual entirety. In other words, 
“charg’d with Objects”, “The Rape of the Lock” might preclude the “ocular demonstration” it sets 
out to give.147  
 In fact, decoration consistently deprives the reader of a complete view: 
 
Fair Nymphs, and well-drest Youths around her shone, 
But eve’ry eye was fix’d on her alone. 
On her white breast a sparkling Cross she wore, 
Which Jews might kiss, and Infidels adore. (II 5-8) 
 
At work here is the same slippage from metonymic extension to synecdochic substitution that 
allows Evelyn to link body part and commodified embellishment so closely that the difference 
between ornamental accessories and prosthetic replacements constringes to the point of collapse.  
At the very moment when “ev’ry eye” fixes on “her alone”, the reader is only offered a partial view, 
a glimpse of “her white breast”, which is immediately occluded by the radiance of the inanimate 
trinket that decorates it. In the same way at the precise moment when the reader is encouraged to 
“[l]ook on her Face” (II 17), Belinda's “bright Locks” (II 29) emerge to “insnare” (II 27)  her 
admirers, including, one supposes, the easily diverted reader.148 The reduction of Belinda's 
“heaven’ly Image” (I 125) to the “shining Ringlets” of her locks (II 22) is a dual gesture of 
literalising solidification and synecdochic dissolution. Inscribed in the supplementary logic of 
unchecked amplification, Belinda is both base matter and a deceptive illusion, both an “earthly 
Vehicle” (I 50) that is never successfully transformed into “liquid Air” (V 126) and a false whole, 
the result of a skilful manipulation of parts. This deferment of what matters is the condition under 
which the hypotyposis of the dressing room labours: rendered metonymically, the dressed self 
(whether monstrous or beautiful) is located in the heap of things with which she is “decked”. It is 
the dressing room that is unlocked and “the Toilet” that “stands display’d” (I 121). Belinda is a 
hypotypotic effect, a collected whole the entirety of which can only be inferred by the things that 
surround it.  The “real self” is only there by way of metonymic extension, quite literally lost in 
dress. What is left is an empty outline, the vacuity of a figure.  
 Chico sees this loss of wholeness by detail as the result of Pope’s “aesthetic rivalry 
with Belinda” (“The Arts” 12). Threatened by the possibility that Belinda’s beauty “might be 
realized literally and actually” (Mitchell 154) and thus by a visual display that might dwarf his own, 
he never allows her image to shine through in entirety. Placed at the end of the final canto, the 
italicized demonstrative pronoun takes the entire poem as its antecedent, thus creating an opposition 
between Belinda’s “lost” lock (V 144) and its textual recovery:  
 
This Lock, the Muse shall consecrate to Fame, 
And mid’st the Stars inscribe Belinda’s Name! (V 149) 
 
                                                 
147 Substantiating Chico notes that the front piece to the revised 1714 edition of the poem gives no full view of Belinda, 
showing her only in profile, half turned to the mirror as she applies her cosmetics.   
148 The image is a commonplace inherited from the Renaissance. In The Arraignment of lewd, idle, forward and 
unconstant Women (1615), Joseph Swetnam notes how women “lay out the folds of their Hair, to entangle Men in their 
Love” (43).  
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Chico’s point is that Pope “firmly displaces her art with his...by promising that ‘This LOCK’ shall 
outlive her cosmetic one” (“The Arts” 16).149 Unlike Belinda’s lock, “This Lock” remains intact, 
unthreatened by sheers that can “dissever” or “divide” (III 153, 148). Pope dissociates himself from 
Belinda’s “parted Hair” (IV 134, 236) by bestowing upon his poem an entirety that is insusceptible 
to partition, elevating it above both division and loss. The implied opposition here is between the 
divisible satiric subject and its incorporeal inscription: put in writing and so transformed to a mere 
“Name”, Belinda achieves an existence that is “less charged with objects” and a starry glow that 
does not depend on the “glitt’ring Spoil” (I 132) that covers her. In this reading the final couplet 
thus echoes the “upward rise” (V 123, 241) of Belinda’s lock “to the Lunar Sphere” where “all 
things lost on Earth, are treasur’d” (V 112-113, 240). Its subsequent transformation into a “sudden 
Star [that] shot through liquid Air / And drew behind a radiant Trail of Hair” (V 126-27, 241) is 
noticed by “none but quick Poetic Eyes” (V 124). In both instances the transformation that takes 
place relies on a poetic vision that is similar to Addison’s imaginative spectatorship, resorting to the 
power of a “diffusive” gaze to elevate and create “a kind of property” that is as elusive as it is 
permanent (no. 411 83). The beauty of Pope’s “Lock” is of the kind that cannot be procured. 
Whereas Belinda’s lock is prepared in essence, bound in “Paper-Durance” (IV 99, 235), wreathed 
with “tort’ring Irons” (IV 100, 235) and “strain’d with Fillets” (IV 101, 235), Pope’s “Lock” 
appears instantaneously in a deictic gesture that requires only the intellectual work of inscription (a 
kind of labour that stops short of the mechanical reproduction in the print shop).  The opposition 
relies on the separation of the poetic work from its physical instantiation. Decorporealized, writing 
institutes integrity through a literary renown that is untainted by the corruption of self-worship and 
a textual sanctity that is uncompromised by commodifiable matter. Chico finds that this insistence 
on textual integrity is an attempt to “contain the influence of the ekphrastic image...by urging 
people to read texts instead”. Pope copes with the threatening reality of hypotyposis by turning it 
into the “[a]iry Substance” of text: “[W]e are left with an antiportrait, one that ultimately sheds its 
pictorial skin and that can exist only in language” (Chico, “The Art” 130).  
Chico’s analysis turns on the means by which Belinda’s cosmetic art of beauty is 
“contained” by the poetic beauty of Pope’s hypotyposis: “By using ekphrasis to manage the subject 
(and subjectivity of women, Pope reiterates his poetry’s status as art and also adopts the topic of 
female beauty as the occasion to produce an art that supplants women’s art” (Chico, “The Art” 130). 
Yet, it is an approach that leaves Pope simultaneously too much and too little in control of the 
hypotypotic effects of his work. On the one hand Pope’s control is belittled because Pope’s 
supposed concern to counter Belinda’s attempt to “upstage” and “outwit” endows his creation with 
just the kind of subjectivity he seeks to elide. As A. S. Crehan reminds us, Belinda is after all “a 
literary construct” (55): “Once reduced to a lock of hair, Belinda’s name becomes a sign of value, a 
virgin body, honor, a labyrinth, reputation, a trap, a trophy, and a transparent poetic device (‘A 
sudden Star’) in a chain of metonymic substitutions” (61). The act of naming itself becomes an 
empty duplication, as the celebration of onomastic singularity in the last line is compromised by the 
paronomastic equivalence that dominates the rest of the poem. One the other hand, Chico 
overestimates Pope’s textual control because in declaring the unwavering success of Pope’s 
“aesthetic management” (130), she overlooks the extent to which the final substitution of locks 
implicates Pope’s art in the metonymic logic of Belinda’s dressing room.  
That Pope was aware that the curls of scribbling consecrated to fame might be lost in 
disrepute just as easily as the more tangible ones is evident from his poem “The Temple of Fame” 
                                                 
149 Tillotson has chosen to italicize the word “Lock” in the penultimate line to accommodate the eighteenth-century 
habit of using capitalization for emphasis. 
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(1715), which like the “The Rape of the Lock” was initially conceived in 1711.150 Contemplating 
the unpredictability of literary fame in a literary environment that includes both “The Temple of 
Fame” and “The House of Rumour”, the poet notes:  
 
But few, alas! the casual Blessing boast, 
So hard to gain, so easy to be lost: 
How vain that second Life in others’ Breath, 
Th’ estate which Wits inherit after Death! (503-6) 
   
As David Wheeler suggests, the second line “refers, in addition to fame, potentially to the self – so 
easy to be lost” (7) in that it connotes both moral and physical corruption. Wheeler notes that in the 
period between 1709 and 1714 the nature of Pope’s authorship changed appearance from 
aristocratic pastime to a professional occupation requiring “full-scale marketing” (6).151  Between 
the early pastorals “largely commissioned, or at least urged and assisted by his aristocratic friends” 
and the publication of the Iliad which saw Pope “hawking subscriptions” like a “sales manager” (6), 
Wheeler identifies a transitional period during which Pope “found himself at a crossroads, seeking 
at once acceptable definitions of poet and self” (6). The decorporealization of writing in the last 
couplet of The Rape of the Lock is a vehicle of this change, an act of sublimation that neatly 
separates the author’s monolithic work from its multiplication into marketable items of 
consumption. But the very comparison of Pope’s “Lock” with Belinda’s ringlets is suggestive of the 
kind of vulnerability to partition that texts – at least in their printed versions –  after all exhibit. 
Indeed in its initial publication as part of Lintot’s Miscellany the poem itself had a “second Life in 
others’ Breath”. Only after its favourable initial reception did Pope have it published separately in 
an enlarged version adorned with a front piece and five other engravings. While the Essay on 
Criticism (1711) thrust Pope into fame and alerted him to the fickleness of critical opinion and the 
instability of “poetic texts [as] public commodities, available for use” (Wheeler 10), it was the 
publication of “The Rape of the Lock” in what Pope called the “fair manner” of the newly 
embellished octavo edition that turned him into what Colin Nicholson terms “an astute manipulator 
of audience and opportunity” (“The Mercantile” 77). Although the remarkable sale of the new 
edition (three thousand copies sold in four days) could not be solely attributed to its “fair manner”, 
it certainly alerted him to the possibilities of ornament and display in establishing a “fashionable 
provenance” for his work (Nicholson, “The Mercantile” 77). According to Nicholson it was only 
“[w]ith this experience under his belt” that “Pope came to exercise [the] thorough control over font 
type and size as well as layout, paper quality, and illustration” (“The Mercantile” 77) that helped 
ensure the economic success of the ensuing publication of the Iliad.152  
 The very fact that Pope was concerned with the “fair manner” of his “Lock” suggests 
that he was not insusceptible to the allure of the kind of beauty that could be procured; he too was 
the manufacturer of a “well-conspir’d” beauty that could “insnare” those who subscribed to it. As 
Mitchell153 suggests, the “very beauty of the poem is a crucial part of its satire” (153) that reveals it 
as part of the culture of luxury it ridicules: 
                                                 
150 Wheeler refers to Pope’s correspondence to confirm this date (note 4). Giving a full publication history of the poem, 
Tillotson also corroborates this dating (215-244). 
151 Although Pope never ceased to project an image of himself as a gentleman author, writing free of pecuniary 
necessity (in the “Epistle to Arbuthnot” (1734) Pope still refers to his occupation as “an idle trade”), his publication 
practices testify to an astute knowledge of the profit-making potential of writing as business.  
152 For more on Pope’s business talents and his ability to exploit the shifting market conditions to promote his own 
authorship, see David Foxon.  
153 Both Laura Brown’s Alexander Pope (1985) and Felicity Nussbaum in The Brink of All We Hate: English Satires on 
Women, 1660-1750 (1984) labour to find contradictions in the poem that implicate Pope in the very corruptions of 
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I sing – This Verse to Caryll, Muse! is due;  
This, ev’n Belinda may vouchsafe to view (I 1-2) 
 
The effect of this self-reference goes beyond the dizzying paradoxes of metalepsis: it gives us a 
glimpse of Belinda reading her copy of the poem and thereby of a poem whose physicality may be 
“vouchsafe[d] to view” rather than exalted by vision. As Murray Cohen suggests, the self-reference 
turns the poem into just “another object of Belinda’s observable world” (55). Subjecting his own 
verse to the promised bathetic transformation of the “mighty” into the “trivial”, Pope here includes 
himself with those "Beaus" he ridicules for depositing their “Wits...in ponderous Vases...in Snuff-
boxes and Tweezer-Cases” (V 115-116, 241). This is an aesthetic rivalry that is left undecided; Pope 
“weighs the Men's Wits against the Lady’s Hair” (V 72) and finds them equally slight.  
 Chico stages Pope’s poem as a satire that ridicules Belinda by taking its task of poetic 
visualisation seriously. What I want to suggest here is that it the hypotyposis itself is part of the 
satire. “The Rape of the Lock” is a an inverse type of hypotyposis that makes the details live, while 
depriving the whole of its reality. It is an accumulation of detail that works as a satiric anticipation 
of Barthes’ “reality effect”, an overindulgence in the triviality of objects that points to the 
coincidence of the fantasmatic and the real.154 Caught between the materiality of mechanical 
reproduction and the unreality of vacuous paranomasia, Pope’s poem does not escape the logic of 
luxury that rules Belinda’s world. When the ornamental comes to define its subject as much as it 
adorns it, description and dress alike produce nothing but empty wholes. The descriptive logic of 
the poem comes to represent the anxieties of consumption that surface at a time when, as Wall 
remarks, “dress connoted the ability to mix socially but no longer necessarily denoted true social 
status” (30). Bereft of the rhetorical and social order of decorum, we are left with a hypostasized 
abstraction (the poem as the singular inscription of a name and the merger of reality and reflection 
in Belinda’s “heavenly Image” (I 125)) and ephemeral concretion (the poem as printed copy and the 
“giddy Circle” (I 93) of things that are parts of Belinda’s make-up). It is this inappropriate excess of 
unruly concretions that makes the poem the disturbing dream of what Derrida calls “the dislocation 
of the proper in general”, a supplementary logic that allows the implosion of the “metaphysics of 
the proper” to render visible “the impossibility - and therefore the desire - of self-proximity; the 
impossibility and therefore the desire of pure presence” (Of Grammatology 244).  
In An Essay on Criticism (1711) Pope uses the common analogy between clothes and 
poetic language to urge “modest Plainness” in dress as well as in poetry.  Pope shuns superfluity: 
Only “unskil’d” (ii 293) poets “hide with Ornaments their Want of Art” (ii 296), whereas 
 
 
                                                 
consumerism and luxury that he decries. Similar efforts have been made by Christina Knellwolf, Nicholson and Chico. 
Mitchell attempts to recuperate Pope’s textual authority by claiming that Pope “deliberately implicates himself”: “The 
Pope that…emerges is neither trapped in his own contradictions nor unconscious of his position…[but] concerned to 
discover subtleties, rather than occlude them, and to find rather than suppress his own culpabilities” (153). While I 
agree with Mitchell that interpreting the mock-heoric as “providing one clear standard, one clear violation” (153) is not 
only erroneous but makes for a less interesting poem, I consider the question of whether or not the self-implication is 
deliberate intrinsically undecidable because it does not allow for the way the generic strictures prevent the assessment 
of authorial intention. As Penelope Wilson suggests: “Augustan satire is perhaps uniquely adept at constructing the 
terms of its own criticism and at preemptive disablement of the opposition” (qtd. in Chico 98).  
154 Thus, in an off-the cuff remark, Alex Eric Hernandez sees in Pope’s commodity catalogues a “mock-heroic 
aggrandizement” of “the kinds of irrelevant detail that would later become the staple of realistic bourgeois fiction: 
things like gloves, garters, and locks of hair” (52). Before the nineteenth century, however, the trivial details of 
courtship had their apotheosis in the particularization of sentimental keepsakes in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. 
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True Wit is Nature to Advantage drest, 
What of was Thought, but ne’er so well Exprest, 
Something, whose Truth convinc’d at Sight we find, 
That gives us back the Image of our Mind: 
As Shades more sweetly recommend the Light  
so modest Plainness sets off sprightly Wit: 
For Works may have more Wit than does ’em good, 
As Bodies perish through excess of Blood. (ii 297-304) 
 
The moral rhetoric against luxury can be recognized in Pope’s efforts to determine modest attire 
from “naked Nature”155 and the “excess” of “Ornaments”. Like Mandeville Pope is concerned with 
determining the “just” and “fit” in a world where people “value Books, as Women Men, for Dress” 
(ii 305-306), and luxuries constantly turn into decencies. “Expression is the Dress of Thought, and 
still / Appears more decent as more suitable,” Pope suggests a little later in the same section (ii 318-
319), but if the promotion of ornamental restraint in An Essay on Criticism suggests that “surface 
beauty has become synonymous for Pope with artful corruption” (Deutsch 8),156 we should not 
forget, as Douglas Patey points out, that “corruption [is] a word never far, at this period, from its 
Latin sense of division into parts” (366). Thus, Pope’s famous definition of wit appears in the 
section of the poem on the critical “Judging by parts, and not by the whole” (index), in which Pope 
takes issue with critics who “offend in Arts / (As most in Manners) by a Love to Parts” (ii 287-88):  
 
Most Criticks, fond of some subservient Art,  
Still make the Whole depend upon a Part 
… 
 Pleas’d with a Work where nothing’s just or fit;  
One glaring Chaos and wild Heap of Wit.  
(ii 263-64; ii 292-92) 
 
Like Dryden, then, Pope promotes a poetic ideal of descriptive asceticism that prevents the 
distortion of detail and the disintegration of ordered figure into a “wild Heap” of merely 
accumulated wit. Unfit detail prevents the kind of vividness, that fullness and force of life, that is 
necessary for explexis: “In Wit, as nature, what affects our Hearts / Is not th’Exactness of peculiar 
Parts; / ’Tis not a Lip, or Eye, we Beauty call, / But the joint Force and full Result of all” (ii 243-
46). True wit, however, “moves the Heart” by capturing the “the living Grace” (ii 294), providing 
what Ronald L. Bogue notes is “not an abstraction of order but a concrete embodiment of it” (175). 
In a couplet that transforms what is imagined in the mind to “Something” that convinces, that is, 
both proves itself and overwhelms, the art of dressing “to Advantage” makes the difference between 
an idea that is found by sight and one that is merely envisioned (ii 299-300). True wit, then, is 
hypotypotical, its effect being a kind of visualisation that “presents in entirety”, and its method a 
descriptive vitality that reanimates the conventional “by restoring to it the full strength of a 
palpable, active reality” (Bogue 174). Its opposite is not just “a Work where nothing's just or fit / 
                                                 
155 Ronald Bogue makes reference to the Epistle to Burlington (1731) where Pope entreats the poet never to “leave 
[Nature] wholly bare” (ii 50-51) to argue that Pope’s promotion of modest attire veils a certain naturalization of dress 
that allows nakedness to be modelled as conceited undress. Where proper clothing turns nature into a better version of 
itself, Bogue argues that mere “naked Nature” comes to present “a self-conscious absence of apparel – hardly ‘decent’ 
or ‘suitable’ attire” (174).  
156  Deutsch refers to David Morris’ suggestion that Pope equates both bodily and poetic deformity to the lack of moral 
integrity. See Morris, David B. Alexander Pope, The Genius of Sense. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.  
 107 
One glaring Chaos and wild Heap of Wit” (ii 292)) but one where superficial ornamentalism 
cultivates a confusion of figure that turns lifelike form into dead convention:  
 
When mellowing Years their full Perfection give, 
And each Bold Figure just begins to Live  
The threach’rous Colours the fair Art betray, 
And all the bright Creation fades away! (ii 490-493) 
 
As Timothy Erwin has noted, this “object lesson turns upon the ambiguity of the bold figure” (54), 
an expression that names the vividness of organic outline as well as the catachrestic death of 
metaphor. Of course, the spectral comedy of The Rape of the Lock originates in this confusion of 
the figural and the real: The poem is a plethora of such bold figures, things that live the zombie life 
of empty conventions. In other words, Pope presents the dream of hypotyposis as a nightmare: 
detail still gives life, but only to itself; words turn real, not as concretions of conceptual contents, 
but as conceptual form itself, language on legs. In a reversal of Mandeville’s complaint, Pope 
presents everything not as what it appears to be but exactly as it is. If, as Lamb proposes, the figural 
collapse out of which the poem grows “makes satire irrelevant” (“The Rape…”56), it is only 
because what is satirised is the possibility of figuration itself. 
 The problem is, as Cohen suggests, that ideas in Pope’s poem “do not seem to exceed 
the metaphors with which they are associated; in fact, the only ideas are things which constitute 
them and the words which name them” (61). Zeugma and literalization rule a world of visual 
contiguities and verbal tautologies. Personality is exhausted by personified literal puns as “light 
Coquettes...aloft repair” (I 65) and “graver Prudes sinks downward” (I 3) while ethical worth is 
emptied by economic value in a series of syntactical-rhetorical equations: honour and brocade are 
linked by their ability to stain, prayers and masquerade by the fact that both can be missed, Diana’s 
law and china by the discredit brought by a crack or a break. Both hearts and necklaces can be 
“lost”. The nominal existences of empty rhetoric and the physical objects of levelling literalism 
replace the presences of hypotyposis. Parker shows how the added “Machinery” of the sylphs 
“collapse[s] a world of fruitful analogies into the space of the trivial and quotidian” (10). Thus, 
although the sylphs promise “a soft Transition… / From earthly Vehicles to these of Air” (I 49-50), 
they tie the physical to the metaphysical only by a purely rhetorical metempsychosis. Christopher 
Norris points to the “force of deconstructive leverage” inherent in metonymy (153) as it “focuses 
attention on the artifice involved – the element of random or piecemeal selectivity – in any act of 
figural substitution” (153). Replacing essential connection with accidental proximity, metonymy is 
the perfect device in the piecemeal assembly of the dressed self as well as the exposure of its 
artifice. When metaphor becomes purely decorative, when the figural becomes merely “dress”, 
metonymy takes over.  The sylphs are “wondrous fond of Place” (III 36), signifying only by verbal 
equivalence and adjacency of place:  
 
The flutt’ring Fan be Zephyretta’s Care;  
The Drops to thee, Brillante, we consign; 
And, Momentilla, let the Watch be thine; 
Do thou, Crispessa, tend her fav’rite Lock; 
Ariel himself shall be the Guard of Shock. 
Fifty chosen Sylphs, of special Note, 
We trust th’important Charge, the Petticoat: 
... 
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Some thrid the Mazy Ringlets of her Hair, 
Some hang upon the Pendants of her Ear  
(II 112-118, 139-140) 
     
Any sylph who strays from the object he attends is threatened with the “Sharp Vengeance” of a 
cosmetic physicality that clogs his wings and inspissates his “thin Essence” (II 125-132). But they 
are already bogged down by matter, unable to lift themselves from the substances they name, while 
at the same reducing their own “rivell’d” (II 132) substance to satiric matter left to “play” in “the 
Fields of purest Æther” (II 77). The substitution of metaphoric or analogical structures for spatially 
associative ones opens the “glaring Chaos” of objects and the “wild Heap of Wit” that Pope fears in 
the Essay. 
 Belinda peers into the mirror, but instead of her “heavenly Image” (I 125) we get a 
view inside the “moving Toyshop” of women’s hearts – a completely exteriorized interior of 
random “Rows” of “Billet-Doux”, “Gems,” “Combs”, or “Men, Monkies, Lap-dogs, Parrots” (I 
100-101). Like the nobleman in Martinus’ Memoirs, Belinda displays the kind of acquisitive self-
absorption that only comes with the powers of a looking glass: “A heavn’ly Image in the Glass 
appears, / To that she bends, to that her Eyes she rears” (I 125-126). The dressing that follows this 
doubling makes the reflection and its image indistinguishable, as imagined likeness turns into 
identity and Belinda is made to match her mirror image: 
 
First, rob’d in white, the Nymph intent adors 
With Head uncover’d, the Cosmetic Pow’rs 
... 
This Casket India’s glowing Gems unlocks, 
And all Arabia breathes from yonder Box. 
The Tortoise here and Elephant unite, 
Transform’d to Combs, the speckled and the white. 
Here Files of Pins extend their shining Rows, 
Puffs, Powders, Patches, Bibles, Billet-doux. 
Now awful Beauty puts on all its Arms;  
The Fair each moment rises in her Charms, 
Repairs her Smiles, awakens ev’ry Grace, 
And calls forth all the Wonders of her Face…  
(I 123-124, 133-142) 
 
The passage amplifies the initial duplication of the mirror in a series of metonymic displacements. 
Belinda is both “Goddess” (I 132) and “Priestess” (I 127)157 in a ritual of self-adoration that leaves 
subjectivity strangely suspended between the abstraction of “awful Beauty” (I 139) and the less 
etherial “Cosmetic Pow’rs” (I 124) that shape her. Somewhere along the way the possessive 
pronoun “her” loses its power to contain its objects as it is left without definite antecedent in an 
anaphoric jest that dissolves both human proprietorship and agency in a series of nominal 
substitutions: “The Fair” that “[s]ees...a purer Blush arise” (I 143) is both Betty, Belinda and their 
mirror images, while “awful Beauty” (I 139) not only as suggested by Stewart Crehan is a praise-
name for Belinda (55), but also a personified abstraction that names the act of dressing itself rather 
than any of the parties involved. Betty is “prais’d for Labours not her own” (I 148) not only because 
the sylphs have been “busy” (I 145), but because the work itself does not seem to require a human 
                                                 
157 While Betty is “Th’inferior Priestness” in line 127 of the first canto, the adjective casts Belinda as a superior type of 
enchantress.  
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activity.  Ultimately it is the objects themselves that “extend their shining Rows” (I 137) and 
“unite” (I 135) to create a new appearance, while Belinda is left not only the artificial reflection of 
her own mirror image but an immovable artefact among what Nicholson calls a “potentially riotous 
assembly of object-agency” (Writing 39), the return of Latour’s quasi-objects. 
 Suggesting that the “real subject of Pope's poem is the autonomous physical realm in 
which Belinda finds herself” (110), Parker touches on the consequences of this displacement of 
human and divine agency by material objects. Parker notices that although the sylphs “preside” over 
the “human race” (II 87), “Watch all their Ways, and all their Actions guide” (II 88), they only play 
a minimal part in promoting the action of the poem: “In a sense they are a double for the pointed 
voyeurism of the narrator and his characters. They ‘watch,’ ‘o’erlook,’ ‘survey,’ and their chief, 
Ariel, when the Lock is threatened, is ‘Amazed, confused’...[i]ncapable of action and frozen in the 
fanciful tableau” (99-100). Even their collective warning of “A thousand Wings” (III 136) blowing 
back Belinda’s hair fails to prevent its disseverance: the sylphs have no real powers of intervention. 
Similarly, they do not “shift” anything in the autonomously “moving Toyshop” of Belinda’s heart, 
where, in a version of metaphoric collapse “giddy” with sibilants, “Wigs with Wigs, with Sword-
knots Sword-knots strive, / Beaus banish Beaus, and Coaches Coaches drive” (I 101-102). In an 
unelaborated comment Parker suggests that they are made to roll the planets, guide “the Course of 
wandring Orbs” and colour “the painted Bow” only because these “are exactly the activities which 
Newton had so recently proved to be the passive results of the general laws of gravity and optics” 
(100). However, the sylphs have more than one connection to Newton’s Opticks. The theory of 
diffraction is illustrated in the way the movement of their wings causes light to disport, and the 
sylphs themselves bear a similarity to the “small Particles of Bodies” imbued with powers of 
motion that “act at a distance”, “not only upon the Rays of Light for reflecting, refracting and 
inflecting them, but also upon one another for producing a great part of the Phænomena of Nature” 
(Optics “Query 31” 350). “Their fluid Bodies half dissolv’d in Light” (II 62) and their play in the 
“purest Æther” (II 77) make the sylphs suggestive not only of a concocted transcendence (Parker 
113) but also of the dissolution of solidity that attended the possibility of automotive matter. The 
sylphs are “incapable of action” (Parker 110) because matter guides itself. The dissevering of the 
lock also becomes the result of the mechanical operation of an object in a passage that only allows 
the Baron to spread “the glitt’ring Forfex wide”  (III 147) while leaving the actual cutting to the 
sheers themselves, “urg’d” by abstract “Fate” (III 151): “The meeting Points the sacred Hair 
dissever / From the fair Head for ever and for ever!” (III 153-54). The dual meaning of “urge” as 
both increase of momentum and calculated persuasion places the action in between a natural 
occurrence and a personal deed.  
 While it would be wrong to extend the scientific schema to the rest of the poem, the 
allusion to Newton does suggest how the autonomous object life of mechanical causation may feed 
into what Laura Brown in Alexander Pope terms the “the uniform valuation of the commodity 
market” (14). Since Brown158 first declared it “particularly useful” in the analysis of the “rhetoric of 
acquisition” (14) displayed by Pope’s “commodity catalogue” (12), critics such as Colin Nicholson, 
James Bunn, Tita Chico, Helen Deutsch, Alex Eric Hernandez and Stewart Crehan have seen 
Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism as the motivation of Pope’s figural strategies in the poem. 
Referring specifically to Brown, Parker draws on this critical tradition, when he sees the machinery 
                                                 
158 Louis Landa identifies two other articles before Brown that explore the connection between commodities, luxury and 
Pope’s poem. See Landa, Louis. “Pope’s Belinda, the Great Emporie of the World, and the wondrous Worm.” In Essays 
in Eighteenth-Century English Literature. Princeton, NJ, 1980): 178-98.  
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of the sylphs as a proxy for “the looming and equally invisible ‘hand’ of trade” (114).159 
Nevertheless, Parker’s identification of the Sylphs as Newtonian gives a new historic specificity to 
the proliferation of object life in the poem. The sylphs may be, as Parker argues, no more than 
“ontological fictions, props of fancy, charming delusions” (110) whose elaboration only enforces 
“the strict realization of their metaphysical impossibility” (106), but they are also material-etherial 
beings that rehearse the anxieties of a culture where matter itself begins to move. Certainly, Marx’s 
commodity fetishism offers a compelling model for the creation of what Nicholson calls a 
“phantom subjectivity” (Writing 35) through the circulation of consumables in the poem. Ralph 
Cohen has shown that the poem is guided by “transformational cycle” (219) rather than progresses 
or regresses (209). The “busy” (I 145) sylphs “hover round” (I 44; III 113), “sport and flutter” (I 66) 
and “wave their Wings” (II 224), but their ceaseless movement “Orb in Orb” (II 138) suggests an 
empty cycle of activity rather than essential metamorphosis. Ensuring the universal exchangeability 
of “ev’ry Part” (I 99), Ariel’s “giddy Circle” seems precisely to replicate Marx’s “perpetuum 
mobile” (Marx, Capital 188) of commodity circulation. Listing not only wigs and sword-knots but 
also “Beaus” (I 103) as substitutable objects, the sylphs’ “mystick Maze” (I 92) resembles Marx' 
mystifications of commodification that produce “material relations between persons and social 
relations between things” (Capital 104) to the point where, as Brown phrases it, “human beings 
themselves can come to be redefined as objects” (Ends 119).  
 It is a process that is completed in the “the gloomy Cave of Spleen” (16) of canto iv, 
where “Strange Phantoms” (IV 40) and “Pale Spectres” (IV 44) rise, while  
 
Unnumber’d Throngs on ev’ry side are seen  
Of Bodies chang’d to various Forms by Spleen. 
Here living Teapots stand, one Arm held out, 
One Bent; the Handle this, and that the Spout: 
A Pipkin there like Homer’s Tripod walks; 
Here sighs a Jar, and there a Goose-pye talks; 
Men prove with Child, as pow’rful Fancy works, 
And Maids turn’d Bottels, call aloud for Corks. (IV 47-54) 
 
Here, it seems, is a perfect image of the “a world where all that is solid melts into other dimensions” 
(Nicholson, Writing 35)160 and where “a kind of phantom subjectivity” (Nicholson, Writing 35) 
takes the place of human activity. Crehan suggests that Belinda works as “a sign of value” (61) 
itself, a vessel that “glides” on the liquidity of credit, a fickle form that according to Marx “presents 
itself as an independent substance” with a cycle of nominal exchange in which “commodities are 
mere forms which it assumes and casts off in turn” (Capital 256). In such a reading, the Cave of 
Spleen perfectly figures the “occult ability” of hypostasized value to “bring forth living offspring” 
(Marx, Capital 255), “grotesque ideas” (Marx, Capital 164) endowed with life by the “the moving 
powers of the imaginary” (Nicholson, Writing 46).  
 Nevertheless, if the merger of the “mechanistic-material realm of physical nature” and 
the “end-oriented human realm of purposes and desires” (Pietz, “Fetishism” 138) in the image of 
the sylphs as Newtonian particles of light prefigures Marx's fetishized commodities, they are also 
indicative of more complicated “interpenetrations of the personal and the artificial” (Nicholson, 
Writing 32) that cannot quite be encompassed and does not quite complete the double reversals of 
                                                 
159 Nicholson makes a similar connection between the sylphs and what in one issue of The Tatler is termed “the unseen 
hand” that guides the “tracts of ambition, of business, and of pleasure” (35) in his reading of “The Rape of the Lock” in 
Writing and the Rise of Fincance. See particularly, 35-38.   
160 The reference is of course to The Communist Manifesto (1848). 
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commodification. The moving objects of the Cave of Spleen have more in common with Marx's 
dancing table than with its abstract counterparts, the purely quantifiable, vocal beings that 
“converse” with each other “merely as exchange values” (Capital 177). They may be the imaginary 
offspring of “pow’rful Fancy” (IV 53), but the specificity of their concretion also remind us that to 
Marx’s commodities are “sensuous things which are at the same time suprasensible” (Capital 165). 
Indeed, the decontextualization and disembodiment entailed by the schema of Marx's commodity 
fetishism obscure other less abstract kinds of “loss of and bondage to the object” (Marx, Economic 
324). James Bunn argues that Belinda’s “lock has been fetishized, has been given transcendent 
value as a commodity in a fit of misattention” (308): “The lock is no longer an accessory, an 
adjunct; in having been given focal attention, its upgathering power from fecundity has been 
forgotten” (308). Likewise, Murray Krieger indicts the “trivial characters” of the poem for their 
indulgence in “the logical fallacy of metonymy” (55): “[T]hey have mistaken the lock of hair, 
actually incapable of being violated, for the lady’s body – vulnerable but unassaulted by the baron” 
(55). Such comments are complicated, when we consider the specific status that hair had in the 
eighteenth century.  
 Not dissimilar from the controversy surrounding the transplantation of teeth were the 
discussions pertaining to the buying and selling of false hair. Angela Rosenthal has pointed out that 
as both “corporeal and a mere lifeless extension” (1), false hair occupied a liminal position between 
properties of self and purchasable commodities.161 Dominating the male fashion between 1660 and 
1810, wigs came to signal the masculinity and integrity necessary to function as a polite individual 
in public life. As Marcia Pointon notes, although men might wear caps instead of wigs in the 
privacy of their own home, the public “removal or loss of wig and consequent revelation of the 
naked head [was] synonymous with exposure, causing a breakdown of social order and the threat of 
unleashed sexual disturbance” (179). In his 1782 history of “the art of hair dressing”, James Stewart 
found that the increasing technical sophistication of the hair dressing profession made it possible for 
“[a]ll conditions of men [to be] distinguished by the cut of the wig” (204). Thus, already by the 
Restoration, the “merchant, the man of business and of letters, were distinguished by the grave full 
bottom, or more moderate tie, neatly curled; the tradesman by the snug bob, or the natty scratch; the 
country gentleman, by the natural fly and hunting peruke” (204). Easily categorizable by type,162 
the wig became synonymous with propriety and public persona, cancelling out the personal 
differences that might stand in the way of professional and polite intercourse of civic man 
(Pointon).   
 And yet, as Rosenthal demonstrates, as a natural extension of the body, hair continued 
to be “thought of as containing the essence of individuality and personhood” (2). For women, to 
whom fashion at the beginning of the century did not dictate full wigs except when riding or at 
court, the question of whether or not the obligatory “flowing locks dispos’d in artful curls” 
(Cunnington and Cunnington 165) were supplemented with prosthetic tresses came to bear on both 
moral and physical integrity. In The Arraignment of lewd, idle forward and unconstant Women 
(1617), which was republished several times in the early eighteenth century, Joseph Swetnam thus 
takes the propriety of hair and clothes to signify moral virtue, giving the following piece of advice 
to cautious suitors:  “For by Inquiry thou shalt hear whether she be Wise, Virtuous, and Kind, 
                                                 
161 In 2004 Eighteenth Century Studies dedicated an entire issue  (38.1) to the subject of hair. In addition to Rosenthal, 
several other historians feature in this issue, which also provides the historical background for the discussion of hair and 
identity confusion taken up by Festa in "Personal Effects: Wigs and Possessive Individualism in the Long Eighteenth 
Century" (2005). See for instance Margaret K. Powell, Margaret K. and Joseph R. Roach on eighteenth-century “big 
hair”.  
162 William Hogarth’s engraving, The Five Orders of Periwigs (1761), parodies eighteenth century obsession with 
classification by matching types of wigs (and their corresponding professional identity). 
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wearing but her own proper Hair, and such Garments as her Friends Estate will affort” (97).  
Problems increase when hair is on the move in a market society. Transferred from one person to the 
other, to whom do the “artful curls” belong? Is the real proprietor of the hair the person on whose 
head it has grown or the person who has bought it as his own? As moveable property, wigs and 
supplementary tresses constitute its possessor as an aggregate of material parts, as much at risk of 
being repositioned, lost and manipulated as the “fleeting particles” that make up Locke’s man. As 
Lynn Festa has written, it is the “wig’s physical nature – the way it shuttles among different 
individuals, recomposing the body and its surfaces” that “makes it difficult to decide where one 
person’s parts end and another’s begin” (“Personal Effects” 48). Thus, the wig’s mobility, its power 
to assemble and disassemble the persons in whose possession it is held undercuts the stability of 
identity it is meant to confer. The wig is a “protean object” (Festa, “Personal Effects” 49) the 
gathering powers of which equal the most malleable of Heideggerian things. In short, the problem 
that is presented by the eighteenth-century wig is that of a synecdochic self, the detachable parts of 
which can always be appropriated by someone else and reintegrated into a new whole.  
 Festa convincingly argues that seventeenth and early eighteenth century discussions 
about wigs often centre on the threat that this detachable sign of individual integrity poses to 
organic self-possession. She quotes William Prynne’s Unloveliness of Lovelocks (1628) in which he 
wonders why “[m]en who weare false Haire, or Periwigs…commonly affirme, and sweare them to 
be their owne, (perhaps, upon this evasion, that they have paid well for them) and would have all 
men deeme them for their naturall, and native Haire” (qtd. in Festa, “Personal Effects” 48). To 
Prynne wigs are both natural (as an organic part of the body) and false (a mere cosmetic covering), 
both superficial and corporeal.163 Such ambiguities expose the logical impasse of possessive 
individualism: the dependence of the possessor on his possessions, the precarious status of 
properties as corporeal embodiments and lifeless, detachable extensions. They veil the fear not only 
of the non-coincidence between public and private selves but of “an individual self [which] (in its 
depths) possesses manipulable external qualities (surfaces)” (Festa, “Personal Effects” 48). Towards 
the end of the eighteenth century, Stewart still found it necessary to separate hair from body. Hairs, 
he insisted, grow “as some plants shoot from the parts of others, from which, though they draw their 
nourishment, yet each has as it were its separate life and distinct æconomy” (Stewart 173). The 
hairs’ “separate life and distinct æconomy” prefigure their future circulation in the market place, 
and their status as purchasable commodities, and yet “every hair does properly and truly live, and 
receives nutriment” (Stewart 172) from the body to which it is attached. In other words, hair 
occupies a position similar to that of the traditional suum, an aggregate being between subject and 
object which distends “like nails, each part, next the root, thrusting forward that immediately before 
it” (Stewart 172). 
 Like the question of the reality of Belinda’s beauty, the question of the genuineness of 
her lock is left unanswered. In fact Pope retains the dual nature of the lock as both an organic 
property of Belinda that has been “nourished” (II 20) and an artificially “wreathed” (IV 100) object, 
a pliable surface. As Belinda’s “fav’rite” (II 115) – both the part to which she adheres the most and 
the designation of the latest fashion of artificially curled temple locks – the lock is delicately poised 
between commodified style icon and private property (Cunnington and Cunnington 165). The point 
is here that the choice of the lock as the main trope of the poem is neither coincidental, nor ruled 
solely by its paronomastic potential. Rather it is its potential as an originary prosthesis that provides 
the supplementary logic of the poem. Erik Gray notes that “hair is the ideal material” (230) for Pope 
                                                 
163 Rosenthal finds wigs both a vehicle for “a ‘superficial,’ cross-cultural masquerade’“ and undeniably “corpo-real, 
emerging naturally from the flesh” (5). Festa spells out the predicament that Prynne’s use of “natural” and “false” 
creates: “The hair is one’s own (‘natural’), but the wig is made (‘false’); the hair is not one’s own (it grew on the head 
of another, but the wig is one’s own (because it was purchased)” (48). 
 113 
as “its ambivalent nature” ensures its position “between vital importance and senseless triviality” 
(229). Arguing that changes Pope made to the 1712 version of the poem clarify the “ambivalent 
nature” (229) of hair, Gray urges us to have a second look at the moment of disseverance: 
 
Ev’n then, before the fatal Engine clos’d, 
A wretched Sylph too fondly interpos’d; 
Fate urg’d the Sheers, and cut the Sylphs in twain, 
(But Airy Substance soon unites again)  
(III 149-152) 
 
Here, Gray argues, Pope places the lock centrally in a “continuous spectrum” the gradations of 
which correspond carefully to permanency of partition: 
 
The Miltonic passage from which this is taken (and to 
which Pope refers us in a footnote) is sublime in its implied 
contrast of angelic substance and human flesh. Pope keeps 
the contrast, but with a new middle term being understood: 
hairy substance, which will not reunite so easily or so soon. 
With the addition of the sylphish machinery, the lock 
reassumes its appropriately liminal position…somewhere 
between harsh physicality and airy insubstantiality… 
(232)164 
 
Building on Gray, we must contemplate the possibility that Pope exploits the precarious liminality 
occupied by hair in contemporary discussions of property and identity for his own ambiguous 
purposes. In fact, moving in the space between “personal possessions and personal identity, 
between the objects one owns and the characteristics individuals are deemed to possess” (Festa, 
“Personal Effects” 49), Pope’s poem comes to illustrate the impasse inherent in Locke’s aggregate 
self. As a “middle term”, the lock is “a personal effect” – both illusory surface and material object. 
Christopher Lamb has suggested that the dissolution of the lock towards the end of the poem in its 
ascent to the “Lunar Sphere” (V 113) where “all things lost on Earth” (V 114) are treasur’d makes 
of the lock “a thing that cannot be symbolized or possessed without entirely disappearing” (“The 
Rape” 61). Locke’s property in the person, of course, is exactly such a thing. In other words, the 
poem has more than one Lock(e)165 to rip. 
 As in Evelyn’s poem the artificiality of hair, that most personal of accessories, comes 
to stand for a dressed self that is detachable in all its parts and can be assembled “by Degrees” (I 
143): “The busy Sylphs surround their darling Care; / These set the Head, and those divide the Hair, 
/ Some fold the Sleeve, whilst others plait the Gown” (I 145-147). Referring to the artificial 
headpiece as well as to the bodily extremity, the setting of the head becomes the primary figure in 
this passage for a kind of prosthetic doubling that makes no discrimination between organic body 
parts and cosmetic add-ons. In other words, where both “Honour” and “bright Locks” can be “lost” 
(II 29, 223; IV 110, 235), the bathetic disorder on Belinda’s dressing table does not only suggest 
moral disorder but self-fragmentation, not only moral but physical corruption. Like Locke’s 
“person”, Belinda is a living fiction of a ghostly proprietor, precariously dependent on the things to 
                                                 
164 The Miltonic reference is to Paradise Lost, book vi, 327-331, in which Satan receives a dividing cut by the angel 
Michael: “Then Satan first knew pain, / And writhed him to and fro convolved; so sore / The griding sword with 
discontinuous wound / Passed through him; but th’ethereal substance closed, / not long divisible...” (132). 
165 The 1712 edition is entitled “The Rape of the Locke”. 
 114 
which she is so “vitally united” (An Essay II.xxvii.11 337).  When identity no longer depends on a 
single physical or spiritual substance, but on “several substances...in a vital union with that 
wherein...consciousness” resides (Locke, An Essay II, xxvii, 25,), even the most trivial of things 
“appear of the utmost Importance” (Pope, dedication). Pope may combine the satiric list with the 
zeugma to cancel the differences between things to satirize the corruption of a world where beaus 
and wigs (I 101-102), husbands and lapdogs (III 158), monuments, men and monkeys (III 172; IV 
120) are all part of the same “lumpish reality” (Murray Cohen 61). But he does so with an obsessive 
inclusiveness that is not unlike that evinced by Comenius’ compendium of “all visible things...of 
the whole World” (preface).  Pope also takes care not to leave anything out of sight. Thus, the poem 
realizes the fear that its satire attempts to dispel: that surfaces run so deep that the cosmetics may 
not hide anything at all, that when we lose our properties we may also lose ourselves. Clarissa’s 
instruction to “keep good Humour whate’er we lose” (V 30) rings hollow in a world where people 
like “rich China Vessels, fal’n from high, / In glittering Dust and painted Fragments lie” (III 159-
160).  
As commodified accessories, alienable adjuncts and adjustable surfaces blend with 
violable incorporations, bodily substances and intimate extensions, it becomes impossible to 
distinguish personal effects from “personal effects”. As Christopher Lamb points out, there “is little 
or no figurative play” on the poem's main tropes (“The Rape” 55):  
 
The same is true of Belinda’s complaint after the rape when 
she wishes the baron had taken from her hairs less in 
sight...[T]hese less visible hairs still belong to the surface, 
although they may (like the metamorphoses of the Cave of 
Spleen) be cast in the shade. There is nothing behind or 
beneath that surface to give the hairs an oblique or 
figurative point. (“The Rape” 56) 
 
The poem is, Lamb argues, a perfect example of still-life aesthetics, where each thing 
“gleams with self-subsistence, taking its place in the scene with utter literalism” (“The Rape” 58). 
What is lost in such literalism is the ability of “the varied acts of investiture” to constitute a person 
“quite literally” (Stallybrass and Jones 2), or rather, the exposure of the “figural reality” (Parker 
130) of such acts as conceit is the eruption of the literal self-subsistence of things. What Pope’s 
poem captures is the moment just before this eruption takes place when the effects of what is 
recognized as mere conceit are still disconcertingly real. Hence why Pope does not offer any 
alternative to the hypotypotic entirety he disassembles; hence our failure to tell whether Pope is 
issuing a warning or an invitation when he writes that a look at Belinda’s face may obliterate her 
moral failings. However deceitful, appearances do matter. Like Marx's commodity fetish, the 
figures of Belinda’s spectral world are at one and the same time the “fantastic form[s]” (Capital 
165) of an unreal exchange of appearances and the representations of things “as what they are” 
(Capital 166). The source of this confusion, however, is not the separation of things from persons 
but their insistent entanglement, and the result of it is not only the “the flat indiscriminacy” (Brown, 
Alexander 138) of universally interchangeable objects, but also a new vibrant specificity attending 
what Parker calls “the world of incidental appearances, stripped for the first time of their iconic 
burden” (18).  
Thus, the parade of spectral teapots and endless wigs or sword-knots, “indiscriminate 
despite their desirability” (Brown, Alexander 14) too easily obscures the mutable particularity of 
those other less indistinguishable objects that also find their way into the poem. As we have seen, 
the lock, in all its functions as a “middle term”, is one such a thing. Another is Belinda’s hairpin the 
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history of which is traced in a hilarious mock-epic passage “in Imitation of the Progress of 
Agamemnon’s Scepter in Homer” (Pope’s note for IV 89, italics reversed). The pin is first 
conceived as the “Seal Rings” (V 91) hanging around the neck of Belinda’s “great great Grandsire” 
(V 90), then becomes a “vast Buckle” (V 92) and a toy in the shape of infant's whistle (V 94), then a 
more modest adornment as Belinda’s mother’s bodkin, which Belinda herself turns into a “deadly” 
weapon (V 88). If we believe, as Parker does, that the seal rings indicate “the trace of a city 
bureaucrat or banker, who applied a...stamp on official documents (akin to the seal of a modern 
notary)” (502), it is possible to see in their transformation into a trivial adornment not only the 
economic and social decline of Belinda’s family, but a history of transmutations between things and 
the personal effects they constitute. Whereas the seal rings have the power to impress its possessor 
as well as his documents with legitimacy and authority, the bodkin can only embellish and adorn. 
The rings mark their subject, creating a material effect etched into the surface, whereas the bodkin, 
attached to the favourite ringlet, merely crowns an already “wreathed” surface. The history of the 
bodkin, then, is also indicative of the symbolic transformation of dressing from an investiture of a 
shared knowledge of social identity to the fickle adornment of an already thoroughly fashioned self.  
What “The Rape of the Lock” expresses is not, as Brown suggests, the false 
comparison of people and things inherent in commodity fetishism, but rather the process by which 
they were made incompatible in the first place. Thus if the bodkin prepares the ground for a new 
imaginative space where things as well as people can “gleam with self-subsistence” (Lamb,  “Rape” 
58), its history is also suggestive of a specificity that in Georg Simmel’s words makes “[e]ven those 
things that are purchasable and replaceable by money…possess, upon closer scrutiny, qualities 
whose value cannot be completely replaced by other possessions” (124). In a true Lockean fashion, 
the identity of the bodkin is preserved only as the “continued consciousness” of is successive forms; 
the bodkin is a “material mnemonic” (Stallybrass and Jones 20) that contains personal rather than 
collective memory associations. As such it becomes symbolic of the mutability of a person whose 
identity relies not on resemblance or sameness but on properties “not shifted all at once” (Locke, An 
Essay II.xxvii.8 335). In the bodkin is a personal effect that does not rely on personification itself, 
nor on any other tricks of “counterfeit representation” (Puttenham, qtd. in Logan 15). In other 
words, here hypotyposis gives way to novel ways of description that foreground the familiarity 
rather than the fascination of objects. The fact that this kind of familiarity is even available for 
description testifies to the disappearance of a less particularized closeness to the object. Only when 
objects are no longer immersed in a shared knowable realm of essential correspondences do they 
acquire a personal history.  
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IV. Writing Things, Object Authors and Literary 
Property 
 
i. “...when the subject is utterly exhausted, to let the pen still move on...”:  
Authority and the Tale of Textual Waywardness  
 
“...imitations are often a sort of manufacture wrought up by those mechanics, art and labour, out of pre-
existent materials not their own.” 
Edward Young. Conjectures upon Original Composition (1759) 
 
Making the connection between clothing and writing explicit, one of Swift’s pseudonyms is “M.B. 
Drapier”.166 Like Campbell’s “Mr. Fashioner”, the author in the guise of “Mr. Drapier” has powers 
of self-fashioning proper to what Wyrick terms a “tailor-God” (191); true “Shape Merchants”, 
authors deal in “woven fabrics of words that make the self visible” (Wyrick 101).167 Whether in 
writing or in draping, self-fashioning requires a good portion of compositional skill and creative 
innovation. Campbell’s linen drapers, tailors, mercers and other dealers in clothes must not only 
have “a perfect Knowledge of the Linen Manufacture in general, the Difference between different 
Fabricks, and the Properties of Linen” (LXX 282), but also the ability to create “a new Fashion” 
(XXIX 171) as well as “a good Invention to find out new Patterns” (XXIX 175). Yet, although the 
“tailor-God” in “Education ought to be genteel, as his Stock in Business entitles him to the first 
Rank of Tradesman”, he is after all “a mere Buyer and Seller of one particular Commodity” (LXX 
282).  
 The eighteenth-century author is similarly lodged between commerce and creativity. 
In the course of the century, the dual image of the gentleman author, writing free of pecuniary 
necessity only to edify, amuse and instruct and the mercenary hack, writing whatever would sell for 
a profit was gradually replaced by the image of a professional author, deservedly paid by the public 
to write for their benefit. Responding to Michel Foucault’s call for a historicization of authorship, 
scholars of the history of print and publication practices168 have pointed to the eighteenth century as 
a transitional period where older forms of anonymous authorship dependent (at least nominally) on 
patronage and newer forms of commercially based authorship of individual attribution. What drove 
this transformation was a complex set of economic, legal and intellectual circumstances. The lapse 
of the 1662 Licensing Act in 1695 removed the restriction on the number and location of printers, 
thereby establishing the “conditions needed for the expansion of the market for printed materials in 
the eighteenth century” (Griffin 878). While the expansion of the print market169 in the wake of the 
1695 lapse established the economic preconditions for the emergence of writing as an independent 
profession, the legal redefinition of the author’s work that took place in the following decades 
provided the necessary conceptual framework. Thus the 1710 Statute of Anne marked “the divorce 
of copyright from censorship and the reestablishment of copyright under the rubric of property 
                                                 
166 The pseudonym is used in his letters on the politically sensitive tracts on corrupt licensing of William Wood’s 
copper coinage in Ireland. 
167 Wyrick extends her point in a phonological reading of the pseudonym, relating it to “the Cartesian cogito:  ‘M. B.’ is 
pronounced as ‘am, be’. The syllables conjugate the existential verb and reveal a first-person existential declaration: 
texo ergo sum. To think is not enough; to write is to sew the self into the material, to sow the self in the field of being” 
(101-102).  
168 I refer, among others, to Mark Rose, Martha Woodmansee, John Brewer and Trevor Ross.  
169 Alan Veylit charts the development in the number of printed titles, using statistics based on The English Short Title 
Catalogue and finds that despite a 1720s setback (perhaps due to the South Sea Bubble), “the output of printed 
materials keeps on the rise” with “exponential progression” throughout the century.  See also Feather (History 89-102). 
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rather than regulation” (Rose, Authors 48). Rather than being considered objects of supervision (by 
the Stationer’s Company) and censorship (by the state), printed texts were now for the first time 
thought of as properties to be protected. Textual ownership became a contested issue that only had 
its legal conclusion in 1774 with the House of Lords’ ruling in the case of Donaldson v. Beckett 
confirming the author’s limited copyright to his work.  
 But if the rights of the author to his creative property had already received its first 
legal definition in 1710, the question of what exactly was owned was still to be clarified. In other 
words, alongside the expansion of commercially oriented publication and its legal codification in 
copyright law, a conceptual shift took place to connect the author more closely to his property in 
writing. 170  It was a shift that had less to do with legal controversy than with the conceptualisation 
of authorial originality. According to Martha Woodmansee, the differentiation of authoring as a 
profession was achieved by minimizing authorial craftsmanship and internalizing the source of 
inspiration (1-4). In many respects the process resembles what Latour calls “black-boxing”,171 a 
process that veils the complex composition of aggregate collective actants/mediators (such as 
airplanes, toasters and books) to present what is really legion as something singular. As Graham 
Harman points out, actants/mediators “do not draw their power from some pristine inner hearth, but 
only through assembling allies” (20), while a black box “is any actant so firmly established that we 
are able to take its interior for granted” (33). Obscuring “the assembly of actors on the inside...that 
enable it to exist” (Harman 135), the black box can be manipulated and controlled because its 
interior remains sealed off. Although the opposition between the skilful composition and creative 
writing (invention) had been articulated before 1700 (Levine 46; Hammond 111), it was not until 
the middle of the century that it could be made with conviction. No longer “attributable to a higher, 
external agency – if not to a muse, then to divine dictation” (Woodmansee 4) – but to the author’s 
own creativity and ingenuity, the inspired work became “a unique property which he owned by 
virtue of a singular, imaginative act” (Brewer 245).   
For this to happen, the property the author had in his writing, like the property he had 
in his person, had to be distinguished from its material embodiment. This was, as Hilary Jane 
Englert points out, a question of establishing a clear and “legally ascertainable difference...between 
the perpetual property in the ‘work’ retained by its author (or the author’s assigns once the 
manuscript was published, sold and publicly circulated) and the property in the book transferred to 
the buyer upon purchase… [so that] the abstract literary work had to be both distinguishable from 
its material manifestations and susceptible to its owner’s unambiguous possession” (Englert 224). 
The change in the author, from automatized vehicle, to autonomous self-mover was paralleled by a 
change in his property from material object to spiritual instantiation. Serving as counsel in a court 
case on literary property (Tonson v. Collins, 1761), William Blackstone decisively extricated 
written composition from its composite materials as well as from the compositing of print:  
 
 
                                                 
170 Although recently the development of copyrights in the eighteenth century has been given much scholarly attention, 
it is only one of several contributing factors that helps the coalescence of the modern, professional author. See Robert J. 
Griffin, Pat Rogers and John Brewer who all complicate the effect of copyright law. For instance, as Griffin 
demonstrates, copyright law had no measurable effect in terms of individual attribution in publication practices: “Quite 
simply, the historical record shows that there is no necessary relation between copyright and the appearance of the name 
of the author on the title page” (878).  
171 I refer primarily to Harman’s exposition of Latour’s concept, which first appeared in Science in Action (1987). 
Harman relates the concept to Heidegger’s concept of the object as a tool whose Zuhandenheit belies its essential 
Vorhandenheit: “Like Heidegger’s tools, a black box allows us to forget the massive network of alliances of which it is 
composed, as long as it functions smoothly” (34).  
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Style and sentiment are the essentials of a literary 
composition. These alone constitute its identity. The paper 
and print are merely accidents, which serve as vehicles to 
convey that style and sentiment to a distance. Every 
duplicate therefore of a work, whether ten or ten thousand, 
if it conveys the same style and sentiment, is the same 
identical work... (qtd. in Rose, “The Author” 83) 
 
Yet, the King’s Bench ruling of what Mark Rose has named “the landmark case of Millar v. Taylor” 
(1768) (Authors 94) established the protection of the perpetual rights of authors (or their assigns) to 
their works after publication on the basis of a split decision. The dissenting judge, Joseph Yates, 
found that while the physical manuscript might be considered a kind of property, to “extend this 
argument, beyond the manuscript, to the very IDEAS themselves, seems...very difficult, or rather 
quite wild...how is possession to be taken...o[f] mere intellectual ideas?” (qtd. in Burrow and 
Murray 2357) “Can sentiments be seized...?” Yates asked, in an attempt to show the absurdity of 
Blackstone's definition (qtd. in Burrow and Murray 2385). Abstracted from their physical 
concretion, conceived without “corporeal substance”, literary works, Yates feared, would have no 
“bounds or marks whatever” (qtd. in Burrow and Murray 2361-2362): 
 
Their whole existence is in the mind alone; incapable of 
any other modes of acquisition or enjoyment, than by 
mental possession or apprehension; safe and invulnerable, 
from their own immateriality: no trespass can reach them; 
no tort affect them; no fraud or violence diminish or 
damage them. Yet these are the phantoms which the author 
would grasp and confine to himself...  
 (qtd. in Burrow and Murray 2361-2362)172 
 
Lord Kames was another jurist that found the idea of property abstracted form its physical form a 
wild idea. Kames considered property and corporeality “relative terms which cannot be disjoined, 
and Property, in a strict Sense, can no more be conceived without a corpus, than a parent can be 
conceived without a Child” (qtd. in Sherman and Bently, note 36 20).173  
 In the process of abstracting of paper and ink, the physical materials of the literary 
corpus, from the spirit that resided in it, the concept of originality was instrumental. In other words, 
a “work of literature belonged to an individual because it was, finally, an embodiment of that 
individual” (Rose, Authors 114, my emphasis). As Rose has demonstrated, the Lockean conception 
of personal property as materials mixed with labour asserted the rights of the author to his property 
only by enforcing the conception of books as 'the preserved essences of authors” (29). Martha 
Woodmansee identifies Edward Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition (1758) as one 
turning point in this development. To Woodmansee Young is noteworthy because “he makes a 
                                                 
172 One might note that the frequent use of capitalization and italics for emphasis found in James Burrow’s publication 
of the court transcript. Burrow’s expressive typography is suggestive of the reliance of authority on the material 
incorporation given by the printer.  
173 Andreas Rahmatian gives a good initial insight into the “property theory of Lord Kames” and his rejection of 
intangible properties, quoting his ruling in the Scottish copyright case of Hinton v. Donaldson: “The meaning of 
property...is a right to some corporeal subject, that can be possessed, that can be transferred from hand to hand,...that 
may be stolen or robbed, and that may be demanded by a real action, termed rei vindication...[The pursuer claiming 
perpetual common law ‘copyright’] does not pretend to say, that it is a right to any corpus, to any subject that can be 
possessed, or that can be stolen form him. Ergo, it is not property” (200). 
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writer’s ownership of his work the necessary, and even sufficient condition for earning the honorific 
title of ‘author,’ and he makes such ownership contingent upon a work’s originality” (431): 
 
The man who thus reverences himself, will soon find the 
world’s reverence to follow his own. His works will stand 
distinguished; his the sole Property of them; which 
Property alone can confer the noble title of an Author; that 
is, or one who (to speak accurately) thinks and composes; 
while other invaders of the Press, how voluminous and 
learned soever, (with due respect be it spoken) only read 
and write. (Young 54) 
 
As Fritz Gutbrodt has noted, the organic metaphors of original writing that has earned the essay a 
prominent place in the prehistory of the Romantic conception of original genius are completely 
absent here (25-33). The printing press rather than nature is the source of poetic authority in this 
passage. Only those writers who also compose can have the “title of an author” bestowed upon 
them; the rest are “invaders of the press” (Gutbrodt 20). Gutbrodt argues that Young uses the term 
“original composition” to pun on writing as compositing (19-21). Thus, designed to have its effect 
in a print culture that facilitated piracy and plagiarism, the essay does as much to annex the printer’s 
shop to the author’s library as it does to relocate the source of creativity from God to the “God 
within” (Young 31). The book becomes a unity, welded to and encompassing a singular author, an 
immediate transcription of his mind. 
 In Derrida’s essay on “The Book to Come”, which partly reads as a corrective and a 
defence of that infamous promise in Of Grammatology of the imminent “death of the book” in 
favour of “the coming of writing” (Of Grammatology 6-27), Derrida points to the impasse in the 
construction of the book as an immediate transcription of a singular mind. The construction fails on 
two accounts. Firstly, the book itself must be conceived as “a certain totality” (4) to which “the idea 
of gathering together, as much as that of...immobility” seems essential (4). Secondly, the book must 
be thought of as a collection of the mind as if the mind could be contained, collected and 
deposited.174  What he meant, Derrida insists, when he wrote “under the heading of “The End of the 
Book” (14) was not that texts - dispersed, playful - would replace the totalitarian book, but that 
textuality as such is always-already operating within tomes that “cannot contain” (11) what they 
gather.  Yet, while Derrida suggests that his idea of the book as that which exists within “the tension 
between gathering and dispersion” (11) disrupts the simple opposition between the “two big ideas 
of the book, of the book both as the unit of a material support in the world, as the unity of a work or 
unit of discourse (a book in the book)” (12), he repeats what Latour might call typically “modern 
work of purification” when it comes to the disembodiment of writing. Thus Derrida’s self-
conflicted, dispersed book is a remarkably ethereal construction that - if only in its ethereality - 
resembles the books that Young sought to protect. Derrida warns against “the fetishistic impulse” 
(14) that “resacrilizes” each new mode of writing by maintaining the propriety of new modes of 
reading and writing that are about to yield to others. It is not, Derrida insists, “appropriate to 
conflate the question of the book...with that of supports” (4). Such purism and - dare I say it - 
concern for propriety - seem curiously to reinscribe the Derridean book within the “metaphysics of 
the proper” that it purports to deconstruct. As we will see, eighteenth-century writers confronted 
with new methods of reading and writing would exploit precisely what Derrida identifies as the 
fetishistic confusion between “support” and “book” to splinter the constructions of authorial unity 
                                                 
174 By “supports” Derrida means the medium or technical means of reproduction through which writing appears.   
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that threatened to replace their composite scribblings with new, more ethereal and self-composed 
bookishness. 
 The eighteenth century saw new developments in the “compound model” 
(Woodmansee 427) that constituted the book making process. Whereas in the seventeenth century 
books were printed by licensed printers, often authors themselves, and sold by booksellers, in the 
eighteenth century a new type of specialist emerged: the publishing bookseller.  These new 
professionals monopolized publishing by restricting access to copyright auctions within tightly knit 
“congers”, business leagues devoted to keeping prices high and competition low.175 More 
importantly, however, the publishing booksellers reversed traditional hierarchies, hiring printers as 
well as writers to produce profitable works in the genres that were most favoured by the public. As 
writers as well as printers now became hirelings, textual composition became “a sort of 
Manufacture”, mechanical labour rather than the work of inspiration. One way of avoiding the 
middle-man of the publisher-bookseller was to become one’s own printer, a path to authorship 
taken by Pope as well as by Richardson, who, incidentally, figures in the Conjectures not only as its 
printer but as its addressee. But when authoring is limited to only those with a legitimate occupation 
in the press, the author becomes not only a composer but a typesetter, and originality becomes 
predicated upon skilful compositing as well as creative writing.  The need to distinguish writing 
from printing might be why the passage quoted above implies a construction of literary property 
that “has more to do with ‘ownness’ than with ‘ownership’” (Rose, Authors 117). In its description 
of the relationship between the author and his work, the initial part of the passage by Young quoted 
above moves from analogy (only a man of a certain standing can produce works that “will stand 
distinguished”) to identification, as “his [property]” becomes “the sole property” of his works 
(Young 54). The particularity of an authored work is guaranteed by the personality of which it 
consists: “No longer simply a mirror held up to nature, a work was also the objectification of a 
writer’s self, and the commodity that changed hands when a bookseller purchased a manuscript or 
when a reader purchased a book was as much personality as ink and paper” (Rose, Authors 121).  
 In showing “the individuality of the work to be identical to that of the author” (Rose, 
Authors 126), Young repeats the traditional image of the book as the incarnation of wisdom, the 
immortal stand-in of its mortal creator. To Milton, for instance, books “preserve as in a violl the 
purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that bred them...a good Booke is the pretious 
life-blood of a master spirit, embalm’d and treasur’d up on purpose to a life beyond life” (5-6). In 
the eighteenth century the idea still had currency - as when Martinus Scriblerus, upon surveying his 
books, breaks forth in “pathetic Apostrophe” (XIV147):”O ye Spirits of Antiquity, who yet live in 
those sacred leaves” (XIV147). But as Rose remarks, Young’s identification of the writer and his 
work has its specific roots in “the Lockean notion of the creation of property in which property 
originates when an individual’s ‘person’...is impressed on the world through labour” (Authors 74). 
To Locke, of course, print and personhood were intimately connected, which is evident in his 
choice of metaphor when describing the process of cognition. Before ideas “imprint themselves” 
(Essay II.i.6 106) on the mind, it is “white paper, void of characters, without any ideas” (Essay II.i.2 
104). Similarly, just as “print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen”, so ideas die 
and “our mind represents before us Tombs to which we are approaching” (Essay II.x.5 151). Thus, 
as Lynch remarks, there is at the centre of Locke’s Essay “an analogy that links the getting of ideas, 
the techniques of typography, and the process of individuation” (Economy 34).   
 Only “mule-like imitators…die without issue,” Young writes (68), but there is a 
different death than the one inflicted by lack of publication: imitation. “Born Originals, how comes 
it to pass that we die Copies?” Young asks (42). As Gutbrodt suggests, one answer is “that there is 
                                                 
175 For more on the emergence of the publisher-bookseller, see Brean Hammond, Scott Hess and Barbara Benedict 
(“The Paradox”). 
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no sufficient protection of intellectual property” (35).  It is an answer that seems all the more 
pertinent when it is remembered that Young himself was the victim of piracy: In 1741 an 
unauthorized edition of Young’s collected works was printed by notorious pirate and bookseller, 
Edmund Curll – a composition that was reclaimed only in 1757 when Young’s authorized edition 
appeared (Gutbrodt 20).176 Young describes the casualties of deadening copying in a passage that 
uses a Lockean metaphorical construction of identity formation as a printing process to distinguish 
the unindividuated hack works from its singularly authorized counterparts:  
  
That meddling Ape of Imitation, as soon as we come to 
years of Indiscretion (so let me speak), snatches the Pen, 
and blots out nature’s mark of Separation, cancels her kind 
intention, destroys all mental Individuality; the letter’d 
world no longer consists of Singulars, it is a Medley, a 
Mass; and a hundred books, at bottom, are but One. (42-43) 
 
The “lettered world” comprises both human and printed characters, and the “Singulars” that 
imitation obliterates are (original) writers as well as their works. The pun on “indiscretion” 
conflates moral transgression with personal vagueness: the apes of imitation (pirates as well as 
plagiarists, we might conjecture) are both morally corrupt and mentally unexceptional, both 
impolite and impersonal.  Singularity, however, is replaced not only by the “Mass” but also by the 
“Medley”. Meddling or mixing is, as we know the foundation of property in Locke’s account, but 
the mixing done by the “apes of imitation” is an in-appropriation (a breach of social decorum as 
well as of property) rather than an appropriation - the result is a “meddling” not only of person and 
property but of one person’s properties with another’s. In other words, what the plagiarist or the 
pirate effectuates is a caricature of Locke’s process of appropriation, exposing the absurdity of an 
appropriation of one man’s property by another merely by adding “to it something that is his own” 
(Essay II.v.27 288).  Thus Young also plays on the literary connotation of the word “Medley”, 
evoking the rising form of the miscellany. Favoured by publishing booksellers, this genre was, 
according to Benedict, “designed to profit from copyrights” (“The Paradox” 233) by allowing the 
endless repackaging and remixing of already published texts.177 Scott Hess therefore argues that 
Young’s concept of the “original genius” seeks to counter such tendencies by supporting “authors’ 
claims to literary property while at the same time allowing them to claim separation from the 
literary marketplace” (52). He does so by tying the literary work closer to its writer in an argument 
that presents the same paradoxes as the Lockean conception of property on which it is based. 
Incorporating the personality of their author, the books ultimately come to be like them (whether 
singular or medley). In his second letter to Edward Stillingfleet countering his criticism of the 
Essay, Locke defends his right “to assume to myself the honour of an original” (142) by stressing 
that he has had no recourse to “the books of others” (137). “All that I...can say of my book,” he 
writes, is that it is “a copy of my own mind in its several ways of operation” (139). Young could not 
have found a more original example of modern authoring.178 
                                                 
176 For more on Curll’s unauthorized edition of Young’s works, see Trevor Mills. 
177 Hess notes that “though copyright was generally respected for works of individual authors, it was often disregarded 
in miscellanies...In the fluid environment of early modern print culture, poems were often pirated or freely reproduced 
in such forms without the author’s consent” (53). 
178 Locke places himself firmly on the side of the moderns, overtly arguing for the claims of novelty and originality 
against the kind of writing and reading that relies on “nothing but what can be justified by authorities in print” (“Mr. 
Locke’s Reply” (138). See Levine (85-89). According to Hammond, Locke attempted to influence the Commons 
towards the lapse of the Licensing Act, sketching out a suggested “redrafted law that included the idea of limited 
copyright...and the proposition that authors themselves should have the sole rights to reprint their own books for a 
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 In his article “The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of 
Modern Authorship” (1988), Rose expounds a similar collapse of the author and his work in Francis 
Hargrave’s Argument in Defence of Literary Property (1774), which comments on the proceedings 
of Donaldson v. Becket, the case that would finally settle the issue of copyright in the eighteenth 
century.  Determining how “one written composition may be distinguished from another” (Hargrave 
qtd. in Rose 72), Hargrave resorts to a “remarkable comparison of the literary work to a human 
face” (Rose 73):  
 
A literary work really original, like the human face, will 
always have some singularities, some lines, some features, 
to characterize it, and to fix and establish its identity. 
(Hargrave qtd. in Rose 73)  
 
Hargrave’s resort to physiognomy is not so remarkable as it might seem. In fact, as Deidre Lynch 
has shown, it was a commonplace to “ascribe a special cachet to the face” (Economy 33) in matters 
of identity. As it was seen to uphold “a foundational sort of private property…the human face 
seemed to function as a rigid designator, a distinct sign belonging to the same distinct person in all 
possible worlds” (Lynch, Economy 33). Assertions of the coincidence of character and countenance 
were readily available to substantiate Hargrave’s assertion of the “self-evident” truth of facial 
singularity as a guarantee of personal identity.179  However, Hargrave extends the singularity of 
personality to only those works that are “really original”, admitting that “there may be cases, in 
which, on a comparison of two literary productions, no such distinction could be made between 
them, as in a competition for originality to decide whether both were really original, or which was 
the original and which the copy” (Hargrave qtd. in Rose 75). As Rose points out, because 
originality is left undefined in Hargrave, it is impossible to tell whether he is “saying that in certain 
cases literary productions themselves are unindividuated” or “that it is sometimes impossible to 
determine which is the original” (Rose 74). If the latter is the case, Hargrave is making an argument 
about the illegitimacy of pirate printing –  no matter how like the legitimate publication, 
unauthorized editions are not “really original”. If, however, the former is the case, Hargrave seems 
to be suggesting that authoring itself is not entirely exempt from illegitimacy. In some cases writing 
produces indistinguishable copies rather than real originals, or rather there is a kind of writing that 
does not produce originals. Just as some works are not “really original”, so some authors are not 
real authors. In other words, what Hargrave’s qualification excludes from original authorship are 
the mere replicas produced by the hack writer.    
 Rose finds the argument faulty, as it undermines the notion of “self-evident” 
(Hargrave qtd. in Rose 74) individuality upon which Hargrave’s earlier argument is based. “Are we 
to infer that only some men have ‘personality’”? Rose asks (74).  But such a suggestion is not as 
peculiar to the eighteenth-century mind as it might seem to us. Or rather, the personality that the 
hack expressed in print had less to do with what in his history of self-representation, The Making of 
the Modern Self (2004), Dror Wahrman calls the “unique, expressive individual identity” (xi) than it 
has to do with the “commonality of types” (182). Like the fop and the coquette, the hack was a 
social type whose singularity was easily contained by the stock of fashionable properties he had 
acquired. The hack is constituted by his exterior appendages – apart from pen, ink and paper, things 
that signified poverty as well as social aspiration – sparse and shabby furniture, cracked tea-cups, 
                                                 
certain term” (34). Hammond refers to Raymond Ashbury’s “The Renewal of the Licensing Act in 1693 and its Lapse 
in 1695”. Library 33 (1978): 296-322. 
179 Lynch points to Shaftesbury’s Second Characters, or, the Language of Forms  (1713) in which he asserts that 
“[e]very face must be a certain man’s” (Lynch 33).  
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garret windows patched with paper alongside foppish effects such as fringed cuffs and aristocratic 
wigs – took part in the typical portraiture of the hack. Using Wahrman’s terminology, we might say 
the personality the hack expresses in print is based on “identicality” rather than “identity” (300). 
The “singularities” of his “lines” and “features” pertain to the “commonality of types” (Wahrman 
182) rather than to “that quintessential uniqueness that separates a person from all others” 
(Wahrman 276). Thus the physiognomic analogy that Hargrave used to underwrite the individuation 
of literary property was also drawn from a much older tradition of “characterology” exemplified 
early in the century with the publication of The English Theophrastus (1702) and later with reprints 
of several other seventeenth-century character collections. Based on the pseudo-Aristotelian 
Physiognomonica (ca. 300 B.C.) and Theophrastus’ On Moral Characters (ca. 319 B.C.), these 
works set out to derive human character from legible appearances. Lynch notes that at “the same 
time that individual faces functioned as the somatic correlate of a proper name, characterizing 
persons in the sense that they permitted them to ‘separate’ themselves and their property from 
others of their kind, faces also, contrariwise, referred to human nature in general” (33). Like the fop 
he so mercilessly strips on the Tale’s dissection table, the hack himself is a surface character under 
attack in a market that had begun to demand distinction rather than typicality.  
 In what was perhaps the most read Theophrastean collections of characters in the 
century, John Earle’s Microcosmography (1628),180 the clothing metaphors that dominate the 
portraits of both the fop and the hack come to mark the point where legible appearances turn into 
deceptive surfaces. Like the “gallant”, the “pot poet” is constantly “in conspiracy…for the next 
device” (65) to avoid the staleness of outmoded fashion, but despite their “pretty title” (98),”his 
verses are like his clothes, miserable cantos and patches” (98). Hack work, we might assume, is 
similar to the auctioned stuff left behind by the expiring fop in the Tatler (no. 113) – a miscellany of 
resaleable imports.181 In one 1751 issue of the Rambler (no. 145) Samuel Johnson is aware that only 
a small minority of writers could “be said to produce, or endeavour to produce, new ideas” (80): 
“[T]he rest, however laborious, however arrogant, can only be considered as the drudges of the pen, 
the manufacturers of literature, who have set up for authors, either with or without a regular 
initiation, and like other artificers, have no other care than to deliver their tale of wares at the stated 
time” (80). Similarly, in his defence of The Case of Authors by Profession (1758), James Ralph 
finds “no Difference between the Writer in his Garret, and the Slave in his Mines....neither can hope 
                                                 
180 For more on the history of character collections, see Jacuqes Bos. John Earle’s work was republished as late as in 
1737 (the edition referred to here). 
181 In Authors and Owners, Rose refers to the Scottish court case Hinton v. Donaldson, in which Lord Hayles argued 
against the decision in Miller v. Taylor on the grounds that mere “compiled” works could not lay claim to property 
status (137-138). Thomas Stackhouse had produced a History of the Holy Bible (1774) primarily composed out of “poor 
Materials, he had scrap’d together”, which had appeared in an unauthorized version by book-binder cum printer, 
Thomas Edlin when Stackhouse had not been able to honour the “three Sheets per week” (9) he was contracted to 
produce by Edlin. To Hayles, however, Stackhouse is not an author, but an “adept…abridger” (6) and a “compiler” 
whose words are like dictionaries in which “The works of a hundred authors are ransacked; out of them is 
produced…an entire new work.” (7). The central passage in Hayles’ argument elaborates on this sentiment: “The 
London booksellers enlarge the common-law right by conferring the name of original author on every tasteless 
compiler. Hereof there is an apposite example in Stackhouse, the author of this day. He was as very a compiler as ever 
descended from a bookseller’s garret. The incorporeal substance of Stackhouse’s ideas is a non-entitey. And yet, in the 
opinion of The Sages in St. Paul’s Chuch-yard, Stackhouse is no less an original author than Hooker or Warburton…we 
could not pronounce judgement for the pursuer, unless we were to hold Stackhouse to have been an original author; this 
I can never do” (7-9). The above quotes have been taken from the full case transcript, which can be read in The 
Decision of the Court of Session, Upon the Question of Literary Property in the Cause Hinton against Donaldson. 
Edinburgh: James Boswell, 1774. Google Books. 19 March 2014.  
http://books.google.dk/books?id=P340AQAAMAAJ&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=“The+London+booksellers+enlarge+the
+commonlaw+right+by+conferring+the+name+of+original+author”&source=bl&ots=R4p5EBdLn3&sig=6MSeFDVm
QNoYgiFDDjMAYVslUO4&hl=da&sa=X&ei=1X4pU9HsEcz64QTElYBg&rh. 
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for Deliverance. The compiler must compile; the Composer must compose on; sick or well; in spirit 
or out” (qtd. in Brewer 245). This reduction of transcendent authorship to physical composition 
draws on Scriblerian models of hack writing established earlier in the century. When writing cannot 
be done “in spirit”, it is reduced to its material counterpart, the mechanical filling of the page with 
letters. The hack writer of Swift’s A Tale of a Tub finds a model for the “methods” exhibited by 
“the spacious commonwealth of writers”(28) in a “physico-logical scheme of oratorical receptacles 
or machines” (27):”[A]ir being a heavy body, and therefore...continually descending, must needs be 
more so when loaden and pressed down by words, which are also bodies of much weight and 
gravity, as it is manifest from those deep impressions they make and leave upon us” (27). A 
staggeringly precise anticipation of Eramus Darwin’s speaking automaton, this mechanical orator is 
suggestive of the automatization of artistic composition in the age of print. Literalising Locke’s 
image of a mind as a printing press,182 the reference to the “deep impressions” of weighty words 
evokes the operation of print rather than the oration of spoken words. The language of mechanical 
measurement collides with the idiom of criticism in the pun on “gravity”. Both physical weight and 
topical severity can be used in the estimation of words as products of “oratorical machines” (I 26). 
 Hard pressed by the bookseller, who in equal measure considers “the bulk and the 
subject” (101) when deciding whether to accept a book for publication, and by his own “urgent 
necessities” (101), the hack decides to engage in “an experiment very frequent among modern 
authors, which is to write upon Nothing, when the subject is utterly exhausted, to let the pen still 
move on” (102).  The hack remarks how the physicality of print lends vacuity substance, as what is 
“wholly neglected or despised in discourse” will pass “very smoothly, with some consideration and 
esteem, after its preferment and sanction in print” (103).  In the later poem “On Poetry: A 
Rhapsody” (1733),183 Swift also deals with the collapsing distance between empty page and printed 
vacuity as the poem’s hack addressee, a “starveling bard” (59), struggles “[i]n gaping lines to fill a 
chink” (167) or produces criticism “merely writ at first for filling / To raise the volume’s price, a 
shilling” (258). In this poem, what is written is a routinely produced “ware” (44) intended for 
consumption, a “product of...toil and sweating” (114) that is “swallowed o’er a dish of tea” (68). 
Presented as instructions in writing from “an old experienced sinner” (75) to his younger peer, the 
poem sets out to “distinguish, which is which, / The poet’s vein, or scribbling itch?” (73-74). Divine 
inspiration does not seem to detract from the laboriousness of writing:   
 
The muse invoked, sit down to write; 
Blot out, correct, insert, refine, 
Enlarge, diminish, interline. 
Be mindful, when invention fails, 
To scratch your head, and bite your nails (86-90)  
 
Here the notion of “invention” only gives limited scope to authorial creativity, its origin being in 
witty adeptness rather than in creative vision. The emphasis is on dexterous manipulation rather 
than on momentary emanation; where “invention fails,” scribbling takes over. No longer the 
transference of spiritual meaning, writing becomes a purely manual task – in accordance with its 
etymological roots, it becomes a kind of scratching.  
What is left after this textual evacuation is apparel, the manipulation of the outside. 
The writer of the “Rhapsody” stresses the importance of getting the poem “in its modish dress, / 
                                                 
182 In the Essay on Human Understanding the image is particularly prominent when Locke writes” of Retention” and 
“Of Perception”, as when he writes of ideas “imprinted on our Mind” (I.ix.7 145). 
183 The early editions of this poem has the spelling “Rapsody”, suggestive of satirical deception in its pun upon the word 
“rapp”, a counterfeit coin. See Pat Roger’s note on the poem’s title in The Complete Poems (871).  
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Correctly fitted for the press” (105-6). Here the amalgamation of writing and typesetting does not 
result in Young’s “original composition”, but in the vulgar degradations of “modern wit”.  
 
In modern wit all printed trash, is 
Set off with numerous breaks – and dashes –  
To statesmen would you give a wipe, 
You print it in italic type. 
When letters are in vulgar shapes, 
’Tis ten to one the wit escapes; 
But when in CAPITALS expressed, 
The dullest reader smokes a jest. (93-191) 
 
The hack writer of the Tale similarly determines that “whatever word or sentence is printed in a 
different character shall be judged to contain something either of wit or sublime” (21). When form 
and meaning is this closely connected, the partition between the disembodied originality of 
abstracted text and its material concretions is literally paperthin. Indeed, the ephemeral materiality 
of the printed work constitutes an interruptive force throughout the century, disturbing that quality 
of uniqueness that makes a work properly one’s own. As copy, manuscripts are always susceptible 
to physical decay and unauthorised reproduction. Provoked by “a foolish paper under the name of 
Notes on the Tale of a Tub” (10),184 the “Apology” appended to the fifth edition of A Tale of a Tub 
is concerned to establish the singular identity of its “undisputed author” (10). “[T]he whole work is 
entirely of one hand,” the author asserts – there is no need for the “conjectures” that any extraneous 
notes may provide; the work is entire by itself (10). Likewise, in another piece of prefatorial matter, 
the bookseller counters the publication of “a surreptitious copy which a certain great wit had new 
polished and refined” (13) by offering “the whole work in its naturals” (13).  Such assertions set out 
to create a clear distinction between primary and secondary texts, between authorial entirety and 
critical corruption, between original text and parasitical gloss: the impression is that the 
“conjectures” of supplementary notes are not only unnecessary but an extraneous and corrupt 
excess that adds nothing to an already complete work.  
Nevertheless, the Tale is already “in its naturals” incomplete, not only littered with 
“defects” (13) and “chasms” (13) that are eventually “filled up” (13) by the annotators of the work, 
but also unfinished, mislaid and lost. The author writes on “upon Nothing” after professing his 
unhappiness “in losing or mislaying among [his] papers the remaining part of these memoirs” (XI 
100). Thus, the copy that is eventually printed is itself surreptitious, printed, by the bookseller's own 
admission, without the author’s knowledge,  
 
for he concludes the copy is lost, having lent it to a person 
since dead, and being never in possession of it after. So that 
whether the work received his last hand, or whether he 
intended to fill up the defective places, is like to remain a 
secret. (13) 
 
Under such conditions conjecture seems unavoidable. Once the author is no longer in possession of 
his manuscript, the text is lost to “those who ha[ve] the papers in their power” (4). Indeed, the 1710 
edition has suffered not only the friendly expurgations by a nameless annotator and the sterner 
censorship of satirical passages deemed “too particular” (4) by others who have “had the papers in 
                                                 
184 Probably Edmund Curll’s publication of A Complete Key to the Tale of a Tub: with some Account of the Authors, 
and the Occasion and Design of writing it, and Mr. Wotton’s Remarks examined (1710). 
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their power” (4), but also the supplementary corrections of the explanatory notes by “W. W---tt---n, 
B. D. and Others” (Title page).185 The Apology traces the transmission of the manuscript until its 
publication: 
 
How the author came to be without his papers is a story not 
proper to be told...He had, however, a blotted copy by him 
which he intended to have write over with many alterations, 
and this the publishers were well aware of, having put it 
into the bookseller’s preface, that they apprehended a 
surreptitious copy, which was to be altered, &c. This 
though not regarded by the readers, was a real truth, only 
the surreptitious copy was rather that which was printed; 
and they made all haste they could which indeed was 
needless, the author not being at all prepared; but he has 
been told the bookseller was in much pain, having given a 
good sum of money for the copy. (8) 
    
As Nick Rushworth notes, “the Tale that finally makes it into print...amounts to an unfinished 
fragment of an expurgated, retrenched, finally malformed copy of an original defective copy of a set 
of manuscripts” (41). It seems futile to look for an “undisputed author” to such a compound work. 
Rushworth identifies the effect of this history of textual corruption as a satire on “conjectural 
emendation” (50) of the speculative kind that Richard Bentley had committed in, among other 
editions, his 1697 Notes on Callimachus. Engaged with “countering centuries' worth of editorial and 
scribal error by rewriting what he imagined to be the lost parts of the classics” (43), Bentley sought 
to lift corrupted texts out of obscurity by way of annotation. “Conjecture can cure all,” Bentley 
would boast in his preface to Horace (1728), adding that what results from conjecture is “for the 
most part, more certain than anything that we can exhibit from the manuscripts” (qtd. in Levine 
248).186 While still a student at Cambridge, Bentley professed ambitions of assembling all the 
scattered fragments of the Greek poets into a single great work, in which conjectural emendation 
would necessarily “act as seamless ligaments between the fragments” (Rushworth 47). The Notes 
might have been intended to form part of such a body of work.  
 Providing a satirical model for the Tale, the publication history of the Notes bears a 
surprisingly precise resemblance to that of the Tale – it too is the surreptitious publication of a 
“blotted copy” based on an incoherent, fragmented original. At least that is how it appears in the 
anonymously written A Short Account of Dr. Bentley’s Humanity and Justice, to those Authors who 
have written before him (1699).187 The author of this work objects to Bentley’s appropriation of 
Callimachus’ poems, or rather his tendency out of “a peculiar Fondness for this his Issue” to call 
“that Edition his Callimachus” (31). The Notes, the writer suggests, are not “the Genuine Offspring 
of Dr. Bentley’s own Brain” (30) but rather “an Imperfect Draught of a more Compleat Work” (33). 
The work that the Notes leaves incomplete is not Callimachus’ poems but Thomas Stanley’s edition 
of them, as it had been passed to Bentley in manuscript form by a mutual friend, Edward Sherborn: 
                                                 
185 “W. W---tt---n” is William Wotton who had appended his “Observations Upon a Tale of a Tub” to the 1705 edition 
of his Reflections on Ancient and Modern Learning.   
186 Bentley writes in Latin: “In conjecturis vero contra Librorum fidem proponendis et timor purdorque aurem vellunt” 
(preface to Horace, 1728). 
187 The work is attributed to William King. Rushworth describes the “Callimachus controversy” as a kind of forerunner 
to the dispute between “ancients and moderns” provoked by Bentley’s later Dissertation Upon the Epistles of Phalaris 
(1699). Both disputes were dominated by questions of ownership.  
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“I shall prove, That [Stanley’s] Locks were pick’d, and his Trunks rifled; and that both Dr. 
Bentley’s Method, in marshalling his Fragments, a great part of his Notes on several Heads, and 
some of his Animadversions, are taken from that very Learned Gentleman...” (32)188 But even 
Stanley’s “more Compleat Work” is the “imperfect Draught” of  “a much better Copy…which 
whether preserv’d or not, [the author] cannot learn” (33).189 This impression of incompletion is 
accurately replicated in the Tale. As Rushworth notes, in this “most arcane of literary-
archaeological dogfights”, the original manuscript is reduced to scraps that can be circulated and 
appropriated at will.  
 Hence, if the Tale “with all the trappings of pseudo-scholarship ordinarily accorded a 
Callimachus” (Rushworth 54) mocks Bentleyan conjecture, it also positions misinterpretation and 
mistransmission as the inevitable consequences of the conflation of property and possession that 
occurs in a world where authorial control is relinquished to the bookseller (or any other “Friend” 
who has the papers in his hands). While criticism becomes a form of plagiarism,190 authorship 
becomes a question of ownership, i.e. of “naming the rights to the fragments” of a work whose 
completion itself remains guesswork (Rushworth 47). So too in the Tale, which is authored 
perfectly according to Woodmansee’s “compound model” (427). The Tale’s constitution as a 
fragmented, divisible and hopelessly trivial work parodically inverts the concept of the integral, 
monumental work of universal wisdom and authorial immortality. It does so by opening the black 
box that is the book to reveal its constituent components and thereby the “massive network of 
alliances of which it is composed” (Harman 34). Viewed as such, the Tale comes to anticipate 
Latour’s strategy of prosopopoeic mockery in his article “Mixing Humans and Nonhumans 
Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closer” (1988) in which “Jim Johnson”, technologist in 
Columbus, Ohio, and visitor of Walla Walla University, argues at length about the agency of a 
door-stopper (an undeniably Scriblerian topic). As in any Scriblerian text, the interesting narrative, 
however, takes place in the footnotes, where, by its own admission, the text aims to construct and 
deconstruct the author “several times to show how many social actors are inscribed or prescribed 
by machines and automatisms” (298). In addition to the use of authorial pseudonyms, the text is 
teaming with possibilities of misreading and failed attempts to control its own reception.191 Thus 
Latour seems to succeed in reinscribing authorial control in the text by asserting that he may at will 
employ “delegated human or nonhuman characters”192 in his place or to “position no figurated 
character at all as the author” (304) only to have the footnote on the same page reveal that he was 
prompted to do so by the editors, who find that “[h]is solution seems to have proven our point” 
(note 2 304). Such deconstructive193 strategies come to mock the concept of textual and authorial 
                                                 
188 The writer of A Very Short Account also suggest that the notes themselves were considered plagiarised, lifted without 
due attribution from other previous commentators, such as Joannes Graevius, Isaac Nicolas Nevelet and Thomas 
Stanley. 
189 In fact, the Stanley edition was left unfinished and unpublished at its author’s death (Rushworth 46). 
190 In the last appendage to the Dunciad (1729), “By the Author a Declaration”, Pope considers critics a species of 
counterfeiters who “have taken upon them to adulterate the common and current sense of our Glorious Ancestors, Poets 
of this Realm, by clipping, coining, defacing the images, mixing their own base allay, or otherwise falsifying the same; 
which they publish, utter and vend as genuine...” (458). 
191 The following will serve as an example of the textual waywardness that Latour displays: “Since you have reached 
this point, it means I was right in saying earlier that you were not at all free to stop reading the paper. Positioning 
myself cleverly along a chreod, and adding a few other tricks of my own, I led you here...or did I?” (308) 
192 Latour uses the verb “delegate” without an object, one assumes to avoid the subject-predicate structure that would 
displace his position at “the vinculum itself” (We Have Never 129). 
193 While Latour would probably object to the labelling of his work as “deconstructive”, the peformative strategies he 
uses in this article are reminiscent of much deconstructive writing. Thus, Latour’s parodic attempts to contain and 
construct his reader finds its parallel in - among others - Derrida’s On the Name (1993), which directs itself to a situated 
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autonomy by exposing not only the composite nature of the text, its construction as a gathered thing 
rather than a monolithic object, but also its inseparability from its temporary incorporation.194 
Indeed, William Kinsley lists the Tale alongside the Pope’s The Dunciad (1743)195 and Vladimir 
Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1962) as a “mock-book”, but it might be more accurate to say that the Tale is 
then a kind of mock-miscellany. Or rather, the Tale shows the miscellany as the parodic truth of a 
modern book production that thrives on excess, endless recycling, plagiarism and piracy. Luke 
Roman’s description of “literary materiality” in Roman literature might well apply to the Tale 
conceived as a mock-miscellany: “At the furthest horizon of literary materialism, the work is no 
longer a fabric of interconnected motifs available to the synthetic understanding of a general reader, 
but a collection of disparate items, each applied to their own, occasional use” (136). 
 Thus, in the controversy surrounding Bentley's Notes, Swift would have found “a 
motivation for writing that is not only open and contestable in meaning but physically precarious” 
(Rushworth 47). In other words, textual corruption and disintegration, uncurbed misinterpretation 
and material decay, ground both the critic’s authority and the author’s loss of control. Like Swift’s 
hack, authors might not suspect “it possible that any wrong interpretations could be made” (8) of 
the remains of their works, but as Bentley knew, “'when there are no external proofs and 
testimonies to be had...[t]hen every man passeth his own judgment according to his genius and his 
proficiency” (qtd. in Levine 48).  As tangible objects, texts are up for grabs for any proficient critic, 
but there is nothing to ensure that papers do not also fall into the wrong hands, or that they are even 
read.  As Ian Donaldson demonstrates, writing has always been motivated by “dreams of fame and 
nightmares of oblivion” (5) – dreams and nightmares that depend on perpetuation of reading as well 
as the reading matter itself. Put differently, the paradox of poetic immortality is its dual reliance on 
the irreducibility of what is written to its specific medium and the physical integrity of this medium. 
 The predicament is succinctly stated by the hack that authors The Battle of the Books 
(1704) when he takes issue with the “common opinion” (107) that there in the “Books of 
Controversy” (107) cluttering the modern libraries “is wonderfully instilled and preserved the spirit 
of each warrior, while he is alive; and after his death his soul transmigrates there to inform them” 
(107). In fact, the hack asserts, 
 
it is with libraries as with other cemeteries, where some 
philosophers affirm that a certain spirit, which they call 
brutum hominis, hovers over the monument till the body is 
corrupted and turns to dust or to worms, but then vanishes 
or dissolves. So, we may say, a restless spirit haunts over 
every book till dust or worms have seized upon it, which to 
some may happen in a few days, but to others, later... (108) 
   
                                                 
reader, a specific (yet nameless) “you” throughout the book. Most of Derrida’s books are Scriblerian master pieces, 
abounding with footnotes, quotational mosaics, selfretractions etc. etc.  
194 The argument here has an affinity with Christina Lupton and Aran Ruth’s construction of sentimental thing poems as 
“things that get arranged and collected as physical pieces of writing on the move” (50) and whose value lies in a “loco-
descriptive” impetus that not only traces the history of their inscription, but also makes “reading part of the action, 
rather than something that must be laid aside before the reader can act” (60). See Lupton, Christina and Aran Ruth. 
“The Novel’s Poem Envy: Mid-Century Fiction and the ‘Thing Poem’.” Eds. Kate Parker and Courtney Weiss Smith. 
Eighteenth-Century Poetry and the Rise of the Novel Reconsidered. Bucknell University Press, 2014: 49-65. 
195 The first version of the Dunciad appeared in 1728. The 1743 edition is the second edition of the expanded version of 
the poem that published in 1742. Both Kinsley and I refer to the 1743 edition as presented by James Sutherland in The 
Twickenham Edition.  
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Even to the ancients, “the book itself, as a physical object, serv[ed] as a symbol of...enduring or 
short-lived fame” (Donaldson 5). Roman finds that whereas literary excellence was seen to surpass 
its physical form, “ephemeral writing, according the topos sustained from Catullus through Ovid to 
Martial, [was] ultimately reduced to a purely physical, and minutely circumscribed, function, such 
as wrapping for incense or fish” (118). In the eighteenth century this classical topos gained new 
momentum in the satiric attack on the hurried overproduction of a print culture that relied on the 
immediate usefulness of ephemera. John Feather notes that “the printing trade relied increasingly 
for its income on “the production of ‘non-book’ materials: newspapers, advertisements, tickets, 
trade cards, and catalogues” (408). Such ephemeral productions highlight the potential for the 
corruptibility of writing in a culture geared towards instant consumption and profitable recycling.  
 In the sixth issue of the Covent-Garden Journal (1752), Henry Fielding makes the 
author’s claim to immortality hinge on the fragility of paper: 
 
[T]hough all the Labours of the Architect, the Statuary, and 
the Painter, must share the same Mortality with their 
Authors; yet, with these Time acts in a gentler and milder 
Manner, allows them generally a reasonable Period of 
Existence, and brings them to an End by a gradual and 
imperceptible Decay: so that they may seem rather cut off 
by the fatal Laws of Necessity, than to be destroyed by any 
such Act of Violence, as this cruel Tyrant daily executes on 
us Writers. (70) 
 
Locke, who also knew that “print wears out” (II.x.5 152), had made a similar argument in the 
chapter on retention of ideas in the Essay. Believing it probable “that the Constitution of the Body 
does sometimes influence the Memory” (II.x.5 152), Locke finds that “in some [the brain] retains 
the Characters drawn on it like Marble, in others like Free-stone, and in others little better than 
Sand” (II.x.5 152). Making retention thus reliant on the medium of transmission, Locke provides 
the philosophical pretext for a reversal of the classical topos that transforms the materiality of 
writing from the effect to the cause of literary inferiority. When material durability itself becomes 
the measure of literary quality, triviality finds its excuse in the thinness of paper. Fielding recasts 
the decline of literary standards in the modern age in terms of the advances of paper making. Thus, 
Fielding point out that “whole works of several modern authors have been...obliterated” by “a Use 
for which Parchment and Vellum, the antient Repositories of Learning, would have been utterly 
unfit...what is commoner than to see Books advertised to be printed on a superfine, delicate soft 
Paper, and again, very proper to be had in all Families, a plain insinuation to what use they are 
adapted” (71). The Martialian verse that serves Fielding as an epigraph sacrifices the transcendence 
of writing to the whims of the market: 
 
How many fear the Moth’s and Bookworm’s Rage,  
And Pastry-Cooks, sole Buyers in this Age?  
What can these Murtherers of Wit controul?  
To be immortal, Books must have a soul. (70) 
 
The insistence of a realm of autonomy uncontrolled by the material conditions of the market rings 
hollow here; sublimation will do little to effect the change in the consumers’ habits that will abate 
the fear of the “Murtherers of Wit”. In the sense of material endurance to which it is referred here, 
immortality does not belong to books in possession of a soul but to books in possession of readers 
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or, more specifically, “Buyers” who are also readers.  But when disintegration becomes the rule 
rather than the exception of book production, it becomes impossible to distinguish perennial works 
of value from cheap ephemera – used as wrapping, all books are just paper. In another issue of the 
Covent Garden, the following exchange takes place between a country inn keeper and “a beauish 
gentleman” (no. 33 54):  
 
‘But here, bring me some paper...to air my boots.’ Upon 
which, the landlord presented him with a piece of an old 
news-paper, ‘D-n you,’ says the gent, ‘this is not half 
enough, have you never a Bible or Common-prayer-book in 
the house? Half a dozen chapters of Genesis, with a few 
prayers, make an excellent fire in a pair of boots.’ ‘Oh! 
Lord forgive you,’ says the landlord, ‘sure you would not 
burn such books as those.’ ‘No!’ cries the spark, ‘where 
was you born? Go into a shop of London, and buy some 
butter, or a quartern of tea, and then you’ll see what use is 
made of these books.’ (no. 33 56-57) 
 
 Such jokes of the waywardness of textual works as copies are common throughout the 
century. In Swift’s “Rhapsody”, the hack’s poem reaches its audience only as recycled waste, “sunk 
/ And sent in quires to line a trunk” (143-44). The fate of this poem has its antecedent in an issue of 
The Spectator, which in its entirety is dedicated to the unreaderly uses of printed text. Mr. Spectator 
lists not only a paper-kite, “two long band-boxes...lined with deep erudition” (no. 85 23) and a hat 
case, but also the more peripheral casings such as candlestick fringes, tobacco paper and Christmas 
pie wrapping as places of accidental reading (no. 85 22-25). Swift devotes an entire poem to the 
“burning [of] a dull poem” (1729) whose conceits have left him cold. Later examples of straying 
texts include the use of “the sanative particles” of “such a simple thing as a soft sheet of paper just 
come off the press” as the cure for a delicate burn caused by a hot chest-nut in Laurence Sterne's 
The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, gentleman (1759-68) (IV.xxviii 268). Sterne’s book 
abounds in the alternative material uses of writing, as when Yorick’s sermon is used to light pipes, 
or when some of Tristram’s less witty remarks are used as curlers by a French chaise-vamper’s wife 
(IV.xxvi 262-63; VII.xxxviii 438-39).  In MacKenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771), the fictitious 
editor only retains “scattered chapters, and fragments of chapters” (intro. 7) of the work he 
publishes, as the rest of it has served as “excellent [gun] wadding” to its former owner (intro. 4).   
What authors fear is not only the levelling of exchange value but also the 
democratisation of a mass market; or rather, what kills literature is not its commodification but its 
potential for misappropriation. The commercialisation of writing becomes a problem of 
consumption rather than of production – a deferral that replaces the question of whether or not to 
write for money with the question of which kinds of consumption can be considered legitimate. 
What is discussed indirectly in these passages are norms of consumption, or “taste” as it came to be 
known.196 In an issue of The Spectator (no. 409), Addison uses this metaphor for “that Faculty of 
the Mind, which distinguishes all the most concealed Faults and nicest Perfections in Writing” 
(383). In a passage that struggles to balance the necessities of the author’s ownership of his work 
with the consumptive interests of the readers, Addison narrows the concept through an elaborate 
analogy that compares literary taste to connoisseurship in tea: 
                                                 
196 According to Mr. Spectator himself, however, the concept was already in circulation before his definition. His 
account of the concept, then, only responds to “that fine Taste of Writing...much talked of among the Polite World” (no. 
409 383).  
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I knew a Person who possessed the one in so great a 
Perfection, that after having tasted ten different Kinds of 
Tea, he would distinguish, without seeing the Colour of it, 
the particular Sort which was offered to him; and not only 
so, but any two sorts of them that were mixt together in an 
equal Proportion; nay, he has carried the Experiment so far, 
as upon tasting the Composition of three different sorts, to 
name the Parcels from whence the three several Ingredients 
were taken. A Man of a fine Taste in Writing will discern, 
after the same manner, not only the general Beauties and 
Imperfections of an Author, but discover the several Ways 
of thinking and expressing himself, which diversify him 
from all other Authors, with the several Foreign Infusions 
of Thought and Language, and the particular Authors from 
whom they were borrowed. (383)  
 
Like Hargrave, Addison is concerned to distinguish not only the “general Beauties” of writing but 
the specific qualities which “diversify” each author from all others. The primary function of taste, 
then, is not to preserve the classical canon, but to act as a guarantee for correct authorial attribution.  
Drawing on the Lockean idea of appropriation as ingestion by aligning drinking and reading, 
Addison's analogy sets up an aesthetic calculus in which production and consumption exist in a 
perfect circuit, creating a strange marketplace where books can be sold without really being 
alienated.   
 Nevertheless, making it obvious that the secret is in the blend, that is, in the manner in 
which “Foreign Infusions of Thought and Language” are “mixt”, the analogy fails to sustain the 
natural, exclusive ownership it is meant to figure. Like tea, writing turns out to be an imported 
stimulant. Hinging on the clever combination of “Foreign infusions”, original authorship is hardly 
distinguishable from common hack work. More importantly, however, the metaphor is suggestive 
of the interconnection between literature and commerce that undercuts the authority that it sets out 
to establish. Figured as the perfect palatal concord, reading is here imagined as the precise 
replication of the author’s “blend” in the reader’s gustatory receptors, which leaves the author 
comfortably in control of reception. If a reader finds that he cannot accurately perceive the accepted 
beauties of a particular author, “he ought to conclude, not (as is too usual among tasteless Readers) 
that the Author wants those Perfections which have been admired in him, but that he himself wants 
the Faculty of discovering them” (384). As Hammond notes, according to this injunction, it is not 
readers that judge the books, but the books that judge the readers (186) – a convenient fantasy for 
authors trying to keep those with the papers in their hands from gaining possession of the books. 
The choice of tea as a metaphor not only imbues “fine Writing” (Addison, no. 409 385) with the 
connotations of exclusivity and luxury that still surrounded this beverage, but also with the 
vulnerability that belongs to a fashion commodity.197 Writing always carries the possibility of 
                                                 
197 Berg writes of the status of tea: “Tea drinking was a domestic event, still limited until the last half of the eighteenth 
century mainly to the middling and upper classes, but quickly becoming a priority of expenditure among the artisan and 
labouring classes and even the poor. Tea and coffee were particularly associated with polite behaviour...Drinking these 
new beverages was associated with desirable behaviour- doing business, holding conversations, and acting and speaking 
intelligently...Tea drinking provided an opportunity for sociability involving all members of a household and for 
displaying a range of luxury goods from the tea itself to decorated porcelain or fine earthenware and, where possible, 
silver plate or silver” (230). 
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uselessness, or, to sustain the metaphor, the risk of not catering for the contemporary palate. Thus 
like tea, even the finest writing is subject to the emulative potentiality of all products of fashion.  In 
other words, when a result of the testing of fashionable consumption, taste can no longer be thought 
to be “in some degree...born with us” (Addison, no. 409 385), but something that can be acquired, 
exchanged, discarded and copied. A commodity poised between the empty copying of its 
production and the merciless recycling of its consumption, the book never becomes the exclusive 
possession of a single individual. 
 Thus, in a world where books might be reused but never reread, the economic and 
signifying power of “tasteless Readers” (Addison, no. 409 384) can hardly be ignored. Considered 
in this light, jokes about the waywardness of texts and the unreaderly uses of books counter any 
attempt to wrestle the substance of the text from its physical form. As Christopher Fanning points 
out, stories of printed texts gone astray are indicative not only of “an acute awareness of texts as 
physical things” (369), but also of “the material independence of writing” (372). Once in 
circulation, the author’s work becomes a separate entity the value and meaning of which are 
detached from its maker’s intention. ’Yet, Addison's fear of circulation as a source of value also 
reflects more specific contemporary mercantilist concerns about achieving the right balance 
between widening and restricting the flow of goods. If held by too few, the book is destined to 
become deadstock, wasting away as the inalienable experience of an unread scribbler; if by too 
many, it will eventually be entirely consumed, worn out, or worse, reduced to its recyclable parts.  
 In the “Epistle Dedicatory” to Swift’s Tale, addressed to “Prince Posterity”, the 
fragility of texts as material objects are also brought to bear on the status of poetic immortality. 
Corrupting “Prince Posterity” makes it impossible “for any mortal ink and paper...to make a 
suitable resistance” (15); once “sunk in the abyss of things” (15), texts are more often than not 
“mislaid” (15) and “not to be found” (15). If books are “Children of the Brain” (I 25) then most are 
“barbarously destroyed before they have so much as learnt their mother tongue to beg for pity” (15) 
or stifled “in their cradles” (15) before they make it into print. If, as the publication history of the 
Tale itself suggests, the printing process is one means of textual corruption,198 texts that remain 
manuscripts are entirely lost to posterity. Such is the fate not only of the author’s “original copy” 
(8) but also of the “compleat and laborious Dissertation upon the prime Productions of our Society” 
(I 31) by the author of the History of Reynard the Fox and the “universal System in a small portable 
Volume” written by the “great Philosopher of O. Brazile” (V 60). Yet, print is no guarantee for 
survival. The hack prepares “a copious list of titles” (16) to Posterity, but the “originals” (16) – 
front pages posted as advertisements “upon all gates and corners of streets” (16) – are torn down 
and replaced by new ones. In his “Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift” (1739), Swift imagines a 
similar destiny for his own works. A year after the poet’s death, a “Country Squire” (253) travels to 
inquire “for Swift in Verse and Prose” (254) at Bernard Lintot’s Fleet Street shop. Obviously in the 
dark about the current metropolitan reading fashions, the squire is told that Swift’s writing belongs 
to the “antiquated Stuff” (268) sold in the used books shops in Duck Lane. “I sent them with a Load 
of Books, / Last Monday to the Pastry-cook’s,” Lintot says unapologetically (258-260). Time 
cheapens rather than consecrates as limited shelf-life replaces poetic immortality. Thus in the Tale, 
“several thousand” (15) titles disappear every year, languishing between production and 
consumption; “immense bales of paper...employed in such number of books” (16) are annihilated as 
                                                 
198 Hence, the recipe for making a universal compendium “in a small portable volume” (V 60) of all that is even a 
distillation process and an unravelling of the will “preserve only the first running” (V 60) of a “fair correct”  (V 60) 
copy results in diluted secondary productions, “an infinite number of abstracts, summaries, compendiums, extracts, 
medullas, excerpta quadams, florilegias, and the like, all disposed into a great order, and reducible upon paper” (V 60-
61). Here writing is reduced to endlessly recycled stuff. 
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they disperse to other places than those for which those they were initially intended, “to a jakes, or 
an oven, to the windows of a bawdy-house, or to a sordid lantern” (17).   
 What satires of textual overproduction highlight is the trivialisation of art in an age of 
mechanical reproduction that turns every scribbling hack into an author. Marlon B. Ross points to 
the eighteenth century as that “swivel moment” (236) in the history of authorship when “print 
becomes the cause of authority rather than merely its effect” (245). What is lost in this process of 
reversal is the cultural distinction between that which is “accessibly legible” with “that which is 
printed because it commands our attention” (Ross 237). With its proliferation of prefatorial material 
and its cacophony of self-authorized annotators, the Tale parodies the regression of authorized work 
into “a compendium of error” (Ross): “With each new individual, claiming, from the quirkiness of 
his own little perspective, to have the final word, claiming to have the definitive view, claiming a 
direct descent from ultimate authority, the text becomes both larger, ‘more complete,’ and smaller, 
trivialized by the weight of undistinguished and nondistinguishable authorities” (Ross 239). Thus, 
the fragmentation of the literary work into disparate material uses in the tales of textual 
waywardness comes to parallel the “tendency of authority itself to splinter into the factiousness of 
printed words and dead letters” (Ross 246). Prompted by a supplementary logic that complicates the 
systematic contrast between “divine and natural writing and the human and laborious, finite and 
artificial inscription” (Of Grammatology 15), the Tale inaugurates what Derrida has called “the end 
of the book” only as its revival in its “volatile dispersion” (“The Book” 14).199 Instead of the 
immediate transcription of a singular mind, the book is here allowed to present “the division that is 
essential to it, which it makes not disappear, but appear...so the book can accomplish itself there” 
(Derrida, “The Book” 11) perhaps in ways not quite imagined by Derrida. 
It is a phenomenon that is exacerbated by the proliferation of printed texts well as by 
the nature of print itself. As Walter J. Ong notes in his book on “the technologizing of the word”, 
“the letters used in writing do not exist before the text in which they occur” (118): 
 
With alphabetic letterpress print it is otherwise. Words are 
made out of units (types) which pre-exist as units before the 
words which they will constitute. Print suggests that words 
are things far more than writing ever did” (118).  
 
Lisa Maruca has shown how in Joseph Moxon’s printer’s manual, Mechanick Exercises on the 
whole Art of Printing (1683), meaning lies already-inscribed in the type blocks to such a degree that 
the caster’s body and the body of type at times seem to merge: “Although...the caster instigates the 
work through his body’s actions—he clutches, lays, clasps, presses, etc.—as he brings the male and 
female gages together, the ‘Foot of the Matrice place[s] it self upon the Stool,’ acting, so it seems, 
independently, hopping up on this piece of human furniture with its nimble human appendage” 
(330). To Moxon the resulting text is not the effect of a mental process rendered legible by a 
transparent medium of print, but the hybrid product of a union of compositor and machine. As 
Maruca notes,  “Mechanick Exercises makes it clear that the text is not only influenced by its 
physical form, it is that physical form” (223). We have returned to the hack’s “oratorical machines” 
(I 26). 
 That text in the world of print is self-engendering is not left unrecognized by the 
Scriblerians. In the thoroughly print-driven realm of Pope’s The Dunciad (1728), where weekly 
“Miscellanies spring” (I 39), as if by their own will, “the living boast, Of Curll’s chaste press, and 
                                                 
199 Derrida borrows the expression from Hegel who refers to the nature of the mind. 
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Lintot’s rubric post” (I 40), the scene of textual creativity observed by the Goddess of Dulness is 
almost entirely without human agency:   
 
Here she beholds the Chaos dark and deep 
Where nameless Somethings in their causes sleep,  
’Till genial Jacob, or a warm Third day, 
Call forth each mass, a Poem, or a Play: 
How hints, like spawn, scarce quick in embryo lie,  
How new-born nonsense first is taught to cry,  
Maggots half-form’d in rhyme exactly meet,  
And learn to crawl upon poetic feet. (I 59-62) 
 
Although the “nameless Somethings” are called into more shapely existences as poems and plays by 
the ruling publisher and the profit hungry hack, these human agents are present only vicariously as 
the abstract possibility of profit.200 Thus, read literally the expression “a warm Third day” leaves 
open the possibility of textual autogenesis so that “each mass” coalesces by itself to near-
recognizable literary forms in circulation merely by the momentum of a red-hot print market – a 
reading that is emphasized in the second part of the stanza, where larval rhyme come to stand on 
their own feet and move without authorial support. Like other kinds of moving matter, the “material 
independence” exhibited by the printed text gives rise to an unease – stripped of classical rules of 
composition, the products of mechanical hack writing are unclassifiable “somethings” that exist 
merely by force of their sheer “mass”. Without decorum, what remains of the crippled verse is not 
unlike the bandy-legged denuded nobleman of the Memoirs – a monstrous thing of “the between” 
(Heidegger, What is 243). Matter without form, mass without determinate identity, the self-
authorising things that populate The Dunciad caricature the efforts to regulate the proliferation of 
print by fixing personal identity to writing. But in a world where proper names stand for the person 
as well as his printed product,201 both author and his copy become “a motley mixture” (II 21). 
Authorial appropriation creates order in the mass of print only through a kind of dehumanization, as 
“poetic souls” (III 24) “Demand new bodies, and in Calf’s array, / Rush to the world, impatient for 
the day” (III 29). The “embalmed” spirits of Milton’s books in which Young puts his hopes (5) find 
their perverse counterparts in the ghostly authors of Pope’s poem, living dead walking “like 
mummies” (I 131), a “phantom” (II 46) or a “shapeless shade” (II 103). Cast as “monster-breeding” 
(I 106), writing can only produce “something between a H*** and owl” (I 244),202 “a jumbled race” 
(I 68) of miscreated medleys. As Kinsley argues, in “the world of the Dunciad we find neither real 
books nor humankind, but a sort of monstrous tertium quid, part book (bound in calfskin), part 
author (since ‘calf’ is a slang term for fool), and informed by a dead soul.” (32)   
 
 
                                                 
200 The expression “a warm Third day” refers to the profits of the third day of a play’s run that traditionally belonged to 
the author, whereas “genial Jacob” alludes to the publisher Jacob Tonson (1656-1736). 
201 “There [at the top shelf] Caxton slept with Wynkin at his side…” (I 121-134). 
202 Pope’s gloss reads “A strange Bird from Switzerland” (244). John Butt, the editor of the one-volume Twickenham 
edition of The Poems of Alexander Pope, believes Pope refers to John James Heidegger, a Swiss who became manager 
of the opera-house at Haymarket (367). See Pope, Alexander. The Poems of Alexander Pope. Ed. John Butt. Milton 
Park: Routledge, 1963; 2005. The 1742 version of the poem in four books has “Something betwixt a Heideggre and 
owl” (I 289). 
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ii. Immaterial Scribbling and Writing Things in Mid-Century Hack Writing 
 
“All has been told before, in a better manner; and the reflections are trite, and tediously expanded: in short, 
all the bookmaker’s art is exhausted; all the typographer’s ingenuity employed, to spin out the meagre 
materials into a trifling and insipid volume.” 
Anonymous reviewer of The Adventures of a Hackney Coach (1781). 
  
Later, in the mid-century, self-authorising books make a less shocking, if no less troubled 
appearance in an odd sub-genre of the novel that has received scholarly attention under the label of 
“novels of circulation”, “object tales”, “spy novels” or “it-narratives” – a group of texts that 
distinguish themselves by having inanimate objects or animals as protagonists. Often figuring as 
narrators or even as authors,203 the non-human protagonists of these narratives relate their own 
“adventures” or “histories” as they circulate from hand to hand through a series of changes in 
ownership.204 After lingering in obscurity, it-narratives have gained critical interest, most notably 
with Mark Blackwell's four-volume collection of it-narratives, British It-narratives 1750-1830 
(2012) as well as his critical anthology The Secret Life of Things (2007), which collects the major 
part of what that has been written on the subject to date.  Not included in the anthology, however, is 
Toby Olshin’s pioneering205 1969 defence of the “neglected sub-genre” as “an entity in the 
development of the genre of the novel” (44). Focusing on the “spiritual vacuity” that emerges in a 
materialist world that replaces humans with things and “ethical conduct” with “avarice and vanity” 
(46), Olshin’s article introduced the forgotten novels as an object of criticism in its own right and 
set the theme for subsequent explorations. To Olshin, it-narratives represent the “perfect wedding of 
genre and theme” (45) in rehearsing the “artistic apprehension of how a human being’s point of 
view is shaped by a non-human object” (51): “The novel becomes an allegory in form: as it is 
structured, so are we” (51).  
Later critics have used it-narratives to tap into eighteenth-century attitudes to widening 
systems of trade and exchange. Aileen Douglas relates the narratives to what she calls “England’s 
transformation into a consumer society” in the wake of the Seven Year’s War (1756-1763). 
Prompted by this cue, Markman Ellis coins the term “novel of circulation” (Politics 77) for the it-
narrative and ties it to sentimentalist discourse on commerce, while Liz Bellamy looks at how it-
narratives take as their narrative model the circulation of goods across social boundaries to provide 
“a paradigm of the alienation” (“It-Narrators” 126) characteristic of a society marked by 
“acquisitive materialism” and “bound together by chance or the act of exchange, rather than by 
affective links” (“It-Narrators” 126). In the introduction to the first volume of British It-Narratives, 
Bellamy builds on this insight and suggests a more complicated economy in the it-narrative through 
which the genre “constructs myths of attachment”, which illuminate the return of properties to their 
rightful owners in sentimentalized circles of exchange, while simultaneously exposing “the 
impersonal nature of circulation and the impossibility of any such return” (l). Comparing the it-
narrative to other narratives of “autonomous things” (“Modern” 159), such as self-authored slave 
tales and travel tales of sentimental keepsakes, Jonathan Lamb takes the opposite view and 
identifies in the annexation of the human voice by a commodified thing a “quality surplus to 
                                                 
203 The false ascription of authorship to a character is a move typical of the eighteenth-century pseudo-autobiography. 
William Defoe’s The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Robinson Crusoe…Written by Himself (1719) would be 
the typical example. 
204 Not all it-narratives are narrated by their protagonists. Francis Coventry’s Pompey the little, or the Adventures of a 
Lapdog (1751) is a case in point. 
205 At least three critical works before Olshin deal with the form, but dismiss it as an object of literary study. See Walter 
Raleigh, J. M. S. Tompkins and Ernest A. Baker. Baker dismisses the it-narrative as “an easy means of emptying a store 
of anecdote, miscellaneous observations, surreptious libels, and what-not…[its] literary interest is insignificant” (52). 
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commodity status, a residue of will and self” (“Modern” 158). Although the transmigrations of the 
eighteenth-century it-narratives distinguish themselves from the metempsychosis of Ovidian 
forerunners such as Charles Gildon’s The New Metamorphosis: Or, Pleasant Transformation 
(1704) or Alain René Le Sage’s Le Diable Boiteaux (1707) by being determined by a commercial 
rather than a spiritual logic, Lamb insists that they convey their stories from spaces uncontrolled by 
market values in which “things experience a pause in the system of exchange-value, but not as 
commodity fetishes” (“Modern” 157). Relating their own stories, the pin, the feather or the coin 
indicates a “double metamorphosis – from human to chattel and chattel to human – that tests a 
quality belonging neither to a circulating commodity nor to a civil self” (“Modern” 158).  
What one might call a second wave of critical work on the genre has focused less on the 
“theme” and more on the “form” of Olshin’s “sub-genre”. Christopher Flint has been the first to 
point out how the “stories reproduce the endless circulation of text in modern print culture” (215), 
exposing “the convergence of intellectual and commercial property” (222). Building on Flint’s 
analysis, Mark Blackwell and Hilary Jane Englert have both explored how the “elaborate, self-
referential accounts “ (Englert 223) invariably framing the narratives foreground the 
commercialisation of writing.  Christina Lupton points to the preoccupation with mediation 
rehearsed by it-narratives, suggesting that “what it-narratives play with through their reflexivity is 
the fact that mediation makes writing more than the sum of an author’s thoughts...” (Knowing 69). 
Most interesting for my purposes is Blackwell and Englert’s new take on the role of the it-narrative 
“as an entity in the development of the genre of the novel” (Olshin, 45) and particularly their 
suggestion that the literary historical value of the it-narrative lies in its self-exposition as hackwork.  
A “minor, miscellaneous, ephemeral” literary form (Englert 238) offsetting the inspired originality 
and lasting integrity of “proper novels” (Blackwell 211), the it-narrative represent and expose “the 
literary labor, responsibility, and property rights of writers whose work bore little resemblance to 
the emerging legal paradigm of literary production as the sovereign enterprise of a single, inspired, 
original author” (Englert 223-224). Taking as a point of departure these insights about the status of 
the it-narrative as hackwork, I want to suggest that what these narrating commodities tell us about 
the general economy of trade is less interesting than what they might tell us about the specific 
economy of writing at a time when the commodification of print was changing the status of 
authorship. Unapologetically creating literary value through circulation and the vicarious 
annexation of experiences as saleable “adventures”, it-narratives pose questions about the relations 
between publishing practices relying on partition and detachability and the integrity of knowledge 
as well as about relations between authors and what judge Yates termed the “strange and singular” 
(qtd. in Burrow and Murray 2385) province that was quickly being delimited as their particular 
property. 
 Richard Meeker lists 69 works of fiction “written from a non-human point of view” 
(219) in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries – enough to cater for what Mark Blackwell 
calls a “niche market” (189) for readers hungry for the specific kind of passing insights afforded by 
a circulating thing. This device of the object protagonist became a literary fad in the second half of 
the century. Thus, what began with the 1709 publication of Charles Gildon’s The Golden Spy came 
to include virtual bestsellers such as Charles Johnstone’s Chrysal, or the Adventures of a Guinea 
(1760-65) and Francis Coventry’s The History of Pompey the Little; or, The Life and Adventures of 
a Lap-Dog (1751) by the mid-century. An avid reader such as Lady Mary Wortley Montagu swore 
that Pompey the Little diverted her more than any contemporary works by Tobias Smollett or Sarah 
Fielding (qtd. in Olshin 43).206 Though popular, the genre never drew critical acclaim, even in its 
own time; indeed spun-out triviality, commercial (re-)circulation and mechanical assemblage work 
                                                 
206 The genre actually counted several major authors such as Henry Fielding, Tobias Smollett and Alain-René Le Sage 
(Olshin 43). 
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became the characteristics of it-narratives, as they hardened into what was seen by critics as a 
distinctively undistinguished genre. As Blackwell notes, reviewers never tired of classing it-
narratives as hackworks, the kind of “formulaic literary commodities” (189) that challenged the 
legitimate novel in the literary marketplace.207 As such, Blackwell argues, they mark “the 
appearance of what we now call genre fiction” at a time when “the fashion for novel reading 
experiences is becoming difficult to tease out from the vogue for fresh versions of the same 
experience” (212).  
Often relying themselves on recycled conventions of disparagement to fill up their 
reviews, critics continually accused it-narratives of being revamped reworkings of an already tried 
and tested narrative model. A reviewer of The Adventures of a Hackney Coach (1781) complains 
that neither “genius” nor “learning” 
 
have a share in this work. All has been told before, in a 
better manner; and the reflections are trite, and tediously 
expanded: in short, all the bookmaker’s art is exhausted; all 
the typographer’s ingenuity employed, to spin out the 
meagre materials into a trifling and insipid volume. The 
author of the Hackney Coach has wound up this paultry 
machine: it will go for a few hours, and then be silent, we 
hope, for ever.   
(qtd. in Blackwell 190)208 
 
The imagery of mechanical movement is intuitively appropriate to a work that replaces the author 
with a hired vehicle and novelty with monotonous circulation. Thoroughly driven by the market, the 
writers of it-narratives do not concern themselves with writing but with “making up” books – a 
mechanical occupation that demands the dexterity of a typesetter rather than the inspiration of a 
genius. Rendered the equivalent of Vaucanson’s duck-shaped automaton, the “paultry machine” of 
the it-narrative needs only a little winding up to keep itself in motion. But the references to the 
printer’s workshop are used here to suggest the inertia and generic rigidity of a kind of automatized 
writing that has sacrificed genius to ingenuity and genuine novelty to the relentless and continuous 
production of fashionable ephemera required by a self-driven press. Turned into a mechanical 
operation similar to Knaus’ “selbstschreibende Maschine” (Chapuis and Droz 290-91), mechanized 
writing makes its author redundant.  
 It-narratives themselves prove conscious of the contrivance of their chosen narrative 
vehicle, aligning themselves with the imitative iteration and unashamed borrowing of hack writing. 
The writer of The Secret History of an old Shoe (1734) realizes that critics will label it a “Heap of 
Fabulous Scandal” (preface): “But what are these Reasons to a Writer, that wants Money? He that 
cuts by his Labours, wou’d starve most unchristianly...if neither Truth nor Lies were to be told, or 
propagated” (preface). The narrating pocket watch in The Adventures of a Watch! (1788) terms 
himself a “Repeater” (qtd. in Blackwell 210), collecting the stories of its owners and adopting the 
examples of predecessors such as “lap-dogs, lice, bank notes, guineas” and a “Birmingham 
halfpence...of very roguish appearance” (qtd. in Blackwell 209). The roguish predecessor that the 
watch is so keen to copy, a forged gilded shilling that can “pass current for a guinea” (46), can 
hardly be thought of as an original. Indeed, in the preface to The Birmingham Counterfeit (1772) the 
editor counts it the “species of humble imitators” that “have overflowed the literary markets” in an 
                                                 
207 On the emergence of ‘the novel’ and ‘the elevated novel’ in the mid-eighteenth century, see William Warner. (287-
91). 
208 Blackwell refers to Critical Review 51 (April 1781): 287.  
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attempt to satisfy the “rising disposition for superficial novelties” (preface). Although quick to 
oppose the “incomparable Fielding” to the “men of inferior ability [who] try their Fortune in the 
same channel” (preface), the editor reminds us that distinguishing between “the real and the 
counterfeit” is a “difficult task” (preface), especially “in a world where the generality of human 
actions, like a great deal of our present current coin, is counterfeit.” (I 1) The editor of The 
Adventures of a Corkscrew (1775) knows that the large “quantity of paper” constituting the 
corkscrew’s adventures “may share the like fate with the works of many of his contemporary 
brethren, and be of infinite use in a cheesemonger’s, or chandler’s shop” (introduction).  
Reviewing Adventures of a Black Coat (1760) – a veritable publishing success which 
reached five editions in under two years – a critic in The Critical Review predicted that the work 
would “naturally sink into oblivion” with the “several [other] unsuccessful attempts in our language 
of stringing a parcel of adventures together, by the feeble ties of an ill-designed personification” 
(499): “This subject might have been sufficient to furnish an agreeable entertainment in one essay; 
but it is insupportably tedious, by being spun out into a book of this size” (499). The charge of 
empty reparcelling of medley modishness is repeated by the reviewer of Helenus Scott’s Adventures 
of a Rupee (1782): 
 
This mode of making up a book, and styling it the 
adventures of a Cat, a Dog, a Monkey, a Hackney Coach, a 
Louse, a Shilling, A Rupee, or – anything else, is grown so 
fashionable, that few months pass which do not bring one 
of them under our inspection. It is indeed a convenient 
method to writers of the inferior class, of emptying their 
commonplace books, and throwing together all the farrago 
of public transactions, private characters, old and new 
stories, everything, in short, which they can pick up, to 
afford a little temporary amusement to an idle reader. 
(477)209  
 
What the eighteenth-century critics saw in the “convenient method” of the it-narrator was its 
facilitation of an assemblage mode of composition that discarded the constraints of formal unity in 
favour of “makeshift unifying mechanisms” (Englert 232) in order to “to appeal, within the covers 
of one work, to a variety of audiences” (Saunders 71). Thrown together by “writers of the inferior 
class” who do not shun literary recycling to produce “a little temporary amusement”, these works 
are but fashionable miscellanies of formulaic commonplaces, distinguished from “a nameless but 
superior literary set” (Blackwell 189) that presumably has more lasting integrity. Such criticism is 
not entirely amiss. Indeed, it-narratives were often generic hybrids, patchy miscellanies produced 
by Grub Street hacks responding to an increasingly commercialized literary market.210 Flint 
                                                 
209 Jane Tompkins also quotes this passage (49). 
210 As Christina Lupton points out in “The Knowing Book: Authors, It-Narratives, and Objectification in the Eighteenth 
Century”, there is a case to be made for a biographical reading of the self-staged hacks that populate it-narratives (as 
their authors as well as their subjects). Johnstone, for instance, was – despite the popularity of Chrysal – a literary 
failure not unlike the various drudges of the pen that appear in his work. Indeed, Chrysal remained the only successful 
work written by Johnstone, who had taken up the pen when deafness prevented him from pursuing a legal career. 
Attempting to profit on the recent success of his first work, Johnstone made another it-narrative, The Reverie (1763), 
tied together by the transmigrations of a “benevolent spirit” conjured up by reading Paradise Lost. The Reverie, 
however, proved a failure, as did all his subsequent episodic satires. Roger D. Lund quotes a reviewer of Chrysal, who 
remarks in the Critical Review that “it would be a great injustice…to deny [Johnstone] the character with which he vests 
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highlights the generic voraciousness of these hodgepodge works that digest and blend “satire, 
allegory, anatomy, picaresque, scandal chronicle, roman à clef or secret history, news, propaganda, 
autobiography, moral novel, travelogue, and imaginary voyage” (219). As Bellamy concludes: “The 
essence of the genre is its flexibility” (“It-Narrators” 119). The Genuine Memoirs and Most 
Surprizing Adventures of a Very Unfortunate Goose-Quill (1751) is a display in generic versatility, 
comprising letters, a Physician’s recipe, an elegy to a lap-dog, and a satire upon “A very vain, 
scribbling, silly Apothecary” in its twentyeight short pages. Likewise, The Adventures of a Cork-
Screw (1775) contains not only the usual panorama of characters such as “Lord Darling’s History 
and Character” and the “History of Miss Lucy Lightairs” but also moral reflections on “Love”, 
“Avarice” and “Hypocrisy”, “Verses out of the Psalms” and “An Oration in a Watch-house”, still 
leaving space for a “Digression” or two. Even Argentum; or, The Adventures of a Shilling (1794), a 
work distinguished by its relative stylistic homogeneity, cannot resist the insertion of an unfinished 
translation of “the celebrated Muscipula” (95-103) 211 in the middle of the narrative. 
 As David Saunders has pointed out, insisting that the identity of a work relies on its 
packaging “within the covers of one work” (Saunders 71) rather than in its “style and sentiment” 
(Blackstone qtd. Rose, “The Author” 83), such patchwork presents a challenge to the concept of 
literary property as “immaterial substance” upon which the development of copyright law 
depended. Like other miscellanies, it-narratives replace the uniformity of authorial personality with 
the unity of material coherence (the book as a bound object). To understand the degree to which the 
it-narratives challenge the notion of authorship as the integrity of original genius we need to have a 
closer look at the staging of their authorship. Studying graphic conventions of authorial attribution 
on front pages and in frontispiece portraits in novels throughout the century, Janine Barchas points 
out that the mid-century boom in it-narratives coincided with “a self-consciousness about a rapidly 
coalescing set of conventions attached to...a now autonomous genre” (80) not yet called the novel. 
The appearance of non-human subjects and inanimate objects as supposed authors of their own 
adventures was a pointed parody of the pseudo-autobiography as a novelistic paradigm that had 
long gone stale and an efficient mockery of the “individual psychology, cult of celebrity, and 
private subjectivity” (Barchas 59) that was helping to make personality a selling point.  
 The sophistication of such playful deconstruction of authority receives a further depth 
if we consider the conceits typically designed to explain the it-narrator’s animation and abilities as a 
storyteller. The two most common devices are the human amanuensis and the found manuscript 
(Bellamy, “It-Narrators” 118): “The voice of the object is therefore mediated by a range of humans 
who may influence the telling of the tale” (Bellamy, “It-Narrators” 118). Jonathan Lamb 
convincingly develops the connections between this inspiration and its formalisation as a written 
composition and the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis, or the transmigration of souls 
between species, plants and substances from one body to the next. Philosophically the theory was 
under great pressure throughout the century, rejected and ridiculed though often also playfully 
entertained (Lamb, “Modern” 145; Palmeri 13-36). Locke’s theory of identity develops partly in 
response to the “Christian Platonist or Pythagorean”212 who sees “no absurdity at all” (Essay 
II.xxvii.14 339) in supposing  
                                                 
himself, an Adept in the science of mankind” – or, one might add, in the alchemy that transforms fragmentary narrative 
into solid coinage.  
211 Edward Holdsworth’s Latin mock epic Muscipula sive Cambro-muo-machia (1709). 
212 As Lamb points out, the veiled target here is Descartes whose “system of innate ideas posits an immaterial 
substance, or soul, with a life outside the limits of the body that endures before and after its existence” (Lamb, 
“Modern” 145). The Christian Platonist is likely to be a member of the philosophical school of Cambridge Platonists 
(1633-1688), to which Ralph Cudworth was a member. In The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), 
Cudworth acknowledges that the indestructibility of the soul obliges him to consider “the pre-existence and 
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the same Soul may, at different times be united to different 
Bodies; and with them make up, for that time, one Man; as 
well as we suppose a part of a Sheep’s Body yesterday 
should be part of Melibæus himself as well as it did of his 
Ram. (Essay II.xxvii.27 347). 
 
The awkward switch from transmigration to digestion reminds us of Locke’s own reliance on the 
figure of digestion to sustain the “vital union” of person and property even as it makes mockery of 
the “absurdity” of Pythagorean metempsychosis. In some ways, the shift from immortality of the 
soul to the elasticity of consciousness amounts to a reconceptualization rather than a rejection of 
transmigration. Balancing the preservation of “the same Person” under the “constant flux of the 
Particles of our Bodies” (II.i.12 111) with the rejection of the Pythagorean assertion of an 
independent immaterial substance capable of life and action beyond the body, Locke creates what 
Jonathan Lamb has called “an unmanageable series of possibilities fenced around with negative 
qualifications” (“Locke’s” 194). Though offered as an outlandish improbability, the hypothetical 
“absurdity” of the severed finger remains, as we have seen, a logical consequence of Locke’s 
tightrope walking between Aristotelian hylomorphism and Cartesian substance dualism. Certainly, 
to the undiscerning eye, the transmigration of consciousness to the divided limb does not seem too 
different from standard Pythagorean doctrine. In other words, if making personal identity 
coextensive with consciousness sidesteps the question of a perpetual, autonomous immaterial 
substance, it does so only by raising new questions about the relation between this consciousness 
and “successively fleeting Particles of matter” (Essay II.xxvii.7 332) to which it is nevertheless 
attached:213 
 
In all which account of self, the same numerical Substance 
is not considered, as making the same self...Thus any part 
of our Bodies vitally united to that, which is conscious in 
us, makes a part of our selves: But upon separation from 
the vital union, by which that consciousness is 
communicated, that, which a moment since was part of our 
selves, is now no more so, than a part of another man’s self 
is a part of me; and ’tis not impossible, but in a little time 
may become a real part of another Person.  
    (Essay II.xxvii.25 346) 
 
As Schmidgen notes, provided that what Locke claims here is “that any body part whose welfare we 
are conscious of is part of the self” (“Politics” 213), the constant traffic of parts between bodies 
raises questions about the extension of that self: “How many body parts are there of whose welfare 
we are routinely conscious? How many body parts are there of which we could become conscious 
under certain circumstances?” (Schmidgen, “Politics” 213) And, we might add, to whom does the 
“part” belong in “that little time” it takes for “that, which a moment since was part of our selves” to 
become “a real part of another Person” (my emphasis)? In leaving the precise moment of 
                                                 
transmigration of souls” as “irrefragable…as it is for their post-existence and future immortality, did we not (as indeed 
we do) suppose souls to be created by God immediately, and infused in generations” (xxxiv, 103-104).  
213 Schmidgen argues that the “parallelism of Locke’s argument on personal and physical identity increases throughout 
the chapter, and it grows... into the solidity of actual connection between personal and physical identity” (“Politics” 
212). 
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appropriation undetermined, Locke suggests that appropriation is a question of degrees the 
distinction of which relies on the operation of the unreal. The temporal lapse, then, is suggestive of 
a space of appropriation in which the appropriating consciousness can come to imaginatively, and 
only for “a little time”, posses or inhabit a “part” that is not yet “a real part of him”.  
 The it-narrator exploits this imaginative space of transmigration to authorize a kind of 
writing that is essentially entirely without a “vital union” of its own. Jonathan Bridges’ The 
Adventures of a Bank-note (1770-1771) is typical in pointing out the mixed origins of its making:  
“The inquisitive world may perhaps be curious enough to enquire,” says Bridges’ twenty pound 
note in the first volume of his Adventures,  
 
why I alone, amongst so many thousands of bank-notes, 
came to be possessed of such uncommon talents, as not 
only to recollect the particular passages of my life, but be 
likewise able to dictate to a secretary, or more properly 
speaking, to inspire knowledge into a machine, whose 
utmost qualification before was (like most of the quorum) 
just to be able to write his name, and read it when he had 
done. (Vol. I. 2-3)  
 
Here writing is reduced to mechanical and mindless reproduction, while inspiration comes from 
hard cash itself. Conversely, authoring only takes place as oral communication, and is thus suitably 
removed from the material concerns of print culture. Flint notices that “intuit” is frequently used in 
it-narratives to explain this narrative omniscience and quotes Johnstone’s Chrysal, or the 
Adventures of a Guinea (1760-65). What gives voice to the various adventures in Johnstone’s it-
narrative is in fact an incorporeal agent, a “superior” (4) spirit only temporarily inhabiting “the 
shape of a guinea” (57). Like the dictation of the bank-note, Chrysal’s silence works to protect 
authoring from the automatism of writing. “I can see your thoughts,” Johnstone’s narrator boasts to 
the starving alchemist who, having “condensed” (2) the spirit from his last guinea, dutifully 
transcribes its account: “[I] will answer every doubt which may arise in your mind at the wonders of 
my relation, without the interruption of your inquires, as awful silence is the essence of my 
converse, the least breach of which puts an end to it for ever! Listen then in mute attention, nor let a 
breath disturb the mystic tale!” (3) Communication here is twice removed from its material 
objectification by the double imperative of silence; mutely conversing to a silent scribe, Chrysal 
eliminates the contingencies of copying and ungovernable interpretation to present a purely spiritual 
kind of unmediated communication “without the trouble, delay, and errors of discourse” (56). 
Chrysal is sublime inspiration embodied, before which the humble scribe can only kneel in 
“virtuous joy! And in obedience to the divine impulse” and “the reward of all his labours” (2). As 
Englert argues, Chrysal’s disembodied “converse” enacts a “fantasy of total authorial control” that 
underscores the contemporary legal efforts to base the concept of literary property as “original 
composition” on “the sovereign enterprise of a single, inspired, original author” (Englert 224). The 
alchemist’s efforts to gain “command of that chain, which links the animal and material worlds 
together” (Englert 218) parallel contemporary legal efforts to achieve control of the alliance of spirit 
and matter in the literary object by unlinking textual essence from material commodity. In both 
cases the result is a saleable and profitable yet incorporeal property that can be circulated without 
being directly perceived.  In fact, “an incorporeal substance” (1), the condensed “body of [an] 
effulgence” (1), Chrysal seems the perfect figuration of the immaterial substance that Blackstone 
attempted to make the specific constitution of literary property. The image of an inspired solitary 
composition is underscored in the preface, which traces the adept scribe as an isolated individual 
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“following his business without disturbance from any one, nor appearing to give himself the least 
trouble about that of any other person living” (xiii): “He went on thus for near 20 years, no soul 
ever coming near him, nor he going out, above once or twice in a year, and then not staying above 
an hour or two at a time” (iv).  
 Nevertheless, as Englert also makes clear, the very introduction of a human 
amanuensis stages authoring as a kind of ventriloquism that undercuts the autonomy of authorship. 
Dividing the source of inspiration from the act of writing, the narrative framework of Chrysal 
becomes suggestive of the division of labour inherent in the modern process of book making as well 
as the collaborative nature inherent in all authorship, “if only in the loosest sense implied by the 
notion that ‘inspiration,’ ideas, and creative forces come from everywhere” (Englert 238). As such, 
the monumentalization of the it-narrator as an all-powerful, inspired author can be seen as a 
caricature version of the original genius portrayed by Young. Indeed, the irony of the scribe’s 
prostration to the “reward of all his labours” is easily perceivable once it is remembered that the 
spirit he worships comes in the shape of a “continually lessening”214 piece of gold. Figured as 
alchemy, writing becomes the laborious and futile effort to make ethereal “effulgence” (Vol. 1 I.i 1) 
yield a substantial income and turn inspiration into cash. Like the alchemist, the hack is also 
involved in a “mysterious process” (Vol. 1 I.i 2) during which “pure elements” (Vol. 1 I.i 1) 
compound into a more profitable, though unpolished “mass” (Vol. 1 I.i 4) capable of “of entering 
into the hearts of [its] the immediate possessors” (Vol. 1 I.i 4). Dependent on the hack alchemist, 
Chrysal's authorial staying power is threatened by the constant temptation of a quick cash-in. “I 
entered your heart with the greatest pleasure,” Chrysal flatters his scribe, 
  
…a pleasure that was heightened by the noble constancy 
you shewed, when the smell of the hot ox-cheek, as you 
came by the cook’s shop, raised that conflict between 
nature and knowledge, whether you should purchase some 
of it to satisfy your hunger, or preserve me for this last 
experiment... (Vol. 2 II.xxiv 238)  
 
It is only fitting, then, that the spirit is finally dispelled – before he can impart the secret of making 
gold – by “the unpardonable offence” (Vol. 2 II.xxiv 239) of a “fetid steam” exploding from the 
writer “unable to suppress the impulse of internal vapour, which the mention of the fatal ox-cheek 
set in motion, in [his] empty bowels” (Vol. 2 II.xxiv 238). This transformation of the “internal 
vapour” of inspiration to the “fetid steam” brewing in empty bowels reads as a scatological 
denigration of writing for money that cannot rise above the material constraints of an impoverished 
existence and as a satiric demystification of the apotheosis of the original genius. As originality 
vanishes into hot air, the less pure and more material origins of the work stand exposed; devoid of 
its spirit, Chrysal turns into a heap of paper, or as the preface has it, “some old stuff, that had lain a 
great while, lumbering [in a] garret” (Vol. 1 preface ix). 
 In the preface, the editor recounts the “manner by which [the manuscript] happened to 
come into [his] hands” with the intention “to do justice to the real author” (Vol. 1 ix).  A framing it-
                                                 
214 The quote is from the E.A. Baker’s 1907 edition of the work, in which Chrysal describes how he has been 
“continually lessening ever since the depredations committed on me by young Aminadab” (515-516). The comment is 
inserted by Baker, who has made relatively extensive changes to Johnstone’s wording (the entire first paragraph of 
chapter xvi in vol. 2 is omitted - hence the need to add the comment on the size in a later paragraph).  However, the 
comment is consistent with Johnstone’s character who never ceases to deplore the “diminution of [his] size” (xvi 217). 
See Johnstone, Charles. Chrysal, or the Adventures of a Guinea. Ed. E. A. Baker. London: Routledge, 1907. All other 
references are to the 1760 version (ECCO facsimile).  
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narrative in miniature cast as the journey of a circulating manuscript, the preface supports the 
impression that Chrysal’s political and social satire comes secondary to the more prominent 
concern with the mystery of its own production. If, as Englert argues, “the narrative of nonhuman 
adventures dramatizes the liberation of the spirit of the literary work from its physical confinement 
as printed material” (223), the prefatorial framing of this narrative stages a material, generic and 
compositional disintegration indicative of the tension between the fragmented production of a pile 
of paper and the story of singularly inspired creation that they mean to convey. As with A Tale of a 
Tub, the nature of the originally complete manuscript ever only remains a conjecture “confirmed, by 
its appearing to be part of some regular work” (x). In piecing together the essentially “irreparable” 
(xviii) original, the editor relies mainly on anecdotal evidence presented by the daughter of the 
woman who had lodged the alchemist in her garret. First conceived as a philosophical treatise, the 
work is “reduced to the appearance of a novel or romance” (xviii) by the next lodger, a Methodist 
clergyman who abandons his attempt to “make something” (xvii) of the inherited papers, having  
“taken out such as he like, and done what he pleased with the rest” (xvii). In its final incarnation the 
work presents itself to the editor as “a number of fragments” (x), the remains of which are preferred 
as wrapping for butter in lieu of “brown paper, which [is] much dearer” (x).215  It is a disintegration 
that the editor’s attempt at restoration does little to change. Favouring redaction over emendation, 
the editor presents a publication that is “strictly agreeable to the faith of the text” (xviii) only to the 
extent that he has “honestly omitted the whole” (xviii) wherever he “could not clearly make out the 
very words of the author” (xviii).  
 As we have seen, such accounts of textual degeneration are far from uncommon in the 
eighteenth century, having their roots in Scriblerian satires of textual criticism as well as in a much 
older satiric tradition of mock books associating literary materiality with the work of “writers of the 
inferior class”. The addition of the transmigrating narrator, however, gives the satire a new purpose, 
turning it against the privileged claim to singular inspiration asserted over and against the drudgery 
of composition and compilation.216 With originality compromised and divided at the very moment 
                                                 
215 The joke recurs in The Adventures of a Corkscrew (1775), which begins by describing how the editor has obtained 
the manuscript among the possessions of a pauper who has died in jail. Prior to the restitution of the manuscript, the 
editor lists the items of the pauper’s estate as “one old ragged coat, a pair of rusty breeches, part of an old tyewig, some 
old books, and a large parcel of paper entirely spoiled, being scribbled all over” (x). In Theory of Prose (1929) Viktor 
Shklovsky calls this framing device “the found manuscript”. Only in parodic works such as Laurence Sterne’s The Life 
and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman (1759-1767) does this “old device” (155) come to be part of “the 
displacement and violation of conventional forms” (156). As Mary Rose Sullivan has argued, perhaps the most 
elaborate exploitation of this device is to be found in Robert Browning’s verse novel The Ring and the Book (1868-69). 
A motley of idiosyncratic voices in ten dramatic monologues that never quite amount to a univocal presentation of the 
events surrounding the murder that is the supposed centre of the book, the reality and truth of the events chartered in the 
found manuscript introduced at the beginning of the poem recede into obscurity. As such, Browning’s text is what 
Gordon W. Thompson calls an exercise in “ authorial detachment” (686) – one of the central images in the text is that of 
a fiery repristination of a ring that removes the marks of its maker. It is a use of the device of the “found manuscript” 
that is complicated by Browning’s actual find of an “old yellow book” upon which he built the work. For more on the 
yellow book, see Charles Hodell. For more on the signification of erasement in the use of the ring figure, see George R. 
Wasserman.  
216 The difference between mid-century it-narratives and Augustan satire on hack writing is stressed by Christina 
Lupton in her work on eighteenth-century self-reflective literature. Whereas the Augustans sought to differentiate 
themselves from the hacks, the it-narratives seek to elevate the materiality of literature: “Rather than dismissing 
literature that appears in the guise of paper, these narratives reclaim the sheer materiality of literature as leverage in 
their production of a literal, rather than literary, objectivity” (Knowing 56). While the present section builds on Lupton’s 
insight, it should be noted that overemphasis on this kind of discontinuity between early and mid-century satires on 
hack writing runs the danger of overlooking the radicality of Scriblerian satire. In other words, one should be careful not 
to dismiss Scriblerian awareness of authorial self-fashioning. Thus, as we have seen, the complication of the scene of 
inscription produced by satires such as the Tale makes it difficult to sustain an idea of original authoring. 
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of composition, bookmaking remains a collaborative activity at its core in these narratives. 
Published nearly a decade after Johnstone’s work, at the height of what Janine Barchas has called 
the “vogue” for it-narratives, Tobias Smollett’s History and Adventures of an Atom (1769) presents 
a concern for the unambiguous possession of the literary object not unlike that found in Johnstone’s 
narrative. The novel is prefaced by an “Advertisement from the publisher to the reader”, in which S. 
Etherington” (v) seeks to prevent any “risque of misconstruction” (v) by giving an account of the 
origins of the manuscript. The risk, we sense, not only pertains to “the plague of prosecution” (iii) 
so easily suffered by the secret history, but also to the legitimacy with which the publisher has 
“purchased the copy...now present[ed] in print” (v). The manuscript, the fictional publisher 
explains, has been offered to him by a “Dorothy Hatchet” (iii), the purported “administratrix of Mr. 
Nathaniel Peacock” (iii), who is now dead and buried. While Etherington gives an elaborate 
description of Peacock’s grave, a “particular” in which “any person whatsoever may satisfy 
himself” (iii), he gives no such details of Mrs. Hatchet, who is primarily distinguished by her black 
mourning wear “a little worse for wear” (iii). However, her tattered anonymity is suggestive of a 
type of hackwork that might also be “a little worse for wear”, having undoubtedly seen more than 
one hatchet. 
 The narrative that frames the atom’s tale presents a similar parody of the notion of the 
self-inspired author of original composition. Peacock, “haberdasher and author” (5) transcribes the 
atom's tale, dictated to him by “a shrill, small voice, seemingly proceeding from a chink or crevice 
in [his] own pericranium” (5). “What thou hearest is within thee – is part of thyself,” (8) the atom 
explains, thus dispelling Peacock’s initial fear that the voice is of divine or demonic origin217 and 
echoing Young’s description of the inspired moment as the “full intimacy with the Stranger within 
thee” (53). As in Chrysal, the writer’s meeting with his spirited counterpart is cast in terms of the 
“holy horror” (Johnstone, Vol. 1 I.i 2) characteristic of the encounter with the sublime:  
 
My knees knocked together: my teeth chattered: mine hair 
bristled up so as to raise a cotton night-cap from the scalp: 
my tongue cleaved to the roof of my mouth: my temples 
were bedewed with a cold sweat ------- Verily, I was for a 
season entranced. (Smollett 8)  
 
The humour of the passage relies on the clichéd phrasing of a hyperbolically sketched “violent 
perturbation of spirit” (8) that is entirely disproportionate to the diminutive size of the phenomenon 
that causes it. Parodying the enthusiast thrill attending the moment of inspiration, the comedy of the 
passage flies in the face of the critical and legal privileging of sublimity over other, less exalted 
constructions of inspired writing.218 In its effects, the haberdasher-author’s discourse aligns itself 
with Scriblerian forms of wit that are quickly being relegated to “writers of the inferior classes” in 
favour of novel productions of the sentimental kind better suited to the new paradigm of original 
composition.  
 Peacock’s real fear, however, arises from the “conceit of being in the presence of an 
atomy informed with spirit” (8). Both “conceived” and “conceited”, the atom figures the ambiguity 
inherent in a concept of the literary object that must balance its merely ideational status as personal 
                                                 
217 “I durst not lift up my eyes,” he confesses, “lest I should behold an apparition more dreadful than the handwriting on 
the wall” (2). 
218 According to William Duff in his Essay on original genius (1767), for instance, “Wit and Humour, though nearly 
ALLIED to true GENIUS, being the offspring of the same parent, are however of a distinct nature” (52). Thus to Duff, 
“Swift was not a GENIUS, at least of a very EXALTED kind” (52) “since his Muse scarce ever rises to the region of 
the Sublime, which is the proper sphere of a great Genius” (note, 53). 
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property with the blatant materialism of its public constitution as commodity. Characteristically the 
eventual recognition of the desecrated and internalized particle of inspiration does little to abate 
Peacock’s confusion, as he begins “to think [him]self insane” and concludes “that the voice was no 
other than the fantastic undulation of a disturbed brain” (9). On the other hand, the atom is 
convinced that Peacock will “be firmly persuaded that I am an actual, independent existence; and 
that this address is not the vague delirium of a disordered brain” (10): “ O incredulous wretch, 
(exclaimed the voice,) I will now convince thee that this is no phantasma or hideous dream…” (10). 
And yet, as an anonymous writer argues in An Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of Literary 
Property (1762), lodged only in the writer’s “internal monitor” (Smollett 11), such immaterial and 
abstracted communication is “so unsubstantial, so void of Reality” (2) that it appears to be little but 
an “airy Phantom” (2). As mentioned, Justice Yates reiterated this view when voting in the case of 
Millar versus Taylor (1769) – the same year the History and Adventures of an Atom was published. 
According to Yates, outwith the paper, the literary object is “all ideal; a set of ideas which have no 
bounds or marks whatever” (qtd. in Burrow 2361). The literary object cannot really be a property, 
for “property has some certain, distinct and separate possession...which has bounds to define it, and 
some marks to distinguish it” (qtd. in Burrow 2361). Unambiguous possession, that is, “requires a 
substance” (qtd. in Burrow 2361) of which the literary object is devoid. Led by Lord Mansfield the 
majority vote, however, went on to assert the “independent existence” and immaterial substance of 
“a set of intellectual ideas or modes of thinking, communicated in a set of words and sentences and 
modes of expression....detached from the manuscript, or any other physical existence whatsoever” 
(qtd. in Burrow 2396): “The property of the copy, thus narrowed, may equally go down from 
generation to generation and possibly continue for ever...” (qtd. in Burrow 2397). Like the atom, 
such “narrowed” property “can neither be annihilated, divided, nor impaired” (Smollett 8), passed 
on intactly from generation to generation. As we have seen, the distinction of such incorporeal 
property is ultimately dependent on the markings of personal identity, which is “the reason why 
these great marks are laid down by all writers” (Yates qtd. in Burrow 2361). It is the singularity of 
the atom, the atom explains, that ensures its authority: “We atoms are singly endued with such 
efficacy of reason, as cannot be expected in an aggregate body, where we croud and squeeze and 
embarrass one another” (4). 
 But if the individuality, indestructibility and indivisibility of the atom are meant to 
suggest the unchanging immortality of the “narrowed” literary object, the process of transmigration 
itself comes to signal the corruptions of an author that “had to be prepared to diversify very 
considerably the kinds of commission he was prepared to accept” (Hammond 72). The “indivisible 
particle” (6) that authors the work explains himself (his “integrity” (16) as well as his powers of 
narration) by reference to “the transmigration of souls, a doctrine avowed by Pythagoras, a 
philosopher of Crotona” (16).219  Indeed, the thought that consciousness could “go along with” 
(Locke, Essay II.xxvii.17 341)” a severed part seems a convenient fantasy for an author set on 
avoiding responsibility for the rest of his corpus. Should Peacock suffer burning at Smithfield 
(where heretics as well as literary reputation ended their lives), the atom assures that he will “be a 
gainer by the next remove” (16): “I should shift my quarter from a very cold and empty tenement, 
which I now occupy in the brain of a poor haberdasher, to the nervous plexus situated at the mouth 
                                                 
219 In a possible parody of Cudworth’s attempt to accommodate the immortality of the soul by atomism, Smollett’s 
narrator affirms “[t]his doctrine though discarded and reprobated by Christians....on the integrity of an atom” (16). In 
The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678) Cudworth objected to the corpuscular version of materialism that if 
a person is seen to consist of a congregation of “small particles” in motion, “every Atom of Matter must needs be a 
Distinct Percipient, Animal, and Intelligent Person by itself” (I.ii 72). This discussion, of course, repeats the question of 
part and whole within which the relation between property and personhood unfolds.  
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of the stomach of a fat alderman fed with venison and turtle” (17). As it is, however, the atom has 
little real control of his peregrinations, as “fate” sees him 
 
enclosed in a grain of rice, eaten by a Dutch mariner at 
Firando, and, becoming a particle of his body, brought to 
the Cape of Good Hope. There I was discharged in a 
scorbutic dysentery, taken up in a heap of soil to manure a 
garden, raised to vegetation in a salad, devoured by an 
English supercargo, assimilated to a certain organ of his 
body, which, at his return to London, being diseased in 
consequence of impure contact, I was again separated, with 
a considerable portion of putrefied flesh, thrown upon a 
dunghill, gobbled up, and digested by a duck, of which 
duck your father, Ephraim Peacock, having eaten 
plentifully at a feast of the cordwainers, I was mixed with 
his circulating juices, and finally fixed in the principal part 
of that animalcule, which, in process of time, expanded 
itself into thee, Nathanial Peacock. (8-9) 
 
Flint reads this passage as a testament to the “indivisible nature” by which the atom successfully 
“surpasses…all boundaries of human containment, yet is one of the most contained things on earth” 
(171). Certainly, figuring the retention of a “singly endued…reason” along the lines of the Lockean 
paradigm of possession by digestion, the atom becomes an emblem of a kind of “mixed” property 
that never quite “mixes in” – a feat that Locke himself, as we have seen, did not achieve. The 
scatology of the passage, however, runs counter to such containment, providing rather a sordid 
image of incoherence.  The primacy of “circulating juices” is suggestive not only of the 
“unpredictable circulation of books in the public domain” (Flint 171), but of a fluidity that merges, 
mixes and disperses what never quite amounts to a coherent body. “[D]igested”, “devoured”, 
“assimilated”, “gobbled up”, “mixed”, “expanded” and “separated again”, the atom never quite 
stays the same. Even when divided into its smallest constituent parts, the literary object is 
threatened not only by the randomness of the public distribution but also by constant, unauthorized 
transformations inflicted by a book market that relies on augmentation, serialization and 
vulgarization. Mixed but never mixed in, the atom remains an independent substance whose 
propriety is always already compromised by the last act of appropriation.   
 Thus with circulation and embodiment come vulnerability and the risk of dissolution. 
Such hazards gain a particular prominence in one group of it-narratives in which the writing 
materials and implements become the narrators of their own adventures in a conspicuously self-
referential move that, as Christina Lupton has pointed out, urges the reader “to imagine the 
perspective of a piece of writing that travels beyond the consciousness of its author” (415). Such it-
narratives as the unfinished “Adventures of the Rambler's Magazine” (1785), The Adventures of a 
Quire of Paper (1779), The History of an Old Pocket Bible (1815) and The Adventures of a Pen 
(1806) explicitly refer to themselves as the material remains of the textual performances and 
production processes they document as well as the readerly and non-readerly acts of appropriation 
they anticipate. Written at the end of the vogue, at a time when a saturated market made authors of 
it-narratives abandon their characteristic mocking satire to transform into moral children’s tales, 
The Adventures of a Pen makes the pen’s powers of narration a result of the author’s feverish dream 
rather than of Pythagorean metempsychosis. “[B]urlesquing the historic mode” (24), the it-
narrative becomes the means of disowning a literary production that is a little too similar to “a taste 
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in writing peculiar to the times” (23) that is all too easily “rendered less estimable by the attempts of 
common imitators” (23). At the same time, authorship is figured as a material instantiation since the 
only connection between works produced by a “universal writer” that does “not confine himself…to 
any particular species of composition” (277) is the physical marks lodged by the writing implement: 
“One hour I dabbled in rhyme, and the next I dipped into philosophy; sometimes I wrote a romance, 
and sometimes a satire against politics; now I penned a sonnet, and then I scrawled out a sermon” 
(277). In a world where economic necessity thwarts any aspiration of generic consistency, what 
binds texts together is not so much their authorial, ideational origins as the coincidental similarities 
of their material production. The pen, however, confesses a longing for the material unity it enjoyed 
when it was “unpolluted by ink, and unacquainted with the vicious drudgery of literary deception” 
(188) before it “was mutilated...into a pen” (25). Literary production rips to shreds the kind 
innocence that relies on the inertness of an organic whole that has not yet been mixed or 
appropriated. Once “the packhorse of the public and the slave of the press, the hireling of 
booksellers and the drudge of letters” (277), the pen fears not only the uncontrolled diversification 
of purpose but also the absolute purposelessness inflicted by overuse, facing the risk of another kind 
of “dreadful inaction” on the “dunghill amongst the litter of the stable…smoking with filth, and 
rotting with ordure” (187). 
 In a similar vein, a pocket bible relating its own history (1815) predicts its imminent 
transformation of literature to litter, complaining of its “tattered condition”  (I 1): “One of my 
covers has long since been missing, and the other hangs only by a single thread. A great part of my 
leaves are torn and soiled as scarecely [sic] to be legible. Indeed I daily expect to be cast into the 
flames…” (I 1)220 The Bible is keen to assert its ideal existence: “The more carefully indeed a 
person studies my inspired pages, the more will he be convinced of their transcendent excellence! 
He will of a truth discover within me an inexhaustible mine of spiritual treasures” (VIII 77). 
Nevertheless it soon becomes apparent that it is its “convenient size” (IX 82) as well as its “elegant 
binding” that are the cause of the bible’s wide circulation. Setting out to discourage “the conduct of 
many professors of religion, who are clamorous in defence of its externals, whilst careless or even 
opposers of vital godliness” (IX 83), the book itself seems more concerned with its material than its 
spiritual integrity: “My covers were tattered and unstitched, several of my leaves were loose whilst 
the ombre tint that pervaded my pages, distinctly pointed out my age and decrepitude. My 
appearance was however venerable. And to a pious mind it could but be delightful to see that whilst 
there were no marks of the wantonness or abuse of my readers, there were various vestiges of their 
having carefully ‘read, marked, learned and inwardly digested’ my sacred pages” (VIII 82). The 
banishment of readerly wantonness and the conceit that only authorized uses will leave physical 
traces only thinly veil the fear for a kind of reception that does not depend on the author’s 
“inexhaustible mine of spiritual treasures” (VIII 77) but on the much more finite and always 
materially embedded uses which readers extract out of the “mine” that is authorial possessive 
interiority.221 Once its “externals” lose their appeal, the bible will be “laid aside as unfit for further 
service” (XI 120) and its “place supplied by a new edition” (XI 120).  
                                                 
220 The British Library duodecimo volume that I had access to several years ago had a precise resemblance to the copy 
described by the it-narrator. My notes testify to the power of self-referenced materiality to make the reader “take a 
closer look at the surface upon which the [text is] printed and at the genre she…is reading as an object disposed to 
‘adventures’” (Lupton, "The Knowing" 414): “NB: First title page just reads THE HISTORY OF AN OLD POCKET 
BIBLE, and is literally “hanging by a single thread”. The spine has been resewn (in a rather amateurish way, with rough 
thread) to keep it together, but the thread has snapped half way down the spine, and now only five stitches and the tape 
with its library reference hold it together. The pages are full of splodges and watermarks, especially the inside of the 
covers. 12mo. Paper/cardboard bound.”  
221 Young too figured the original genius as a miner in a passage that conflates pronominal possession and excavational 
profit: “[A]n inventive genius…is divinely replenished from within…Whether our own genius be such or not, we 
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Like The Adventures of a Pocket Bible, The Adventures of a Quire of Paper (1779) is cast as 
“the vision of a drowsy fit” (451) – a circumstance that does not detract from its efficiency as “a 
warning from above” (452). As Blackwell has noted, the quire of paper draws attention to a 
“tension between dissemination and integrity” typical of the genre by ascribing to a material object 
“a singular identity and a unique point of view”, while also registering “the centrifugal forces...that 
render coherence and lasting identity unlikely” (“Introduction” xiii). Following all the stages of the 
paper-making process from the perspective of a former thistle, the Quire of Paper abounds with 
scenes of torturous transformation and slow disintegration. “[C]rumbled into small atoms,” (357) 
the thistle is sown in a field only to be “daily annihilating by grains, till almost a third of what the 
ravenous birds had left, fell a sacrifice to the scorching beams of an intolerable sun” (357). Only 
after “having undergone a variety of new processes, and pains, under the hands of the combers, 
spinners, skainers, twisters, and weavers” do the thistle atoms emerge “a most delicate texture…of 
cambrick” (358). But even as cambric linen, the narrator fails to remain undivided, as parts of the 
material are used by the queen as pocket handkerchiefs while other parts serve “as spitting cloth to 
an old General full of gout, tobacco, and catarrh” (397). Eventually, some rags end up in a 
papermaker’s buildings where in the “jaws” of a “dreadful machine, whirling round with terrible 
velocity”, they are transformed into “the impalpable pulp” which is “the sort of paper you have in 
your hands now” (451). Here, Locke’s unacceptable yet insistent hypothesis that corpuscular 
divisibility might include consciousness as well as matter provides little relief, as the fantasy of 
authorial omniscience is eroded by the anguish of a divided consciousness painfully aware of the 
potential waywardness and mechanical origin of the material parts in which it is invested. 
Metempsychosis is not the right word for what takes place in The Adventures of a Quire of Paper – 
we are not witnessing the transmigration of a single soul successively inhabiting different bodies, 
but rather the dispersion of a narrative consciousness, its simultaneous inhabitation of different 
bodies. “[I]t was the chief and peculiar curse of my destiny,” the narrator laments, “acutely to feel 
an whole, for the pain, or ignominy of my minutest part while it existed in the same nature with 
myself” (448). While the explicit account of the material fabrication of the paper displaces the 
prefatorial glossing of original inspiration that so often works as “a denial of the multiple hands 
involved in the actual process of literary production” (236), the painful dispersal of consciousness 
comes to imply the precarious possession of an author who has invested himself in a property with 
which he can never completely identify. In parallel to Locke’s person, the survival of the 
eighteenth-century author also becomes a question of how many parts of a corpus can be shifted 
before it is no longer itself. 
 In this light, the value of the it-narrative does not lie, as Olshin suspects, in the 
potential reassessment of the literary canon, but rather in the exposition of the paradoxes inherent in 
its creation. In other words, the it-narrative helps articulate the difficulties of conceptualising 
literature as a movable property that remains “distinct and separate” from yet “singly endued” with 
its proprietor without resorting to mystifications of an immaterial spirit. Parodying the mystification 
of the literary production processes effected by the new conceptions of original composition as well 
as the models of proprietorship on which they rely, it-narratives dramatize the existence of the 
inalienable yet transferable literary object in that imaginative space of unspecified belonging that 
Locke could only provisionally point to. It-narratives literalize the prosopopoeic analogies used by 
the advocates of eternal copyright to draw an impermeable boundary around the operation of 
authorship in order to expose the reality of a book market where books circulate as independent 
                                                 
diligently should inquire, that we may not go a-begging with gold in our purse; for there is a mine in man, which must 
be deeply dug ere we can conjecture its contents.” (45) Gutbrodt writes of this passage: “The Conjectures must be 
deeply dug to get at the contents of the purse it constitutes. The modern author will find ‘a mine’ in himself if he can 
make what he writes, composes, and prints his own property: ‘mine’” (36).  
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miscellanies that “have nothing to do with the rest of the Body” (Locke, Essay II.xxvii.17 341) to 
which they were formerly attached. Lupton argues that it-narratives lay bare the mystifications of 
their production and the contingencies of their material recirculation “without reclaiming writing as 
the property of the people who make it” (Knowing 52). As the printed equivalent of a conscious 
little finger, or a dancing table, the it-narrator exposes the absurd, yet insistent potential of 
independent life in a literary object of perception that has gathered to itself the powers of 
subjectivity through the objectification of personal experiences. From this perspective, it-narratives 
render visible the futility of authorial efforts of containment by pursuing the existence of a post-
acquisitive literary life reliant on material endurance and creative recycling as well as on simple 
exchange value.  
 The transmigrating it-narrator, then, does not only allow writers of a critically and 
legally determined “inferior class” to challenge a conception of “literary excellence” that sacrifices 
“their own anonymous, collaborative, unapologetically commercial enterprise…to the property 
rights of the authors of ‘original’ works of literary excellence” (Englert 239). It also enables them to 
rehearse a vital materiality serving to remind their critics that the appropriative powers of 
consciousness might well rely not on the separation but on the “vital union” of consciousness and 
the materiality in which it is embedded. As Lupton argues, the it-narrative reverses “the joke by 
which sordid materiality becomes the downfall of literature” (Knowing 62) to stage a literary object 
whose success is measured in terms of its enduring circulation as a commodity as well as its 
material independence as a thing, thus providing “the perspective from which the hack writer will 
be recognized as producer” (Knowing 62). Pointing to the vitality of the literary object, its capacity 
to gather up and incorporate a history, the writers of it-narratives set the stage for a kind of writing 
the objectification of which provides rather than denies its claim to legitimacy. Put differently, the 
it-narrative presents us with a moment of resistance that relies less on the negative exposure of the 
fetishism inherent in the newly fangled literary object as a “private property enchanted by its own 
independence and splendour, and wholly immersed in itself” (Marx, “Critique” 169) than it does on 
the positive gesturing towards a less conflicted kind of objectification from which personality 
cannot be abstracted. The object narrator, then, reminds us of Marx’s product of labour, a thing that 
has not lest lost “the meaning of personal, human property” (“Excerpts” 261) or its “specific 
personal nature” (“Excerpts” 261). In short, the it-narrative appears as a revelation of the illusory 
abstraction of personality to create a moment of resistance reliant on rather than transcendent of 
objectification. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
“There is something there, some movement, that resembles the abandon of sovereignty... 
It shows that we can put our center outside ourselves” 
Michel Serres. The Parasite? (1935-36) 
 
A central aim of this thesis has been to draw attention to the involvement of personhood and 
proprietorship in eighteenth-century British print culture. By pointing to the material complication 
of the abstract concepts of subject and object afforded by the historically specific transmutations 
between mobile properties and the personal effects they constitute, the thesis has laboured to 
recuperate the eighteenth century prefigurations of what Marx would call the commodity fetish. 
Aligning itself with recent work on the links between consumerism and personal identity at a time 
when the emerging mass-production and mobility of consumer goods made proprietorship less 
exclusive, the thesis places at the centre of eighteenth century discussions of personhood the 
problem of how to keep hold of one’s personal effects without losing what is essentially one’s own.  
As a contribution to the literary history of fetishism, the thesis has presented a series of 
contextualized readings of eighteenth century satirical literature that have sought to bypass the twin 
errors of fetishization and hypostatization found by Marx in the process of commodification in 
favour of the exploration of a more complex human-material realm. This focus has necessitated a 
re-evaluation of contemporary philosophy, particularly of the Lockean construction of the self-
possessed individual. Part of the objective of the thesis has been to dismantle the reading of Locke’s 
philosophy of personhood as the “impossible home of a man without fetishes” (Pietz, “The 
Problem” 14) to outline the conjectural space opened by Locke’s reliance on metaphors of digestion 
and mixing as well as the figuration of corporealized phantasms, such as the severed finger and the 
changeling. Looking specifically for the points at which the discourse of fetishism doubles back on 
itself to reveal the prejudices of a concept of personhood that relies on personalised property, the 
thesis has sought to probe the pressures rehearsed in satirical literature on Locke’s consciousness-
bound conception of identity provided by the slippage between the categories of having and being. 
Primarily focused on satirical literature, the thesis has traced the anxieties that arise in the 
disjuncture between persons and their “effects”. Although embedded in different discursive 
practices, what characterizes the literary satiric avatars of eighteenth-century personhood are their 
aggregate nature, their tendency to fall to bits with the loss of their properties and their precarious 
position as assembled fictions and material compositions. 
As part of the debate on the nature of fashion and the consumption of luxuries early 
eighteenth-century dressing room poetry reflect the categorial instability of the category of “having” 
produced by the gradual loss of the powers of investiture previously afforded by clothes. Taking its 
point of departure in The Memoirs of the Extraordinary Life, Works and Discoveries of Martinus 
Scriblerus, the first chapters of the thesis have demonstrated how the obsession with disrobing and 
demaquillage exhibited in early eighteenth century writing reflects the precarious balancing of 
personal identity between made-up fiction and material assemblage required by self-fashioning. The 
discussion of how much can be removed while still retaining the impression of coherent lifelikeness 
and propriety is paralleled in the eighteenth century by discussions of the relationship between parts 
and whole in the poetic technique of hypotyposis. In dressing room poems such as Pope’s The Rape 
of the Lock or Evelyn’s Mundus Muliebris, the resistance of the descriptive detail to signify in a 
purely symbolic economy or to function as a merely self-subsisting reality effect is suggestive of 
the material importance of things to a person whose sameness relies on the consciousness of 
properties “not shifted all at once” (Locke, Essay II.xxvii.8 335).  
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In the mid-century, it-narratives rehearsed such fears of identity in parts by drawing on early 
eighteenth-century satires of hack authorship and textual criticism. The legal establishment of 
intellectual copyright was attended by discussions of how to distinguish unindividuated hackwork 
and choppy miscellanies from the original compositions whose indivisibility could be a guarantee 
of true authority. Constructed along the lines of Lockean personhood, the concept of authorship 
hinged on the question of how many parts of a corpus could be shifted before it was no longer itself. 
Staging itself as a thoroughly mixed work, an incomplete miscellany whose integrity rests on an 
endless collection of unwarranted emendations, Swift’s A Tale of the Tub points to the indefinite 
deferral of authority in a culture where limited shelf life replaces poetic immortality. Conversely, 
the satires of writing found in it-narratives such as The Adventures of an Atom and The Adventures 
of a Quire of Paper are used to justify a kind of writing that relies on diversification rather than 
singularity. Stressing instead the nature of books as compound works, material as well as ideational 
compilations, it-narratives question the partition between disembodied originality and material 
concretion. In the process, the it-narrative exploits the imaginative space of transmigration opened 
by the Lockean conception of appropriation, mirroring the antinomies inherent in his metaphors of 
digestion, mixing and superaddition. 
 As suggested in the appendix*, in late eighteenth-century sentimental literature and 
satiric counterparts such as Sterne's A Sentimental Journey such a transmigrational space becomes 
key in the construction of sympathetic transference as personal effects acquire a new importance as 
sentimental barter in the interstice between acquisition and relinquishment. If one resists readings of 
sentimentalism that stress the pictorial distance between the subject and the object that sympathy as 
an imagined projection is meant to bridge, it becomes possible to point to the impasses in the 
conception of sympathy that question the fiction of a self-contained personhood on which this 
projection is predicated. In this re-evaluation of sympathy, the revisitation by physiologists of 
Locke’s problem of how to translate sense impressions into ideas uncovers the volatility of a 
personhood that still relies heavily on the fortuitous encounter between things and people. Even to 
Adam Smith, whose disinterested spectator is often seen as a model of deliberate introjective self-
containment, sympathy occasionally relies on a much more volatile and indiscriminate joining of 
what is one’s own with what is not. The propriety of such an indiscriminate sharing depends on the 
delimitation of the kinds of things to which sympathy is allowed to extend. Like authorship, the 
sentimental object is suspended between the value it accrues in the interstices of the commercial 
circuit and its realization in a process of exchange that depends on the correct evaluation of recycled 
goods. Yorick’s inability to determine which things are worth investing his sympathies in and 
which are not belies the integrity of an insular self uninvolved with the properties its seeks to own.  
Tracing the textual movement between lack and excess, the thesis has focused on such 
breaches of decorum to shed light on what Pocock has called “that world of language in which 
‘property’ – that which you owned – and ‘propriety’ – that which pertained or was proper to a 
person or situation – were interchangeable terms” (104). Mistaking trivial adornment for the 
substance of personhood, eighteenth-century satiric vehicles from Martinus Scriblerus to Yorick 
lose themselves in the promiscuous acquisition and exchange of personalty. Thus the thesis has 
demonstrated how the pretensions of the possessive individual as well as the fictions of a deep self 
that relies on the rigid divisions between interior and exterior parts become potent objects of satire. 
In this context the satirical divestments and exchanges of the eighteenth century ultimately work to 
expose the kind of Enlightenment discourse that seeks to uphold its legitimacy by dissociating itself 
from the previous superstitions of investment and proprietorship that failed to distinguish between 
the symbolic and the actual, between dead abstraction and living reality.  
My readings of eighteenth-century satires of possessive individuality therefore call for a 
complication of the theories of the Enlightenment that predicate its cultural heritage on the mastery 
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of an “all-powerful self [that] becomes a mere having” (Adorno and Horkheimer 6). More than the 
distance of the subject from the object over and against which it defines itself, these texts figure the 
more or less disturbing leftovers that remain when levelling abstraction fails to turn the things into 
objects. Rife with anthropomorphized objects and reified abstractions, the satires explored in the 
thesis have pointed to an acute awareness in eighteenth-century literary discourse of the complicity 
of self-constitution and fetishism. Similarly, by pointing out the magic that turn books into the 
abstract transcription of consciousness, the satires deprive writing of is status as a privileged site of 
knowledge. Like Adorno and Horkheimer, Swift’s hack is aware that “knowing in advance” 
(Adorno and Horkheimer 18) does not provide an exit from deception. Thus the satirical eversions 
of the subject-object divide testify not only to the persistent fears of the “complex concatenation of 
nature in contrast to its individual link” (Adorno and Horkheimer 10) that Enlightenment thinking 
purports to dispel, but also to the pleasures that attend the disclosure of this dialectic. What drives 
the satires on the possessive individual is the same discursive logic that Horkheimer and Adorno 
unfold: the tendency of the discourse of fetishism to turn against its practitioners to disclose their 
own figments of fantasy. In this sense, the satires are governed less by the instrumental rationality 
of disenchantment than by the sensible nostalgia for the immanence lost in things turned into mere 
objects. 
Exposing a certain slippage between the subject and the object to reveal the personal effects 
that lie in between these opposites, the texts explored by this thesis work to reveal the poverty of a 
representational paradigm that rely on facile “equations between the subject and what is not its like” 
(Adorno 191). Thus one of the more bold implications of the thesis – not fully developed here – is 
that the crisis of representation identified by twentieth-century philosophy as the primary ill passed 
on by Enlightenment to modernity is not only produced but also thematized in the eighteenth 
century. Even as the eighteenth century effected the loss of the “manifold affinities between 
existing things” in favour of “the single relationship between the subject that confers meaning and 
the meaningless object, between rational significance and its accidental bearer” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer 7), it also made possible the strategies of description that enables the very articulation 
of this loss, a certain production of supplementarity lodged or hosted within the apparent unity of 
self-possession.  
The location of descriptive details – the luxuries of personal adornment as well as the 
sentimental properties of sympathetic exchange – in between the real and the symbolic is one such 
strategy. Thus the literary fascination with the self-constituting powers of things exhibited by 
eighteenth-century descriptive strategies is perhaps best considered an early example of what 
Tzvetan Todorov terms “the fantastic”, a genre that allows the reader to remain poised between two 
mutually exclusive interpretations of “apparently supernatural events” (25).  Just like Pope’s Lock 
or Swift’s Tale, fantastic literature obliges readers to entertain a certain level of fetishism when 
faced with the animated object. Hesitating between the figurative or psychological reading invited 
by what Todorov calls “the uncanny” and the uncomplicated naturalization that appears in the 
opposed category of “the marvellous”, readers of the fantastic are held in a temporary 
interpretational paralysis when faced with things that defy the logic of the proper. The 
immobilization of readers caused by the fantastic bifurcation of interpretation necessarily 
challenges the “precincts of representational thinking” (Heidegger, “The Thing” 179).  
Lupton points to H. C. Andersen’s Romantic it-narratives as an extension of mid-eighteenth 
century self-reflective it-narratives (“Introduction” xiii). Certainly Andersen’s willingness to endow 
objects as trivial as darning needles, silver shillings and tea pots with singular personalities seems 
akin to the prosopopoeic imagination that fostered the sentimentalized objects so common in the 
previous century. In some cases the tales even mirror the circular return to an appropriate ownership 
rehearsed by eighteenth century sentimental it-narratives, such as when Andersen lets a foreign 
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shilling find its true home with a traveller who recognizes its “genuine stamp”. Similarly, “The 
Shirt Collar” (1848) repeats the self-reflective satire on the matter of writing found in “The 
Adventures of A Quire of Paper”, as we follow the gradual demise of “one of the most remarkable 
shirt collars in the world” from prized possession to rags and, after being the deposited at the paper 
mill, “this very piece of white paper we here see, and on which the story is printed”. Nevertheless, 
the facility with which Andersen’s personified objects are deciphered as mere figures of the 
pretentious self-fashioning of a rising middle class diminishes their ability to work as meditations 
on the objective constitution of personhood or as disruptions of a unified, singular identity. In this 
sense Andersen’s darker tale of “The Shadow” (1847) is a more poignant nineteenth-century 
reflection on the nature of the aggregate self. In this tale a learned traveller and writer of “books 
about the true, the good, and the beautiful” sends his shadow away to the house of poetry only to 
see him return in force, having spent years filling out in the “twilight of [an] ante-room” and 
claiming a privileged view to his interior without ever gaining full access to the “blazing light” in 
the “court of poetry”. Having only glimpsed Poetry “for a very short moment” in the epiphanic 
instant before sleep, the writer yields to the deceptive authority of his former shadow and is 
enslaved, dismissed as madman and eventually executed as an impostor before the shadow is wed to 
the princess. Although the story might seem to belong squarely within the category of the 
marvellous, there are moments when the mimetic vraisemblance disrupts the absorption of the 
supernatural into a facile allegorical interpretation, most prominently in the passages that indulge in 
descriptive detailing:  
 
‘Ah, I hoped you would recognize me,’ said the elegant 
stranger; ‘I have gained so much that I have a body of 
flesh, and clothes to wear’....And as he spoke he rattled 
between his fingers a number of costly trinkets which hung 
to thick gold watch-chain he wore round his neck. Diamond 
rings sparkled on his fingers, and it was all real.  
 
While such passages222 ultimately confirm rather than confuse the distinction between appearance 
and reality, clothes and man, properties and their effects, their efficacy relies on the reader’s 
hesitation between the symbolical and the real. If only for the shortest amount of time, the reader 
must believe that “it was all real” for the simulation to be recognized as such.  
In its reincarnation in the literature of the fantastic, the topos of the aggregate self returns in 
early nineteenth-century gothic constructions of animated automata in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein 
(1818), Heinrich von Kleist’s “On the Marionette Theatre” (1810), or – as recently suggested by 
Julie Park – E.T.A Hoffmann's “The Sandman” (1816).T the climax of Hoffmann's tale is the main 
character’s “horrified recognition” that the lifeless female automaton that is the subject of his 
fascination “is merely a collection of objects” (Park 211). Yet, eighteenth-century fantasies of 
dispossession perhaps most clearly return in the modernist estrangement of the human. Indeed, as 
Viktor Shklovsky suggests, the technique of defamiliarization itself may be best explained as the 
assumption of a point of view outside the human subject that “allow[s] us to perceive the object in a 
special way, in short, to lead us to a ‘vision’ of this object rather than mere ‘recognition’” (10).  
                                                 
222 Also in the following passage the differences between having and being are rendered imperceptible: “It 
was really most remarkable how very much he had become a man in appearance. He was dressed in a suit of the very 
finest black cloth, polished boots, and an opera crush hat, which could be folded together so that nothing could be seen 
but the crown and rim, besides the trinkets, the gold chain, and the diamond rings already spoken of. The shadow was, 
in fact, very well dressed, and this made a man of him.”  
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Thus, the creatures that Marc Lucht and Donna Yarri have termed Kafka’s “fantastic beings”223 
constitute one possible point of consummation for eighteenth-century thinking things. Located in 
spaces that are only occupied by people in passing as the discomfiture of a “broken-down remnant” 
that can nevertheless “stand upright as if on two legs” (427), Franz Kafka’s “Odradek” in “The 
Cares of a Family Man” (1919) is the twentieth-century return of the abominations of Belinda’s 
toilette. An “extraordinarily nimble” collection of “broken-off bits of thread, knotted and tangled 
together, of the most varied sorts and colors” (428), a true matter of concern, Odradek is an emblem 
of Heideggerian thinghood. Even the use of pronouns used about the diminutive trinket slips 
uncomfortably between “it” and “he”. What pains the family father voicing his concerns about the 
strange creature is not only fact that “the whole thing” (428) escapes proper representation, as its 
shape as well as the origins of its name are indeterminate, but also the nagging suspicion that it is 
likely to outlive him. Esther K. Bauer sees Odradek as the disruption of the figural itself224 as well 
as of an ocular paradigm of representation; Odradek is what is left behind once the subject has lost 
its privileged position225 as panoptic surveyor in his own house: “His efforts to define Odradek are 
attempts to push the creature back in the object role and to thus regain the role of subject for 
himself” (Bauer 164). The fear that the family father expresses at the end of the story stems from 
the realization that what is other to the subject ultimately decides its fate – the future belongs to the 
things that cannot quite be named or appropriated, those creatures of the in-between that  “can never 
be laid hold of” (“Odradek” 428).  In such a literary history of the detail, modernism may arise not 
as the extinction of fetishism but as the questioning of the possibility of a making a home without it 
being a matter of concern.  
 Similarly, as a twentieth century version of dispossession, “The Metamorphosis” 
(1915) is not only an exposition of the brutish limits of the human, but also, as Kevin W. Sweeney 
suggests, a “philosophical exploration of the nature of self, personhood and identity” (63). Through 
the gradual independence of the insect body in relation the human consciousness trapped within it, 
Gregor Samsa’s transformation into “a gigantic insect”226 reveals the inadequacy of the Lockean 
insistence on the unifying consciousness as decisive for personal identity. One source of 
uncanniness in the story is the self-directed motion of his “numerous little legs which never stopped 
waving in all directions” (12) combined with the immobility of the lower part of his body “of which 
he c[an] form no clear conception” (13) and which initially proves “too difficult to move” (13). Part 
of the horror of the story resides in the recognition that “something less than a person” (Sweeney 
68) begins to exhibit what Sweeney calls “a motivating character of its own, disrupting the integrity 
of Gregor’s original character” (67). It is a divestment of authority that is paralleled in the removal 
                                                 
223 For a reference of Lucht and Yarri’s anthology of criticism, see Edith Bauer. Todorov does not consider Kafka a 
writer of fantastic literature, placing him instead in another category characterized by the coincidence of the marvellous 
and the uncanny. For a critique of Todorov’s consideration of the fantastic as a genre as well as his insistence on the 
category as a theoretical rather than a historical genre, see Christine Brooke-Rose. 
224 Bauer builds on Detlef Kramer’s description of Odradek as “a figure that is none” (158). She refers to Kramer, 
Detlef. Kafka: Die Erotik des Schreibens. Schreibe als Lebensentzug. Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1989: 166. 
225 The German title is “Die Sorges des Hausvaters”. Whereas the English title is suggestive of the threat Odradek poses 
to the power of linguistic categorization (the families that naming creates), the German title identifies dislocation as the 
matter of concern presented by the creature.  
226 The original reads “ungeheuren Ungeziefer”, and so Stanley Corngold’s translation of the phrase into “monstrous 
vermin” is perhaps more apt. Certainly, as Corngold points out in his article “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Vermin: 
Metaphor and chiasm in Kafka’s The Metamorphosis”, the German phrase carries a number of associations that cannot 
easily be conveyed in English: “Something of the uncanny, mysterious, unfortunate identity of this ‘ungeheures 
Ungeziefer” (monstrous vermin) is conveyed by its etymological background: being ‘ungeheuer’ it is a creature 
unsuited to a household (ungeheures = the Latin infamiliaris); being an ‘Ungeziefer,’ it is a creature unacceptable as a 
sacrifice (Middle High German: ungezibere” (59). For Corngold’s translation, see Kafka, Franz. The Metamorphosis. 
Norton Critical Edition. Ed. and trans. Stanley Corngold. New York: Norton, 1996.  
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of furniture in the familiar bedroom to which Gregor is confined. The prospect of being able to 
“crawl unhampered in all directions” (38) is quickly offset by fear, as Gregor faces “his room 
emptied of furnishing” (38). Beyond its Oedipal associations, the image of Gregor clasped onto the 
glass of a remaining picture of a fur dressed lady is perhaps the most disquieting image of the 
comical desperation associated with the Enlightenment equation of self-possession and the 
appropriation of personal effects. Gregor’s illusory comfort that nothing that is “entirely hidden 
beneath him” can be removed from him works as the final spasm of a personhood that relies on the 
frenzied attachment to the most trivial of possessions. Gregor needs a “good surface to hold on to” 
(40) only because, as Hume cynically remarked, “man is altogether insufficient to support himself” 
(II.ii 226). What awaits Gregor after he is separated from the picture is the melancholy and despair 
faced by Hume’s marionette version of humanity, who collapses in immobility once “you loosen all 
the holds, which he has of external objects” (II.ii 226). 
Repetitively encircling the site of a lost or missed coincidence between the person and the 
properties that constitute its personhood, the literary exposition of eighteenth-century personal 
effects mark that point where the apparent compliancy of the familiar objects that lend continuity 
and mastery to our lives suddenly gives way to an uneasy pliancy beyond our control. As such, 
eighteenth-century satires of the possessive self work as precursors twentieth-century attempts to 
distinguish things from objects to bring into view the otherness of what lies in between the subject 
and the object. Such a heritage would include not only the Freudian uncanny, but also other less 
pathological constructions of thinghood, such as Heidegger’s definition of things as quasi-animated 
forms that we can only apprehend (vernehmen) in “The Thing” (1951-52). While Heidegger defines 
the essence of the object (Gegenstand) as its contraposition, its “over-againstness” (167) in relation 
to the subject, he imagines the emergence of the thing through a complicated movement of 
unconcealment (emerging-withdrawal) that can be understood as the sway of propriation, the 
simultaneous coming into their own of things and men. Objects appear opposite subjects as fixed 
entities in a representational grid; things appear as the result of a fluidity of exchange, a “co-
responding” (181):  
 
[Things] do not appear by means of human making. But 
neither do they appear without the vigilance of mortals. The 
first step toward such vigilance is the step back from the 
thinking that merely represents – that is, explains – to the 
thinking that responds and recalls. (181)  
 
Objects demonstrate how we as subjects master the world, but things show how we as mortals are 
“be-thinged” (bedingt), conditioned in our mortality. Objects are the dead matter of representation; 
things have a life of their own. In this light, the truth presented in the eighteenth-century satires 
dealt with here is that of man given over to the unpredictability of things. If this truth leads to the 
comic horror of the abject in the shape of Belinda’s lock or in the scatological self-consumption of 
Swift’s Bedlam patient, it also leads to the tragi-comical longing for a lost intimacy between a 
person and his properties in the shape of the perfect belonging between property and proprietor in 
sentimental it-narratives. 
 Perhaps the recent “return to things”227 in the humanities has arrived not so much 
because we are experiencing what Heidegger calls the “restless abolition of distances” (“The 
                                                 
227 For a summary of the trend, see Ian Hodder. “The Entanglements of Humans and Things: A Long Term View”. New 
Literary History 45.1 (winter 2014): 19-36. 
 156 
Thing” 164)228 as because fissures are appearing in “the Modern Constitution” (Latour, We Have 
Never 13) that preserves the subject-objet dichotomy only by ignoring the proliferation of hybrids 
so characteristic of the contemporary involvement of humans and nonhumans. Things have moved 
in on us, “shuddering, stretching, and muttering” and beginning “to swarm in all directions, shaking 
the other human actors, waking them out of their dogmatic sleep” (Latour, Reassembling 73). The 
ubiquity of the mobile phone, that most hybrid of objects, is a case in point. “You are more 
powerful than you think,” is the promise made by a recent advertisement for a new mobile phone: 
“You have the power to create, shape, and share your life. It’s right there in your hand. Or bag. Or 
pocket. It’s your iPhone 5s”.229 If the manipulation of docile objects is what premises the 
hypostatization of the object as well as the unequivocal empowering of the subject in this tagline, it 
nevertheless glosses over the ambiguity inherent in all manipulation. As Latour notices, “[t]he hand 
still hidden in the Latin etymology of the world ‘manipulate’ is a sure sign of full control as well as 
a lack of it” (Reassembling 58). Indeed, mobile phones are associated with loss of control and 
improper overconsumption as often as they are with individual empowerment. Afflictions such as 
“nomophobia”, the fear of being without a mobile pone, are fuelled by “android addiction” the 
symptoms of which seem not to differ significantly from the insistent tapping or beating upon snuff-
boxes by Scriblerian fops.230 Recurrent debates over the propriety of mobile phone use prove that, 
like eighteenth-century luxuries, mobile phones are truly matters of concern, loudly mobilizing the 
human community.231 As perfect black boxes, our phones are inconspicuous extensions of our 
selves, “materializations of memory” (Jones and Stallybrass 13), “Store-house of our Ideas” 
(Locke, Essay I.x.3 150) - today’s most personal effects. Language testifies to the imperceptible 
transition from personalized inter-faces to fabricated selves that we might recognize from Locke’s 
account of property in the person.232 While slang expressions such as “crackberry” position mobiles 
as not wholly inactive objects of consumption, generic names such as “smartphone” identify them 
as thinking matter in which the most human of properties has long been incorporated. Aptly named, 
the iPhone spells out its own quasi-subjectivity as an aggregate self in object form. The lowercase 
“i” is not only a breached “it”, an object freed from its plosive occlusion to expose its fronted 
interior but also a suitably reduced “I”, a subject stripped of its transcendental pretensions. While 
the advertisement heralds self-control and monopolized power, the name of its subject shows us that 
in the current state of hybridity only matter itself is capitalized.  
                                                 
228 Heidegger speaks of the acceleration of the modern movement of modern technology that cancels out remoteness 
only at the expense of the nearness in which things thrive. “Near to us are what we usually call things,” Heidegger 
insists (“The Thing” 164).  
229 The text can be found on Apple’s webpage for the iPhone 5s. See https://www.apple.com/iphone-5s/powerful/. The 
locations of the phone mentioned in the text are indicative of just the sort of unperceived nearness that attends  things in 
Heidegger’s description in “The Thing”.  
230 For an account of the origins and prevalence of “nomophobia”, see Eddie Wrenn. “Android addiction” is now so 
widespread that it produces its own inoculation in the form of mobile phone apps that can “curb your smartphone 
addiction”. See Angela Alcorn.  
231 Like eighteenth-century debates on fashion and luxury, the debates surrounding the propriety of mobile phone use 
turn on questions of attachment, excess and depletion couched in unsettling personifications. Titles of articles such as 
“Cell Phone Attachment and Etiquette” (Pewinternet.org, 2012), “Your Cell Phone Is Not Part of Your Body - You Can 
Let It Go” (HuffingtonPost.com, 2014) and “Should You Be Snuggling With Your Cellphone?” (NewYorkTimes.com, 
2010) are suggestive of a recurrent interlacing of property, propriety and selfhood similar to the one recognized in the 
satiric texts dealt with in this thesis. For a deeper insight into the anxieties of loss and dispossession that mobile phones 
bring, see Christine Rosen. Rosen is not an advocate of Latour’s nonmodernity – her fears are unmistakably 
Heideggerian: “Cocooned within our ‘Personal Area Networks’ and wirelessly transported to other spaces, we are 
becoming increasingly immune to the boundaries and realities of physical space” (42). 
232 See Somini Sengupta and Chris Speed. 
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More than the cruel delight that always resides in the nakedness that occurs when we are 
stripped of our pretensions, the pleasure afforded us by eighteenth century satires of the possessive 
self resides in the knowledge that the “possession of being well deceived” (Swift, Tale IX, 83) 
overrides any security afforded by proprietorship of the things that surround us. What the satires 
expose as laughable about the possessive individual is not only the belief that objects can really be 
“owned” but also the reliance on that most fundamental of truths, that “[t]hings are in themselves 
external to man, and consequently alienable by him” (Marx, Capital I.i.2 182). In ways not quite 
accounted for by Marx, the eighteenth-century denudings of an obsessively acquisitive self reveal 
the “loss of and bondage to the object” (Marx Economic 324) that is the precondition of all attempts 
to define and delimit the boundaries on which personhood is built. The crisis in the concept of the 
self-possession encircled by the texts examined here amount to what the original theorist of “quasi-
objects” Michel Serres has called “the abandon [sic] of sovereignty” that proves our sharing, our 
participation in the things that move us: “Participation is the passing of the “I” by passing. It is the 
abandon [sic] of my individuality or my being in a quasi-object that is there only to be 
circulated...Being is abolished for the relation” (“Theory of the Quasi-Object 228). The language 
that has made this truth available for description belongs as much to Belinda’s lock and the 
peregrinations of a quire of paper as it does to our contemporary philosophical counterparts. 
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Appendix: Seizing Sentiments and Mixing Feelings 
 
i. Sympathetic Objects: Sentimental Exchange in Late-Century It-Narratives 
 
“Man is altogether insufficient to support himself, when you loosen all the holds, which he has of external 
objects, he immediately drops down into the deepest melancholy and despair” 
David Hume. Treatise on Human Nature (1738) 
 
Pointing to the dependence of proprietors on the material survival and integrity of their properties, 
it-narratives construct a model proprietorship that does not depend on the “separation of man from 
things” (Marx, Excerpts 263) or on the loss of their “specific personal nature” (Marx, Excerpts 261). 
Although it-narratives do not lack in descriptions of commercial transactions, the value that objects 
communicate in these narratives is not acquired through the conversational relationships between 
the objects themselves (Marx, Capital 177), but through the more intimately affective, yet equally 
tenuous relationships between objects and the people to whom they belong. Lynn Festa argues 233 
that the role played by anthropomorphized it-narrators does not match that accorded to Marx's 
personified commodities:  
 
In these narratives, people do not exist in self-evident 
autonomy, aloof from objects, detached from and prior to 
the things that make and unmake their world…The world 
that Marx’s commodity inhabits is not yet fully realized in 
these books. Indeed, the purpose of these narratives is to 
fend off that day. (Sentimental 117-118) 
 
In other words, in an analysis of the historically specific textual construction of persons and things 
in an economy of circulation, the use of prosopopoeia as a dominant trope in a text is less 
interesting than what that trope is made to express. The proponents of the new paradigm of 
authorial originality infused a material object with a personality of its own to distinguish the 
author’s property in his work from the property in the book transferred to the buyer upon purchase; 
the authors of it-narratives used the same illusion of abstracted personality to highlight their 
integration. In it-narratives books are quite literally embodied personalities in circulation.  What is 
lost in the satirical concretion of the it-narrative is the indiscriminate interchangeability that comes 
with abstraction; what it-narrators produce is not literature, but trash, the kind of “old stuff” that 
will lie “a great while, lumbering [in a] garret” (Johnstone ix). But as Lamb suggests, it is typically 
in places outside the market-place, when “suspended in an intercalary state without a price” 
(“Modern” 156), in the garret, on the dunghill or put away for a newer edition, that the object 
attains self-consciousness and begins its story. Only when it has been “lumbering” for some time 
does any “thinking thing” exhibit the sensory traces, the imprints, that constitute it as a person, and, 
similarly, only by lying as lumber, a heap of disused articles retained from circulation for a while, 
do properties turn into personalty.  
As recycled waste, literature comes to rehearse and create social meanings not bound by the 
transactions of sale and purchase in the marketplace, nor merely guided by immediate use value. 
Schmidgen’s distinction in Eighteenth-Century Fiction and the Law of Property between Marx’s 
capitalist commodity fetish and the “mercantile fetish” that properly belongs to eighteenth century 
                                                 
233 See both Sentimental Figures of Empire (111-125) and “The Moral Ends of 18th- and 19th-Century Object 
Narratives”. 
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is one way of approaching such tales of transvaluation. As opposed to Marx’s fetishized 
commodities, the circulating goods of mercantile fetishism “remain recognizable as human 
extensions, as being directly involved in the process of human reproduction” (122) as well as in the 
production of the human. Deriving their magical properties from their “potential, not actual, 
usefulness” (114) brought out by their circulation, such objects “become protagonists in a ritual that 
is based on an unwavering belief in the secret and unpredictable power of things to create context 
and concrete relationships once they are in the right place” (115). Context-bound and mutable, the 
mercantile good “has not hardened into an independent material reality” but appears as “a porous 
commodity whose identity is shaped by the markedly different zones it inhabits” (121). In other 
words, the biographized objects of it-narratives unlock the life of things beyond their fetishization 
as commodities or objects of use. Thus what distinguishes the pocket bible is not its abstracted text, 
but its “tattered condition”  (I 1), the various ways in which it has been “read, marked, learned and 
inwardly digested” (VIII 82): it is a commodity on the bookseller’s shelf, an heirloom, a gift, a 
stolen good, a magical object in the hands of a fortune teller and a piece of litter. The coin that 
narrates Helenus Scott’s Adventures of a Rupee (1782) is raw material, currency, intended gift and 
curiosity before finally being “safely laid up in a the storehouse of a society of antiquarians” (XXII 
259) among “medals, busts, inscriptions” (XXII 259) and other collector’s items. It-narratives, then, 
illustrate Appadurai’s point “that the commodity is not one kind of thing rather than another, but 
one phase in the life of some things” (17). 
Nevertheless, while the adoration of potential use value might propel the circulation of an 
object, it is another kind of love that brings out the magic an object finds “in the right place” 
(Schmidgen, Eighteenth-Century 115).  As Festa points out, finding the right place is in fact what 
provides the moral impetus for these tales (“Moral Ends”). The pocket bible is tirelessly searching 
for an appropriate votary, expressing discomfort when in the possession of a Methodist preacher 
and taking offense at his transferral from “from one of the best to one of the worst of mistresses” (X 
99). Placed by a new owner in a clothes trunk, the eponymous narrator and protagonist of “The 
Memoirs of a Wig” (1814) finds himself “lying upon a regimental coat, and...scattered sundry 
articles of military dress” (477). It is a condition that makes the wig fear not only that it is “doomed 
to eternal incarceration” but also that “the beauty of my appearance would be entirely lost on my 
ruthless gaoler” (478). The incisive protagonist and narrator of The History of a Pin (1798) believes 
to have “gained my POINT of brightest glory” (107), when after “all the vicissitudes of my 
existence, I was fortunate enough to find myself once again with my first friends, from whom I had 
learnt those precepts, that made me ever after detest vice, and venerate virtue” (104). In The 
Adventures of a Black Coat  (1760) the protagonist enlivens at the prospect of being worn by “a 
young gentleman of a most graceful appearance” (13), having lingered three months “in dull apathy 
and close imprisonment” (12) of a closet, a disowned state that is “worse than total dissolution” 
(12):  
 
I was fearful of being something too large, but the desire I 
had to accompany this agreeable youth, made me contract 
every thread to clasp him; and I so far succeeded, that he 
seemed equally pleased with me as I with him. In short, we 
soon left the neighbourhood of St. Gile’s, and with genteel 
deportment he conducted me towards the court end of the 
town, each, if I may be allowed to say so much in my own 
praise, lending grace to the other. (13) 
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Such passages describe a kind of belonging that substitutes the legal, economic or acquisitive bonds 
that tie objects to their owners for mutual appreciation and affective intimacy. In the image of the 
coat the old idea of investiture as “a form of incorporation” (Jones and Stallybrass 275) is given a 
sentimental form.  No longer signifying social rank or the “ordered transmission of authority” 
(Jones and Stallybrass 275), the act of dressing becomes a immensely personal symbiosis between 
an individual-in-the-making and a singularized object, “each...lending grace to the other”. As 
person and property rub off on each other, as the coat clasps its owner with every fibre of its 
existence, one imperceptibly glides into the other in a perfect fit.  
A bizarrely pathetic expression of sentimental belonging, however, is to be found in 
The Adventures of an Ostrich Feather of Quality (1812), a narrative that exhibits the circular plot of 
loss and restoration of properties to their rightful owners that in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century came to supplant the endless and arbitrary perambulations of early it-narratives (Festa, 
“Moral Ends” 324-325). The narrative revolves around a dual loss and return of the ostrich feather 
to its rightful owner, and of “the brave Captain Dorville” (116) to his fiancée, with the same 
virtuous Caroline in both recipient roles. The following exchange takes place at the moment of 
denouement when both objects of love have been safely recovered: 
 
- Don’t be alarmed, said she; but you must know the history 
of that dear Feather is very surprising. She then, in as short 
a manner as it was possible, related the History of the 
Feather. Captain Dorville was delighted, and condescended 
to give me many gentle strokes with his hand; and 
Caroline, affectionately taking me from him, said she 
would preserve me with her life; and never, but to Sophia, 
would she suffer me out of her possession.  But, what was 
the gentlemen’s astonishment when they heard the Feather 
speak! which it did, in the following manner: 
 
This is the happiest moment I have experienced since I left 
the extremity of my mother’s wing! To see this amiable 
family happy, and my dear captain restored to peace of 
mind, is almost too much for my feelings. It is more than I 
could expect, after the vicissitudes, the ill-treatment, I have 
experienced, and the vagrant, rantipole life I have led...I am 
now repaid for every thing...I am convinced every thing is 
so connected in life, that the great wheel which turns the 
affairs of the world, brings all things for our good in the 
end, even to a feather. (151-152) 
 
There are a few things to note in this sentimental passage, in which the feather freely communes 
with everybody who is touched by it. (Captain Dorville might be astonished to hear the feather 
speak, but in fact in this it-narrative, objects express themselves so prominently that they have to 
whisper to avoid being heard by the people who surround them (124-125).) The feather’s take on its 
return spells out what Festa calls “the ideological labour” (Sentimental 119) undertaken by the 
narrative form. The restoration of the lost property to its rightful owner underwriting the conviction 
that “every thing is…connected in life” forces the rantipole vagrancies of commercial traffic into a 
perfect circle, a neat loop that masks the impersonal nature of market relations as well as the social 
inequalities derived from its contingencies (Festa, “Moral Ends” 323; Lynch, Economy 98).  It is a 
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move that renders “the great wheel which turns the affairs of the world” both providential grace and 
imperial commerce. Although this legitimization of commerce occurred throughout the century, 
from Mandeville’s paradox of private vices and public benefits to its more succinct formulation in 
the abstract personification of Adam Smith’s invisible hand,234 its appearance in this context is 
suggestive of a complicity of sentimental discourse with the commercial circulation it attempts to 
contain. It is a complicity that is confirmed by the feather’s claim that it is “now repaid for 
everything” by the sight of “this amiable family”.  
Critics such as Ellis, Festa and Schmidgen argue that sentimentality veils political 
conservatism as emotional excess. Uncovering “the language of commerce in the rhetoric of 
sentimentalism” (Politics 139), Ellis finds that “many sentimental novels evolve complex systems 
to commodify virtue by assigning cash values to sentimental moments” (Politics 129): “Sentimental 
scenarios tend to close with an attempt to fix the value of the sentimental relation by an analogous 
exchange relation, for example the trading of snuff-boxes, or Yorick’s attempt to overpay the grisset 
[in Sterne's A Sentimental Journey]” (Politics 129). Indeed, in many sentimental novels sensibilities 
are moral as well as tradable goods. Measuring the effectiveness of the sentimental display against 
the implied debt Caroline has incurred by allowing her personal property to suffer the vicissitudes 
of circulatory life, the feather aligns itself with sentimental heroes such as Henry Brooke’s “fool of 
quality”, Harry Clinton, or Sarah Scott’s hero, Sir George Ellison, both stock figures of the 
benevolent gentleman in search of sentimental tales of distress worthy of being rewarded in cash 
“according to a perversely precise system of valuation” (Ellis, Politics 135). Sir George reserves 
150 pounds a year for the relief of imprisoned debtors. Always allowing “himself time enough in 
each place, to examine thoroughly into the characters, former circumstances, and every particular 
relative to the prisoners” (II.iv 76), Ellison has time to indulge himself in “the superior pleasure” 
(II.iv 77) offered by the “delightful” (II.iv 77) scenes relayed to him. Similarly, in Brooke’s novel, 
Mr. Clement instructs young Harry to find deserving poor in debtors’ prison and reward them 
according to the depth of their sensibility to their surrounding fellow prisoners: “[T]hose among 
them who are most affected by the distresses of their fellows, ought to be the principal objects of 
your own charity and relief” (XII 171). Although Harry spends the astounding sum of 1500 pounds 
on this exercise in benevolence, Mr. Clement is convinced that he “shall be overpaid and enriched 
by the narration” (XV 217).  
Disguising calculated exchange as benevolent bequest, sentimentality models 
emotional sincerity on just economic distribution. According to this kind of argument, it-narrators’ 
                                                 
234 Emma Rothschild, Gavin Kennedy and Peter Minowitz have all pointed to the potential self-referential core of a 
clever trope that points to the seductive power of skillful manipulation. That Smith made a connection bewteen the 
mystifications effected by the diffuse non-human agency that seemingly guides trade and those achieved by rhetorical 
manipulation can be seen in his first mention of the trope in his History of Astronomy (published 1795, but written 
before The Theory of Moral Sentiments) in which he mocks the Roman belief in “the invisible hand of Jupiter” as the 
“pusillanimous superstition which ascribes almost every unexpected event, to the arbitrary will of some designing 
though invisible beings” (qtd. in Minowitz 406). Thus, Rothschild argues, when using the trope in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, he is not unaware of the irony inherent in his own use of an ornamental figure of 
speech that depends on what in a lecture on Shakespeare’s use of metaphors Smith calls “the allusion betwixt one object 
and an other” (qtd. in Kennedy 243). Certainly, both the hand of trade and Smith’s rhetorical handling of the subject are 
concerned with the yoking together of otherwise unconnected objects. Thus, the invisible hand “is not a discovery of 
inherent order”, but a sign of the “suceptibility of public men; of their propensity to be led by the imagination, or by the 
love of beauty and order” (Rothschild 137). The rhetorical magic that caters to this susceptibility gives us a glimpse of 
the invisible, though less intangible, authorial hand whose “little ornaments…trinkets, gewgaws” (Wealth I.iii.42 289) 
become potent objects of fascination in their own right. The trope, Rothchild argues, is used as a “self-ironical joke” 
that points to a double consciousness that forms part of Smith’s critique of material and rhetorical trinkets or 
ornemantation:  “It is difficult, Smith himself says in the ‘History of Astronomy,’ to speak of scientific systems as 
‘mere inventions of the imagination,’ and not to ‘make use of language…as if they were real chains [of] Nature” (136).   
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efforts to find their “right place” among the virtuous few work as a convenient legitimization of the 
concentration of wealth: “By implying that the problem lies not in institutions but in the character of 
those who use them, the [it-narrator] personalizes systemic exploitation. Good owners redeem 
unjust property claims” (Festa, Sentimental 121). As Festa has pointed out, while such criticism 
reveals the ideological bias of sentimental property, it tells us little about how it is constituted; or 
rather, in “gleefully stripping off the altruistic veneer to reveal the self-interest beneath” 
(Sentimental 70), these analyses must necessarily dismiss the very notion of sentimental 
appropriation and its basis in the object’s “sensuous capacity to store up the human’s living being” 
(Sentimental 73 my emphasis). In other words, what such criticism leaves unexamined is the 
assumption not only that “gift exchange and commodity exchange are fundamentally contrastive 
and mutually exclusive” (Appadurai 11), but also that the border between persons and their 
properties is impermeable.  
It is a prejudice that betrays itself in the analytical favouring of spectatorship as a 
paradigm for sentimental experience that takes its point of departure in Adam Smith’s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (1759). Smith constructs sympathy as an “illusion of the imagination” (I.i.I.10 13) 
whereby a “bystander” (I.i.I.10 13) comes to feel “something which is not altogether unlike” the 
emotions of his fellow-being “by changing places in fancy with the sufferer” (I.i.I.1 10). The 
emotional replica produced by Smith’s sympathy – in itself nothing but “the impressions of our own 
senses only” (I.i.I.1 9) – is further removed from its object by the introduction of an impartial 
spectator, determining the propriety of the bystander’s reactions: “We must look at ourselves with 
the same eyes with which we look at others; we must imagine ourselves not the actors, but the 
spectators of our own conduct” (III.i.2 111).235 It is a self-reflective process that transforms the 
sympathetic actor to a passive onlooker. Referencing Smith, Benedict believes that sentimentality 
“seeks to modify...excessive sympathy” (Framing 9) and “criticize[s] immersion in feeling praising 
the rational and aesthetic pleasures of distance” (Framing 18). Ellis casts the sentimental hero as a 
calculative voyeur and writes of sentimental “scenarios” that “work by being personalized, unique 
and discrete, so as to place the maximum pressure on the relation between the subject and the 
viewer, yet manage or mystify that pressure so as not to threaten the position of the viewer” 
(Politics 72). In Eighteenth-Century Fiction and the Law of Property, Schmidgen too finds that 
sentimentalism is a “movement toward pictorial isolation” (144) which derives its force from 
objectified tableaux “whose self-conscious pictorialism, circumstantial detail, and undisturbed 
intimacy provoke an emotional response that is predicated on our distance from it” (144): 
“Sentimental commerce...is centrally about increasing the intensity of sympathetic connection by 
creating pictorial effects of enclosure, distance, and absence” (146). As a series of arresting scenes, 
sentimental fiction, Schmidgen argues, leaves readers as well as protagonists as passive spectators 
“without the ability to participate in the scene in more tangible ways” (144).  
And yet, the exchanges between the feather and its owners are anything but intangible; 
the feather is a sentimental hero who is directly involved in, and quite literally grasped by the 
prospects he contemplates. An unsympathetic reader might find that the feather provides not only 
emotional communion but also erotic titillation. Or rather, when interpreted as a metaphoric 
repository for the caresses that are not exchanged between its owners, the feather acts as a 
convenient agent of politeness, sublimating sexuality and transforming physical touch into 
emotional movement. The thoroughly sensuous transaction that takes place here is easily 
deciphered as a displaced sexual intercourse.236 This kind of reading would certainly work to 
                                                 
235 The passage was inserted in Smith’s revised edition of the work in 1761. 
236 Cf. the masturbatory connotations of the “many gentle strokes” that Captain Dorville awards the feather “with his 
hand”. Sterne uses the same bawdy pun in the description of the exchange of snuff-boxes that take place in A 
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confirm generic expectations – descriptions of eroticism figured prominently in it-narratives, not 
just in translations and imitations of French nouvelles risquées such as Claude Crébillon’s The 
Sopha (1742) and Dennis Diderot’s The Indiscreet Jewels (1749), but also in numerous semi-
pornographic scenes of it-narratives that not exclusively centred on the erotic. 237 The bank-note, for 
instance, narrates an entire chapter from a newly-wed woman’s cleavage, a position that the narrator 
invites the reader to imagine with appreciation, “if thou hast any sensation” (I.iv 51): “[D]issolved 
in pleasure, I lay gasping and panting like a great carp in a fishmonger’s basket, placed in a vale 
between two snowy mountains” (I.iv 53-54). In a later scene nothing is left to the imagination, and 
only the object shows signs of more delicate sentiments fitting for a being of a finer constitution: 
“[S]eizing his beautiful bride round the waist, he pressed his bosom so hard against her’s [sic], that 
one of his buttons, taking me under the fifth rib, gave me so much pain that I instantly fell into a fit” 
(I.iv 54). If the feather absorbs the erotic tension that threatens to vulgarize the conveyance of 
virtue, the bank-note here becomes the carrier of true sentimental feeling, helplessly immobilized 
by the blatant physicality of an unashamedly erotic encounter. At the same time the bank-note’s 
earlier admission calls into question the sincerity of an anguish that is so easily “dissolved in 
pleasure” (I. iv 53).   
Even without activating its latent eroticism, however, the scene in The Adventures of 
an Ostrich Feather of Quality points to the necessity of animating what Ann Jessie van Sant calls 
“the physical meanings of such psychological terms as feeling and touching” (93). Indeed, in this 
scene sentiment is inextricably connected to touch. The verbal exchange of feeling between people 
seems predicated on the physical traffic between human and thing; delight and affection are not 
only expressed by but also passed on with the fondled object. The feather acts as a kind of 
anticipation of a wedding ring, a symbolic confirmation of the rekindled alliance between the once 
separated lovers. Caroline’s pledge to preserve the feather from straying out of her possession again 
is easily decoded as a pledge of faithfulness to Captain Dorville. Certainly more in the object than 
its potential usefulness (or even less its market price) is being exchanged here. Yet, the stress on the 
tangibility of the feather suggests a slippage from the symbolic to the fetishistic in its adoration of 
material sensuousness. It is the contiguity of the object to its possessors, the physical handling of it, 
that holds the key to this exchange. What goes on here is both spiritual metempsychosis and a 
material osmosis; like Locke’s proprietor, Captain Dorville has “joined to it something that is his 
own” that is transferred along with the object, which can then be treasured and preserved.  
 Not just personal, but interpersonal (Festa, Sentimental 121), this kind of property 
finds its right place where it is appreciated the most. Love, not potential usefulness, nor merely 
abstract exchange value is the key to its value. In Sarah Trimmer’s The Silver Thimble (1799), the 
eponymous protagonist is eventually “restored again to the possession of Miss Steady” (113) and 
promptly “honoured with a place in a repository for keepsakes” (112). The thimble is “bent worn-
out” (112) and “not worth a farthing” (112), but as a remembrance it is “just as valuable as any 
other trifle in the box” (112). What is fetishized is what Igor Kopytoff calls the “autonomous 
cognitive...process of singularization” (83) of properties that emerges out of their material 
instantiations. Festa’s concept of “sentimental value” is useful in this context: 
 
                                                 
Sentimental Journey (1767), in which the monk insistently rubs “his horn box” (I 21), which is only passed on “as soon 
as it had acquired a little air of brightness by the friction” (I 21). 
237 Crébillon’s novel was originally published in 1740, Diderot’s was anonymously published in 1748.  
 164 
What is loved in the sentimental object is not, however, the 
object’s use value (the child does not love its blanket for its 
capacity to keep it warm) but something close to its 
sensuous capacity to store up the human’s living being 
(thus its softness, its smell, and the fact that it brings 
warmth have meaning). (Sentimental 73) 
 
Superfluous “trifles”, decorative accessories and other luxuries that are not consumed on account of 
their usefulness are well-suited carriers of sentimental value. But even money, that most 
exchangeable of commodities, may be invested with proprietary emotion. In The Adventures of a 
Silver Penny (1882), a schoolboy takes “a fancy” (1782, 12) to a penny that is treasured as a 
“pocket piece” (12) until it is once again snatched from its owner by his cousin “notwithstanding 
the value he told her he had for me” (24). When deposited to a Holborn pawnbroker along with two 
bundled shirts, Scott’s rupee remarks on its owner’s disposition in terms of emotional rather than 
economic loss: “The shirts he left with much pleasure, but I could see his pain on producing me” 
(135). Unlike Marx’s commodities, then, the sentimental object acquires rather than suspends its 
particularity in the process of exchange, feeding off the people in whose hands it is held. It is a 
process of appropriation that can only take place in close physical proximity – the further away an 
object strays from its owner, the more likely it is to be snapped up in commercial circulation, its 
personality once again subsumed by the more generic considerations of the market.  
Samuel Johnson’s 1755 Dictionary of the English Language has no entry for 
“sentimentality” 238 and only a very unsentimental description of the term “sentiment”, which he 
explains without any reference to feeling (in either senses of the word), providing instead the 
definition of “a striking sentence in a composition” (vol. II) that Blackstone would use in his 
defence of literary copyright.239 Sentimentality to Johnson, then, is either “[t]hought, notion, 
opinion” or  “[t]he sense considered distinctly from the language or things” (vol. II). Leaving 
unexplained how to extract the “sense” from the “things” in which it is embedded or how to make 
palpable thought once such an extraction had succeeded, the phrasing nevertheless points to the 
conceptual difficulties lodged in the idea of sentimental transaction. No less than the spiritual 
substance that is the literary object, the sentimental object “by its very nature leaves the person who 
has it in a condition suspended between proprietorship and exchange” (Lynch, Economy 115), 
determined to keep to himself what is inherently mobile. If the sentimental object secures 
personality by withdrawing personal effects from commercial exchange, it also puts it at risk by 
mobilising and materialising feeling in the sentimental exchanges through which it is imparted. Not 
unlike the proponents of perpetual copyright, sentimental proprietors, in other words, want to have 
it both ways, clinging to their sentiments while having others consume them. The transferral of 
personal properties imbued with sentimental value is one solution to this paradox employed in 
sentimental fiction. A physical repository of the “little time” (Locke, Essay II.xxvii.25 346) that it 
takes for one personal property to turn into another, singularized personalty becomes a testing 
ground for the problems inherent in sentimental exchange as such.  
 
                                                 
238 According to The Oxford English Dictionary the word was coined only in 1749 by Samuel Richardson in a letter to 
Lady Bradshaigh.  
239  Rose cites Johnson’s involvement in the issue of copyright on the basis of Boswell’s paraphrase of his “decantation” 
on the subject at a 1773 dinner (Rose, Authors 85-86). A more public involvement is his 1739 Considerations on the 
Case of Dr. T[rapp]’s Sermons in which he argues – as he did throughout his life – for the author’s limited copyright. 
Robert DeMaria has written on the Considerations and Johnson’s stance on copyright.  
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Yet, if the sentimental property leaves behind the kind of porosity that Schmidgen 
finds in the mercantilist fetish in order to locate a value in personalty less dependent on the 
“different zones it inhabits” (Schmidgen, 32), it still operates in terms of physical contiguity and 
tangibility to sustain a “tangible continuity between human and material spheres” (Eighteenth-
Century 140-41). The sentimental exchange of personal effects may perfectly seem to picture Adam 
Smith’s  triangulation of sympathy with a singularized object cast in the regulatory role of the 
indifferent spectator who channels the pathetic vision of, for instance, an “amiable family” while 
ensuring that it does not become “too much” for feeling (Ostrich 152). Put differently, as a 
concretion of what Festa calls “the splintering of the self into multiple personality positions” 
(Sentimental 28) required by Smithean sympathy, the sentimentalized object realizes the desire for a 
materialisation of emotion that will render the sympathetic exchange of feelings possible without 
constituting a mingling. Conveniently externalized, the personal effect makes it possible to grasp 
another’s feelings without losing the hold of one’s self.  On the other hand, this exchange of 
personal effects is itself predicated on an attraction to things, a sympathetic exchange that does not 
occur between human beings through the transfer of things, but between objects and their owners 
through the contiguous transport of feeling or touch. Unaccounted for by Smith’s spectatorial 
model, this kind of sympathetic tactility has its roots in a much older paradigm of sympathies and 
antipathies in which the late-eighteenth-century theories of animal magnetism found their 
antecedent.  In order to flesh out this argument, however, I want to leave the question of what is 
exchanged in the sentimental encounter, to deal with the form it takes, the mechanisms of sympathy 
through which feelings are mobilized. 
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ii. The Love of Things: Touching Things and Constructions of Sympathy 
 
“Even for some inanimate things we have a sort of tenderness, which by a licentious figure of speech might 
be called sympathy.” 
James Beatty. Elements of Moral Science (1790) 
 
As indicated by Justice Yates’ query in connection with the Millar v. Taylor case, the 
question of whether or not sentiment could be “seized” was a central issue of the period. The 
centrality of touch to the sentimentalization of value reveals the inadequacy of accounts that explain 
sentimentality solely in terms of its spectatorial mechanisms. Thus theorists such as G. J. Barker-
Benfield, G. S. Rousseau,240 John Mullan, Anne C. Vila, Ann Jessie van Sant and recently 
Catherine Packham have all attempted to complicate the spectatorial model of sentimentalism, 
reminding us that sentimentalism was part of a much broader “culture of sensibility” also 
encompassing the emerging physiology of the nervous system.241 The most valuable insight that 
these scholars have provided is that the crossing of these two genealogies dislodges the ambiguity 
inherent in the sentimental vocabulary. Stressing the integration of the mental and the physical, of 
touch and vision, van Sant notes that although “sensibility” tended to designate “the processes of 
sensation” (4) and “sentimentality” tended to denote a “refinement of thought” (4), “each term got 
pulled into the primary context of the other” (7) as the century wore on.242  
The issue at the heart of the culture of sensibility as well as its scientific counterpart is 
how to bring these two spheres into the same equation: how do “the processes of sensation” 
translate as “the refinement of thought”, how do mental modulations turn into an object of 
perception? As David Fairer suggests, this too is the issue at the heart of the sentimental encounter 
in the prose fiction that belongs to the sentimental mode. The problem is not only how to share the 
properties of my feelings, the particularities that make them so integral to my subjective experience, 
without losing them entirely, but how to impart as my lived, embodied reality what you can only 
have an idea of in the first place.  Locke grapples with the problem in the Essay when he tries to 
define the nature of the “impressions” on which our personalities hinge, trying to mediate between 
primary qualities that are immanent in the object and secondary qualities that “no other Reality than 
what they have in the Minds of Men” (II.xxx.4 373). The problem for Locke is how to conceive the 
point of contact between these two spheres, in other words, whether to understand the impression 
made on the mind by external objects figuratively or literally.  At some point in the process of 
storing up sense-impressions as ideas, “object and idea must touch (in the sense that one brings 
about the other)” (Fairer 136). The question is “whether the ‘touching’ is at the level of substance or 
idea” (Fairer 136). Transforming the fragmented impressions of our encounters with disconnected 
objects into the continuity of a merely “Forensick” personhood (II.xxvii.26 346), Locke’s 
philosophy is dependent on a projected coherence susceptible to falsification. Little but “a 
Collection of a certain number of simple Ideas, considered as united in one thing” (II, xxiii, 305), 
Locke's self promotes what Lamb has called “a state of affairs in which an expedient fictionality 
assigns...a kind of coherence that real knowledge cannot supply” (“Locke’s” 195). Thus the new 
                                                 
240 Rousseau dates the suggestion to look for the origins of sensibility beyond the moral philosophers of the mid-century 
to an essay written by R.S. Crane’s in 1934. Crane writes:  “[I]f we wish to understand the origins and the widespread 
diffusion in the eighteenth century of the  ideas which issued in the culture of sensibility, we must look, I believe to a 
period considerably earlier than that in which Shaftesbury wrote…” (qtd. in Rousseau 142). To my knowledge, 
however, Rousseau is the first to uncover the contemporary physiological understanding of the term. 
241
 According to this approach, the trajectory of sensibility that terminates in the sentimental novel does not go from 
Shaftesbury to Adam Smith via Hume and Hutcheson, but from Newton and Locke to Robert Whytt though Albrecht 
von Haller and David Hartley. This is also the historical lineage van Sant outlines. 
242 Van Sant draws on Barker-Benfield’s work, which also stresses the integration of the physical and the mental. 
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physiology laboured less to “dissolve the barrier between thought and feeling” (Barker-Benfield 4) 
than to revisit this “Lockean mystery” (Fairer 136).  
If moral theories of sympathetic exchange were predicated upon “a self with 
improperly policed, porous boundaries” (Schmidgen, Eighteenth-Century 36), physiology gave this 
porosity a material foundation. Physiologists such as Robert Whytt, William Cullen, Alexander 
Monro and William Smith used Newton’s idea of ether to explain how the immaterial could come 
into contact with material objects. In A Dissertation on the Nerves (1768) Smith sets out to 
demonstrate the existence of a “connecting medium” (III 44) in the form of an “infinitely fine and 
elastic fluid” (III 49) contained in the nerves, which amounted to “the cement between the human 
soul and body” (III 49). In this kind of bodily fluidity sympathy became a key physiological 
concept, the exchange of feeling relying on what in Observations on the nature, causes, and Cure of 
those Disorders which have been called nervous, hypochondriac, or hysteric (1765) Robert Whytt 
calls “the sympathy of the nerves” (v). Explaining the “very remarkable consent between various 
parts of the body” (vi) as the effect of “a general sympathy which prevails through the whole 
system”, Whytt admits that the mechanisms through which it works remain “not a little obscure” 
and cannot be expected to “admit as clear an explication as matters that are less intricate” (viii). As 
Evelyn Forget notes, it is this obscurity that leaves room for what Locke would have called 
“extravagant conjecture” and “wild fancy”243 (Essay II.xxiii.13 303, 304): “[U]ncertainty about the 
process by means of which somatic communication occurred allowed scientists to entertain 
sometimes fantastic speculations, and it was through these speculations that the broader associations 
of sympathy infected scientific discourse” (Forget 295).  
In this way sympathy comes to work as an index for the gap between sensation and 
thought. Thus, although nerves constitute the physical connections of sympathy, sympathy also 
exceeds physicality. The sympathy between the ear canal and the organs of respiration, for instance, 
“cannot be owing to any connexion between their nerves, or indeed to any mechanical cause, but 
proceeds from a particular feeling, and must be referred to the sensorium commune” (Whytt, 55). 
Commonly thought of as “that part of place where the sensible soul is supposed more immediately 
to reside” (Chambers’ Enyclopædia (1729), qtd. in Dussinger 3), the sensorium commune was 
shorthand for the mystery connection between corporeal impression and incorporeal idea.244 Where 
there is no physical link, “the force of the imagination” (Whytt 222) comes into play: 
 
We observe a remarkable sympathy between many parts, 
whose nerves have certainly not the smallest 
communication with one another. Thus...the flux of the 
saliva into the mouth of a hungry person at the sight of 
savoury food...[is proof] that the stomach and salivary 
glands sympathize with the retina. (Whytt 42)  
 
In such cases sympathy arises “through the intervention of the brain and sentient principle: for 
thinking strongly on savoury victuals...will have almost the same effects on some people, as seeing 
                                                 
243 In the chapter on “Our Ideas of Substances”, Locke apologizes for entertaining a “wild fancy” of angelic creatures 
that “can so frame, and shape to themselves Organs of Sensation or Perception, as to suit them to their present Design 
and the Circumstances of the Object they would consider” (Essay II.xxiii.13 304). Such speculation on alternate “ways 
of Perception” are ultimately purposeless, as “our Thoughts can go no farther than our own, so impossible it is for us to 
enlarge our very Guesses, beyond the Ideas received from our own Sensation and Reflection” (Essay II.xxiii.13 304). 
To Locke sympathy in Smith’s sense would have constituted nothing more but an “an extravagant conjecture”. For 
more on this, see Lamb’s  article on “Locke’s Wild Fancies” (2007).  
244 For a general account of the notion of the sensorium commune in the eighteenth century as well as a specific account 
of its place in A Sentimental Journey, see John Dussinger. The present quote is from Chamber’s Encyclopædia (1728).   
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them.” (Whytt note 42). The sympathetic bridging of distance through the power of imagination 
effectuates the transformation of sympathy from a physiological into social concept:  
 
[T]here is a remarkable sympathy, by means of the nerves, 
between the various parts of the body; and now it appears 
that there is a still more wonderful sympathy between the 
nervous systems of different persons, whence various 
motions and morbid symptoms are often transferred from 
one to another, without any corporeal contact or infection. 
 In these cases, the impression made upon the 
mind or sensorium commune [is made] by seeing others in 
a disordered state... (Whytt 219-220)  
 
Defending his refusal to explain the mechanisms of such “wonderful” phenomena, Whytt has 
recourse to Newton’s theory of gravitational attraction: “Sir Isaac Newton did not pretend to explain 
the cause of gravity, yet he made no small improvement” (vii). The enigma of sympathy remained. 
Others were less comfortable with the role of the imagination in the production of 
sympathy. Forget points to Seguin Henry Jackson’s 1781 Treatise on Sympathy in which Jackson 
pinpoints the dangers of the “wild fancies” of sympathy: 
 
There is not a doubt, but the force of imagination often 
gives energy to our actions. It may, however, unless we are 
much on our guard, easily delude us aside from reason. It 
has been the tree which has yielded the fruits of 
superstition in former times, and which has often fed the 
human mind with the most extravagant notions of 
sympathy. Sympathy of this kind, such as the power of 
charms, and the like, are now pretty generally exploded. 
   (102-103)  
 
However, the magic of sympathy proved more difficult to “explode” than Jackson would have us 
believe, its longevity suggested not only by the recurring lexis but also by its resurfacing in texts 
that purported to dismiss it.245 In other words, in recognising an “obscure” form of sympathy that 
did not rely on “any corporeal contact or infection,” Whytt aligns himself with a conception of 
sympathy that was increasingly identified as an irrational. As Jackson points out, Whytt’s 
description of sympathy as a “general” expression of “consent” forms part of “the old language” 
which is “liable to some objections and restrictions” (173).  
The “old language” to which Jackson objects is outlined in Jonathan Lamb’s book on 
The Evolution of Sympathy in the Long Eighteenth Century  (2009). Lamb argues that eighteenth 
century moral theories of sympathy should be considered in the context of an older paradigm, an 
ancient vocabulary of sympathies and antipathies in which sympathy was the name for the cosmic 
binding power, conceived as the universality of magnetic or, later, gravitational attraction and 
repulsion as well as for corpuscular exchanges connecting the entities of the world. Writing at the 
                                                 
245  Jackson himself ends his book in a rejection of the old system that is at best partial: “I cannot conclude the subject 
without observing that the influence of sympathy even extends itself to the inanimate part of nature…The whole world 
was formerly supposed by the ancients to sympathize in all its parts. Their doctrines were, however, carried too far, and 
built upon superstitious principles, though they were occasionally supported by many observations... “ (113).  
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very beginning of the century, H. M. Herwig summarizes the position in The Art of Curing 
Sympathetically (1700):   
 
Sympathy is a mutual and natural affection and 
combination between natural things...from which affection 
it proceeds, that one body attracts another to itself...Others 
call sympathy a consent, when certain things are joined 
together by a mutual marriage, as bound in a kind of league 
one to the other... 
 
There are fixed degrees of Sympathy and Antipathy 
established amongst natural bodies. The first is betwixt 
Metals and Precious Stones, for example, between Coal and 
Gold...the next degree is between Planets and Metals...the 
third degree...is reckoned between Plants and the Sun...” 
(21-22) 
 
According to this doctrine of universal sympathy, sympathy comes about less by an act of willed 
spectatorial projection than by the destined material encounter with objects that are entirely beyond 
our control.  
Lamb points to Sir Kenelm Digby as another exponent of the old paradigm. Digby’s 
notion of sympathy relies on what Lamb calls “a strangely thoroughgoing materialism” (48), a 
corpuscular vision of connectivity, which he expounds in his discourse Of Sympathetick Powder 
(1657):  
 
[I]n the actions of all our senses, there is a material and 
corporal participation of the things we are sensible of, viz. 
Some atoms of the body operate upon our Senses, and enter 
into their organs; which serve them as funnels, to conduct 
and carry them to the brain and the imagination...every 
body sends forth a continual emanation of atoms out of it 
self... (180)246 
 
Thus, Digby paints the picture of a world of mixed bodies and blended elements: “[I]n nature there 
cannot be actually found any pure Element, unblended with other: for the exterior Fire and the Light 
acting one way, and the internal Fire of every Body pushing on another way, causes this marvailous 
mixture of all things in all things” (159). According to Digby the world abounds with animate and 
inanimate things that are attracted to each other and seek completion by merging. Things that have 
“Resemblance and Sympathy...one with the other...stay, stick, and mingle more willingly” (172), but 
mixing also takes place unwillingly in so far as particles are mixed in air and light: “Light, 
reflecting from the body that is seen enters into the eyes; and cannot, but bring with it some 
emanations of the body whereon it reflects...” (180) In Digby’s understanding of the word, 
sympathy does not involve a conscious effort of imaginative representation, but an instinctive, 
automatic physical process whose source is not immediately comprehensible. In such a world of 
mixtures, “Sympathetic Powder” “doth, naturally and without any Magick, cure wounds without 
                                                 
246 Lamb refers this quotation to Digby’s Of Bodies and Man’s Soul (1669). Its actual source, however, is Of the 
Sympathetick Powder (1657).  
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touching them, yea, without seeing the Patient” (149).247 In Receipts in Physick (1668) Digby gives 
“A Sympathetick cure of the Tooth-ach”, which is typical of this kind of distance healing: “With an 
Iron-nail raise and cut the Gum from about the Teeth, till it bleed, and that some of the blood stick 
upon the nail; then drive it into a woodden beam up to the head: After this is done, you never shall 
have the tooth-ach in all your life” (45).  
Until the very end of the eighteenth century, sympathetic medicine remained a vexed 
issue, dismissed, ridiculed and yet a firm part of the public imagination as well as of at least a 
peripheral section of medical therapy. When the hack who scribbles Swift’s Tale recommends 
reducing boiled up folios of deep learning to an elixir that can be snuffed up into the brain, he forms 
part of an already established satire on the theories of sympathy between the human organism and 
the surrounding world of things (V). The success of the satire depends on the viability of the 
satirized belief.  As Patricia Fara, Riskin and Forget have noted, the resilience of the old vocabulary 
is testified to not only by the frequent reprinting of Digby248 and other key proponents of 
sympathetic medicine, but also in the pseudoscientific occultism that exploited and combined a cult 
of sensibility and the uncertainties of a emerging science of physiology in which sympathy 
constituted an essential although conflicted term. In fact, as Fara points out the belief in curing 
disease, particularly toothache, magnetically or sympathetically survived throughout the century. 
Sympathetic powders like the one promoted by Digby were still advertised in the mid-eighteenth 
century, and even in the late eighteenth century the line between science and pseudoscience had yet 
to be drawn.   
 Surveying the terrain between “sentimental empiricism” and “sensationist 
pseudoscience” in the 1780s, Riskin’s work on Science in the Age of Sensibility (2002) provides 
many useful insights here. Riskin traces the rise and fall of Parisian-based Franz Anton Mesmer. 
From 1779 to 1784 the practices of mesmerism thrilled Parisian society eager to share sensibilities 
that could not otherwise be grasped. Mesmer based his method on the expression of deeply personal 
impressions through proximity and touch: 
 
Patients gathered, joined by ropes, around baquets, tubs 
filled with miscellaneous bits of glass, metal, and water, 
from which flexible iron rods protruded…They pressed 
these rods to their left hypochondria (upper abdomens) and 
joined their thumbs to increase the communication of the 
magnetic fluid. (Riskin 201) 
 
Central to Mesmer’s practice was the belief that what was grasped in the conductive rods was 
nothing but “the ethereal medium of sensation itself” (Riskin 192).  Mesmer held that the rods were 
suffused by an “imponderable magnetic fluid” (Riskin 192) of sensibility, a universal ether of 
feeling that pervaded the material world and provided a connection between individual feeling and 
the sensory world. In accordance with sentimental conventions, Mesmer considered tears and 
violent fits of fainting visible proof of the existence of an imperceptible, yet somehow transmittable 
universal ether. As illness was attributed to the blockages and obstructions to the free flow of the 
                                                 
247
 In Of the Sympathetick Powder Digby relates the story of his sympathetick cure of James Howel, who suffered a 
sword-cut in his hand that had begun to congest. Dipping one of Howel’s blood-drenched garters into a bowl of water in 
which a bit of the “sympathetic powder” had been dissolved, Digby effectively cures Howel’s wound. As long as the 
garter remained submerged in the vitriol, Howel experienced “a pleasuring kind of freshness” (150), but upon its 
removal he immediately relapsed.  
 
248 Forget finds evidence of the reprinting of key texts such as Digby’s Of Bodies and of mans soul (1669) and Henry 
More’s The Immortality of the Soul (1659) throughout the eighteenth century. 
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magnetic fluid, its mesmeric cure was often accompanied by so-called “crises” - convulsions, 
tremors and emotional agitation that testified to the release, the soothing liquefaction of feeling.249 
Rest rooms covered with mattresses were provided for those patients who had been particularly 
affected by the sessions (Riskin 201). Translating the vulgarity of touch into the more subtle 
pleasures of an arresting tableau, the function of the mesmeric crisis seems to accord with the visual 
bias of sentimental culture outlined earlier. However, at the heart of mesmerism and other forms of 
animal magnetism was the notion of a graspable, although “imponderable” link between the 
individual and the world. Once magnetized, everything from pointed rods and trees to tea cups 
could work as conductors: the mesmeric world was a world alive with objects communicating the 
most personal of sensations. Like the writers of it-narratives, Mesmer also wished to make things 
talk and to render people sensible to the feelings harboured by things so that they temporarily could 
lose their self-possession. 
In 1784 Mesmer’s practices were investigated and eventually rejected by 
commissioners from the Academy of Science and the Faculty of Medicine as well as by the Royal 
Society of Medicine in France as quackery. According to the commissioners the effects of 
mesmerism were ascribed not to an invisible fluid of sensibility but to the “active and terrible 
power” of the imagination (qtd. in Riskin, Science 224).250 Relying heavily on the striking 
convulsions of the mesmeric crisis, the sympathetic healing of mesmerism was an easy target for 
the new sciences of medicine and physiology eager to establish their empiricist sobriety in 
opposition to the showy magic of market fair superstition. Nevertheless, as Riskin points out, 
Mesmer’s “imponderable fluid” also exposes the vulnerability of what she calls “a subjectivist 
epistemology founded in feeling” (14). In other words, highlighting the absence of a separation 
between the figurative and the literal senses of words such as “feeling” and “sensibility”, between 
what is touched and what is merely felt, Mesmer’s fluid points to the chimeric status of a 
personhood relying on the storing of sense impressions. It is in this tight spot between the material 
and the mental, between the real and the illusory that sentimental properties linger.  
Revisiting Smith’s Theory with this broader and more complicated history of 
sensibility, Lamb uncovers the materialist tint in what has otherwise been considered an abstract 
picture (Evolution 53-54, 86-88). Throughout the work Smith labours to distinguish his “system of 
sympathy” (VII.iii.i.4 317) from the materialism of universal sympathy as well as from the magic of 
Pythagorean metempsychosis. Lamb argues that Smith’s efforts to distinguish his theory from the 
materialism of universal sympathy is compromised by the necessity to use a language inherited 
from sympathetic medicine. Smith insists that no physical exchange takes place in the establishment 
of sympathy. He persists that our senses “never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own 
person”, and that therefore it is “by the imagination only that we can form any conception” of 
another person’s sensations (I.i.I.32 9). Yet, Smith never abandons Lockean empiricism; sympathy 
is after all the reproduction not merely of ideas but also of feelings. In a central passage littered with 
                                                 
249 Riskin quotes Antoine Lavoisier here. Astronomer Jean-Sylvain Bailly, who was a member of the investigative 
committee, denounced Mesmer’s treatment as the “greatest experiment concerning the power of the imagination” (qtd. 
in Riskin, 223). To Mesmer and his followers feeling equalled liquidity in more than one way in so far as the 
mesmerists drew their clientele “mostly from the ranks of the nobility or wealthy entrepreneurs, bankers, lawyers, and 
doctors” (Riskin, Science 205-206). One of his disciples, Charles Deslon, earned 350,000 livres in one year by his 
mesmeric practice (Riskin, Science 205). 
250
 Forget gives a short outline of the afterlife of mesmerism in Britain, referring to the London based animal 
magnitiser, John B. de Mainauduc who “argued that sensations were conducted along nerves in the human body, which 
he envisioned as chains of linked atoms, just as atmospheric nerves conduct sound” (298) – a world view that is not 
dissimilar to the sympathetic universalism proposed by Digby.  
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moderations and partial retractions, the notion of sympathy as identity of embodied sentiment 
surfaces: 
 
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we 
conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we 
enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure 
the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his 
sensations… (I.i.I.32, 9, my emphasis)251   
 
The difficulty of interpreting this passage hinges not only on linguistic impermeability, but also on 
the unresolved position of the imagination in the eighteenth century between sense and thought. To 
Smith the transformative powers of the imagination252 work as a convenient instrument in the 
construction of a mechanism that is adequately ethereal to avoid the material delusions of former 
sympathetic superstitions and yet sufficiently solid to constitute a basis for a empiricist theory of 
moral sentiments. Produced by the imagination Smith’s version of sympathy has the same structure 
as Mesmer’s “imponderable fluid” – an illusion that is nevertheless felt.  
Thus, although the method of sharing is strictly imaginary, “never carrying us beyond 
our own person”, there can be no doubt of the genuineness of what is shared. Even if I can only 
imagine another person’s sensations by becoming “in some measure the same with him”, what I 
sense is nevertheless real. Smith specifies the process in a later passage: 
 
But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an 
imaginary change of situations with the person principally 
concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to 
happen to me in my own person and character, but in that 
of the person with whom I sympathize….I consider what I 
would suffer if I was really you, and I not only change 
circumstances with you, but I change persons and 
characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your 
account, and not in the least upon my own. (VII.iii.I.4  
317)253 
 
My “person” is changed in everything but name here as “I change persons and characters” to adopt 
the inner happenings of “the person with whom I sympathize”. The doublings of the distant 
observer are circumvented in favour of a full-blown involvement of my person on another person’s 
account. This ready adoption of feelings “not in the least” connected to me, the insistence on the 
reality of what I feel as yours, makes it obvious that sympathy entails at least “some measure” of 
convergence of identities or metamorphosis of personhood the reality of which is testified to by the 
feeling that attends it. It is of course imagined, but that does not make it less real. As David 
                                                 
251 Smith’s emphasis on the bodily transfer of feeling resurfaces in the peculiar passage in which he explores our 
sympathy with the dead in a passage that is treated below, and which prefigures Smith’s admission to the existence of 
the habitual sympathy with things.  
252 As we have seen above, the productive powers of the imagination could quickly turn figments of one’s “fancy” into 
solid realities and appearant substances into mere illusions (see p. 88).  
253
 The passage is pivotal to Lamb’s interpretation of Smith as an unwitting heir to the universal sympathy of the 
previous period. The passage was initially, however, interpreted  in a similar vein by David Marshall.  
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Marshall says in an article on “Adam Smith and the Theatricality of Moral Sentiment” (1984), 
Smith’s “greatest fear” (610) is not that moral judgment requires people to become objects of their 
own observations, to make spectacles of themselves, but rather “that they remain spectators” (610): 
“The dream of sympathy, the fiction of sympathy, is that an interplay and interchange of places, 
positions, persons, sentiments, and points of view could cancel out the theatricality of the most 
theatrical of situations” (610). Sympathy is the willed oblivion of the impossibility of such a 
cancellation, the deliberate forgetting of the impossibility of losing ourselves in another person 
while still maintaining the integrity of our own personhood. Lamb also considers the passage proof 
that Smith eventually must move from sympathy as a “hypothesis” to sympathy as “a fully 
furnished alternative to reality” (Evolution 87). Through Lamb’s interpretation of the passage, the 
Lockean paradoxes of appropriation reappear in Smith’s construction of sympathy: 
What he says in effect is that things are happening to me in 
the person of the person with whom I sympathize, a sort of 
third person standing between his and the other’s who 
provides a common ground for feelings that otherwise 
could not be owned, and would have no other imaginable 
home to which they could be fetched. (87-88) 
 
The question of who owns what is felt in that “common ground” is left as open by Smith as it was 
by Locke. Like Locke, Smith entertains the perceptual merging described in the present passage as 
a “wild fancy” mediated through the conveniently unexplained mechanisms of the imagination. In 
this sense, the dream of sympathy is not founded on the spectator’s conception of “a passion 
somewhat analogues to what is felt by the sufferer” (I.i.IV.8 22) but rather on the sufferer’s 
sensitivity to “[t]hat imaginary change of situation, upon which their sympathy is founded” (I.i.IV.6 
21), which although “but momentary” nonetheless transcends the “thought of their own safety” 
(I.i.IV.6 21): “The person principally concerned…passionately desires a more complete sympathy. 
He longs for that relief which nothing can afford him but the entire concord of the affections of the 
spectator with his own” (I.i.IV.8 22).  
 Even in passages that more clearly conform to the Smith’s general constitution of 
sympathy as disinterested spectatorship, Smith’s sympathy is predicated upon a perforation of the 
membrane that keeps persons to themselves. Not unlike Locke’s metamorphosis of appropriation, 
Smith’s sympathetic exchange relies on the joining or mixing of what is one’s own with what is not, 
and as such, sympathy is a willed act, a controlled annexation of another person’s passions. In a 
remarkable passage, Smith claims that the appropriative powers of sympathy extend even to the 
dead (I.i.I.13 12-13). Such an “illusion of the imagination” (I.i.I.13 13) can be wielded by “our 
joining to the change which has been produced upon them, our consciousness of that change…and 
from our lodging, if I may be allowed to say so, our own living souls in their inanimated bodies” 
(I.i.I.i 13). Where there is no person with whom to sympathize, sympathy must again have recourse 
to a purely internal spectatorship through which no real commonality is created: “The anguish 
which humanity feels, therefore, at the sight of such an object…must arise altogether from the 
consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation…” 
(I.i.I.11 12).  
 However, true sympathy or antipathy of moral judgment cannot be afforded to 
insensible objects. Smith therefore hastens to stress the pointlessness of such inanimate sympathies, 
which are far inferior to the more complete “pleasure of mutual sympathy” cultivated between the 
living (I.i.II.1 9). Thus in Smith’s section “merit and demerit”, he sets out to prove that “what has no 
sensibility” cannot be “the proper object of gratitude or resentment”. Relegating the love of things 
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to a past insensible to the differences between the dehiscent depths of sensible life and the 
impenetrable solidity of unfeeling things, Smith dissociates himself from the misguided animations 
of “the Dryads and the Lares of he ancients, a sort of genii of trees and houses” (II.iii.I.2 94). Yet, 
strangely ambiguous in his dismissal of sympathetic things, Smith admits that even this brand of 
outdated universal sympathy had its own sentimental causes, as it presumably developed from a 
“sort of affection…felt for such objects” (II.iii.I.i 94). Thus Smith reasons that once the life of 
things had let itself be felt, it would have “seemed unreasonable, if there was nothing animated 
about them” (II.iii.I.2 94). Although Smith’s use of the past tense dismisses the contemporary 
relevance of these “superstitions felt for such objects” (II.iii.I.2 94), the logic behind these 
circularities belongs to the sentimental empiricism that would allow Mesmer to lend substantiality 
to his imponderable fluid: what is felt is undoubtedly nothing but illusions of a sensitive 
imagination, and yet the fact that it is felt just as surely testifies to its actuality. 
In a previous paragraph Smith is no less ambiguous. “We are angry, for a moment, 
even at the stone that hurts us,” he declares (II.iii.I.1 94). Although even “[t]he least reflection” 
(II.iii.I.1 94) will convince us of the impropriety of this antipathy, not only natural inclination but 
our very humanity dictates that we should make our feeling known: 
 
When the mischief…is very great, the object of which 
caused it becomes disagreeable to us even after, and we 
take pleasure to burn or destroy it. We should treat, in this 
manner, the instrument which had accidentally been the 
cause of the death of a friend, and we should often think 
ourselves guilty of a sort of inhumanity, if we neglected to 
vent this absurd sort of vengeance upon it. (II.iii.I.1 94) 
 
The editors of the Oxford University Press edition of Smith’s Theory direct us to the common law 
notion of the deodand, treated in Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence (1761-1766), where he calls 
attention to resentment as an “indiscriminating principle”, which “pays little attention to the 
disposition of the mind” (485). In the Lectures, Smith repeatedly points out the customary 
accountability of guilty properties that “tho’ inanimate objects are accounted execrable”, as 
“resentment falls upon the very member of the body which perpetrated the action” (485). In other 
words, relying on a direct, physical impact, the resentment sketched in this passage is a sentiment 
that invites to a more spontaneous outburst of feeling than the deliberate antipathies outlined in the 
Theory. The impartial spectator so carefully in control of his feelings is here replaced by a judge 
with more volatile sensibilities and an entirely different sense of things.  
Indeed, Smith’s best developed example of the unmerited love of things reveals that 
habitual contiguity rather than willed projection guides this type of sympathy: 
 
A man grows fond of a snuff-box, of a pen-knife, of a staff 
which he has long made use of, and conceives something 
like a real love and affection for them. If he breaks or loses 
them, he is vexed out of all proportion to the value of the 
damage. The house which we have long lived in, the tree, 
whose verdure and shade we have long enjoyed, are both 
looked upon with a sort of respect that seems due to such 
benefactors. The decay of the one, or the ruin of the other, 
affects us with a kind of melancholy, though we should 
sustain no loss by it. (Theory II.iii.I.1 94) 
 175 
 
Despite the partial acknowledgment implied by the personification of the patron tree and house, the 
passage beams with light-hearted belittlement. The sympathy produced by snuff-boxes, staffs and 
houses finds its worth in our extended proximity to them; sentimental value is gained by habit.   If 
the impropriety of such habitual sympathy seems comical, Smith reminds us elsewhere that most 
passions “which take their origin from a peculiar turn or habit…are always, in some measure 
ridiculous” (I.ii.II.1. 31) – habitual love is always “out of all proportion” because it relies on the 
fortuitous association of ideas. Although “extravagantly disproportioned to the value of their 
objects” (I.ii.II.4 33), such love is to be considered “perfectly natural” (I.ii.I.2 31). Thus, if a 
shipwrecked sailor were to burn the plank that had saved him, he “would seem to be guilty of an 
unnatural action” (I.iii.I.1 94). Both wayward and natural, the passion inspired by such objectified 
“benefactors” is suggestive of the power of sentimental value. If unworthy of sympathy, such 
objects are after all to be prized beyond the economic damage or the disuse their loss would 
represent. 
Yet, while pointing to the reality of a sentimental worth cultivated by extended usage, 
the unspecified nature of the “loss” and the “value” that the objects represent allows Smith to let the 
commercial logic underwrite the sentimental. In this disciplining of consumer behaviour 
sentimental value can work to underwrite the critique of luxury consumption. Replicating the 
sentimental economy sketched above, Smith moves easily between economic value and moral 
worth. The two collide in the image of the tree and the house as protecting “benefactors”, a trope 
that suggests both economic and moral patronage. The love of things is improper not only because 
what is felt is merely a counterfeit emotion that “seems due” but is really unearned by objects that 
cannot be made sensible of what is owed them, but also because the feelings they incite are 
disproportionate to their actual value. Drawing on early eighteenth century concerns with 
proportion and consumptive excess,254 Smith’s first examples of things unworthy of sympathy are 
stock commodities in the perverted economy of foppish luxury. Luxurious expendables, the snuff-
box and its companions can only rouse “something like a real love and affection,” not dissimilar to 
the misguided affections exhibited by Mr. Softly or the members of the Fringe Glove Club.255 Thus 
rather than excluding objects from gratitude, the passage suggests that we might choose objects that 
are more worthy of it. In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith insistently makes the distinction 
between “opulence” and “frugality” that Mandeville and others found so difficult to uphold, 
strongly decrying the extravagant consumption of “frivolous objects, the little ornaments of dress 
and furniture, jewels, trinkets, gewgaws” (I.iii.42 289). In the movement from snuff-boxes and 
penknives to houses and trees, it becomes evident that some objects are more deserving of our 
respect and less overpriced than others.  
 The difficulties in maintaining such a distinction have been explored in recent 
scholarship on eighteenth-century debates on the status of animals, specifically the liminal position 
of pets. As Tobias Menely points out, in the course of the eighteenth century the love of animals 
came to be identified with “overwrought sensitivity” (247) as the distinguishing mark of the 
potential for emotional hypocrisy in the culture of sensibility. The century abounds in satiric 
                                                 
254 See for instance Nathaniel Wanley’s History of Man (1704) referenced above (p. 68). 
255 In Elements of Moral Science (1790), James Beattie also finds that we “[e]ven for some inanimate things…have a 
sort of tenderness, which by a licentious figure of speech might be called sympathy” (I.i.x 171-172). The examples that 
Beatty gives are duplicated from Smith: “To lose a staff which we have long walked with, or see in ruins a house where 
we had long lied happily, would give a slight concern, though the loss to us were a trifle, or nothing at all.” (I.i.x 171-
172). When this passage is compared with Smith’s examples of objects of sympathy (II.iii.I.1 94), the parallel between 
the two is striking. Although Beatty clearly relegates the sympathy for things to the strictly figurative realm of the 
imagination, he distinguishes it from the sympathy between men by degree, not by kind, adding only that “our 
sympathy operates most powerfully towards our fellow-men” (I.i.x 172).  
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declarations of affection for diminutive pets and pathetic defences of their captivity. Pets served as a 
testing ground for the propriety of personal properties not only because of their similarity to the 
other obviously problematic forms of property categorized as both chattel and individuals, such as 
slaves, indentured servants and women, but also because they challenged facile categorizations of 
human identity. Lapdogs in particular were a contested possession, located somewhere between the 
human and the thingly. In her survey of pet epitaphs and elegies Ingrid H. Tague finds that “artists 
were both playing with the permeable boundaries between human and beast, and using similarities 
between some people and animals in order to emphasize the sharp distinctions that ought to define 
human identity” (295). Tague refers to Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s “Epitaph on a Green-Finch” 
(1798) in which she describes the capture of the beloved “Richard Acanthis” 
 
...in his callow infancy 
From under the wings of a tender parent, 
By the rough and merciless hands 
Of a two-legged monster without feathers. 
   (qtd. in Tague 296) 
 
Beyond the chiasmic inversion of beastly vice and human virtue, such passages are suggestive of 
what Festa in her article on “the 1796 Dog Tax and the right to superfluous things” (2009) has 
named “the instability of the classifications of human, animal and thing” (2). Indeed, the mockery 
of excessive affection for pets also shows the felt reality of such scenes of sympathy. The complete 
exploration of the fluid boundaries between the human and the brutish that surface in the literary 
representation of eighteenth-century owners and their pets lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, acutely pertinent for my discussion of the eighteenth-century distinction between 
property and person is the suggestion implied by such research that we might only fully grasp the 
love of superfluous things if we recognize the poverty of a representative paradigm that simply 
relegates the non-human “to symbolic labor, either as anthropomorphized substitutes for human 
beings or as the other against which the category of the human is constituted" (248).256 For the 
present purpose, it is enough to notice that the extension of sympathy to non-humans points not 
only to the complexity of a type of possession that is irreducible to ownership but also to the 
instability of notions of modern identity that do not recognize what Laura Brown has called the 
power of the “sudden proximity to the radically alien in a transcendence of the ordinary, the 
naturalized, or the familiar” (“Lady” 44). Like lapdogs, monkeys and captured finches, inanimate 
objects of sympathy are indicative of the inadequacy of a schema of interpretation that moves 
simply between figures of anthropomorphism and alterity.  
 
                                                 
256 In Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes (2010) Laura Brown makes a similar suggestion. Looking at human-animal 
relationships in eighteenth-century literature, Brown seeks to challenge the “modern understanding of the nonhuman 
being [that] is often built on [the] opposition between anthropomorphism and alienation” (7). Instead of this dichotomy, 
she finds that literature provides “an alternative model” that “gives rise to complex and flexible literary fantasies that 
verge toward the dissonant, the unconventional, the aberrant, and the unbounded” (2). Similarly, Chi-ming Yang also 
takes Brown’s complication of this simple opposition as a useful point of departure in her article on “toy dogs and 
object life”. For more on the problematic status of lapdogs, Laura Brown’s “The Lady, the Lapdog, and Literary 
Alterity” (2011) and Ellis (2007). 
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Beneath the ridicule of foppish luxuries we might distinguish the Humean fear of a 
personhood whose coherence hinges on the imaginary hold of his possessions. The difficulty in 
distinguishing the sentiments produced by our relation to things from the sentiments produced 
by other relations is emphasized in Smith's chapters on the “influence of fortune” on the 
“irregularity of our sentiments” (II.iii.II, II.iii.III). Although proper objects of gratitude or 
resentment must be sensible of their actions and the pleasure or pain they cause (II.iii.I.6 96), the 
vicissitudes of fortune prove that unintentional acts may produce strong feelings that are less 
deliberate than the careful substitution of sentiments produced by sympathy. With such 
difficulties in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that Smith refers to value rather than sensibility 
as the criterion that excludes the snuff-box, the tree or the walking staff as recipients of our 
gratitude or mourning. What is mourned in a lost pen-knife is neither its insignificant economic 
value, nor its use value, but a worth which accrues in time, with the familiarity of extended use 
and proximity. Where things and people touch, sensibility takes on a form that relies less on the 
intentional, imaginative appropriation of feelings than on the impulsive surrender to passions 
and wild fancies incited by accidental encounters. While Smith’s construction of sympathy 
labours to distinguish the insensible objects from those worthy of our gratitude, the insistent 
physicality of the sentimental object undercuts such distinctions. It is in the negotiation of these 
boundaries between persons and things that the most interesting sentimental fictions develop. 
 
 
 
 178 
iii. Shoe Buckles and Sentimental Happenstances:  
The Scandal of Impassioned Things 
 
“I feel some generous joys and generous cares beyond myself – all comes from thee, great --- great 
SENSORIUM of the world!” 
Laurence Sterne. A Sentimental Journey (1768) 
 
In a 1821 satire257 on Laurence Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey, Thomas Hood lets his protagonist 
distinguish himself from the “imposters” (34) of sensibility who “advertise their counterfeit drops” 
(34) too freely rather saving them for appropriate subjects. Hood’s traveller meets with a staple 
subject in Sternean sentimentality – the deranged peasant girl Maria who appears in both The Life 
and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, gentleman (1759)258 and A Sentimental Journey (1768). Unlike 
Yorick and Tristram, Hood’s traveller finds Maria “a dry subject” (34) and prides himself with 
being more careful with his sentimental investments: 
 
Maria found Sterne’s handkerchief, and washed it with 
tears, and dried it in her bosom; but if I lose mine here, it’s 
ten to one if I see it again; and if this Maria should wet it 
with her eyes, methinks it would dry best again at her 
nose…Some sentimentalists would have vented them upon 
the first dead dog or lame chicken they might meet with, 
but I held them too valuable to be wasted upon such 
objects. I hate the weeping-willow set, who will cry over 
their pug-dogs and canaries, till they have no tears to spare 
for the real children of misfortune and misery… (34) 
 
The passage illustrates what Menely calls “the two conventional criticisms of sentimentality” (246). 
According to Menely, one criticism commonly levelled against sentimentalism maintains that 
sentimental emotions are inherently duplicitous and superficial, veiling self-interest as sympathy 
and justifying a delight in emotional pleasures that are afforded by others’ misery. Another, 
contrary, argument, holds that sentimentality is implausible not because it hides but because it 
overlooks duplicity and deceit. In this version, then, “the problem with sentimentality is not its 
underbelly of cynicism…but rather its earnest and idealizing failure to account for the darker facets 
of human nature” (Menely 245). The two strands of criticism often coalesce in the erroneous choice 
of sentimental object – the person who lavishes his emotions on a “dead dog or lame chicken” is 
both emoting excessively (and thus naïve) and robbing “the real children of misfortune” of their 
proper sentiments (and thus unscrupulous). Hood points partly to the hypocrisy of sentimental 
feelings, partly to the impropriety and worthlessness of the things they take as their objects. In other 
words, according to Hood, Sterne is both deceitful and deceived, an “imposter” whose display of 
emotion is calculative parsimony designed to privatise emotions that cannot really be shared, and a 
“weeping willow” whose emotional overabundance is easily manipulated by a cunning Maria. 
However, Hood is well aware that pitting his own tears against Sterne's “counterfeit drops” (34) 
will not free him from suspicion, noting that “sensibility is too scarce, and too valuable, not be often 
imitated” (34). Indeed, Hood’s "A Sentimental Journey" is more a pastiche than a parody of 
                                                 
257 Thomas Hood. “A Sentimental Journey from Islington to Waterloo Bridge, in March 1821”. First published in The 
London Magazine, the satire is repeated in part in Alan B. Howes (367-69). I quote from the full version of the satire, 
also included in the works cited list. 
258 Maria appears in vol. 2, chapter iiiv. 
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Sterne’s work, unashamedly repeating Sterne's comic use of pathetic isocolon and anticlimactic 
bathos: 
 
They will warn me against being too sentimental, said I. In 
the first place it’s ridiculous; secondly, it’s useless; and 
lastly, it’s inconvenient; for I just recollect that there’s a 
very large hole in my pocket handkerchief. (34) 
 
Thus if Hood’s criticism of Sterne repeats the early Romantic distaste for eighteenth-century 
sentimentalism, echoing Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s evaluation of A Sentimental Journey as “poor 
sickly stuff” (qtd. in Howes 15), it also repeats Sterne’s own division between burlesque satire and 
pathetic exaltation of the sentimental ideals of sympathy.  
As the clearest example of Sterne’s ambiguous brand of sentimentalism, A 
Sentimental Journey has presented an interpretational conundrum for critics since its publication. 
Sterne both depicts the selfless transports of sympathy and reveals its limitations, and Menely’s 
presentation of the sentimentalist deadlock therefore is clearly reflected in the critical commentary 
of Sterne’s sentimental literature. The evaluation of Sterne’s sentimentality hinges on his degree of 
sincerity: is the work satiric or is it serious? Alan B. Howes’ collection of early reviews and critical 
comments on Sterne’s work shows that already contemporary readers of A Sentimental Journey 
were divided in their interpretations of the work. While most critics of the 1770s and 1780s agree 
with The Monthly Review’s Ralph Griffith who identifies Sterne’s “highest excellence…not in his 
humorous but in his pathetic vein” (qtd. in Howes 200),259 not everybody is convinced that the 
pathos is sincerely meant. Even the otherwise positive Griffith is disappointed that Sterne’s book 
ends “with a dash…somewhat bordering rather on sensuality than sentiment” (qtd. in Howes 201). 
Fanny Burney refers to Sterne’s “seducing sentimentalism” (qtd. in Howes 204), and Mrs Greville 
speaks of the sickening pretensions of a “man [that] chooses to walk about the world with a 
cambrick handkerchief always in his hand, that he may always be ready to weep, either with man or 
beast…” (qtd. in Howes 204). Vicesimus Knox later sums up this line of criticism by pointing to 
Sterne’s “affective sympathy” and “sentimental affection, which is but lust in disguise” (251). Most 
interesting, perhaps, is poetess and literary savant Mrs Vesey’s evaluation of the feelings espoused 
by “the Sentimental Traveller” (qtd. in Howes 203) – here a name that seems to cover both Sterne 
and his protagonist: 
 
Merely to be struck by an impulse of compassion at the 
view of an object of distress, is no more benevolence than it 
is a fit of the gout, and indeed has a nearer relation to the 
last than the first. (qtd. in Howes 203) 
 
What Mrs Vesey objects to is the substitution of the old paradigm of virtue with the newer, less 
stable physiological paradigm of sympathy. How can you tell impulsive passion from sympathy if 
feeling relies merely on striking impressions?  
 Twentieth-century critics have constructed a very different Sterne, emphasizing not 
the genuineness of his emotion but rather the force of his parody. Where Sterne’s contemporaries 
readily conflated the author with his protagonist – a move that is well supported by Sterne’s 
                                                 
259 Griffith’s favourable two-part review is full of rambling digressions and Shandean dashes, proving that Sterne was 
not too difficult to imitate after all. The full review can be found in the Monthly Review 38 (March, April 1768): 174-
185, 309-319. 
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conscious literary self-fashioning260 – twentieth century criticism has laboured to determine to 
which extent Sterne seeks to mock Yorick and his sentimental pretensions.261 Similarly, if 
contemporary critics attempted to shield Sterne’s sentimentalism by insisting upon his sincerity, 
modern criticism since the 1940s has attempted to rescue it by doing just the opposite. Recently, 
criticism has sought to complicate Sterne’s work by pointing out the nuances in his conception of 
sympathy. In Preserving the Self in the South Seas (2001) Jonathan Lamb points to Sterne's humour 
as a criticism of the voyeurism produced by a culture of visually based vicarious suffering (262-63). 
Lynn Festa and Markman Ellis have also worked to recuperate the subversive potential in Sterne’s 
sentimentalism as well as its ultimate failure to circumvent the economic realities and social 
inequalities it seeks to overcome. One of the insights that such scholarship has afforded is that the 
contradictory nature of Sterne’s work stems from the ambiguities intrinsic to the logic of 
sentimentality itself.262 Viewed in this light, Sterne relentlessly exposes the confusion entailed by 
the physicality of the sentimental encounter between the sentimental traveller and any object worthy 
of sympathy. 
Echoing the doctrine of the “sensorium commune”, Yorick’s apostrophe to sensibility 
placed centrally in the Sentimental Journey thus both reproduces and satirizes the instabilities of the 
physiological paradigm of sympathy. It locates the concept firmly in the intersection between 
movement of the mind and physiological vibration: 
 
Dear Sensibility! Source inexhausted of all that’s precious 
in our joys, or costly in our sorrows! Thou chainest thy 
martyr down upon his bed of straw – and ’tis thou who lifts 
him up to HEAVEN – eternal fountain of our feelings! – 
’tis here I trace thee – and this is thy divinity which stirs 
within me --- not, that in some sad and sickening moments, 
‘my soul shrinks back upon herself, and startles at 
destruction’ – mere pomp of words! – but that I feel some 
generous joys and generous cares beyond myself – all 
comes from thee, great --- great SENSORIUM of the 
world! Which vibrates, if a hair of our heads but falls upon 
the ground, in the remotest desert of thy creation. (II.xxix 
111)263   
 
The mention of vibration as a means of communicating what Whytt might have called the “general 
sympathy which prevails through the whole system” (vi) targets the physiological theory of 
sensibility as a satirical butt. The specific reference is here to David Hartley's vibratory theory of 
the nervous system according to which sense impressions diffuse through “the motory nerves…in 
some such manner as sound runs along the surface of rivers” (qtd. in Glassman and Buckingham 
                                                 
260 Warren L. Oakley traces the many contemporary attempts at mimicking Sterne’s art as well as impersonations of 
Sterne himself. Oakley also suggests that Sterne’s mimics considered “Sterne’s alter ego, ‘Mr. Yorick’…an act of 
creative self-fashioning” (11). Ian Campbell Ross paints a similar picture: “Sterne himself would become almost 
indistinguishable in the public’s mind from his own creations, Tristram Shandy and Parson Yorick. No wonder that 
James Boswell, himself a newcomer to London in search of fame, should be so enthusiastic an admirer of ‘Squire 
Tristram’ and his ‘damn’d clever book’” (226).  
261 For an overview of modern criticism of Sterne, see Lodwick Hartley and Jesse Molesworth. Tobias Meneley also 
gives a short overview (261). 
262 For an elaboration of this argument, please see van Sant (107-111). 
263 Chapters in A Sentimental Journey are not numbered. I have done so for ease of reference. 
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181).264 Puzzled by the exact nature of Newtonian ether, Hartley solves the problem of the 
transformation of sensations into ideas by miniaturization by proposing that diminutive vibratory 
motions, so-called “vibratuncles”, are picked up by the “medullary substance” of the nervous 
system and transformed into ideas: 
 
We are to conceive, that the Vibrations thus excited in the 
Æther will agitate the small particles of the medullary 
Substance of the sensory Nerves with synchronous 
Vibrations in the same manner as the Vibrations of Air in 
Sounds agitate many regular Bodies with corresponding 
Vibrations or Tremblings. (qtd. in Glassman and 
Buckingham 184)   
 
Hartley’s world of sensibility is a world of miniaturized correspondences produced by an oscillatory 
motion that sustains the continuity between people and their surroundings. In Yorick’s version of 
this vibratory world excessively endowed with sensation, susceptibility to the life of even the most 
minute things serves as proof of the refinements of the sentimental mind.  The superlative in the last 
sentence of Yorick’s apostrophe points to the untenable tensions in a world that relies on such 
microsensation. 
 Certainly, much of the parodic humour in Sterne’s novel comes from the confusion 
that such indiscriminate sensibility produces. Helene Moglen points to the solipsistic nature of 
feeling in A Sentimental Journey: 
 
…Sterne suggests the potentially solipsistic nature of all 
empathic experience. He reveals how difficult it is to be 
certain of the objective validity of the emotion one projects 
on to another, for the act of projection is imaginative, 
fundamentally subjective, and therefore belongs to the 
more inclusive process of self-investigation. (100-102) 
  
In one oft-quoted passage, Yorick models his sentimental journey on a similar slippage from 
objective sense impression to autosuggestion: 
 
I declare, said I, clapping my hands cheerily together, that 
was I in a desart, I would find out wherewith in it to call 
forth my affections – If I could not do better, I would fasten 
them upon some sweet myrtle, or seek some melancholy 
cypress to connect myself to – I would court their shade, 
and greet them kindly for their protection – I would cut my 
name upon them, and swear they were the loveliest trees 
throughout the desert: if their leaves wither’d, I would 
teach myself to mourn, and when they rejoiced, I would 
rejoice along with them. (I.xviii 28) 
 
The reiteration of the first person pronoun combined with the use of the second conditional stresses 
the speculative, projective nature of Yorick’s sentiments. Yorick “put[s him]self into motion (I.xviii 
                                                 
264 Jonathan Lamb first noted the parallel between Yorick’s sentimental vocabulary and Hartley’s physiological theory 
in  “Language and Hartleian Associationism in A Sentimental Journey” (1980). 
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28) and actively “call[s] forth” affections that are marked as private by the use of a possessive 
pronoun. Personification marks the parodic shift from what Yorick in the previous paragraph calls 
the sound interest of the heart “in every thing” (I.xviii 28) to the erroneous indiscrimination of 
fetishism, as trees are greeted, mourned and rejoiced and they themselves exhibit the attributes of 
sensibility, storing both melancholy and joy. Hyperbole and incongruity go hand in hand to create 
the parody of a man of sensibility that “misses nothing” only to take in too much. Yet, projective 
“process of self-investigation” that Moglen describes suggests a deliberation of which Yorick never 
seems capable. In fact, in one oft-quoted passage, Yorick measures the success of his sentimental 
journey by the joys afforded by happenstances that “time and chance are perpetually holding out” 
(I.xviii 28) and any random objects he can “fairly lay his hands on” (I.xviii 28) rather than by 
insights gained by intentional scrutiny. In fact, as Lamb notes, the entire passage “construe[s] 
sentimental travel as manual dexterity” (“Language” 393), relying heavily on the image of hands as  
shorthand for the interface between the feelings that can be grasped as objective sense impressions 
and the affections that can be pulled from within.  
One can only get so far by clapping one’s hands together without having something to 
which one can “fasten” or “connect [one]self”. Yorick’s cutting of his name upon the “melancholy 
cypress” embodies the complexity as well as the potential violence inherent in all verbal 
appropriation of sentiment and shows inscription as a labour of pain. What is lost when sense 
impressions that can merely be felt turn to sentiments that can also be articulated is the honesty of a 
sensibility alert to the “great SENSORIUM of the world”. The sentence thus strengthens what 
Jeffrey R. Smitten calls the “implicit opposition between the natural signs of emotion and the 
arbitrary sign of spoken or written language” (85). But Sterne does more than merely repeat the 
prejudices of a culture of sensibility that values codified gesture easily amenable to Smith’s visual 
paradigm of sympathy. The concretion of the image and the violence of the verb remind the reader 
of the physical nature of the trees that in the preceding and succeeding sentences are merely reduced 
to tropes. The act of carving thus also works to retain the material basis for the feeling, a sensible 
resistance to a sentimentality that is “mere pomp of words”, while the centrality of the sentence 
creates a bathetic counterpoint to the lofty pathos that surrounds it. 
This reading of Yorick’s apostrophe corroborates the suspicion that the difficulties 
that critics have had in determining the extent of Sterne’s parody in such passages stems from the 
fact that the source of Sterne’s parody comes from within the physiological logic of sensibility 
itself. The movement towards the deflating full stop in the apostrophe thus parallels the 
physicalization that threatens to block the spiritual project of sensibility: sympathy always risks 
dissolution into more spontaneous, less refined passions when it stumbles upon its solid objects. 
The humour stems not only from the disproportion between the omnipotence of divine sensibility 
and the diminutive source from which its springs (the hair), but from the discrepancy between 
proposed spirituality and material reality.  While the three exclamation marks provide visual 
stumbling blocks that connect “Dear sensibility” with its dual nature as “eternal fountain of 
feelings” and “mere pomp of words”, the full stop finally succeeds in puncturing the inflated 
language.  
The chapter does not end with the comic hyperbole of the hair, but with the touching 
tableau of a peasant’s anguished pity for a “lacerated lamb of another’s flock” (II.xxix 111). 
Syntactically the paragraph thus ends as it begins with an aposiopesis at the height of sympathetic 
intensity:  
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This moment I beheld him leaning with his head against his 
crook, with piteous inclination looking down upon it – Oh! 
had I come one moment sooner! – it bleeds to death – his 
gentle heart bleeds with it – (II.xxix 111)   
 
The aposiopesis is suggestive both of limitless emotional immersion and of frustrated expectation. 
Similarly, the free indirect discourse (“Oh! had I come…) suggests both the identificatory 
completion and the vicarious suspension of sympathy: Yorick’s assumption of the peasant’s voice 
marks the appropriation of his feelings, but the suddenness of the interjection makes it seem 
contrived, as the demands of composition overstretch the reliability of a persona that is both 
impartial spectator and participator. The use of the first person pronoun introduces a referential 
confusion that further stresses the compositional deliberation of the outburst. Who really speaks 
here? Yorick’s “I” in the former sentence is too close for this pronominal identification to be 
believable, and the interjection may be taken for an imaginative projection as well as for a 
sympathetic substitution of feeling. The promise of a sensible transport of feelings that will allow 
“generous joys and generous cares beyond myself” (II.xxix 111) threatens to collapse into the wild 
fancies of a self-absorbed imagination.  Similarly, the proximity of the literal and the figurative 
sense of the word “bleeds” suggest the instability of a discourse that relies on facile conversions 
between mind and matter. The untenability of Yorick’s dual position as participator and impartial 
spectator is emphasized in the following paragraph in which Yorick vows that “joys shall balance” 
the peasant’s “anguish” (II.xxix 111). Such admonitory comments favour the equanimity of self-
possession over the transport of shared passion. The careful balancing of emotion suggests that the 
generosity afforded by the cares and joys of sympathy are predicated on calculated self-gratification 
rather than benevolent “sharing” (II.xxix111). The weighing up of what is “costly in our joys” 
(II.xxix 111) and “precious in our sorrows” (II.xxix 111) is a necessary part of a restricted 
circulation of feelings that moves between benevolence and recompense.  
The sexual suggestiveness of such an economy of feeling concentrates in the adjectival 
participle “inexhausted” in the first line of the apostrophe, which rather than boundlessness suggests 
the painfully suspended relief of pent up emotion. Lamb has noted how this movement from the 
limitlessness of a divine sensibility to the strictures of what Yorick elsewhere calls “sentimental 
commerce” (I.vii 11) is replicated in the three chapters that follow the apostrophe to sensibility 
during which “the physical component of Yorick’s associations gets less as his religious fancy gets 
stronger” only to resurface in the “sudden bathos of 'The Case of Delicacy'“ (“Language” 309), the 
last chapter of the novel. As opposed to the framing dashes of the apostrophe, the aposiopesis that 
famously concludes the last chapter holds no indeterminacy – what hides in the empty space is not 
the silence of absorbed, solipsistic sensibility but rather the embarrassment of an accidental physical 
encounter: 
 
    – But the Fille de Chambre…had advanc’d so far up as 
to be in a line betwixt her mistress and me –  
    So that when I stretch’d out my hand, I caught hold of 
the Fille de Chambre’s 
 
 
  END OF VOL. II 
 
If the continuation of the final sentence into the volume marker suggests, the physical ends of any 
exchange of feeling, including the one between reader and reading material, the suspended 
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possessive suggests the problematic moral status of realized appropriation.265 The refinement of 
sentiment relies on the curtailment of the material desires of a possessive individual. As long as 
feelings do not fully materialize, as long as they remain just outside of our proper grasp, they may 
retain the ambiguity that shields them from impropriety. Despite their possible unfortunate effects, 
unowned feelings are outwith moral judgment. While Sterne’s consistent double entendres keep 
himself in the clear of moral accusation, they also point to the gap between intended right and felt 
wrong that is the unfortunate corollary of moral theory based on sympathy.  In Smith’s chapters on 
the irregularity of feeling (II.iii.I–II.iii.III), he points out that the discrepancies between intended 
sensibility and felt end cannot be objectively judged and therefore must be tolerated. If intentions 
and feelings were made the “proper and approved objects of human punishment and resentment” 
(II.iii.I.3 94), our judgments would deteriorate into delusional misconceptions as “we should feel all 
the furies of that passion against any person in whose breast we suspected or believed such designs 
or affections were harboured” (II.iii.III.2 105). 
Sterne’s parodic use of aposiopesis works to highlight the conjectural space opened by 
such irregularities of feeling. In the process he points precisely to the weaknesses of a sympathetic 
exchange that relies too heavily on distinctions between things that are “proper and approved 
objects” and those that are not. Yorick’s sentimental journey between things, ideas and the 
sympathetic feelings that allow them to mix often depend on a willingness to entertain the 
superstitions that Smith only barely tolerates as side effects of an overdeveloped sensibility. Yet, the 
insistent physicality of sentimental exchanges prevent them from taking on the “solipsistic nature” 
that Moglen asserts. The insistence on a sensuous “divinity that stirs within me” that provides not 
only spiritual relief but joys and cares that can be felt rather than merely conceived266 is thus typical 
of Yorick’s sympathetic imagination. Reminding us that “there is nothing unmix’d in this world”, 
Yorick insists on the interdependence of the physical and the emotional aspect of sensibility. 
Yorick’s construction of the object of his apostrophe as a cross between a hypostatic sentiment 
(“Dear sensibility”) and fetishized thing (the “great SENSORIUM of the world) and as both  
disseminator (“fountain”) and receptacle of vibrational emotion testifies to his failure (or 
unwillingness?) to subscribe to the neat distinctions necessary to uphold an impartial position in the 
efforts to seize another’s sentiments while not entirely losing touch with one’s own. The sensuous 
singularity and the particularity of feeling stored in sentimental objects are key in this balancing act. 
What staves off the solipsism of imagined sympathies is the ability to grasp and keep 
hold of the specifically sentimental properties of sympathetic transference that are so easily lost in 
the more promiscuous exchanges in a society marked by increasingly distant, commercially 
oriented relations between people. A quick glance at the chapter titles shows that disentangling 
Yorick’s “web of kindness” (II.xv 90) is also a matter of tracing the itinerary of mobile objects: 
Yorick sets off in that most singular of vehicles “The Desobligeant” from “The Snuff-Box. Calais” 
with a stop at “The Bidet”, before he can enjoy a series of erotosocial encounters at Paris mediated 
by luxury objects such as  “The Wig”, “The Gloves” and “The Rose”. What is precious about these 
objects is their ability to constitute a human community in the interstice between acquisition and 
cession. Staying out of the centreless network of impersonal substitutions that characterizes 
                                                 
265 If the volume marker is restricted to perform its extradiegetic function, the punctuation of the the last sentence might 
imply that a more innocent antecedent of the possessive by referring simply to the “hand” of the first part of the 
sentence, leaving the aposiopesis a mere typographical omission of a full stop. This does not alter my reading. 
266 Yorick quotes from Joseph Addison’s play Cato (V, I, 6-8). Identifying the source of Addison’s “pomp of words” as 
Plato’s Phaedo, Dussinger finds that Sterne consistently lets his characters assert “the close interdependence of mind 
and body” (7): “What Yorick rejects…is apparently Plato’s argument in the Phaedo that the rational soul welcomes 
death as a release from the prison of the body” (7).  
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commercial exchange is key to the preservation of sentimental value in a sympathetic transference – 
an insularity that is as difficult to sustain as the solipsism of a desobligeant.  
That the fear of accelerated commercial duplication threatening to annul the 
singularity that can make a commodity “one's own” belongs to Yorick as well as to Sterne is 
evident from what Deidre Lynch calls the parodic “miniaturized narrative[s] of circulation folded 
into A Sentimental Journey” (“Personal” 83), the most well-documented one of which is the story of 
the captive starling Yorick adopts as the symbol for his crest of arms. Not a few critics have noticed 
how closely Yorick’s figuration of “the miseries of confinement” spurred by the failed attempt to 
free the bird parallels the imaginative spectatorialism of Smithean sympathy.267 Activating “the full 
scope of my imagination” (II.iv 70), Yorick singles out a prisoner from an imaginative crowd and 
proceeds “to take his picture” (II.iv 70). Adam Smith’s oscillation between impartial spectatorship 
and sympathetic participation here finds its parallel in the overt compositional deliberation he takes 
in “the picture of confinement which my fancy had drawn” (II.iv 71). Thus Yorick is careful to 
darken the light of the sentimental tableau he has composed before allowing himself to burst into 
tears. What has been less noted is the extent to which Yorick’s initial connection with the bird is 
based on the physical proximity and suddenness typical of the sudden encounter with portable 
properties. The tangibility of the details – the doubly twisted wire and pressure of the bird’s body 
against the trellis – suggests the predominance of what Christopher Nagle identifies as the 
“pleasures of proximity” (824) that characterize Yorick’s attunement to the vibrations of the great 
sensorium of the world. Taking both hands to the cage, his previously “dissipated spirits” are “so 
suddenly call’d home” (II.iii 69) in a centrifugal motion that centres on the sensuous appropriation 
of a singularized object. The stillness of the sentimental tableau that Yorick imagines is predicated 
upon the arrest of the manipulation of an otherwise mobile object.   
The exclusivity of the feelings that such closeness can ensure is easily lost, which 
becomes evident from Yorick’s account of the bird’s past and future in the last chapter that deals 
with the subject on the “road to Versailles”. Yorick’s resumption of his journey mirrors the 
starling’s re-entry into the trade circuit. Although initially wanting to liberate the bird “cost what it 
will” (II.iii 69), Yorick is subsequently very conscious of the precise value represented by the 
starling, detailing the establishing cost of a livre expended on the bird’s cage by its first master and 
taking delight in the fact that he has “bought both him and his cage…for a bottle of Burgundy” (II.v 
72). The loss of value is directly related to the object’s ability to function successfully as a 
sentimental prop: an “unknown language at Paris” (II.v 72), the starling’s specific brand of 
sensibility is more in demand in England:  
 
In my return from Italy I brought him with me to the 
country in whose language he had learn’d his notes – and 
telling the story of him to Lord A – Lord A begg’d the bird 
of me – in a week Lord A gave him to Lord B – Lord B 
made a present of him to Lord C – and Lord C’s gentleman 
sold him to Lord D’s for a shilling – Lord D gave him to 
lord E – and so on – half round the alphabet –  (II.v 72) 
 
In this circuit cheaply bought sentimental value is easily converted into quick profits – a transaction 
that condenses in the economic and musical vibrations of the starling’s “notes”. The starling’s route 
from one lordship to another through “the hands of as many commoners” (II.v 72) and “into the 
lower house” (II.v 72) parodies eighteenth-century tenets about the emulative powers associated 
                                                 
267 See for instance Lamb (Preserving 264-271), Ellis (Politics 71-79) and Mullan (Sentiment 193-194). 
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with luxury goods as well as the standardized plot of it-narratives.268 The cheapening of the starling 
is relative to the speed of the transactions – the wider the circulation, the less original and the more 
worn becomes the story.  
As Gardner D. Stout has pointed out, the urgency of such parodic distancing from the 
facile pathos of a stock tale can more easily be recognized in a reading that considers the 
homophonic similarity between the old-English appellation for starling, “stearn”, and Sterne’s last 
name. Such a reading would take into account not only the many writers who were to be inspired by 
Sterne to write and advertise their works as “sentimental” in what would prove a veritable vogue of 
sentimental fiction,269 but also the many imitations and spurious continuations of Sterne’s work that 
had already appeared by the publication of A Sentimental Journey. These includes several titles that 
overtly profited on Yorick’s popularity as a character from The Life and Opinions of Tristram 
Shandy, Gentleman (1759-1767), such as Yorick’s Meditations upon Various Interesting and 
Important Subjects (1760) and A Funeral Discourse. Occasioned by the Much lamented Death of 
Mr. Yorick (1761).270 To Sterne it must have seemed exceedingly clear how easily the speedy 
transactions in the commercial exchange circuit might undercut the distinctions that can single out 
an object as “one’s own”. Nevertheless, as Ian Campbell Ross has documented, Sterne himself was 
adept at exploiting the possibilities for imitation and profitable reappearances, obligingly 
performing as either Tristram or Yorick according to public demand. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that in a characteristic move that makes the parody double back on itself, Sterne lets Yorick relate 
the story of the starling’s commercial afterlife only to “fill out the blank” left by a landscape that 
has “nothing which I look for in travelling” (II.v 71) – if there are no sensations that will advance 
original composition, the fabrication of formulaic sentimentality will keep the wheels spinning.271  
Once again the problem becomes how to distinguish between a work of integrity and 
the choppy duplications that capitalize on it. Indeed, as unsympathetic reviewers noted, the episodic 
nature of A Sentimental Journey could mask the patchiness of a less carefully written work. An 
anonymous reviewer in The Critical Review complained about the “whimsical titles” of the novel 
and pointed to the unoriginality of La Fleur’s character “pieced out with shreds which Mr. Yorick 
has barbarously cut out and unskilfully put together from other novels” (qtd. in Howes 197-198).272 
According to the review, Sterne had written a thoroughly “calculated” work, “imposing upon his 
countrymen whim for sentiment, and caprice for humour!” (qtd. in Howes 198).273 Making Yorick’s 
“delirium…a fatal symptom of his dissolution” (qtd. in Howes 197), the anonymous reviewer 
decisively connects the frenzy of sensibility and the incoherence of hack writing. Although 
convinced of Sterne’s inimitability and the sincerity of his “pathetic vein”, even Griffith cannot 
                                                 
268
 Repeating Mandeville’s insight about the recirculation of luxury goods, albeit with less concern, Smith excuses the 
luxury spending that allows wealth to be distributed to the lower classes “in time” in The Wealth of Nations (1776):  
“The houses, the furniture, the clothing of the rich, in a little time, become useful to the inferior ranks of people…What 
was formerly a seat of the family of Seymour, is now an inn upon the Bath road. The marriage-bed of James the First of 
Great Britain, which his Queen brought with her from Denmark, as a present fit for a sovereign to make to a sovereign, 
was, a few years ago, the ornament of an ale-house at Dunfermline” (II.iii.II 378). Smith’s description is satiric rather 
than sentimental, but the life trajectories of his debased luxuries follow those of the mid-century it-narratives. For an 
account of how sentimental novels provided Smith with models for his sympathy, see Seigel, Jerrold Seigel (162-165). 
269 In “Sterne’s Comedy of Sentiments” (1994), John Mullan notes that the earliest book entitled “a sentimental novel” 
was published the year after The Sentimental Journey and that through “the 1770s and 1780s, there is a stream of such 
fiction, much of it offering homage quite explicitly to Sterne…” (235).  
270 For more on the imitation of Sterne, see René Bosch (15).  
271 For an argument of how Sterne elsewhere conceives writing along the lines of mechanical production, see William 
C. Mottolese, and Joseph Drury. 
272 The original review can be found in the Critical Review XXV (March 1768): 181-185. 
273 Like the anonymous writer, Griffith also implies that the novel is marred by sloppy writing, deploring Sterne’s 
tendencies to “adopt the vulgarism of a city news-writer (qtd. in Howes 199).  
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resist alluding to the pecuniary motivation for writing, pointing to the worrying gap between the 
“the price of a book” and the “many a bright glittering guinea” expended on the “groundwork” 
travels necessitated by the novel (qtd. in Howes 199).274  
Yorick, however, is keen to shield the starling as a representative of the “style and 
sentiment” (Blackstone qtd. Rose, “The Author” 83) that Blackstone considered the true identity of 
a literary work from the duplicity that its circulation effects. Like the starling’s automatized request, 
“I can’t get out – I can’t get out”, the success of Yorick’s declaration hinges on its ability to exhort 
sympathy from what is essentially the stylized copying of human communication. The discovery of 
authentic feeling relies on the distinction between notes that are merely automated reproductions 
from the ones that though “mechanical” are also somehow “true in tune to nature” (II.iii 69).275  The 
difficulty in sustaining such distinctions can be traced in Yorick’s overinsistence on the self-identity 
of the starling: 
 
It is impossible but many of my readers must have heard of 
him; and if any by mere chance have ever seen him – I beg 
leave to inform them, that that bird was my bird – or some 
vile copy set up to represent him. (II.v 72) 
 
The necessary contingencies of commercial circulation quickly rob the author of a nervous 
confidence inspired by a literary success built on rumour and chance exposure. Outwith Yorick’s 
“tenderly awakened” (III.iii 69) recollection, the starling cannot be unambiguously possessed. The 
interjection before the correlative conjunction becomes the axis around which the antinomies of 
sentimental appropriation spins, highlighting the loss of what Yorick at the beginning of the chapter 
insists is “the self-same bird” (II.v 71).  Yorick’s disembodiment of the starling in his final 
construction of it as “the crest to my arms” (II.v 72) might be seen as an attempt to distinguish the 
emptiness of a fashionable commodity adopted by the masses who want “to get in” (II.v 72)276 from 
the genuineness of a sentimental object reserved only for those with more aristocratic sensibilities. 
The move from an audio-tactile constitution of the bird as tune and violence of movement to its 
visual immobilization is stressed by the insertion of a plate representing Sterne’s coat of arms. The 
stylization of the image throttles the life in things freeing them from the double twists of embodied 
metonymy only to fix them in the strictures of allegory.277 In Yorick’s final comment the frustrated 
loss of control caused by the waywardness of the sentimental possession surfaces in what Judith 
Frank calls an “aggressively aesthetized” gesture (78) that balances between injunction and 
incitement as a “fantasy of its murder that seems comically like a wish” (78): “And let the heralds 
officers twist his neck about if they dare” (73).278 
                                                 
274 For an exploration of the connections between words and money in the novel, please see Lamb’s article on 
“Language and Hartleian Associationism in A Sentimental Journey” (1980) 
275 For an argument that traces the mechanization of feeling in the culture of sensibility, see Alex Wetmore. 
276 Peter Manning describes the consumption of books as mere status symbols by tracing the “snobbery and concern 
with fashion that were the hallmarks” (44) of the popular poetic annual giftbook, The Keepsake, in the 1820s. 
Advertised as “a status gift rather than a book to read”, the annual disguised what was an overtly commercial enterprise 
by presenting itself as “a cheap luxury for those who could afford it” (Manning 47). Sterne hints that the same 
mechanisms were in place by the 1760s.  
277 The move is similar to the move from a spontaneous to what Paul Goring calls a formalized “rhetoric of sensibility”, 
i.e. a codified “elocutionary discourse” in which the formalization and modelling of specific gestures encourages the 
constitution of “bodies as expressive, eloquent objects” (6). Such a rhetoric creates a “sentimental visibility” (Goring 
145) only by disciplining contagious forms of sensibility that allow more spontaneous raptures of emotion to emerge.  
278
 Even this gesture of containment, however, might not be able to withhold the propagation of surreptitious claims to 
originality. Sterne’s right to use the arms has thus been the subject of scholarly discussion. Michael O’Shea has 
contested Gardner Stout’s claim (205-206) that Sterne used his great-grandfather’s arms “without the authority of the 
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Also displaying the connection between anxieties of authorial possession and the 
devaluation of the singularized object caused by the contiguous circulation is the story of the 
bouquet of flowers that La Fleur gives to his “petite demoiselle” (II.xix 96).  Repeating the social 
descent of the starling, the flowers quickly change hands from the mistress “to one of the Count’s 
footmen – the footman to a young sempstress – and the sempstress to a fiddler” (II.xxii 101) within 
two hours of La Fleur’s departure. The promiscuity of such rapid exchanges are implied by 
Yorick’s reservations about the kind of mistress that can be “pick’d up in so little time in Paris” as 
well as La Fleur's confession that the he “should not have been mortified…if she had lost it” (II.xxii 
101). (The ambiguous antecedent of the pronoun (“it”) hints at a less innocent loss that that of the 
flowers.) The loss is paralleled by Yorick’s loss of the sheets of writing that would have completed 
the sentimental story of a “heart-broken” gentleman written on the “waste paper” that La Fleur has 
used as a dish for Yorick’s breakfast butter (II.xix 100). In common with Swift’s Tale, writing is 
figured as layered packaging. Although written “in the old French of Rabelais’ time” (II.xx 97), the 
manuscript is so gripping that Yorick works the entire afternoon to make sense of it, eventually 
translating it into English. A witty history of the misfortunate notary that transcribes it, the 
Scriblerian framing of the story is successfully preserved and translated, while the sentimental core 
of the story is irreparably lost, used by La Fleur as wrapping for his scrapped “gage d’amour” 
(II.xxii 101). Like the story of the starling, this story exposes the unmanageable hollowness in a 
mode of writing that depends on the recirculation of sentimental gesture – an emptiness underlined 
by the predominant imagery of unruly winds in the translated fragment.  
Reproduced as an independent chapter, the translated fragment is another miniaturized 
history of circulation, featuring an uncooperative cane, two lost hats and some borrowed matches. It 
is the story of how the notary loses his castor to a sentry in “an ill wind” (II.xxi 99) crossing Pont 
Neuf. In addition to underlining the hollowness of a type of writing that abandons original 
composition for translation, the wind imagery also stands for “the ebbs and flows of accidents” 
(II.xxi 99) that so easily separate a person from his possessions. The notary’s castor is 
underhandedly taken by the sentry to replace his own hat accidentally tipped off into the hands of a 
boatman on the Seine by the tip of the notary's cane. Although tempted to shoot the notary, the 
sentry settles for the substitute hat only because the matches needed to light his gun have been left 
with an old woman to relight her paper lantern. The faster an object changes hands the less likely it 
is that it will enjoy the kind of ownership that inspires sentimental worth or motivate the deliberate 
exchange of sympathy. Indeed in this hurricane of “unpremeditable puffs” (II.xxi 99) people are just 
barely in control of the involuntary passions incited by things always just beyond their grip. 
Deliberately fostered sympathy, however, has no place in this tempestuous crossing of people and 
things. Providing an obvious allegory of the possible misuses of Yorick’s own Menippean 
fragment, the story of the discarded manuscript contains the fears that the writing of a parodic 
sensibility perhaps not “altogether of a different cast from any of [its] fore-runners” (I.vii 13) might 
be wasted on a literary public used to less indecipherable sensibilities of a Richardsonian kind.  
What slips through this allegorical mesh, however, is the vulnerable constitution of 
sentimental value in an object whose worth is bound up with its ability to translate another’s 
feelings. The first step in the reappropriation of the feelings that hide in things thus hinges on the 
                                                 
herald’s officers” (Stout 205-206), suggesting instead that the use of the starling is problematic because its position 
might be understood as an indication of bastardy. Whatever the biographical implications of the starling, however, the 
wording of the last sentence remains ambiguous. A summary of the discussion between O’Shea and Stout is given in 
Melvyn New and Geoffrey Day’s notes to the Hackett edition of A Sentimental Journey (2006, 106, note 2), on which 
this note is based. See Sterne, Laurence. A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy and Continutation of the 
Bramine’s Journal. Ed. Melvyn New and W. G. Day. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006.  
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transformation of unremarkable, indiscriminate waste into a more noticeable thing. Drawn in by the 
first line, Yorick stops long enough to realize that although it is “faded and gone off by damps and 
length of time” (II.xx 97), he should take “trouble to make any thing of it” (II.xx 97). The “better 
worth” (II.xx 97) that Yorick identifies in the waste paper promises a sentimental return that is 
superior to its apparent economic or use value. The successful translation of stored up emotion 
hinges not only on the beholder’s ability to overlook its material crudity, but also on the object’s 
ability to command the attention of its beholder. Michael Fried identifies the sentimental tableau as 
an art form that depends on the successful replacement of the beholder’s normal state of distraction 
with the concentrated state of absorption. Fried argues that one of the common tenets of late 
eighteenth-century theory of the relationship between the painting and the beholder was the 
assumption that an effective painting must attract, arrest, and enthral the beholder: “[A] painting 
had to call to someone, bring him to a halt in front of itself, and hold him there as if spellbound and 
unable to move.” (92) The schema provides the scaffolding for Sterne’s parody of the demands of 
pictorialist absorption:  
 
I stopping to read a line, and that drawing me on to a 
second and third….I sat down to read it….Still it kept hold 
of me….and after two or three hours poring upon it, 
with…deep attention …, I thought I made sense of it… 
(II.xx 97) 
 
The lacunae that I have inserted here to shorten the narrative, however, are indicative of Yorick’s 
failure to live up to the requirements of enthralled absorption. In between what proves to be the 
forced agony of deciphering the manuscript, Yorick manages to write two letters, consume a bottle 
of wine and observe the bustle of the streets from his window. Resistant to selfless absorption, the 
manuscript seems to invite a different, less planned approach between hurried distraction, painful 
concentration, alcohol-induced impassivity and amused non-commitment:  
 
I went on leisurely, as a trifling man does, sometimes 
writing a sentence – then taking a turn or two – and then 
looking how the world went, out of the window; so that it 
was nine o'clock at night before I had done it – (II.xx 97-
98)  
 
The lack of focused attention suggests that the manuscript is not a suitable vehicle for sympathetic 
self-transcendence, working instead as an entertaining trifle that fails to engage its beholder 
properly. What Yorick decries as “the irreparability of the fragment” (II, 98) is partly the insistent 
impenetrability of an object whose superficiality makes light of sentimental expectations of depth 
and absorption and exposes the theatricality of a sympathetic translation that relies solely on a 
visual paradigm. The irreparable fragmentation of the object points to a materiality that resists the 
control effected by an overexerted sentimental gaze.  
The chapter that sets the stage for this parodic history of the fragment is likewise ripe 
with objects that fail to complete the perfect circles that proper objects of sentimentality take. The 
story of the bouquet thus starts with a careful depiction of La Fleur’s acquisitions from the Parisian 
second-hand clothes market in order to “faire le gallant” (II.xix 96). The exhaustiveness of the 
details given of the clothes inadvertently draws attention to the inadequacies of clothes “squeezed 
out of the money” (II.xix 95) given by Yorick: 
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He had bought a bright, clean, good scarlet coat and a pair 
of breeches of the same – They were not a crown worse, he 
said, for the wearing – I wish’d him hang’d for telling me – 
they look’d so fresh, that tho’ I knew the thing could not be 
done, yet I would rather have imposed upon my fancy with 
thinking I had bought them new for the fellow, than that 
they had come our of the Rue de Friperie. 
… 
He had purchased moreover a handsome blue sattin 
waistcoat, fancifully enough embroidered – this was indeed 
something worse for the services, it had done, but ’twas 
clean scour’d – the gold had been touch’d up, and upon the 
whole was rather showy than otherwise – (II.xix 95)   
 
The sentiments extracted from such a tableau is not the bemusement of what Roche calls the 
“fraudulent metamorphosis” associated with a “man who w[ears] the clothes of another” (332), but 
rather the pity elicited by the incompletion of such duplicity by a man whose cast-off luxuries 
reveals his bluff “to get in”. The insistence on a sympathy elicited from the particularization of the 
material decline of recycled commodities is a trick that Yorick picks up from the mid-eighteenth 
century novels of circulation. Yet, in the central description of the passage, the satin waistcoat 
attains its status as a sympathetic object only by serving as a metonymic extension of La Fleur and 
by highlighting Yorick’s embarrassed culpability: although “rather showy than otherwise”, Le Fleur 
is also “worse off “ for the service he is in.  
 The association between servant and used object finds its equivalent in Yorick’s 
subsequent reflections on extent to which the former are allowed to “set their self-denials at a price” 
(II.xix 96). La Fleur asks for a Sunday leave to meet with Madame de R****’s maid, and Yorick 
has to remind himself that “the sons and daughters of service” are “flesh and blood” before agreeing 
to “spare” La Fleur (II.xix 96). The ambiguity of this verb279 suggests the fine line between 
possessive self-interest and benevolent sentimentality. Yorick’s admission that he “never could 
have worse spared him” (II.xix 96) because of his impending vis à vis with Madame de R**** 
comically contrasts the intended generosity with the actual thriftiness of a benevolence that only 
reluctantly saves the beneficiary from wear. Both economical and existential, La Fleur’s “self-
denials” are a product of the short-comings of a sentimental economy that cannot quite afford its 
own luxuries. A “poor fellow” (II.xix 95), but not quite a self (a self denied), La Fleur is somehow 
less than the sum of his purchases. In a restricted economy, sensibility amounts to the correct 
evaluation of recycled goods. Le Fleur's self-denial partly depends on his inability to determine 
which objects are worth investing in and which are indeed “worse for the wearing”. In other words, 
La Fleur’s failure to assert his personhood has as much to do with the legal contract that has made 
him “part with liberty” (II.xix 96) as it has to do with the economic constraints that make him 
unable to truly inhabit his possessions. The sentimental humour of this passage is driven not by the 
fear of a self-fashioning individual, but by the nostalgic longing for things that have lost their 
                                                 
279  The most relevant meanings of the verb “to spare” listed by The Oxford English Dictionary are “To dispense with 
from one’s stock or supply, or from a number, quantity…especially without inconvenience or loss to oneself” (II.8.a), 
“To use or practise economy or frugality; to be parsimonious or niggardly” (II.5.c), “To exercise or show mercy, 
forbearance, or leniency” (I.2.a) and “To allow to escape, go free, or live” (I.1.a). The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd 
edition, 1989. “spare, v. 1”. July 25 2013. http://www.oed.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/view/Entry/185645.  
. 
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powers of investiture and the comical exposition of people’s inability to stand alone without them. 
The key image in the story of the lost fragment as well as in the tableau of the refashioned Le Fleur 
is that of botched recycling of cast-off commodities rather than of the successful reclaiming of 
sentimental goods, as both Yorick, La Fleur and the notary fail to control the incessant circulation 
of things and keep hold of the properties that they deem “better worth”.  
 Other examples of more effective reappropriations of sentiment in exchanged objects 
are compromised in different ways. Thus, while the “green taffeta” purse (II.xiv 89) fashioned by 
the chamber maid for the purpose of keeping apart the crown that Yorick has given her is an 
effective image of monetary circulation quite literally hemmed in, it also suggestive of the thin line 
between benevolent and sexual gestures. In Yorick’s first encounter with the girl, the renunciation 
of the crown’s purchasing power is underlined by pointing to the luxuries for which it could have 
been exchanged: had it not been selected from Yorick’s parcel of crowns, it could have paid for a 
volume of Shakespeare or laid out on ribbands (II.i 64). The implication is that the keepsake is a 
more durable luxury – “better worth” because unspent: “My advice, my dear, would not have been 
worth a pin to you, said I, if I had not given this along with it” (II.i 64). The girl has bought a 
romance and Yorick’s advice addresses the moral corruption inherent in the indulgence of novel 
reading:  
 
----- And what have you to do, my dear, said I, with The 
Wanderings of the Heart, who scarce know yet you have 
one? …if it is a good one, ’tis pity it should be stolen: ’tis a 
little treasure to thee, and gives a better air to your face, 
than if it was dress’d out with pearls. (II.i 63)  
 
Yorick’s identification of the girl as a typical reader of novels, “a susceptible female whose moral 
life is at risk” (Warner 5) taps into what William B. Warner has identified as “the aura of sexual 
scandal which clings to the early novel” (4). Associating sexual licentiousness with the unrestrained 
consumption of widespread fantasies, the title of the romance points to shared characteristics of the 
novel and the market that distributes it, both of which are condemned by what Warner calls “the 
anti-novel discourse”: “Many of the vices attributed to the novel are also attributes of the market: 
both breed imitation, incite desire, are oblivious to their moral effects, and reach into every corner 
of the kingdom” (Warner 7). What Yorick objects to is the temerity inherent in the commercial 
trafficking of sentiments – the wanderings of the heart are inevitably a morally risky business.  
Kept apart and hemmed in, the crown works to disrupt the market that sets feelings in 
motion. Insisting on the singularity of the coin, the girl makes it her own – a sentimentalized token 
of the kind of “virtuous convention between man and woman…[that] sanctifies even the most 
private walks” (II.i 64). However, Yorick’s assurances of the innocence of the exchange brings into 
view the possible inappropriateness of the couple’s lack of scruples at “walking along the Quai de 
Conti together” (II.i 64) at night, just as his confession that no other crown he has given to a girl has 
ever given him “half the pleasure” (II.i 64) evokes other less innocent kinds of pleasures that can be 
procured from female streetwalkers at night. Lynch points out that the girl’s very choice of 
keepsake holds a similar ambiguity: “When our keepsake is our money, we have not abrogated that 
connection with the marketplace that compromises our pleasure in having. Instead the market 
continues to figure in our story, as a defining line of self-expression” (“Personal” 85).280 What seals 
the connection between calculating investment and sentimental benevolence as well as between 
sexual self-interest and sentimental amity is the necessity of touch as a means of affective 
                                                 
280 Lynch does not apply this insight to her reading of Yorick’s crown, which she instead prefers to see as “money 
converted into a keepsake…the object of a more absolute, immaculate mode of ownership” (“Personal” 82).  
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transference: “[A]s is usual in little bargains of honour, she gave me her hand” (II.i 64). While the 
adjective only partly succeeds in diminishing the careful value assessments of a commercial 
venture, the offering of the hand balances evenly between the conventionality of a commercial 
transaction and the sensitivity of an affective gesture.  
Yet, the protracted moment of the initial exchange between Yorick and the fille de 
chambre provides an exact model of the constitution of sentimental property in which the centrality 
of physical sharing is evident: 
 
The young girl listened with a submissive attention, 
holding her sattin purse by its ribband in her hand all the 
time – ’Tis a very small one, said I, taking hold of the 
bottom of it – she held it towards me – and there is very 
little in it, my dear, said I; but be but as good as thou art 
handsome, and heaven will fill it: I had a parcel of crowns 
in my hand to pay for Shakespear; and as she had let go the 
purse intirely, I put a single one in; and tying up the 
ribband in a bow-knot, returned it to her. (II.i 64) 
 
Underlining the significance of hands as a recurrent image in the novel, the passage clearly equates 
physical touch with the movement of emotion – or rather, constructed along the lines of Hartley’s 
theory of vibration, it conceives physical movement as emotion. Lamb has noted how at the 
intersection between ideas and impressions the hand works as “the creator and recorder of…felt 
impressions” and as “a channel of ideas by gesture” (“Language” 292). Emotions work along a 
similar interface. The “bow-knot” that Yorick ties before returning the purse emphasizes the link 
between successful manipulation of objects and the delicate handling of emotions. Yet, although 
taking the dynamics of interchange rather than an instantaneous moment of “frozen pathos” (Anne 
Patricia Williams 481, Fried 96) as its subject, the scene demonstrates both the theatricality and the 
ekphrastic specificity characteristic of the tableau. Infusing a moment with sentimental significance 
through the use of detailed description and the staging of conventional gesture, the scene achieves 
its sentimental effect as a pictorial composition whose distance is inscribed on two levels. Firstly, 
the reader’s enjoyment of the scene rests on the voyeuristic pleasure taken from observing another’s 
pleasurable, seemingly private (unselfconscious) moment.281  Secondly, the exchange is carefully 
delineated as a meeting that forges sympathy through a proximity that never quite amounts to a 
convergence. Central to the exchange is the instant the purse is held by both Yorick and the fille de 
chambre without their hands touching. Like Mesmer’s magnetic rods, the purse works as a common 
ground of shared feeling, achieving an interchange without compromising the separateness of the 
individual. In this sense the passage provides a model for a Smithean pictorial sympathy that 
nevertheless relies on a materialist mixing. 
The association between the singularization of commodities turned keepsakes and the 
compromised secrecy of an encounter that is just a little too personal is emphasized when the fille 
de chambre re-enters the story to present Yorick with a purse she has fashioned for the express 
                                                 
281 Michael Fried and Anne Patricia Williams have both noted that the distanced positioning of the viewer of the 
sentimental tableau is central to its constitution. Fried points out that according to Diderot, the tableau was best 
achieved when”the grouping of figures and stage properties that constituted a tableau stood outside the action, with the 
result that the characters themselves appeared unaware of its existence and hence of its effect on the audience” (95). 
Williams compares the witness to the literary version of the sentimental tableau to “the seual voyeur since both take a 
sort of pleasure in observing unobserved” (483, note 46).  
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purpose of holding Yorick’s crown.282 Locking bawdy figurative implications and innocent surface 
denotations in a mutual hold, Sterne creates a double text that allows the reader to see clearly what 
is not written – and redden perhaps with that “pleasing half guilty blush” (II.xiv 88) that Yorick 
experiences at this second encounter. Readers trained in Sterne’s punning would not take long to 
recognize the sexual implications of the “pretty” purse (II.xiv 89) resting in the girl’s lap “just big 
enough to hold the crown” (II.xiv 89).283 As Ariane Fennetaux points out, the sexual suggestiveness 
of the scene is underscored by the ambiguous role purses and pockets played in the construction of 
eighteenth-century femininity. Hand-fashioned primarily for the keeping of needles, pins, scissors 
and thread, pockets provided the space for female privacy and encapsulated “the domestic role of 
women as keepers of the house” (307).284 Yet, as portable accessories and repositories for money 
and purses, they also testified to women's “increasing mobility and independence” (Fenneteaux 
333) trough their involvement in the public market place. Furthermore, by their “liminal position 
between undergarment and outer-garment, between the inside and the outside” (Fenneteaux 317), 
pockets and purses worked as distinctly female interiors in permanent risk of being compromised. 
Sterne uses the association between pockets and female genitalia to further the confusion between 
sexual and emotional intensity and destabilize the equation between physical and emotional 
proximity relied upon by physiological version of sympathy:  
 
I’ll just shew you said the fair fille de chambre, the little 
purse I have been making today to hold your crown. So she 
put her hand into her right pocket, which was next to me, 
and felt for it for some time – then into the left – she had 
lost it. ---I never bore expectation more quietly. (II.xiv 89) 
 
What makes sympathy suspicious here is not the theatrical pretences of a visually oriented, 
projective sympathy ruled by the imagination, but the potential eroticism of a sympathetic exchange 
that relies on touch.  Characteristically disguised by an ellipsis (between two chapters), the nature of 
Yorick’s final “address” (II.xv 90) which throws the fille de chambre “off her center” (II.xiv 89) 
and onto the bed remains as impenetrable as what Yorick terms nature’s “web of kindness” in 
which “threads of love and desire” (II.xv 90) can only be disentangled at the expense of the entire 
piece (II.i 64). The suggestion here is that the public good of sympathetic exchanges is inherently 
complicated by private passions: not only Sterne’s humour but also the effect of sympathy itself 
would be lost if one insists on the unmixed pleasures produced by simpler designs. If Sterne points 
to the rehearsed theatricality of the kind of sympathy that relies on vision, he also exposes the 
sexual aspect of the physical part of sensibility. There are reasons to be suspicious of both visual 
and physiological models of sympathetic exchange – neither exists in an unmixed form. 
                                                 
282 Michael McKeon has written of the association between the fantasy of compromised privacy and prostitution: “The 
appeal of the streetwalker – of the ‘private’ whore – was thus bound up with her proximity to her putative, more 
categorically private antithesis [the wife or maiden]. This goes some distance, perhaps, toward rationalizing the oddity 
that solicitation that occurred in public – that is, on the streets – was called ‘private’, whereas solicitation that occurred 
in private domiciles was called ‘public’ (197). What makes Yorick’s commerce with the fille de chamber comically 
immoral is its demonstration of the discrepancy between the vices that are being publicly displayed and the virtues that 
Yorick privately avows. In reversing Mandeville’s dictum of “private virtues and public vices”, Sterne shows the 
weakness of a discourse that begins to distinguish between interior and exterior selves. 
283 According to Christopher Nagle the word “purse” was eighteenth century slang for female genitalia. 
284 Fenneteaux notes that unlike modern pockets eighteenth century women’s pockets were not sewn onto the dress, but 
rather “detachable items of clothing rather like bags worn under a woman’s skirt and accessed through slits in her 
overdress” (308). In this way women’s pockets have a liminal position as an alienable private space. 
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Yet, the passage hints that what replaces the carefully controlled reticence of sensed 
proximity as well as the deliberately staged substitutions of a pictorial sympathy is something like 
the surprise imposition of an impassioned sympathy in which reflection has no time to develop. 
Like Smith, Sterne points to the importune physicality of objects as stumbling blocks to a controlled 
type of sympathy untainted by passions. In Sterne the thing resurfaces in its original incarnation as 
skandalon. Taking the place of Smith’s stone as the deodand, the fille de chambre’s shoe buckle 
works as a catalyst for unchecked passion, literally throwing the parties involved off balance, as 
Yorick attempts to put it right. Although the honesty of such an unreflective, mechanical-
materialistic sympathy is never allowed to surface completely, it nevertheless looms in pockets of 
the narrative as an alternative to complications of the more imaginative, pictorial and the 
physiological kinds. Like Yorick’s wayward waste paper manuscript and La Fleur’s unsuitable suit, 
the scandalous shoe buckle points to the power of things that are beyond the individual’s control. 
The chance sympathy tentatively outlined in Sterne’s parody of sentiment might be founded on the 
fluidity of commercial circulation rather than the mechanics of the fixed system of correspondences 
that characterizes Digby’s system of sympathies and antipathies, but it shares its sense of surprise 
and the scandalous outburst of passion that comes from the unexpected encounter with things.  
As conductor of human sympathy and token of its proprietor’s emotional intensity, the sentimental 
object would appear to anticipate the fleshing out of a realist interiority familiar to readers of 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century fiction. Indeed the perfect communication between the world of 
things and that of people entertained by early nineteenth-century sentimental it-narratives such as 
The Adventures of an Ostrich Feather of Quality (1812) seems a benign fantasy compared to the 
nightmarish entanglement of people and properties in dressing room poems of the early eighteenth 
century. Similarly, in A Sentimental Journey, Yorick’s autosuggestive manipulation of the passing 
scenery safely distanced from the imposition of its physical reality in the confine of his chaise 
seems to confirm the isolation of a subject in control of his personal effects. Consistently pointing 
to things that are misplaced, misappropriated, misevaluated or just lost, the narrative confirms the 
disjuncture between a person and his effects to ridicule the twin confounds of hypostatization and 
fetishism. Yet, if Sterne’s sensibility strives for a subject that is shielded from his effects by 
providing a “pictorial isolation” of the objects that are worthy of emotional investment, it does so 
only to point to the artifice and potential self-deception created by the effects of a paradigm that 
privileges distanced observation at the expense of physical proximity. Rather than a solitary subject 
unencumbered and untouched by things, Sterne presents us with a subject that is overwhelmed by 
wayward personalty, recycled attire and incoherent waste paper. As a traveller of the “great 
sensorium of the World”, the man of sensibility is both dependent on and exposed by the transitivity 
between his self and transient and aimless material objects. Like Locke’s aggregate self, Yorick 
struggles to remain coherent in a narrative whose parts quite literally seem connected only by the 
transposition of trivial superfluities. The success of the sentimental traveller depends on his 
susceptibility to the superstition that holds what is merely felt as real. 
 195 
Bibliography 
 
 
Print Sources 
 
Addison, Joseph and Richard Steele. The Spectator 409 (June 19 1712). The Commerce of Everyday 
 Life. Selections from the Tatler and the Spectator. Ed. Erin Mackie. Bedford: 
 Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998: 383-386. 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. Negative Dialectics (1966). Trans. E. B. Ashton. London: Routledge, 1973; 
 1990.  
  
Adorno, Theodor W. and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments 
 (1944). Ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford  
 University Press, 2002. 
 
 
Alston, William P. and Jonathan Bennett. “Locke on People and Substances. Philosophical Review 
97 (1988): 25-46. 
 
Anon. “The Adventures of a Black Coat, Containing a Series of remarkable Occurrences and 
entertaining  Incidents, that it was a Witness to…..” (review). The Critical Review: or, 
Annals of Literature IX (June 1760): 499. 
 
Anon. The Adventures of an Ostrich Feather of Quality (1812). London: Sherwood, Neely and 
Jones, 1812.* 
 
Anon. The Adventures of a Pen (1806). The European Magazine and London Review  
 (July, Sept. and Oct. 1806). Vol. 50. London: I. Gold, 1806: 23-26, 187-191, 277-282. 
 
Anon. “The Adventures of the Rambler’s Magazine” (1785). The Rambler’s Magazine (May 1785):  
 Vol. III. London, 1783-90: 174-175. 
 
Anon. The Adventures of a Silver Penny. London: W. Nicoll, 1782.* 
 
Anon. Argentum; or, The Adventures of a Shilling (1794). London: J. Nichols, 1794. 
 
Anon. The History of a Old Pocket Bible, as Related by Itself. London: Sherwood, Neely and Jones, 
1815. 
 
Anon. “The Memoirs of a Wig.” The Scourge, or, Literary, Theatrical, and Miscellaneous 
Magazine. Vol. VII (June 1814). London: W. N. Jones, 1814: 472-482. 
 
Appadurai, Arjun. “Introduction: commodities and the politics of value.” The Social Life of Things. 
 Commodities in Cultural Perspective. Ed. Arjun Appadurai. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1986; 2003: 3-64. 
 196 
 
Arbuthnot, John et al. Memoirs of the Extraordinary Life, Works and Discoveries of Martinus 
 Scriblerus (1741). Ed. Charles Kerby-Miller. New Haven: Yale University Press,  
 1950. 
 
Ayers, Michael. Locke: Epistemology and Ontology. 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1991. 
 
Baker, Ernest A. The History of the English Novel. Vol. 5. London: Barnes & Noble, 1934. 
 
Barker-Benfield, G. J. The Culture of Sensibility. Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.   
 
Baudrillard, Jean. For A Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. Trans. Charles Levin. St. 
 Louis: Telos, 1972.   
 
Bauer, Esther K. “The Power of the Look: Franz Kafka’s ‘The Cares of a Family Man’.”  
 Kafka’s Creatures: Animals, Hybrids and Other Fantastic Beings. Eds. Marc Lucht 
 and Donna Yarri. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010: 157-175. 
 
Beattie, James. Elements of Moral Science. Delmar: Scholar’s Facsimiles, 1976. 
 
Bedini, Silvio A. “The Role of Automata in the History of Technology.” Technology and Culture 
 5.1 (Winter 1964): 24-42. 
 
Bellamy, Liz. Commerce, Morality and the Eighteenth-Century Novel. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2005. 
 
---. “Introduction.” British It-Narratives, 1750-1830. Ed. Mark Blackwell. Vol. 1. London: 
 Pickering and Chatto, 2012: xli-lv. 
 
---. “It-Narrators and Circulation: Defining a Subgenre.” The Secret Life of Things. Animals, 
 Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England. Ed. Mark Blackwell. 
 Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2007: 309-329. 
 
Benedict, Barbara M. “The Paradox of the Anthology: Collecting and Différence in Eighteenth-
Century Britain.” New Literary History 34.2 (spring 2003): 231-256. 
 
---. “Self, Stuff and Surface: The Rhetoric of Things in Swift’s Satire.” Swift’s Travels. 
 Eighteenth-Century British Satire and Its Legacy. Eds. Nicholas Hudson and Aaron 
 Santesso. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: 93-107. 
 
---. Framing Feeling: Sentiment and Style in English Prose Fiction, 1745-1899. New York: AMS 
 Press, 1994: 1-20.* 
 
Berg, Maxine. Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 2005; 2007. 
 
 197 
Bergson, Henry. Laughter. An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. Trans. Henry Brereton and Fred 
Rothwell. Minola: Dover, 2005. 
 
Bernhart, Walther. “Functions of Description in Poetry.” Description in Literature and other 
Media. Eds. Werner Wolf and Walther Bernhart. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007: 129-153. 
 
Bakhtin, Mikhail M. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1929). Trans. & Ed. Caryl Emerson. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. 
 
---. Rabelais and his World (1965). Trans. Helen Iswolsky. Bloomington and  
 Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1984. 
 
Barchas, Janine. Graphic Design, Print Culture, and the Eighteenth-Century Novel. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Barthes, Roland. “The Reality Effect.” The Rustle of Language. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: 
 Hill and Wang, 1986: 141-149. 
 
Beaumont, Charles Allen. “A Tale of a Tub and The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit.” Swift’s 
Use of the Bible: A Documentation and a Study in Allusion. Athens, Georgia: 
University of Georgia Monographs,1965: 1-15. 
 
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book II. Of the Rights of Things 
 (1765-69). Ed. William Draper Lewis. Philadelphia: Rees Welsh, 1902.  
 
Blackwell, Mark. “Hackwork: It-Narratives and Iteration.” The Secret Life of Things: Animals, 
 Objects and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England. Ed. Mark Blackwell. 
 Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 2007: 187-218. 
 
---. “Introduction: The It-Narrative and Eighteenth-Century Thing Theory” (2007). Ed. Mark 
 Blackwell. The Secret Life of Things. Animals, Objects and It-Narratives in  
 Eighteenth-Century England. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2007: 9-19. 
 
---. “Introduction.” British It-Narratives, 1750-1830. Vol. 4. London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012: 
 ix-xix. 
 
Bogel, Fredric V. The Difference Satire Makes: Rhetoric and Reading from Jonson to Byron. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001: 41-84; 215-259. 
 
Bogue, Ronald L. “‘Nature to Advantage drest’: Pope and the Improvement of Nature.” Essays in 
 Literature 10.2 (1983): 169-81. 
 
Bos, Jacques. “Individuality and Inwardness in the Literary Character Sketches of the Seventeenth 
Century.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 61 (1998): 142-157. 
 
Bosch, René. Labyrinth of Digressions. Tristram Shandy as Perceived and Influenced by Sterne’s 
Early Imitators. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007. 
 
 198 
Boyle, Robert. “An Excursion about the Relative Nature of Physical Qualities.” The Works of the 
 Honourable Robert Boyle. Vol. II. Ed. Thomas Birch. London: A Millar, 1744: 462-
 475. 
 
Bradley, Arthur. Originary Technicity. The Theory of Technology from Marx to Derrida. New 
 York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
 
Brayton, Dan. “Angling in the Lake of Darkness: Possession, Dispossession, and the Politics of 
 Discovery in King Lear.” EHL 70.2 (summer 2003): 399-426. 
 
Brewer, John. “Authors, Publishers and the Making of Literary Culture.” The Book History Reader. 
 Ed. David Finkelstein and Alistair McCleery. London: Routledge, 2002: 241-249. 
 
Brewer, John and Roy Porter. “Introduction.” Consumption and the World of Goods. Eds. John 
 Brewer and Roy Porter. New York: Routledge, 1993: 1994: 1-19. 
 
Brooke, Henry. The Fool of Quality (1765-70). Ed. Ernest A. Baker. London: Routledge, 1906.* 
 
Brooke-Rose, Christine. “Historical Genres/Theoretical Genres: A Discussion of Todorov on the 
Fantastic.” New Literary History 8.1 (Autumn 1976): 145-158. 
 
Brown, Bill. A Sense of Things. The Object Matter of American Literature. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press, 2003. 
 
---. “Thing Theory”. Critical Inquiry 28 (2001): 1-22. 
 
Brown, Laura. Alexander Pope. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. 
 
---. The Ends of Empire. Women and Ideology in Early Eighteenth-Century English 
 Literature. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. 
 
---. Homeless Dogs and Melancholy Apes. Humans and other Animals in the Modern Literary 
Imagination. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010: 1-27. 
 
---. “The Lady, the Lapdog, and Literary Alterity.” The Eighteenth Century 52.1 (spring 2011): 
 31-45.* 
 
Bunn, James. “The Aesthetics of British Mercantilism.” New Literary History 11.2 (winter 1980): 
 303-321. 
 
Bywater, David. “Anticlericism in Swift’s A Tale of a Tub.” Studies in English Literature 36 
(1996): 569-602. 
 
Carter, Sophie. Purchasing Power: Representing Prostitution in Eighteenth-Century English Print 
 Culture. London: Ashgate, 2004. 
 
Carrier, James G. Gifts and Commodities: Exchange and Western Capitalism since 1700. London, 
 New York: Routledge, 1995 
 199 
 
Castle, Terry. Masquerade and Civilization: The Carnivalesque in Eighteenth-Century Culture and 
 Fiction. London: Methuen, 1986. 
 
Chapuis, Alfred and Edmond Droz. Automata: A Historical and Technological Study. Trans. Alec 
 Reid. London: Neuchatel, Editions du Griffon & B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1958. 
 
Chico, Tita. “The Arts of Beauty: Women’s Cosmetics and Pope’s Ekphrasis.” Eighteenth Century 
 Life 26.1 (2002): 1-23. 
 
---. Designing Women. The Dressing Room in Eighteenth-Century Literature and Culture. 
 Cranbury: Associated University Press, 2005. 
 
Clarke, Samuel and Anthony Collins. The Clarke-Collins Correspondence of 1707-1718. Ed. 
 William L. Uzgalis. Peterborough: Broadview, 2011. 
 
Cohen, G. A. Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
 1995. 
 
Cohen, Murray. “Versions of the Lock: Readers of ‘The Rape of the Lock’.” EHL 43.1 (spring 
 1976): 53-73. 
 
Cohen, Ralph. “Transformation in the Rape of the Lock.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 2.3  
 (spring 1969): 205-224. 
 
Colebrook, Claire. Philosophy and Post-Structuralist Theory: From Kant to Delueze. Edinburgh: 
 Edinburgh University Press, 1999; 2005: 55-93.  
 
Conn, Christopher Hughes. Locke on Essence and Identity. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
 Publishers, 2003. 
 
Connery, Brian A. and Kirk Combe. “Theorizing Satire: A Retrospective Introduction.” Theorizing 
 Satire. Essays in Literary Criticism. Eds. Brian Conner and Kirk Combe. New York: 
 St. Martin’s Press, 1995: 4-19. 
 
Corngold, Stanley. “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Vermin: Metaphor and Chiasm in Kafka’s The 
Metamorphosis.” Literary Research 21.41-42 (2004): 59-85. 
 
Crane, R. S. “Suggestions Toward a Genealogy of the ‘Man of Feeling’”. The Idea of the 
Humanities, 2 vols. Chicago, 1967: 188-213.  
 
Crehan, Stewart. “The Rape of the Lock and the Economy of ‘Trivial Things’.”  
 Eighteenth-Century Studies 31.1 (1997): 45-68. 
 
Cruise, James. Governing Consumption. Needs, Wants, Suspended Characters, and the “Origins” 
of Eighteenth-Century English Novels. Cranbury: Associated University Press, 1999. 
 
 200 
Cunnington, Cecil Willett and Phillis Emily Cunnington. Handbook of English Costume in the 
 Eighteenth Century. London: Plays, 1972. 
 
Davies, Charles. “The Rape of the Lock and Evelyn’s Mundus Muliebris.” RES 10.39 (July 1934): 
 324-329. 
 
Day, J. P. “Locke on Property. “Philosophical quarterly 16 (1966): 207-220. 
 
De Man, Paul. Blindness and Insight. Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. 
 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971; 1983: 102-142. 
 
---. “Semiology and Rhetorics.” Diacritics 3.3 (1973): 27-33. 
 
DeMaria, Robert. The Life of Samuel Johnson. A Critical Biography. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1994: 67-86.  
 
Derrida, Jacques. “As If It Were Possible, ‘Within Such Limits’.” Paper Machine. Trans. Rachel 
 Bowlby Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005: 73-100. 
 
---. “The Book to Come.” Paper Machine. Trans. Rachel Bowlby Stanford: Stanford University 
 Press, 2005: 4-18 
 
---. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore and London: The Johns 
 Hopkins University Press, 1997; 1997. 
 
---. “Sauf le nom.” On the Name. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993; 1995: 35-89. 
 
---. The Spectres of Marx. The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and the New International 
 (1993). Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Routledge, 1994. 
 
---. Derrida, Jacques. The Work of Mourning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 
 
Deutsch, Helen. “The ‘Truest Copies’ and the ‘Mean Original’: Pope, Deformity, and the Poetics of 
 Self-Exposure.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 27.1 (autumn 1993): 1-26. 
 
Dobrée, Bonamy. English Literature in the Early Eighteenth Century: 1700-1740: 187-222. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959.   
 
Donaldson, Ian. “The Destruction of the Book.” Book History 1.1 (1998): 1-10. 
 
Douglas, Aileen. “Britannia’s Rule and the It-Narrator.” The Secret Life of Things. Ed. Mark 
 Blackwell. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2007: 147-162. 
 
Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Charles Spinosa.”Coping with Things-in-themselves: A Practice-Based 
 Phenomenological Argument for Realism.” Inquiry 42.1 (1999): 49-78.  
 
Drury, Joseph. “The Novel and the Machine in the Eighteenth Century.” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 
42.2 (Summer 2009): 337–42. 
 201 
 
Dunn, John. The Political Thought of John Locke. An Historical Account of the Argument of the 
 Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969; 1975. 
 
Dussinger, John A. “The Sensorium in the World of ‘A Sentimental Journey’.” Ariel 13.2 (1982):  
 3-16.* 
 
Dye, H. “The Appearance-Reality Theme in King Lear.” College English 25.7 (April 1964): 514-
517 
 
Ehrenpreis, Irvin. “Personae.” Restoration and Eighteenth-Century Literature: Essays in Honour of 
Alan Dugald McKillop. Ed. Carol Camden. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1963: 25-37. 
 
Ellis, Markman. The Politics of Sensibility: Race, Gender and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
 
---. “Suffering Things: Lapdogs, Slaves, and Counter-Sensibility.” The Secret Life of Things. 
 Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England. Ed. Mark 
 Blackwell. Lewisburg: Bucknell Press, 2007: 92-117.* 
 
Englert, Hilary Jane. “Occupying Works: Animated Objects and Literary Property.” The Secret Life 
 of Things: Animals, Objects and It-Narratives in Eighteenth-Century England. Ed. 
 Mark Blackwell. Lewisburg: Bucknell Press, 2007:  218-242. 
 
Epstein, Robert. “Possession as the Root of Title.” Georgia Law Review 13 (1979): 1220-1243.  
 
Erwin, Timothy. “Alexander Pope and the Disappearance of the Beautiful.” Eighteenth-Century 
Life 16.3 (November 1992): 46-64. 
 
Fairer, David. “Sentimental Translation in Mackenzie and Sterne.” Essays in Criticism 49 (1995):  
 1-33.* 
 
Fanning, Christopher. “Small Particles of Eloquence. Sterne and the Scriblerian Text.” Modern 
 Philology 100.3 (2003): 360-392. 
 
Fara, Patricia. Sympathetic Attractions. Magnetic Practices, Beliefs and Symbolism in Eighteenth-
 Century England. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.* 
 
Farnham, Fern. “Achilles’ Shield: some Observations on Pope’s ‘Iliad’.” PMLA 84.6 (Oct 1969): 
1571-81. 
 
Feather, John. “The Commerce of Letters: The Study of the Eighteenth-Century Book Trade.” 
 Eighteenth Century Studies 17.4 (summer 1984): 405-424. 
 
---. A History of British Publishing. London and New York: Routledge, 1988: 89-102. 
 
 202 
Fenneteaux, Ariane. “Women’s Pockets and the Construction of Privacy in the Long Eighteenth 
 Century.” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 20.3 (spring 2008): 307-333.* 
 
Ferguson, Rebecca. “‘Quick as her Eyes, and as unfix’d as those’ Objectification and seeing in 
Pope’s Rape of the Lock”. Critical Survey 4.1 (1992): 140-53. 
 
Festa, Lynn M. “The Moral Ends of Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Object Narratives.” The 
 Secret Life of Things. Ed. Mark Blackwell. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 
 2007: 309-329. 
 
---. “Person, Animal, Thing: The 1796 Dog Tax and the Right to Superfluous Things.” Eighteenth-
 Century Life 33.2 (spring 2009): 1-44. 
 
---. “Personal Effects: Wigs and Possessive Individualism in the Long Eighteenth 
 Century.” Eighteenth-Century Life 29. 2 (Spring 2005): 47-90.* 
 
---. Sentimental Figures of Empire in Eighteenth-Century Britain and France. Baltimore: The Johns 
 Hopkins University Press, 2006.*  
 
Fielding, Henry. Covent Garden Journal 6 (21 January 1752). The Criticism of Henry Fielding. 
 Ed. Ioan Williams. London: Taylor & Francis, 1970; 2011: 70-74.  
 
Flint, Christopher. “Speaking Objects: The Circulation of Stories in Eighteenth-Century Prose.” 
 PMLA 113. 2 (1998): 212-26. 
 
Forget, Evelyn L. “Evocations of Sympathy: Sympathetic Imagery in Eighteenth-Century Social 
 Theory and Physiology.” History of Political Economy 35 (2003): 282-308. 
  
Foucault, Michel. “What is an Author?” (1969). Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. 
 Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Ed. Donald F. Bouchard. Ithaca:  
 Cornell University Press, 1977: 124-127. 
 
Fowler, Alastair. Kinds of Literature. An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 1982; 2002: 107, 110. 
 
Fox, Christopher. “Locke and the Scriblerians: The Discussion of Identity in Early Eighteenth- 
 Century England.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 16.1 (autumn 1982): 1-25. 
 
---. Locke and the Scriblerians: Identity and Consciousness in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain. 
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 
  
---. “The Myth of Narcissus in Swift’s Travels.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 20.1 
 (autumn 1986): 17-33. 
 
Foxon, David. Pope and the Early Eighteenth-Century Book Trade. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991. 
 
 203 
Frank, Judith. “‘A Man Who Laughs Is Never Dangerous’: The Gentleman’s Disposition in A 
 Sentimental Journey.” Common Ground: Eighteenth-Century Satiric Fiction and the 
 Poor. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997: 63-90.* 
 
Freiburg, Rudolf. “Enlightened Darkness: The Treatment of Arcane Learning in Jonathan Swift’s A 
Tale of a Tub.” Swift the Enigmatic Dean: Festschrift for Herman Josef Real. Eds. 
Rudolf Freiburg, Arno Löffler and Wolfgang Zach. Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1998: 
47-69. 
 
Fried, Michael. Absorption and Theatricality. Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot.  
 Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980; 1988: 93-105.* 
 
Frogel, Shai. “Philosophical Argumentation: Logic and Rhetoric.” Argumentation 18 (2004):  
 171-188.   
 
Frye, Dean. “The Context of Lear’s Unbuttoning.” EHL 32.1 (March 1965): 17-31. 
 
Gallagher, Catherine. “The Rise of Fictionality”. Ed. Franco Moretti. The Novel. Vol. 1. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006: 336-361. 
 
Gasché, Rudolphe. The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics. Stanford: Stanford University 
 Press, 2003. 
 
Gilmore, Thomas B. “The Comedy of Swift’s Scatological Poems.” PMLA 91.1 (Jan. 1976): 33-43. 
 
Glassman, Robert B. and Hugh W. Buckingham. “David Hartley’s Neural Vibrations and 
 Psychological Associations.” Brain, Mind and Medicine. Neuroscience in the 18th 
 Century. Ed. Harry Whitaker et al. New York: Springer, 2007: 177-191.* 
 
Goring. Paul. The Rhetoric of Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
 
Gray, Erik. “Severed Hair from Donne to Pope.” Essays in Criticism 47.3 (July 1997): 220-239. 
 
Grazia, Margreta de. “The Ideology of Superfluous Things: King Lear as Period Piece.” Subject and 
 Object in Renaissance Culture. Eds. Margreta de Grazia, Maureen Quilligan and Peter 
 Stallybrass. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996: 17-43. 
 
Greenfield, Thelma Nelson. “The Clothing Motif in King Lear.” Shakespeare Quarterly 5.3 
(summer 1954): 281-286. 
 
Griffin, Robert J. “Anonymity and Authorship.” New Literary History 30.4 (autumn 1999):  
 877-895. 
 
Gutbrodt, Fritz. “The Genius as Compositor: Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition and 
the Imprimatur of Romanticism.” Imprints and Revisions: The Making of the Literary 
Text, 1759-1818. Eds. Peter Hughes and Robert Rehder. Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1996: 
15-37. 
 204 
 
Hammond, Brean S. Professional Imaginative Writing in England: Hackney for Bread. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997: 45-46. 
 
---. “Scriblerian Self-Fashioning.” The Yearbook of English Studies 18 (1988):  108-124. 
 
Harman, Graham. Prince of Networks. Melbourne, Australia: re.press, 2009: 11-99. 
 
Hartley, Lodwick. Laurence Sterne in the Twentieth Century. Chapel Hill: University of Carolina 
Press, 1966: 35-42. 
 
Hazlitt, William. Lectures of English Comic Writers (1819). New York, 1945. 
 
Heckscher, Eli F. Mercantilism. Trans. Mendel Shapiro. London: E. F. Söderlund, 1934; 1962. 
 
Heffernan, James A. W. Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time (1926). Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New 
 York: Harper & Row, 1962: 91-148. 
 
---. Heidegger, Martin. “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” (1951-52). In Poetry, Language, Thought. 
Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper and Row, 1971; 1975: 143-163. 
 
---. “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954). Trans. W. Lovitt. The Question Concerning  
 Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper and Row, 1977: 3-35 
 
---. “The Thing” (1951-52). Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: 
 Harper and Row, 1971; 1975: 163-187. 
 
---. What is a thing? (1935-36). Trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch. Lanham: University 
 Press of America, 1967; 1985. 
 
Heilman, Robert B. “Some Fops and Some Versions of Foppery.” EHL 49.2 (Summer 1982): 363-
 395. 
 
Heimann, P. M. “Voluntarism and Immanence: Conceptions of Nature in Eighteenth-Century 
 Thought”. Journal of the History of Ideas  39 (1978): 271-283. 
 
Heimann, P. M. and J. E. McGuire. “Newtonian Forces and Lockean Powers.” Historical Studies in 
 the Physical Sciences 3 (1971): 251-261. 
 
Hernandez, Alex Eric. “Commodity and Religion in Pope’s The Rape of the Lock.” SEL  48.1 
(summer 2008): 569-584. 
 
Hess, Scott. Authoring the Self: Self-representation, Authorship and the Print Market in British 
 Poetry from Pope through Wordsworth. New York and London: Routledge, 2005. 
 205 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan (1651).  Eds. Aloysius P. Martinich and Brian Battiste. 2 Vols. 
 Peterborough: Broadview, 2011: 11-12. 
 
Hodell, Charles, ed. and trans. The Old Yellow Book. Source of Browning’s The Ring and the Book. 
Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1908. 16.19.2014. 
http://archive.org/stream/oldyellowbooksou00hodeuoft - page/n7/mode/2up. 
 
Hodder, Ian. “The Entanglements of Humans and Things: A Long Term View”. New Literary 
History 45.1 (winter 2014): 19-36. 
 
Holly, M. “King Lear: The Disguised and Deceived.” Shakespeare Quarterly 24.2 (spring 1973): 
171-180. 
 
Howes, Alan B. Sterne, The Critical Heritage. London: Routledge, 1974.* 
 
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40). Eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.  
 
Hunt, Alan. Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law. Basingstoke: 
 Macmillan Press, 1996:  17-102; 295-325; 357-392. 
 
Hunter, J. Paul. “Form as Meaning: Pope and the Ideology of the Couplet.” Ideology and Form in 
 Eighteenth-Century Literature. Ed. David H. Richter. Texas: Texas University Press, 
 1999: 147-163. 
 
Hyde, Alan. Bodies of Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995: 48-97. 
 
Jefferson, D. W. “Tristram Shandy and the Tradition of Learned Wit.” Essays in Criticism 1 (1951): 
 225-48. 
 
Jones, Ann Rosalind and Peter Stallybrass. Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory.  
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 1-15; 17-59; 269-78. 
 
Kafka, Franz. “The Cares of a Family Man” (1919). Franz Kafka. The Complete Stories.  
New York: Schocken, 1971: 427-29. 
 
---. “The Metamorphosis” (1915). Metamorphosis and Other Stories. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. 
 London: Penguin, 1961: 7-65.  
 
Kang, Minsoo. Sublime Dreams of Living Machines. The Automaton in the European Imagination. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011: 103-185. 
 
Kearney, James. “‘This above all strangeness’: King Lear, Ethics and the Phenomenology of 
 Recognition.” Criticism 54.3 (summer 2012): 455-467. 
 
Kennedy, Gavin. “Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand: From Metaphor to Myth.” Econ Journal 
Watch 6.2 (May 2009): 239-264. 
 206 
 
Ker, James. “Roman Repraesentatio.” American Journal of Philology 128.3 (2007): 341-365. 
 
Khong, Lynnette. “Actants and Enframing: Heidegger and Latour on Technology.” Studies in 
 History and Philosophy of Science 34 (2003). 
 
Kinsley, William. “The ‘Dunciad’ as Mock-Book.” The Huntington Library Quarterly 35.1  
 (Nov. 1971): 29-47. 
 
Kleist, Heinrich von. “On the Marionette Theatre” (1981). Ed. and trans. Idris Parry. Hand to 
Mouth and Other Essays. Manchester: Carcanet New Press, 1981: 13-18. 
 
Knellwolf, Christina. A Contradiction Still: Representations of Women in the Poetry of Alexander 
Pope. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998. 
 
Kochan, Jeff. “Latour’s Heidegger.” Social Studies of Science 40.4 (2010): 579-59. 
 
Kopytoff, Igor. “The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process”. Ed. Arjun 
 Appadurai. The Social Life of Things. Commodities in Cultural Perspective. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; 2003: 65-91. 
 
Kopytoff, Igor. “The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as process.” The Social Life 
 of Things. Commodities in Cultural Perspective. Ed. Arjun Appadurai. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 1986; 2003: 65-91. 
 
Korkowski, Eugene Bud. “With an Eye to the Bunghole: Figures of Containment in A Tale of a 
 Tub.” SEL 15.3 (summer 1975): 391-408.  
 
Kowaleski-Wallace, Elizabeth. Consuming Subjects: Women, Shopping, and Business in the 
 Eighteenth Century. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 
 
---. “Reading the Surfaces of Colley Cibber’s The Careless Husband.” SEL 40.3 (2000): 473-489. 
 
Kramer, Matthew H. “The labours of Locke: a critique.” John Locke and the Origins of Private 
 Property. Philosophical Explorations of Individualism, Community and Equality. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997: 93-151. 
 
Krieger, Murray. Ekphrasis: The Illusion of the Natural Sign. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
 Press, 1992. 
 
Kuhn, Thomas S. “Robert Boyle and Structural Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century.” Isis 1.43 
 (1952): 12-36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 207 
Lamb, Jonathan. The Evolution of Sympathy in the Long Eighteenth Century. London:  
 Pickering and Chatto, 2009.* 
 
---. “Language and Hartleian Associationism in A Sentimental Journey.” Eighteenth Century 
Studies 13.3 (spring 1980): 285-312.* 
 
---. “Locke’s Wild Fancies: Empiricism, Personhood, and Fictionality.” The Eighteenth Century  
 48.3 (2007): 187-204.* 
 
---. “Modern Metamorphoses and Disgraceful Tales.” Critical Inquiry 28 (Autumn 
 2001): 133-166. 
 
---. Preserving the Self in the South Seas, 1680-1840. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
 2001: 250-281.*  
 
---. “The Rape of the Lock as Still Life.” The Secret of Things: Animals, Objects, and It-Narratives 
 in Eighteenth-Century England. Ed. Mark Blackwell. Lewisburg:  
 Bucknell University Press, 2007: 43-63. 
 
---. The Things Things Say. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
 
Lanham, Richard A. A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1991. 
 
Latour, Bruno. “A Collective of Humans and Nonhumans: Following Daedalus’s Labyrinth.” 
 Pandora’s Hope. Essays on the Reality of Science Studies. Harvard: Harvard 
 University Press, 1999: 174-215. 
 
---. “Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closer.” 
  Social Problems 35.3 (1988): 298-310.   
 
---. Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2005; 2007. 
 
---. We Have Never Been Modern. Trans. Catherine Porter. Harvard: Harvard University 
 Press, 1991; 1993. 
 
Laycock, Deborah. “Shape-Shifting: Fashion, Gender, and Metamorphosis in Eighteenth-Century 
England.” Ed. Lori Hope Lefkovitz. Textual Bodies. New York: Suny, 1997:127-161.   
 
Lemire, Beverly. “Second-hand beaux and ‘red-armed Belles’: conflict and the creation of fashions 
in England 1660-1800”. Continuity and Change 15, 3 (2000): 391-417. 
 
Levine, Joseph M. The Battle of the Books. History and Literature in the Augustan Age. Ithaca: 
 Cornell University Press, 1991; 1994. 
 
 
 
 208 
 
 
Locke, John. An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689; 1694). Ed. Peter H. Nidditch. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975; 1979. 
 
---. Two Treatises of Government (1689-90). Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 University Press, 1960; 1988.  
 
Logan, Sandra. Text/Events in Early Modern England. Poetics of History. Aldershot: Ashgate 
 Publishing, 2007: 1-33. 
 
Lupton, Christina. “Introduction.” British It-Narratives, 1750-1830. Ed. Mark Blackwell. London: 
 Pickering and Chatto, 2012: vii-xix.  
 
---. Knowing Books. The Consciousness of Mediation in Eighteenth-Century Britain. 
 Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 
 
---. “The Knowing Book: Authors, It-Narratives, and Objectification in the Eighteenth 
 Century.” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 39.3 (summer 2006): 402-420. 
 
Lupton, Christina and Aran Ruth. “The Novel’s Poem Envy: Mid-Century Fiction and the ‘Thing 
Poem’.” Eds. Kate Parker and Courtney Weiss Smith. Eighteenth-Century Poetry and 
the Rise of the Novel Reconsidered. Bucknell University Press, 2014: 49-65. 
 
Lutz, Alfred. “Commercial Capitalism, Classical Republicanism, and the Man of Sensibility in ‘The 
 History of Sir George Ellison” in Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 39, 3 
 (Summer 1999): 557-574. 
 
Lynch, Deidre S. Lynch. The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of 
 Inner Meaning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
---.”Personal Effects and Sentimental Fictions.” The Secret Life of Things. Ed. Mark Blackwell. 
 Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2010: 63-91. 
 
Mackenzie, Henry. The Man of Feeling (1771). Ed. Brian Vickers. Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 1987; 2002.   
 
Mackie, Erin. Market à la Mode. Fashion, Commodity and Gender in the Tatler and the Spectator. 
 Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
 
Maclean, Kenneth. John Locke and English Literature of the Eighteenth Century (1936). New 
 York: Russel and Russel, 1962. 
 
Macpherson, Crawford B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Hobbes to Locke. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.  
 
 
 
 209 
 
Mandell, Laura. “Bawds and Merchants: Engendering Capitalist Desires.” EHL 59.1 (spring 1992): 
 107-123. 
 
---. Misogynous Economies: The Business of Literature in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1999. 
 
Manning, Peter. “Wordsworth in the Keepsake, 1829”. Literature in the Marketplace.  
Ed. John O. Jordan and Rupert L. Patten. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995: 44-73. 
 
Marder, Michael. The Event of the Thing. Derrida’s Post-Deconstructive Realism. Toronto: 
 University of Toronto Press, 2009: 135-143. 
 
Marshall, Ashley. The Practice of Satire in England, 1658-1770. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
 University Press, 2013.   
 
Marshall, David. “Adam Smith and the Theatricality of Moral Sentiments.” Critical Inquiry 10.4 
 (June, 1984): 592-613.* 
 
Martin, Raymond and John Barresi. Naturalization of the Soul. Self and Personal Identity in the 
 Eighteenth Century. London and New York: Routledge, 2000; 2004. 
 
Maruca, Lisa. “Bodies of Type: The Work of Textual Production in English Printers’ Manuals.” 
 Eighteenth-Century Studies 36.3 (2003): 321-343. 
 
Marx, Karl. Capital. A Critique of Political Economy (1867). Vol. I. Trans. Ben Fowkes. 
 London: Penguin, 1976; 1990. 
 
---. “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State” (1843). Early Writings. Trans. Rodney Livingstone 
 and Gregor Benton. London: Penguin, 1974; 1992: 166-170 (on private property). 
 
---- . Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844). Early Writings. Trans. Rodney Livingstone 
 and Gregor Benton. London: Penguin, 1974; 1992: 279-401. 
 
---. “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy” (1844). Early Writings. 
 Trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton. London: Penguin, 1974; 1992:  
 259-279.  
 
Mauss, Marcel. The Gift. The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies (1950). London: 
 Routledge, 1990; 2002. 
 
McCann, Edwin. “Locke on Identity: Matter, Life, and Consciousness.” The Empiricists. Critical 
 Essays on Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Ed. Margaret Atherton. London: Rowman & 
 Littlefield, 1999: 63-89. 
 
 210 
McKendrick, Neil, John Brewer and J. H. Plumb, eds. The Birth of a Consumer Society: The 
 Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England. London: Europa Publications, 
 1982. 
 
McKeon, Michael. The Secret History of Domesticity. Public, Private, and the Division of 
Knowledge. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. 
 
Meeker, Richard K. “Bank Note, Corkscrew, Flea and Sedan: A Checklist of Eighteenth-Century 
 Fiction.” The Library Chronicle 35 (winter-spring 1969): 52-57. 
 
Menely, Tobias. “Zoöphilpsychosis: Why Animals Are What’s Wrong With Sentimentality.” 
 Symploke 15.1/2 (Dec. 2007): 244-267.* 
 
Michel, Andreas. “Differentiation vs. Disenchantment: The Persistence of Modernity from Max 
 Weber to Jean-François Lyotard.” German Studies Review 20.3 (1997): 343-370. 
 
Michals, Teresa. “‘That Sole and Despotic Dominion’: Slaves, Wives, and Game in 
 Blackstone’s Commentaries.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 27, 2 (winter 1993-1994): 
 195-216. 
 
Mills, Trevor. “An unpublished subscription edition of Young’s Works”. The Library 2, 4 (1980): 
60-65. 
 
Milton, John. The Poems of John Milton. Ed. Helen Darbishire. London: Oxford University Press, 
1958; 1963: 1-283. 
 
Minowitz, Peter. “Adam Smith’s Invisible Hands.” Econ Journal Watch 1.3 (Dec. 2004): 441-465. 
 
Mitchell, W. J. T. “Ekphrasis and the Other.” Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual 
 Representation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994: 151-183. 
 
Moglen, Helene. The Philosophical Irony of Laurence Sterne. Gainesville: University Presses of 
 Florida, 1975.* 
 
Molesworth, Jesse. “Sterne Studies on the Eve of the Tercentenary”. Literature Compass, 9.7 
(2012): 453-463. 
 
Montag, Warren. The Unthinkable Swift. The Spontaneous Philosophy of a Church of England 
 Man. London: Verso, 1994. 
 
Mottolese, William C. “Tristram Cyborg and Toby Toolmaker: Body, Tools, and Hobbyhorse in 
Tristram Shandy.” SEL 47.3 (summer 2007): 679–701. 
 
Mullan, John. Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century. 
 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.* 
 
---. “Sterne’s Comedy of Sentiments.” XVII-XVIII Bulletin de la société d’études anglo-américaines 
des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles 38.38 (1994): 233-241. 
 211 
 
Nagle, Christopher. “Sterne, Shelley, and Sensibility’s Pleasures of Proximity.” EHL 70.3  
 (fall 2003): 813-845.* 
 
Nicholson, Colin. “The Mercantile Bard: Commerce and Conflict in Pope.” Studies in the Literary 
 Imagination 38.1 (2005): 77-94. 
 
---. Writing and the Rise of Finance. Capital Satires of the Early Eighteenth Century. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
Norris, Christopher. “Pope among the formalists: textual politics and ‘The Rape of the Lock’.” 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987: 134-162. 
 
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974; 1996. 
 
Nussbaum, Felicity. The Brink of All We Hate: English Satires on Women, 1660-1750. Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1984. 
 
---. “Juvenal, Swift and The Folly of Love.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 9.4 (summer 1976): 540-
552. 
 
Oakley, Warren L. A Culture of Mimicry: Laurence Sterne, His Readers and the Art of 
Bodysnatching. London: Maney Publishing, 2010. 
 
Olivecrona, Karl. “Locke’s Theory of Appropriation.” The Philosophical Quarterly 24, 96 (1974): 
 220-234. 
 
Olshin, Toby. “Form and Theme in Novels About Non-Human Characters, a Neglected Sub-
 Genre.” Genre  2 (1969): 43-56. 
 
Ong, Walter J. Literacy and Orality. The Technologizing of the Word. London: Methuen, 1982. 
 
O’Shea, Michael J. “Laurence Sterne’s Display of Heraldry”. Shandean 3 (1991): 61-69. 
 
Packham, Catherine. Eighteenth-Century Vitalism. Bodies, Culture, Politics. Basingstoke:  
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.* 
 
Palmeri, Frank. “Martinus Scriblerus, Diderot’s Dream, and Tiepolo’s Divertimento: Eighteenth-
 Century Representations of Aggregate Identity.” Comparative Literature Studies 38.4 
 (2001): 330-354. 
 
Parker, Blanford. The Triumph of Augustan Poetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Park, Julie. The Self and It. Novel Objects in Eighteenth-Century England. Stanford: Stanford 
 University Press, 2010.  
 
 212 
Paulson, Ronald. Theme and Structure in Swift’s Tale of a Tub. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1960. 
 
Pietz, William. “The Problem of the Fetish I.” Res 9 (1985): 5-17. 
 
---. “Fetishism and Materialism: The Limits of Theory in Marx.” Fetishism as Cultural Discourse. 
 Eds. William Pietz and Emily Apter. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993: 119-152. 
 
Pocock, John G. A. Virtue, Commerce, and History. Essays on Political Thought and History, 
 Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
 
Pointon, Marcia. “The Case of the Dirty Beau: Symmetry, Disorder and the Politics of 
 Masculinity.” The Body Imagined: The Human Form and Visual Culture since the 
 Renaissance. Eds. Kathleen Adler and Marcia Pointon. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1993: 175-189. 
 
Pope, Alexander. The Dunciad. Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope.  
 Ed. James Sutherland. Vol. 5. London: Methuen, 1943; 1953. 
 
---. “Epistle to Arbuthnot” (1734). Imitations of Horace and an Epistle to Dr Arbuthnot and The 
Epilogue to the Satires. Ed. John Butt. The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of 
Alexander Pope. Vol. IV. London: Methuen, 1939; 1959. 
 
---. An Essay on Criticism (1711). Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope.  
 Ed. E. Audra and Aubrey Williams. Vol. 1. London: Methuen, 1961; 1969: 233-327. 
 
---. The Rape of the Lock (1714). The Rape of the Lock and Other Poems. Twickenham Edition of 
 the Poems of Alexander Pope. Ed. Geoffrey Tillotson. Vol. 2. London: Methuen, 
 1940; 1972: 139-212. 
 
---. “The Temple of Fame” (1715). The Rape of the Lock and Other Poems. Twickenham Edition of 
 the Poems of Alexander Pope. Ed. Geoffrey Tillotson. Vol. 2. London: Methuen, 
 1940; 1972: 249-289. 
 
Porter, Roy and Simon Schama. Flesh in the Age of Reason: The Modern Foundations of Body and 
 Soul. London: Allen Lane, 2003. 
 
Powell, Margaret K. and Joseph R. Roach. “Big Hair.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 38.1 (fall 2004): 
79-99.   
 
Quinlan, Maurice J. “Swift’s Use of Literalization as a Rhetorical Device.” PMLA 82.7  
 (Dec. 1967): 516-521.  
 
Radin, Margaret. “Property and Personhood.” Stanford Law Review 34 (1982): 957-1015. 
 
Rahmatian, Andreas. “The Property Theory of Lord Kames (Henry Home).”  International Journal 
of Law in Context 2 (2): 177-205. 
 213 
 
Raleigh, Walter. The English Novel. New York: C Scribner, 1911. 
 
Ricoeur, Paul. Oneself as Another (1990). Trans. Kathleen Blaney. Chicago: University of Chicago 
 Press, 1992; 1994: 27-40; 113-203. 
 
Rifkin, Benjamin, Michael J. Ackerman and Judith Folkenberg. Human Anatomy. Depicting the 
 Body from the Renaissance to Today. London: Thames and Hudson, 2006. 
 
Riis, Søren. “The symmetry between Bruno Latour and Martin Heidegger.” Social Studies of 
 Science 38.2 (2008): 285-301. 
 
Riskin, Jessica. “The Defecating Duck, or the Ambiguous Origins of Mechanical Life.” Critical 
Inquiry 29.4 (summer 2003): 599-633.  
 
---. Science in the Age of Sensibility. The Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.* 
 
---. “Eighteenth-Century Wetware.” Representations 83 (summer 2003): 97-125. 
 
Roche, Daniel. The Culture of Clothing. Dress and Fashion in the Ancien Regime (1989). Trans. 
 Jean Birrell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Roman, Luke. “The Representation of Literary Materiality in Martial’s ‘Epigrams’.” The Journal of 
 Roman Studies 91 (2011): 113-145. 
 
Rose, Mark. Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Cambridge, Mass.:  
 Harvard University Press, 1995.  
 
---. “The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern 
 Authorship.” Representations 23 (summer 1988): 51-85. 
 
Rosen, Christine. “Our Cell Phones, Ourselves.” The New Atlantis 6 (summer 2004): 26-45. 
 
Rosenheim, Edward. Swift and the Satirist’s Art. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. 
 
Rosenthal, Angela. “Raising Hair.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 38.1 (2004): 1-16. 
 
Ross, Ian Campbell. Laurence Sterne. A Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.* 
 
Ross, Marlon B. “Authority and Authenticity: Scribbling Authors and the Genius of Print in 
 Eighteenth-Century England.” The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation 
 in Law and Literature. Ed. Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi. Duke University 
 Press, 1994; 1999: 231-259. 
 
Ross, Trevor Thornton. “The Emergence of ‘Literature’: Making and Reading the English Canon in 
the Eighteenth Century.” ELH 63.2 (1996): 397-422. 
 
 214 
Rothschild, Emma. Economic Sentiments. Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment. 
Cambridge, Mass., 2001: 116-156. 
 
Rousseau, G. S. “Nerves, Spirits, Fibres: Towards Defining the Origins of Sensibility.” Studies in 
the Eighteenth Century III: Papers Presented at the Third David Nichol Smith 
Memorial Seminar, Canberra, 1973. Eds. R. F. Brissenden and J. C. Eade. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1976: 137-57.* 
 
Rushworth, Nick. “‘This Way of Printing Bits of Books’: The Fiction of Incompletion in A Tale of 
a Tub.” Representations of Swift. Ed. Brian A. Connery. London: Associate University 
Presses, 2002: 41-57. 
 
Saunders, David. Authorship and Copyright. London: Routledge: 1992: 35-75. 
 
Sayes, Edwin. “Actor-Network Theory and methodology: Just what does it mean to say that 
 nonhumans have agency?” Social Studies of Science 44.1 (2014): 134-149. 
 
Schmidgen, Wolfram. Eighteenth-Century Fiction and the Law of Property. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2002.  
 
---. “The Politics and Philosophy of Mixture: John Locke Recomposed.” Eighteenth Century: 
 Theory and Interpretation 48.3: 205-223. 
 
Schofield, Robert E. Mechanism and Materialism. British Natural Philosophy in An Age of Reason.  
 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970: 3-63. 
 
Scott, Sarah. The History of Sir George Ellison (1766). Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 
 1996.* 
 
Shakespeare, William. King Lear. Ed. M. H. Abrams. The Norton Anthology of English Literature. 
 Vol. 1. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1993: 888-968. 
 
Shannon, Laurie. “Poor, Bare, Forked: Animal Sovereignty, Human Negative Exceptionalism, and 
 the Natural History of King Lear.” Shakespeare Quarterly 60.2 (summer 2009):  
 168-196. 
 
Sherman, Brad and Lionel Bently, eds. The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Shklovsky, Viktor. Theory of Prose (1929). Trans. Benjamin Sher. Illinois: Dalkey Archive Press, 
1998; 1990.  
 
Seigel, Jerrold. The Idea of the Self. Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the 
Seventeenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 139-171. 
 
Simmel, Georg. The Philosophy of Money (1907). Trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby. 
 London, Henley and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. 
 
 215 
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). Vol. 2. Ed. 
 R. H. Campbell et al. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976: 277-290.* 
 
---. Lectures on Jurisprudence (1761-1766). Ed. R. L. Meek et. al. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978: 
 172-185.* 
 
---. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1876; 1979.* 
 
Smitten, Jeffrey R. “Gesture and Expression in Eighteenth-Century Fiction: ‘A Sentimental 
 Journey’.” Modern Language Studies 9.3 (Autumn 1979): 85-97.* 
 
Smollett, Tobias. The History and Adventures of an Atom (1768). Ed. Robert Adams Day. Athens, 
 Georgia; University of Georgia Press, 1989. 
 
Solomon, Harry M. “Thomas D’Urfey and the Context of Swift’s ‘The Lady’s Dressing Room’.” 
SEL 19.3 (1979): 431-444. 
 
Speed, Chris. “Take me, I’m Yours: Mimicking Object Agency.” Proceedings of the 2012 ACM 
Conference on Ubiquitous Computing. New York: ACM, 2012: 1167-1170. 
 
Sprigge, T. L. S. “Dreyfus and Spinosa on Things-in-themselves.” Inquiry 42.1 (1999): 115-24. 
 
Stafford, Barbara Maria. Body Criticism: Imagining the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and Medicine. 
 Boston: MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Starkman, Miriam Kosh. Swift’s Satire on Learning in A Tale of a Tub. New York: University 
Press, 1950. 
 
Sterne, Laurence. A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (1768). London: Penguin, 
2001.* 
 
---. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman (1759-67). Ed. Melvyn New. London: 
 Penguin, 1997.  
 
Stout, Gardner D. “Yorick’s Sentimental Journey: A Comic ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’ for the Man of 
 Feeling.” EHL 30.4 (Dec. 1963): 395-412.* 
 
Stuart, Matthew. “Locke on superaddition and mechanism.” British Journal for the History of 
 Philosophy 6, 3 (1998): 351-379. 
 
Styles, John. “Manufacturing, Consumption and Design in Eighteenth-Century England.” 
 Consumption and the World of Goods. Eds. John Brewer and Roy Porter. New York: 
 Routledge, 1993: 1994: 527-555. 
 
Suarez, Michael F. “Swift’s satire and parody.” The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Swift. Ed. 
 Christopher Fox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003: 112-128. 
 
 216 
Sullivan, Mary Rose. “The Function of Book I in ‘The Ring and the Book’.” Victorian Poetry 6.3/4 
(autumn-winter 1968): 231-242. 
 
Sweeney, Kevin W. “Competing Theories of Identity in Kafka’s The Metamorphosis.” New York: 
 Bloom’s Literary Criticism, 2008: 63-77. 
 
Swift, Jonathan. A Tale of a Tub. A Tale of a Tub and other Works. Ed. Angus Ross and 
 David Woolley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986; 1999: 1-104. 
 
---. The Battle of the Books. A Tale of a Tub and other Works. Ed. Angus Ross and 
 David Woolley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986; 1999: 104-125. 
 
---.”A Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed” (1731). The Complete Poems. Ed. Pat 
 Rogers. New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1983: 453-455. 
 
---. “On Poetry: A Rhapsody.” The Complete Poems. Ed. Pat Rogers. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1983: 522-536. 
 
---. “On Burning a Dull Poem” (1729). The Complete Poems. Ed. Pat Rogers. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1983: 395. 
 
---. “The Lady’s Dressing Room” (1732). The Complete Poems. Ed. Pat Rogers. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1983: 448-452. 
 
---. “The Progress of Beauty” (1719-20). The Complete Poems. Ed. Pat Rogers. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1983: 192-195. 
 
---. A Tale of a Tub (1704). A Tale of a Tub and other Works. Ed. Angus Ross and David Woolley. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986; 1999: 1-104. 
 
---. “Verses upon the Death of Dr. Swift” (1739). The Complete Poems. Ed. Pat Rogers. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1983: 485-498. 
  
Tague, Ingrid H. “Dead Pets: Satire and Sentiment in British Elegies and Epitaphs for Animals.” 
 Eighteenth-Century Studies 41.3 (2008): 289-306.* 
 
Thompson, Gordon W. “Authorial Detachment and Imagery in The Ring and the Book”. Studies in 
English Literature 1500-1900 10.4 (autumn 1970): 669-686. 
 
Todd, Dennis. Imagining Monsters. Miscreations of the Self in Eighteenth-Century England. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
 
Todorov, Tzvetan. The Fantastic. A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre. Trans. R. Howard. 
 Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970; 1975. 
 
Tompkins, J. M. S. The Popular Novel in England. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961. 
 
 217 
Tully, James. A Discourse on Property. John Locke and his Adversaries. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1980. 
 
Vaggi, Gianni and Peter Groenewegen. A Concise History of Economic Thought: From 
 Mercantilism to Monetarism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; 2006: 15-39. 
 
Van Sant, Ann Jessie. Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1993.* 
 
Vartanian, Aram. “Trembley’s Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism.” 
 Journal of the History of Ideas 11.3 (June 1950): 259-286. 
 
Vidal, Fernando. “Brains, Bodies, Selves, and Science: Anthropologies of Identity and the 
 Resurrection of the Body.” Critical Inquiry 28.4 (June 2002): 930-974. 
 
Vila, Anne C. Enlightenment and Pathology. Sensibility in the Literature and Medicine of 
 Eighteenth-Century France. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.* 
 
Vries, Jan de. “Between Purchasing Power and the World of Goods: Understanding the Household 
 Economy in Early Modern Europe.” Consumption and the World of Goods. Eds. John 
 Brewer and Roy Porter. New York: Routledge, 1993: 1994: 85-132. 
 
Wahrman, Dror. The Making the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth Century England. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004; 2006.  
 
Waldron, Jeremy. The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
 
Wall, Cynthia Sundberg. The Prose of Things: Transformations of Description in the Eighteenth 
 Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
 
Warner, William B. Licensing Entertainment: The Elevation of Novel Reading in Britain, 1684-
 1750. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 
 
Wasserman, George R. “The Meaning of Browning’s Ring-Figure.” Modern Language Notes 76.5 
(May 1961): 420-426. 
 
Watt, Ian. The Rise of the Novel. Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (1957). London:  
 Pimlico, 2000. 
 
Weatherhill, Lorna. “The Meaning of Consumer Behaviour in Late Seventeenth- and Early 
Eighteenth-Century England.” Consumption and the World of Goods. Eds. John 
Brewer and Roy Porter. New York: Routledge, 1993: 1994: 206-228. 
 
Webster, C. M. “The Satiric Background of the Attack on the Puritans in Swift’s A Tale of a Tub.” 
PMLA 50 (1935): 210-223. 
 
Weiner, Annette B. Inalienable Possessions. The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving. Berkeley, Los  
 Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992 
 218 
 
Welch, Dennis M. “Defoe’s ‘A True Relation,’ Personal Identity, and the Locke-Stillingfleet 
 Controversy” in Studies in Philology 100, 3 (Summer 2003): 284-399. 
 
West, Shearer. “The Darly Macaroni Prints, and the Politics of ‘Private Man’.” Eighteenth-Century 
 Life 25.2 (2001): 170-182. 
 
Wetmore, Alex. “Sympathy Machines. Men of Feeling and the Automaton”. Eighteenth Century 
Studies 43.1 (fall 2009): 37-54. 
 
Wheeler, David. “‘So easy to be lost’: Poet and self in Pope’s ‘The Temple of Fame’.” Papers on 
 Language and Literature 29.1 (Winter 1993): 3-17. 
 
Williams, Anne Patricia. “Description an Tableau in the Eighteenth-Century British Sentimental 
 Novel.” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 8.4 (1996): 465-484.* 
 
Williams, Grant R. “Disfiguring the Body of Knowledge: Anatomical Discourse and Robert 
 Burton’s ‘The Anatomy of Melancholy’.” EHL 68.3 (fall 2001): 593-613. 
 
Williams, Neville. Powder and Paint. A History of the Englishwoman’s Toilette, Elizabeth I-
 Elizabeth II. London: Longmans, 1957. 
 
Wills, David. Prosthesis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995: 214-250. 
 
Wood, Gaby. Living Dolls A Magical History of the Quest for Mechanical Life. London: Faber and 
 Faber, 2002. 
 
Wood, Nigel. “Haranguing upon Texts: Swift and the Idea of the Book.” Proceedings of the First 
Munster Symposium of Jonathan Swift. Eds. Herman J. Real and Heinz Vienken. 
München: W. Fink, 1985: 187-197. 
 
Womersley, David. “Swift’s Shapeshifting.” Swift’s Travels. Eighteenth-Century British Satire and 
 Its Legacy. Eds. Nicholas Hudson and Aaron Santesso. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2008: 108-124. 
 
Woodmansee, Martha. “The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
 Emergence of the ‘Author’.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 17.4 (summer 1984):  
 425-488. 
 
Wyrick, Deborah Baker. Jonathan Swift and the Vested Word. Berkeley: University of California 
 Press, 1988. 
 
Yang, Chi-ming. “Culture in Miniature: Toy Dogs and Object Life.” Eighteenth-Century Fiction 
25.1 (Fall 2012): 139-174. 
 
Yolton, John W. Thinking Matter. Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Oxford: Basil 
 Blackwell, 1984. 
 
 219 
Zuckert, Michael P. Natural Rights and The New Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the 
 American Political Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.  
 
 220 
Online Sources 
 
 
Addison, Joseph and Richard Steele. The Spectator 15 (17 March 1711); 30 (4 April 1711). Vol. I. 
 London: S. Buckley, 1712: 83-88; 163-168. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 
 25 Aug. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3312985556&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
---. The Spectator 85 (7 June 2011). Vol. 2. London: s. Buckley, 1714: 22-26. Eighteenth 
 Century Collections Online. 19 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&useroup
Name=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3312986068&type=multipage&contentSet=EC
COArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
---. The Spectator. No. 98 (22 June 1711). Vol. II. London: S. Buckley, 1712: 91-93. Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online. 25 Aug. 2013. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGroupName=dkb&ta
bID=T001&docId=CW3312985556&type=multipage&contentSet=ECCOArticles&version=1.0&docL
evel=FASCIMILE. 
 
---. The Spectator 275 (15 January 1712). Vol. IV. London: S. Buckley, 1712: 133-138. Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online. 1 Sep. 2013. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGroupName=dkb&ta
bID=T001&docId=CW3313081540&type=multipage&contentSet=ECCOArticles&version=1.0&docL
evel=FASCIMILE. 
 
---. The Spectator 411 (21 June 1712); 413 (25 June 1712). Vol. VI. London: S. Buckley, 
 1713: 83-87; 94-98. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 25 Aug. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3313082437&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Anon. The Adventures of a Corkscrew (1775). London: T. Bell, 1775. Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online. 20 March 2014.   
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3309688642&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Anon. The Adventures of a Quire of Paper (1779). London Magazine (August & September 1779). 
 London: R. Baldwin, 1779: 355-358, 448-452. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 
 20 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3308381938&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
 
 221 
Anon. “The Adventures of a Rupee” (review). The Critical Review, or, Annals of Literature 52  
 (December 1781): 477-480. Google Books. 20 March 2014.   
http://books.google.dk/books?id=lvsvAAAAYAAJ&pg=PP7&redir_esc=y - 
v=onepage&q=styling&f=false 
 
Anon. The Adventures of a Watch! (1788). London: G. Kearley, 1788. Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online. 21 March 2014.   
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CB3332759876&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
 
Anon. The Art of Poetry on a New Plan. London: J. Newbery, 1762. Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3314116334&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Anon. The Birmingham Counterfeit, or, Invisible Spectator. A Sentimental Romance (1772). 2 vols. 
 London: S. Bladon, 1772. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 20 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3310237631&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Anon. An Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of Literary Property. London: William Flexney, 
1762. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 20 March 2014.   
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3312963447&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Anon. The Genuine Memoirs and Most Surprizing Adventures of a Very Unfortunate Goose-Quill 
(1751). London: M. Cooper, 1751. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 21 March 
2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3312052170&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Anon. The History of a Pin, as Related by Itself. London: E. Newberry, 1798. Eighteenth Century 
 Collections Online. 21 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3310911727&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Anon. Mundus Foppensis: or, the Fop Display’d, Being the Ladies Vindication, in Answer to a Late 
 Pamphlet Entitled Mundus Muliebris. London: John Harris, 1691.  
 Early English Books Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://gateway.proquest.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res
_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99825461. 
 222 
Anon. A Short Account of Dr. Bentley’s Humanity and Justice, to those Authors who have written 
before him (1699). London: Thomas Bennet, 1699. Early English Books Online.  
23 March 2014.   
http://gateway.proquest.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res
_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99830627. 
 
Alcorn, Angela. “Enough Already: 4 Android Apps to Curb Your Smartphone Addiction.” 28 June 
2013. Makeuseof.com. http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/enough-already-4-android-
apps-to-curb-your-smartphone-addiction/.  
 
Andersen, Hans Christian. “The Shadow” (1847). The Complete Andersen. 6 vols. New York: The 
 Limited Editions Club, 1949. Trans. Jean Hersholt. 13 October 2014. 
 http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/TheShadow.html 
 
---. “The Shirt Collar” (1848).  The Complete Andersen. 6 vols. New York: The Limited Editions 
Club, 1949. Trans. Jean Hersholt. 3 Jan. 2015. 
http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/TheShirtCollar.html  
   
---. “The Silver Shilling” (1861).  The Complete Andersen. 6 vols. New York: The Limited Editions 
 Club, 1949. Trans. Jean Hersholt. 13 October 2014. 
 http://www.andersen.sdu.dk/vaerk/hersholt/TheSilverShilling_e.html. 
 
Apple inc. “iPhone 5S – You are more powerful than you think.” 3 Jan. 2015. 
https://www.apple.com/iphone-5s/powerful/.  
 
Bridges, Thomas. The Adventures of a Bank-Note. 4 vols. London, 1770-71. Eighteenth Century 
 Collections Online. 20 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3309129651&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Brown, Andrew. The Character of the True Publick Nation. London, 1702.  Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online.  24 Aug. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3305118386&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
 
Burgersdijck, Franco. An Introduction to the Art of Logick (16). London, 1701.  Eighteenth Century 
 Collections Online. 17 Aug. 2013.   
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3316900933&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
 
 
 
 223 
Burke, James. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 
(1757). London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1757. 2 Jan. 2014. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3309732666&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Burrow, James and James Murray, eds. Millar v. Taylor. Reports of cases argued and adjudged in 
 the Court of  King’s Bench, during the time of Lord Mansfield’s presiding…vol. 4. 
 Dublin: Luke White, 1794: 2303-2418. Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  
 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CB3332210441&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Butler, Joseph. The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of 
 Nature. London: James, John and Paul Knapton, 1736: 11-30; 301-08. 23 March 
 2014.   
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3318843280&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Campbell, Richard. The Compleat London Tradesman. London: T. Gardner, 1747. Eighteenth 
 Century Collections Online. 24 Aug. 2013. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3305601411&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
 
Clarke, Samuel. A Third Defense of an Argument Made use of in a Letter to Mr Dodwell, to prove 
 the Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul. London: James Knapton, 1708. 
 Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3319992807&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Collins, Anthony. Reflections on Mr. Clark’s Second Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell. London: 
 J. Darby, 1711. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3318961897&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Comenius, Johann Amos. Orbis Sensualium Pictus, or The Visible World (1659). Trans. Charles 
 Hoole. London: S. Leacroft, 1777. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 
 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3306431716&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
 224 
Cudworth, Ralph. The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678). Vol. I, 2nd edition. London, 
 1743: 57-101.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3318419902&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Curson, Henry. The Theory of Sciences Illustrated, or the Grounds and Principles of the Seven 
 Liberal Arts. London, 1702. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale.  
 Copenhagen University Library. 17 Aug. 2013.    
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3308520038&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Davenant, Charles. Discourses on the Public Revenue, and on the Trade of England (1698). The 
 Political and Commercial Works of that Celebrated Writer, Charles Davenant. Ed. 
 Charles Whitworth. Vol. 1. London: Becket and De Hondt, 1771: 345-394.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3305596840&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Defoe, Daniel. The Compleat English Tradesman. 2 vols. London: Charles Rivington, 1727. 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 24 Aug. 2013. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGr
oupName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3305536041&type=multipage&contentSet
=ECCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Dennis, John. An Essay upon Publick Spirit; being a Satyr in Prose upon the Manners and Luxury 
 of the Times, The Chief Sources of our present Parties and Divisions. London: 
 Bernard Lintott,1711. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 24 Aug. 2013.    
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3311868034&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Digby, Kenelm. Of Sympathetick Powder (1657). London: John Williams, 1669.  
 Early English Books Online. 21 March 2014.   
http://gateway.proquest.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res
_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:49807.* 
 
Dryden, John. “A Parallel of Poetry and Painting.” Dufresnoy, Charles-Alphonse. The Art of 
 Painting. Trans. John Dryden. London: J. Heptinstall, 1695: i-lvi. Early English Books 
 Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://gateway.proquest.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res
_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:12112190. 
 
 
 
 
 225 
Duff, William. Essay on original genius; and its various modes of exertion in philosophy and the 
fine arts, particularly in poetry. London: Edward and Charles Dilly, 1767. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3315874833&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
 
Earle, John. Microcosmography (1628). London: E. Say, 1732. Eighteenth Century Collections 
 Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3324628903&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Evelyn, Mary. Mundus Muliebris: or, The Ladies’ Dressing-Room unlock’d, and her Toilette 
 spread, in Burlesque, together with the Fop-Dictionary, compiled for the Use of the 
 Fair Sex. London: Printed for R. Bentley, 1690. Early English Books Online. 23 
 March 2014.  
http://gateway.proquest.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99833802. 
 
Fielding, Henry. Covent Garden Journal 33 (23 April 1752). The Works of Henry Fielding, Esq.; 
 with the life of the author. London: W. Stahan et. al., 1784: 53-58. Eighteenth-Century 
 Collections Online. 19 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3310958829&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
 
Gauden, John. Several Letters between two Ladies wherein the Lawfulness and Unlawfulness of 
 artificial Beauty in Point of Conscience are nicely debated (1662). London: Tho. 
 Ballard, 1701. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3306082239&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Gay, John. The Guardian 97 (2 July); 149 (1 Sep. 1714). Vol. II. London: J. Tonson, 1714: 84-89; 
 365-374. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 31 Aug. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3312063686&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
---. “To a Lady on her Passion for old China.” Dublin, 1725. Eighteenth Century Collections 
 Online.  25 Aug. 2013.   
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CB3326902739&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
 
 
 226 
Harrington, James. Harrington, James. The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington Esq 
(1656). London: Millar, 1937. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 24 Aug. 2013. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3314710450&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
 
Harris, James. Philosophical Arrangements. London: John Norse, 1775. Eighteenth Century 
 Collections Online. Gale. Copenhagen University Library. 18 Aug. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3321491704&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Herwig, H. M. The Art of Curing Sympathetically (1700). London: R. Parker, P. Buck et al., 1700.  
 Early English Books Online. 21 March 2014. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&resi
d=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:63381.*  
 
Hood, Thomas. “A Sentimental Journey from Islington to Waterloo Bridge, in March 1821.”  
 The Works of Thomas Hood. Comic and Serious in Prose and Verse. Vol. 1.  
 Ed. Tom Hood. London: Edward Moxon, 1862. Hathitrust.org. 22 March 2014.   
 http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6b286975.* 
 
Hume, David. “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757). Four Dissertations. A. Millar: London, 1757: 
210-248. 2 Jan. 2014. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3325288869&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.    
 
Jackson, Seguin Henry. Treatise on Sympathy (1781). London: J. Murray, 1781. Eighteenth Century 
 Collections Online. 21 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3306947854&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.* 
 
Jeamson, Thomas. Artificiall Embellishments; or Arts Best Directions how to Preserve Beauty of 
 Procure it. Oxford: William Hall, 1665. Early English Books Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://gateway.proquest.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res
_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:11931312. 
 
Johnson, Samuel. A Dictionary of the English language. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: W. Strahan,  
 1755-56. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 21 March 2014. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3311952888&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
 
 227 
---. The Art of Poetry on a New Plan (1761). 2 vols. London: J. Newbery, 1762. 2 Jan. 2014. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3314116334&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
---. The Rambler 145 (6 August 1751). London: John Payne and J. Bouquet, 1752. Vol. 5: 76-84. 
 Early Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3310677764&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Johnstone, Charles. Chrysal or the Adventures of a Guinea (1760-1765). 4 Vols. London: John Hill, 
 1767. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 20 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3312226401&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Juvenal. Juvenal’s Sixteen Satyrs, or, A Survey of the Manners and Actions of Mankind.  
 Trans. Sir Robert Stapylton. London: Humphrey Mosely, 1646. Early English Books 
 Online. 31 August 2013.  
http://gateway.proquest.comep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res_
id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:61761.   
 
---. The Satires of Juvenal and Persius. Trans. Robert Dryden. London: Jacob Tonson, 1693. Early 
 English Books Online. 31 August 2013.   
http://gateway.proquest.comep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882++3&res_
id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:612894:2. 
  
La Mettrie, Julian Offroy de. Man a Machine (1748). 3rd edition. London: G. Smith, 1750. 
 Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.   
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3317776747&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
 
Layton, Henry. “Observations upon Dr. Nicholls’s Book”. Arguments and replies, in a dispute 
concerning the nature of the humane soul. London, 1703. 26 December 2014. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3320780797&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
 
Locke, John. “Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to 
 his Letter, Concerning some Passage Relating to Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human 
 Understanding: in a Late Discourse of his Lordship’s, in Vindication of the Trinity.” 
 The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes. Vol. 3. London: Rivington, 1824: 98-186. 
 Google Books. 18 March 2014. 
 
http://books.google.dk/books?id=GtdkSGns7wC&lpg=PA97&ots=02jwjtlqNc&dq=m
r locke’s reply to the right reverend the lord&hl=da&pg=PA505 - 
v=onepage&q&f=false. 
 228 
 
Lund, Roger D. “Biography of Charles Johnstone.” British Novelists 1660-1800. Ed. Martin C. 
Batterstein. Dictionary of Literary Biography. Vol. 39. Detroit: Gale Research, 1985. 
Gale Literature Resource Center. 20 March 2014. 
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CH1200003094&v=2.1&u=dkb&it=r&p
=LitRC&sw=w&asid=a696653af586e3ec7f27008ac1438c13. 
 
Mandeville, Bernard. Mandeville, Bernard. The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices Publick 
 Benefits. London, 1714. Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  24 Aug. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3321179687&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Mattaire, Michael. The English Grammar. London: H. Clements, 1712. Eighteenth Century 
 Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3313014291&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
 
Mackenzie, George. Essays upon Several Moral Subjects. London: D. Brown et. al, 1713. 
Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 24 Aug. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3317452650&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Newton, Isaac. Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687).Vol. I. London: Benjamin 
 Motte, 1729: 218-219. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3307862587&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
---. Opticks: or, A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections and Colours of Light (1713). 
 London: W. and J. Innys, 1718. Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  
 23 March 14  2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3308037165&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
 
Ovid. Ovid’s Art of Love with Hero and Leander of Musaeus. Trans. [R. Dryden, W. Congreve, N. 
 Tate]. London. J. T., 1692. Early English Books Online. 31 August 2013.  
http://gateway.proquest.com.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res
_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:60433. 
 
 
 
 
 229 
Pope, Alexander. “Observations on the Shield of Achilles.” Homer. The Iliad. Vol. 1. Trans. 
 Alexander Pope. London: W. Bowyer and Bernard Lintott, 1715-20: 129-151. 
 Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  20 Oct. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3313162436&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Priestley, Joseph. Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit. London: J. Johnson, 1777. Vol. 1. 
 Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3319556503&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Edinburgh: John Bell and London: J. & J. 
 Robinson, 1785: 315-356. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3307462279&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
The Secret History of an old Shoe (1734). London: Dickinson, 1734. Eighteenth Century 
 Collections Online. 20 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3314143307&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Sengupta, Somini. “Machines Made to Know You, by Touch, Voice, Even by Heart.” 10 September 
2013. TheNewYorkTimes.com.  
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/beyond-passwords-new-tools-to-
identifyhumans/?_php=true&_type=blogs&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3
Ar,%7B”2”%3A”RI%3A17”%7D&_r=0 
 
Shaftesbury, Earl of (Anthony Ashley Cooper). The Moralists. A Philosophical Rhapsody (1709). 
Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions and Times (1711). Vol. II. 2nd ed. 
London, 1714: 340-429.  Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 18 Aug. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3304448875&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
---. “Miscellany III”. Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions and Times (1711). Vol. III.  
 2nd ed. London, 1714: 134-191. Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  
 23 March 2014.    
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3304279236&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
 
 
 
 230 
---. “Miscellany IV”. Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions and Times (1711). Vol. III.  
2nd ed. London, 1714: 191-212. Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  
26 December 2014. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3304279236&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Smith, John. The Mystery of Rhetorick Unveiled (1656). 10th edition. London: R. Wilkin, B. Tooke,  
 D. Midwinter, B. Cowse and G. Mortlock, 1721. Eighteenth Century Collections 
 Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3311353628&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Smith, William. A Dissertation on the Nerves (1768). London: W. Owen, 1768. Eighteenth Century 
 Collections Online.  21 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3306721039&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.* 
 
Spencer of Cobham, Richard. Suada Anglicana: or, a Short Review of Rhetoric. London: R. 
Tookey, 1704. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3311353628&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Steele, Richard. The Tatler 110 (22 Dec. 1709); 113 (29 Dec. 1709); 143 (9 March 
 1709); 151 (28 March 1710). Vol. 1. London: John Morphew, 1709-1711: 260-264; 
 268-270; 334-336; 350-352. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 25 Aug. 2013.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3314815407&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Stewart, James. Plocacosmos, Or, The Whole Art of Hair Dressing. London, 1782. Eighteenth 
 Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3306139938&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
 
Stillingfleet, Edward. A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (1697). The Works 
 of that Eminent and most Learned Prelate, Dr. Edw. Stillingfleet, Together with his 
 life and character. Vol. 3. London: Henry and George Mortlock, 1709-10:  413-520, 
 especially 502-520.  Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3314455206&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
 231 
---.”An Answer to Mr. Locke’s Second Letter; Wherein his Notion of Ideas is prov’d to be 
 Inconsistent with it self, and with the Articles of the Christian Faith” (1698). The 
 Works of that Eminent and most Learned Prelate, Dr. Edw. Stillingfleet, Together with 
 his life and character. Vol. 3. London: Henry and George Mortlock, 1709-10: 563-
 612. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3314455206&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Swetnam, Joseph. The Arraignment of Lewd, Idle forward and Unconstant Women (1616). 
 London: B. Deacon, 1717. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014. 
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3310907500&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Trimmer, Sarah. The Silver Thimble (1799). London: E. Newberry, 1799. Eighteenth-Century 
 Collections Online. 21 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3314093382&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Veylit, Alan. “Some Statistics on the Number of Surviving Printed Titles for Great Britain and 
Dependencies from the Beginning of Print in England to the year 1800.” 2 Jan. 2015. 
http://estc.ucr.edu/ESTCStatistics.html.  
 
Wanley, Nathaniel. History of Man; or, the Wonders of Humane nature, in Relation to the Virtues, 
 Vices and Defects of both Sexes. London: R. Basset and W. Turner, 1704. Eighteenth 
 Century Collections Online. 23 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3300255153&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. 
 
Whytt, Robert. Observations on the nature, causes, and Cure of those Disorders which have been 
 called nervous, hypochondriac, or hysteric (1765).  
 Edinburgh: T. Becket and P. A. de Hondt, 1765. Eighteenth Century Collections 
 Online. 22 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3308524348&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.* 
 
Wrenn, Eddie. “The biggest phobia in the world? ‘Nomophobia’ - the fear of being without your 
mobile - affects 66 per cent of us.” 8 May 2012. MailOnline.com. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2141169/The-biggest-phobia-world-
Nomophobia--fear-mobile--affects-66-cent-us.html. 
 
 
 232 
Young, Edward. Conjectures on Original Composition in a Letter to the Author of Sir Charles 
 Grandison. London: Millar, 1759.  Eighteenth Century Collections Online.  
 17 March 2014.  
http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGro
upName=dkb&tabID=T001&docId=CW3304998892&type=multipage&contentSet=E
CCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE.  
